PEARL HARBOR

PRIOR KNOWLEDGE?

A Historical Analysis of the 'Surprise Mass Attack on Pearl Harbor'

By William P. Litynski

The Attack on Pearl Harbor

A navy photographer snapped this photograph of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on Sunday, December 7, 1941, just as the USS *Shaw* exploded. (National Archives)



Joseph C. Grew

"My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that **the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities**."

– Joseph C. Grew, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, in a diplomatic cable message to the U.S. State Department on January 27, 1941

U.S. Navy sailors in a motor launch rescue a survivor from the water alongside the sunken battleship USS *West Virginia* (BB-48) during or shortly after the Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. *USS Tennessee* (BB-43) is visible behind West Virginia. (Photo: U.S. Navy/National Archives)


Cordell Hull

"Relations were extremely critical and that **we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time.**" – U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, during a Cabinet meeting on November 7, 1941

Photo # 80-G-474789 Burning ships in Pearl Harbor drydocks, 7 December 1941

The Imperial Japanese Navy Attack on Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, 1941. View from Pier 1010, looking toward the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard's drydocks, with USS *Shaw* (DD-373) in floating drydock *YFD-2* -- and USS *Nevada* (BB-36) burning at right, 7 December 1941. In the foreground is the capsized USS *Oglala* (CM-4), with USS *Helena* (CL-50) further down the pier, at left. Beyond *Helena* is Drydock Number One, with USS *Pennsylvania* (BB-38) and the burning destroyers *Cassin* (DD-372) and *Downes* (DD-375).
(Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives Collection.) http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-nyd.htm

Henry L. Stimson

"The President brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1], for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. **The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.**"
– U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, November 25, 1941, from his own diary

Photo # 80-G-32640 View down "Battleship Row", Pearl Harbor, 7 Dec. 1941

View looking down "Battleship Row" from Ford Island Naval Air Station, shortly after the Japanese torpedo plane attack on December 7, 1941. USS *California* (BB-44) is at left, listing to port after receiving two torpedo hits. In the center are USS *Maryland* (BB-46) with the capsized USS *Oklahoma* (BB-37) alongside. USS *Neosho* (AO-23) is at right, backing clear of the area. Most smoke is from USS *Arizona* (BB-39). (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives Collection) http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-bbs.htm

Henry L. Stimson	"When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. For I feel that this country united has practically nothing to fear, while the apathy and division stirred by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging." – U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, December 7, 1941, from his own diary Source: *On Active Services in Peace and War* by Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, p. 393

Photo # NH 97378 USS Arizona burning after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941



View looking up "Battleship Row" on December 7, 1941, after the Japanese attack. USS *Arizona* (BB-39) is in the center, burning furiously. To the left of her are USS *Tennessee* (BB-43) and the sunken USS *West Virginia* (BB-48). (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, NHHC Collection)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-bbs.htm

Henry L. Stimson

"[I]t was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this [fire the first shot] so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors."
– Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Secretary of War

Source: *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 372

Photo # NH 50931 Japanese torpedo attack on "Battleship Row", Pearl Harbor, 7 Dec. 1941

Torpedo planes attack "Battleship Row" at about 0800 on 7 December, as seen from a Japanese aircraft. American ships located on “Battleship Row” are, from lower left to right: *Nevada* (BB-36) with flag raised at stern; *Arizona* (BB-39) with *Vestal* (AR-4) outboard; *Tennessee* (BB-43) with *West Virginia* (BB-48) outboard; *Maryland* (BB-46) with *Oklahoma* (BB-37) outboard; *Neosho* (AO-23) and *California* (BB-44). *West Virginia*, *Oklahoma* and *California* have been torpedoed, as marked by ripples and spreading oil, and the first two are listing to port. Torpedo drop splashes and running tracks are visible at left and center. White smoke in the distance is from Hickam Field. Grey smoke in the center middle distance is from the torpedoed USS *Helena* (CL-50), at the Navy Yard's 1010 dock. Japanese writing in lower right states that the image was reproduced by authorization of the Navy Ministry. (Photo: U.S. Navy; NHHC Photograph)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air.htm



Franklin Delano Roosevelt

“I just want them to keep popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing. I don’t mind losing one or two cruisers, but do not take a chance on losing five or six.”
– President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941

Photo # NH 50473 Burning planes and hangars at Wheeler Field after Japanese air attack, 7 Dec. 1941

A photograph taken by an Imperial Japanese Navy airman during the Pearl Harbor air raid shows airplanes and hangars burning at Wheeler Army Air Field in Oahu, Hawaii on the morning of December 7, 1941 soon after Wheeler Army Air Field was attacked.
(Photo: U.S. Navy; Donation of Theodore Hutton, 1942; NHHC Photograph)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air.htm



Franklin Delano Roosevelt

"Sooner or later the Japanese would commit an overt act against the United States and the nation would be willing to enter the war."
– President Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 1940

Photo # 80-G-19948 Sailors at NAS Ford Island watch as USS Shaw explodes, 7 December 1941

Sailors stand amid wrecked planes at the Ford Island seaplane base, watching as USS *Shaw* (DD-373) explodes in the center background on December 7, 1941. USS *Nevada* (BB-36) is also visible in the middle background, with her bow headed toward the left. Planes present include PBY, OS2U and SOC types. Wrecked wing in the foreground is from a PBY.
(Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives Collection) http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-shw.htm



Franklin Delano Roosevelt

"I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again; your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."
– President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940

"In politics, nothing happens by accident. If it happens, you can bet it was planned that way." – Franklin Delano Roosevelt

"Oh what a tangled web we weave, When first we practise to deceive!" – Sir Walter Scott

Photo # 80-G-32463 USS California damaged, during the Pearl Harbor attack, 7 December 1941

Scene on the southeastern part of Ford Island, looking northeasterly, with USS *California* (BB-44) in right center, listing to port after being hit by Japanese aerial torpedoes and bombs. (*Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives Collection*)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-ca.htm

Pearl Harbor and Prior Knowledge

January 26, 1940 – Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 between America and Japan is terminated
July 10, 1940 – Henry L. Stimson begins his duty as Secretary of War for the second time.
September 16, 1940 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signs the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 into law.
September 22, 1940 – Imperial Japan invades French Indochina [Vietnam].
September 26, 1940 – America imposes a total embargo on all scrap metal shipments to Imperial Japan.
September 27, 1940 – Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy sign the Tripartite Pact in Berlin.
October 7, 1940 – U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum's **eight-action (provocation) memorandum** is issued.
October 8, 1940 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt orders U.S. Fleet to stay in Hawaii (Pearl Harbor).
October 29, 1940 – Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson draws the first numbers for draft under the Selective Service Act.
January 27, 1941 – U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew sends a **'Pearl Harbor warning message'** to the State Department.
March 11, 1941 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signs the Lend-Lease Bill.
March 27, 1941 – Japanese spy **Takeo Yoshikawa** enters Honolulu aboard Japanese ship *Nitta Maru*.
March 31, 1941 – Martin-Bellinger Report (a report describing a simulated Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor) is issued.
June 16, 1941 – U.S. State Department orders the closure of all German consulates (and Italian consulates on June 21, 1941).
July 26, 1941 – Pres. Roosevelt orders seizure of all Japanese assets in America in response to Japanese conquest of French Indo-China
August 1, 1941 – President Roosevelt imposes an oil and gasoline trade embargo on Japan.
August-Oct. 11, 1941 – U.S. Senator Guy Gillette and U.S. Congressman Martin Dies attempt to investigate Japanese espionage in Hawaii.
September 24, 1941 – Japanese Foreign Ministry issues the "**bomb plot" dispatch** to the Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu.
November 4, 1941 – Japan begins withdrawing all its merchant vessels from the Western Hemisphere.
November 27, 1941 – Department of War and the Department of the Navy issue **war warnings** to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
November 29, 1941 – Japanese Foreign Ministry issues the **"winds" (weather) dispatch** to Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura.
December 7, 1941 – Japanese government issues the **"Part 14" message** and **"1:00 P.M." message** to Ambassador Nomura.

"All the News That's Fit to Print."

The New York Times.

LATE CITY EDITION

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JAPAN WARS ON U. S. AND BRITAIN; MAKES SUDDEN ATTACK ON HAWAII; HEAVY FIGHTING AT SEA REPORTED

CONGRESS DECIDED

Roosevelt Will Address It Today and Find It Ready to Vote War

CONFERENCE IS HELD

Legislative Leaders and Cabinet in Sober White House Talk

By C. P. TRUSSELL

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 7—President Roosevelt will address a joint session of Congress tomorrow and will find the membership in a mood to vote any steps he asks in connection with the developments in the Pacific.

The President will appear personally at 12:30 P. M. Whether he would call for a flat declaration of war against Japan was left unannounced tonight. But leaders of Congress, shocked and angered by the Japanese attacks, were talking of a declaration of war on not only Japan but on the entire Axis.

The plans for action tomorrow were made tonight in the President's study. There, in rumpled dark suit and surrounded by his Cabinet and by Congressional leaders of both parties, he went through reports, some official, some unconfirmed, of the continued assaults of the Japanese upon American Pacific outposts.

Most Far Into Night

The conference lasted until after 11 o'clock and at its close an official statement was issued. This said that the President had reviewed for his confreres the latest advices from the Pacific and declared:

"It should be emphasized that the message to Congress has not yet been written and its tenor will, of course, depend on further information received between 11 o'clock tonight and noon tomorrow. Further news is coming in all the time."

Rayburn Predicts Unity

Congressional leaders asserted as they left the White House that they did not know what the President would say tomorrow.

"Will the President ask for a declaration of war?" Speaker Rayburn was asked.

"He didn't say," answered the Speaker.

Asked whether Congress would support a declaration of war, Mr. Rayburn observed:

"I think that is one thing on which there would be unity."

"There is no politics here," said Representative Joseph W. Martin Jr., Minority House Leader. "There is only one party when it comes to the integrity and honor of the country."

"The Republicans," said Senator Charles L. McNary, of Oregon, the Senate Minority Leader, "will all

TOKYO ACTS FIRST

Declaration Follows Air and Sea Attacks on U. S. and Britain

TOGO CALLS envoys

After Fighting Is On, Grew Gets Japan's Reply to Hull Note of Nov. 26

By The Associated Press

TOKYO, Monday, Dec. 8—Japan went to war against the United States and Britain today with air and sea attacks against Hawaii, followed by a formal declaration of hostilities.

Japanese Imperial headquarters announced at 4 A. M. [4 P. M. Sunday, Eastern standard time] that a state of war existed among these nations in the Western Pacific, as of dawn.

Soon afterward, Domei, the Japanese official news agency, announced that "naval operations are progressing off Hawaii, with at least one Japanese aircraft carrier in action against Pearl Harbor," the American naval base in the islands.

Japanese bombers were declared to have raided Honolulu at 7:35 A. M., Hawaii time [1:05 Sunday, Eastern standard time].

Premier-War Minister General Hideki Tojo held a twenty-minute Cabinet session at his official residence at 7 A. M.

Soon afterward it was announced that both the United States Ambassador, Joseph C. Grew, and the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Leslie Craigie, had been summoned by Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo.

The Foreign Minister, Domei said, handed to Mr. Grew the Japanese Government's formal reply to the note sent to Japan by United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull on Nov. 26.

[In the course of the diplomatic negotiations leading up to yesterday's events, the Domei agency had stated that Japan could not accept the premises of Mr. Hull's note.]

Sir Robert was summoned by

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

PACIFIC OCEAN: THEATRE OF WAR INVOLVING UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES

Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities an American ship sent a distress call from (1) and a United States Army transport carrying lumber was torpedoed at (2). The most important action was at Hawaii (3), where Japanese planes bombed the great Pearl Harbor base. Also attacked was Guam (4). From Manila (6) United States bombers roared northward while some parts of the Philippines were raided from the air. At Shanghai (5) a British gunboat was sunk and an American gunboat seized by the Japanese. To the south, in the Malaya area (7), the British bombed Japanese ships. Tokyo forces attempted landings on British territory and Singapore underwent an air raid. Distances between key Pacific points are shown on the map in statute miles.

JAPANESE FORCE LANDS IN MALAYA

First Attempt Is Repulsed—Singapore Is Bombed and Thailand Threatened

By The Associated Press

SINGAPORE, Monday, Dec. 8—The Japanese landed in Northern Malaya, 200 miles north of Singapore, today and bombed this great British naval stronghold, causing small loss of life among civilians and property damage.

About 500 Japanese troops landed on the east coast of Malaya and began filtering through jungle-fringed swamps and rice fields toward Kota Bahru airdrome, which is ten miles from the northern terminus of a railroad leading to Singapore.

British defenders had repulsed

Continued on Page Two

Tokyo Bombers Strike Hard At Our Main Bases on Oahu

By The United Press

HONOLULU, Dec. 7—War broke with lightning suddenness in the Pacific today when waves of Japanese bombers attacked Hawaii this morning and the United States Fleet struck back with a thunder of big naval rifles. Japanese bombers, including four-engined dive bombers and torpedo-carrying planes, blasted at Pearl Harbor, the great United States naval base, the city of Honolulu and, several outlying American military bases on the Island of Oahu. There were casualties of unstated number.

[The United States battleship Oklahoma was set afire by the Japanese attackers, according to a National Broadcasting Company observer, who also reported in a broadcast yesterday that two other ships in Pearl Harbor were attacked.

[The Japanese news agency, Domei, reported that the battleship Oklahoma had been sunk at Pearl Harbor, according to a United Press dispatch from Shanghai.

[Governor Joseph B. Poindexter of Hawaii talked with President Roosevelt late yesterday afternoon, saying that a second wave of Japanese bombers was just coming over, and the Gov-

Continued on Page Thirteen

ENTIRE CITY PUT ON WAR FOOTING

Japanese Rounded Up by FBI, Sent to Ellis Island—Vital Services Are Guarded

The metropolitan district reacted swiftly yesterday to the Japanese attack in the Pacific. All large communities in the area, including New York City, Newark, Jersey City, Bayonne and Paterson, went on immediate war footing.

One of the first steps taken here last night was a round-up of Japanese nationals by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, reinforced by squads of city detectives acting under FBI supervision. More than 100 FBI men, fully armed, were assigned to the detail.

The prisoners were sent to Ellis Island, where they will be held pending action at Washington. It was indicated hundreds would be detained.

Earlier Mayor La Guardia had convened his Emergency Board and

HULL DENOUNCES TOKYO 'INFAMY'

Brands Japan 'Fraudulent' in Preparing Attack While Carrying On Parleys

Texts of Secretary Hull's note and Japan's reply, Page 10.

By BERTRAM D. HULEN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 7—Japan was accused by Secretary of State Cordell Hull today of making a "treacherous and utterly unprovoked attack" upon the United States and of having been "infamously false and fraudulent" by preparing for the attack while conducting diplomatic negotiations with the professed desire of maintaining peace.

But even before he knew of the attack, Mr. Hull had vehemently brought the diplomatic negotiations to a virtual end with an outburst against Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, and Saburo Kurusu, special envoy, because of the insulting character of the reply they deliv-

Continued on Page Eleven

The International Situation

MONDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1941

Yesterday morning Japan attacked the United States at several points in the Pacific. President Roosevelt ordered United States forces into action and a declaration of war is expected this morning. [Page 1, Columns 7 and 8.] Tokyo made its declaration as of this morning against both the United States and Britain. [Page 1, Column 2.] The first Japanese assault was directed at Pearl Harbor Naval base in Hawaii. Many casualties of his fruitless appeal to the Japanese Emperor. [Page 13.] The White House was the hub of Washington activity and news bulletins were released there. [Page 12, Column 2.]

The Federal Bureau of Investigation was expected to begin the round-up of the Japanese in this country. [Page 6, Column 8.] As New York City went on a war footing and public precautions were taken, the FBI began a round-up of Japanese

Lewis Wins Captive Mine Fight; Arbitrators Grant Union Shop

The three-man arbitration board appointed by President Roosevelt to arbitrate the union shop dispute in the captive coal mines last night

...surance before the decision was reached that they would accept it as binding.

GUAM BOMBED; ARMY SHIP IS SUNK

U. S. Fliers Head North From Manila—Battleship Oklahoma Set Afire by Torpedo Planes at Honolulu

104 SOLDIERS KILLED AT FIELD IN HAWAII

Japanese Envoys, at Moment of Attack, Deliver Reply to U. S. Note—President Sees Cabinet and Drafts Message to Congress

By FRANK L. KLUCKHOHN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Monday, Dec. 8—Sudden and unexpected attacks on Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, and other United States possessions in the Pacific early yesterday by the Japanese air force and navy plunged the United States and Japan into active war.

The initial attack in Hawaii, apparently launched by torpedo-carrying bombers and submarines, caused widespread damage and death. It was quickly followed by others. There were unconfirmed reports that German raiders participated in the attacks.

Guam also was assaulted from the air, as were Davao, on the island of Mindanao, and Camp John Hayes, in Northern Luzon, both in the Philippine Archipelago. General Douglas MacArthur, commanding the United States Army of the Far East, reported there was little damage, however.

Japanese submarines, ranging out over the Pacific, sank an American transport carrying lumber 1,300 miles from San Francisco, and distress signals were heard from a freighter 700 miles from that city.

The War Department reported that 104 soldiers died and 300 were wounded as the result of the attack on Hickam Field. The National Broadcasting Company reported from Honolulu that the battleship Oklahoma was afire. [Domei, Japanese news agency, reported the Oklahoma sunk.]

Nation Placed on Full War Basis

The news of these surprise attacks fell like a bombshell on Washington. President Roosevelt immediately ordered the country and the Army and Navy onto a full war footing. He arranged at a White House conference last night to address a joint session of Congress at noon today, presumably to ask for declaration of a formal state of war.

This was disclosed after a long special Cabinet meeting, which was joined later by Congressional leaders. These leaders predicted "action" within a day.

After leaving the White House conference Attorney General Francis Biddle said that "a resolution" would be introduced in Congress tomorrow. He would not amplify or affirm that it would be for a declaration of war.

He did say, however, that "certain vital powers" would become available after a declaration of war. He said that he was on his way to the Justice Department, where he would confer with other officials, including Vice President Henry A. Wallace.

Congress probably will "act" within the day, and he will call the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for this purpose, Chairman Tom Connally announced.

Both Speaker Rayburn and Senator McNary predicted that Congress would follow the president and support any steps he might deem necessary.

As the reports of heavy fighting flashed into the White House, London reported semi-officially that the British Empire would carry out Prime Minister Winston Churchill's pledge to give the United States full support in case of hostilities with Japan. The President and Mr. Churchill talked by transatlantic telephone.

This was followed by a statement in London from the Netherland Government in Exile that it considered a state of war to exist between the Netherlands and Japan. Canada and Costa Rica took similar action.

Singapore Landing Attempted

A Singapore communiqué disclosed that Japanese troops had attempted to land in Northern Malaya and that Singapore had been bombed.

Summary of the Pearl Harbor Attack:

2,402 American people killed in action (2008 U.S. Navy sailors, 109 U.S. Marines, 218 U.S. Army soldiers, several women and children)
1,282 American people wounded
USS Arizona and *USS Oklahoma* were sunk; *USS California* and *USS West Virginia* were sunk and later raised
Four battleships (*USS Nevada, USS Pennsylvania, USS Maryland, USS Tennessee*), three cruisers (*USS Helena* (CL-50), *USS Honolulu* (CL-48), and *USS Raleigh* (CL-7)), and four destroyers were damaged
169 American military aircraft lost (U.S. Navy aircrafts – 92 lost, 31 damaged; U.S. Army aircrafts – 77 lost, 128 damaged)
Bombardment and attack on Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field [later Hickam Air Force Base], Wheeler Field, Schofield Barracks, and Ford Island
Japanese failure to attack oil storage tanks, CINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet) headquarters building, the submarine base, and the Navy Yard



Left: Franklin Delano Roosevelt (January 30, 1882-April 12, 1945), President of the United States and *Time* magazine's Man of the Year, appears on the front cover of the January 5, 1942 edition of *Time* magazine.
Right: Secretary of Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State (March 4, 1933-November 30, 1944), appears on the front cover of the January 8, 1940 edition of *Time* magazine.



Left: Frank Knox, U.S. Secretary of the Navy (July 11, 1940-April 28, 1944), appears on the front cover of the September 7, 1942 edition of *Time* magazine.
Right: Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Secretary of War (July 10, 1940-September 21, 1945), appears on the front cover of the August 25, 1941 edition of *Time* magazine. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Time magazine Editor-in-Chief Henry R. Luce were members of Skull & Bones, a secret society at Yale University.



Left: General Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister of Japan (1941-1944) and Minister of War (1940-1944), appears on the front cover of the November 3, 1941 edition of *Time* magazine. Hideki Tojo was tried as a "Class A" war criminal in Tokyo, Japan after World War II.
Right: Admiral Shigetarō Shimada, Minister of the Navy (October 18, 1941-July 17, 1944), appears on the front cover of the July 3, 1944 edition of *Time* magazine.



Left: Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto appears on the front cover of the December 22, 1941 edition of *Time* magazine.
Right: Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff (April 1941-February 1944), appears on the front cover of the February 15, 1943 edition of *Time* magazine. Osami Nagano was tried as a "Class A" war criminal in Tokyo, Japan after World War II.



Joseph Clark Grew (May 27, 1880-May 25, 1965, A.B. Harvard 1902), appeared on the front cover of the November 12, 1934 edition of *Time* magazine, was the U.S. Ambassador to Japan from June 14, 1932 to December 8, 1941.

"In any case, somewhere along the line, the hint of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor came out. This rumor may have had nothing to do with either Yamamoto's scheme or Uchida's work. It may have been merely a coincidental upsurge of a swashbuckling notion which had intrigued Japanese fiction writers for years. Whatever the source, sometime near the end of January a rumor reached Ricardo Rivera-Schreiber, Peru's veteran minister to Tokyo, one disturbing enough for him to go immediately to his friend Edward S. Crocker, first secretary of the United States Embassy. Rivera-Schreiber said that "he considered it a fantastic rumor, at the same time that it was sufficiently important to justify his passing it on…" Crocker straightway relayed it to Ambassador [Joseph C.] Grew, whose credulity it strained to the utmost. Nevertheless, he had "full confidence" in Rivera-Schreiber. "I knew him very well, I had known him for years, and I was quite certain that he would not mislead me in anything that he might pass on to me," Grew testified. So, a mere twenty days after Yamamoto wrote his historic letter to Oikawa, on the advice of his naval attaché Grew composed a dispatch, one of the most remarkable ever to flash between an American ambassador and the State Department. He handed it over to his encoding staff, and at 1800 [Japan time] on January 27 [, 1941] they sent it off: *"My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that* ***the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities.*** *He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the information."* But what steps did Grew or other American officials in Japan take to track the rumor to its "many sources" and try to determine whether the Japanese actually had such a plan under way? On the basis of information currently available, the answer appears to be "none."" – *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 31



Confidential

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Op16-F-2
(SC)A16-3/EF37
Serial No. 09716

Feb. 1, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL 10465

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subject: Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect:

"The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff."

2. The Division of Naval Intelligences places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the forseeable future.

Op-16-F

Jules James,
By direction

Op-16-F-2

Dictated Jan. 31, 1941
" by Lieut. Comdr. A. H. McCollum
Typed by M. E. Morse

CC - Com 14 10466

Confidential

(SC)A16-3/EF37

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Harold R. Stark's February 1, 1941 confidential memo acknowledging U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew's January 27, 1941 "Pearl Harbor" cable to the State Department
Source: http://www.hongpong.com/archives/2010/01/15/pearl-harbor-evidence-shady-biz-or-just-letter-ambassador-warning-attack
Document: http://www.hongpong.com/files/attackrumor.gif

"There is a lot of talk around town to the effect that the Japanese, in case of a break with the United States, are planning to go all-out *in a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor*. I rather guess that the boys in Hawaii are not precisely asleep."
– U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, from his diary entry on January 27, 1941
(Source: *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years 1904-1945, Volume 2* by Joseph C. Grew, p. 1283)

Japanese Espionage in Hawaii & ‘Operation Hawaii’

The Consulate General of Japan at Honolulu in 1941 (above) was located within 7 miles of Pearl Harbor.
(Photo: FBI Files; Source: *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett)



Left: Nagao Kita, Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, Hawaii in 1941 (Source: *At Dawn We Slept* by Gordon W. Prange)
Right: Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa in 1941 (Source: *Day of Deceit* by Robert B. Stinnett)

Tadashi Morimura was really Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa of the Imperial Japanese Navy; he came to Hawaii for espionage purposes. Morimura came to Hawaii under diplomatic auspices, but the ruse did not fool US officials. Rear Admiral Walter Anderson made it clear the to the FBI's Robert Shivers that the Navy, not the FBI, was in charge of the Morimura investigation. They carefully monitored Morimura's every move—but did nothing.

Richard Kotoshirodo assisted Morimura in gathering intelligence information for the Japanese navy. Kotoshirodo, an American citizen, was later sent to a Utah internment camp at Topaz, but was never charged with espionage. *Photo from FBI files.*



The Japanese Consulate at Nuuanu Avenue and Kuakini Street in Honolulu. Morimura lived in the residential quarters at right rear. *Photo from FBI files.*

(Source: *Day of Deceit* by Robert B. Stinnett)

"As early as August 10, 1936, Roosevelt had circulated a secret memorandum declaring: "Every Japanese citizen or noncitizen on the Island of Oahu who meets these Japanese ships or who has any connection with their officers and men should be secretly but definitely identified and his or her name placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp in the event of trouble." Emanuel was the Navy's senior undercover agent in Hawaii, assigned to maintain surveillance on suspected Japanese agents. On this particular Boat Day, his mission was to obtain a surreptitious photograph of a suspected Japanese navy spy arriving under diplomatic cover on the *Nitta Maru*, a luxurious passenger liner…He hurried along Bishop Street to Pier 8. The *Nitta Maru* was scheduled to dock earlier than expected. She had arrived during the night and was anchored offshore in Mamala Basy, awaiting Customs clearance. Emanuel's target was the Japanese spy Tadashi Morimura, who was scheduled to assume the post of chancellor in the Japanese Consulate. The position was a responsible diplomatic job, usually assigned to seasoned, experienced members of the foreign service. Morimura's posting aroused suspicions within America's intelligence community, because he was young and not listed in the official Japanese Diplomatic Registry. Japan rarely sent twenty-seven-year-olds to fill such important consular posts. His real name was Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa; under the cover name of Morimura he had been detailed to Hawaii for espionage purposes. Yoshikawa had graduated from Japan's naval academy, Eta Jima, in the late 1930s. Japanese naval authorities decided that a navy officer was needed to observe military operations on Oahu and spy on the Pacific Fleet. His job called for him to gather fleet operational details, to obtain Hawaiian maps including photographs, and then to assemble them into an intelligence picture for use by Japanese torpedo and bombing pilots…Morimura was allowed to operate freely throughout 1941. **American authorities, including Roosevelt, never curtailed his espionage.** Morimura was able to supply Admiral Yamamoto with highly accurate bombing charts of Pearl Harbor and other U.S. Army and Navy targets on Oahu. On December 6 Morimura's work was complete."
– *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 84-85

"Here began what would persist throughout the year – report after report accurately identifying the schedules and routines of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Schedules and routines! How beguiling they are, so easy to follow! What a comforting sense they give of security and predictability! For this reason, over many generations the men aware of the value of such intelligence have handed down a mighty commandment: Thou Shalt Not Establish a Habit Pattern. But by early December 1941 the American commanders had neglected this cardinal rule. The Japanese planners had to know where to put their finger on target ships; reliable U.S. patterns plus excellent reporting from the consulate enabled them to do just that. Honolulu's new Japanese consul general, Nagao Kita, disembarked from *Tatsuta Maru* on March 14; after being duly wined and dined, he paid courtesy calls on local dignitaries, including Short. Kita's broad face, thick hair, bushy brows, and flat pug nose above a short, chubby body gave him the look of a prizefighter. He dressed well, played an enthusiastic, if average, game of golf, and was something of a social lion. His years on the Asian mainland had given him the Chinese gentleman's gift of infinite leisure. He was flexible and adjusted to the needs and circumstances of the moment, always calm, detached, and alert. A widower whose only son attended school in Japan, he could devote his abundant energies exclusively to his job in Honolulu. To assist him, his superiors sent him a young man whose name appeared as "Tadashi Morimura" on the passenger list of the liner *Nitta Maru* as she nosed into Pier 8 in Honolulu Harbor on March 27, 1941. Actually he was Takeo Yoshikawa, a trained intelligence agent. When Okuda draped a welcoming lei around Yoshikawa's neck and shepherded his charge through customs, the Japanese Navy had slipped ashore its top secret spy as unobtrusively as any tourist. Okuda immediately took him to the consulate and ushered him into Kita's office. Yoshikawa presented the consul general with a letter from Captain Bunjiro Yamaguchi of the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff. The letter enclosed six $100 bills for use in Yoshikawa's mission…After a flurry of bows and assorted pleasantries Okuda escorted Yoshikawa from Kita's office to meet the rest of the staff. These people would know him only as Tadashi Morimura. At first Kita, like Okuda, wondered whether this man could make a good spy. But Tokyo had not been mistaken. Yoshikawa was a walking encyclopedia of the United States Navy. A graduate of Eta Jima, he had appeared well on the way to advancement in his chosen career when a serious stomach ailment forced his retirement. He was moping unhappily when a Navy personnel officer told him that the service still held a place for him. However, he must forgo all hope of future advancement. This seemed to Yoshikawa a small price to pay for a return to his beloved Navy. In the Intelligence Division of the Naval General Staff, Yoshikawa received simple but compressive instructions: He must improve his English and become an expert on the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the American bases at Guam, Manila, and Pearl Harbor. After four years of intensive study he took the Foreign Ministry's English-language examinations, and a few weeks later he became a junior diplomat. Now he had the necessary cover for his true mission. In August 1940 his chief, Captain Masao Nishida, informed him that he was going to Honolulu as a diplomat and would report by diplomatic code on the daily status of the U.S. Fleet and its bases. Captain Bunjiro Yamaguchi gave him his final instructions just before he sailed, directing him to place major emphasis on Oahu."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 72-75

"Soon after his arrival Yoshikawa took several sight-seeing trips around Oahu, observing the terrain and keeping a sharp eye out for military installations and airfields. On his initial expedition and for many other drives around Pearl Harbor, Yoshikawa hired a taxi driver, John Yoshige Mikami…Yoshikawa also had at his frequent disposal [Richard] Kotoshirodo's 1937 Ford along with its owner, who became Yoshikawa's trusted and valuable assistant. Within a week of his arrival the agent had visited the Pearl Harbor area. In these early days Okuda occasionally went along. But as the spy became more surefooted, Okuda eased out…When Yoshikawa first arrived, Seki went with him to observe ships in Pearl Harbor, and Kotoshirodo sometimes accompanied them. Yoshikawa coached Kotoshirodo to the point where, in addition to the trips the two men made together, Kotoshirodo could scout the Fleet by himself or with Mikami at Yoshikawa's direction. Kita gave Yoshikawa the title Chancellor in the consulate as a cover for his real activities. In due course the consul general introduced him to a Japanese-style teahouse called the Shuncho-ro. The place charmed Yoshikawa, for the proprietress came from his native prefecture in Japan and the geishas reminded him of home. More important, the teahouse, located in Alewa Heights, contained a second-floor room which commanded a view of Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field. Although too far removed for precise checking with the naked eye, the Shuncho-ro had a telescope which Yoshikawa used to advantage. By the end of April 1941 Yoshikawa had acquired a number of espionage locations. From a point on Aiea Heights he had an excellent view of Pearl Harbor, while the best look at the submarine base called for a stop on Kamehameha Highway between Aiea and Makalapa. Occasionally he would take a jitney to Honolulu bound for any point beyond Pearl Harbor, get off at Aiea, and prowl about. The cane fields at Aiea gave the best view of all. Yoshikawa would dress in laborer's garb and hide amid the cane. After using this site ten times, he broke off the habit, deciding that he had pushed his luck far enough or else had seen all he could see. Mikami and Kotoshirodo often drove Yoshikawa to Pearl City, northwest of the naval base. On a pier at the end of the peninsula there Yoshikawa could clearly see Pearl Harbor and Ford Island and its airstrips. He observed that the battleships moored in pairs, so that the inshore ship was practically impervious to torpedo attack. Despite its value, Yoshikawa dared not risk visiting the pier more than twice or three times a week, and each time he did so, he wore a change of clothes. In general, the western part of Pearl Harbor held little interest for Yoshikawa. However, he wanted to see the channel which Hickam Field blocked from view on the eastern side; he tried to reach the channel mouth by going west of Waipahu and then swinging south. This area near the West Loch was closely guarded, and Yoshikawa feared to risk moving close enough for a good view. Neither he nor the other consulate members knew for sure whether or not submarine nets guarded the entrance, but they went on that assumption. Spying on the submarines was difficult for Yoshikawa, and he never developed satisfactory notes on them. With true Japanese meticulousness, Yoshikawa charted every bit of information he secured. In time a pattern emerged. **As the year progressed, he observed that a large number of ships always were in port on Saturdays and Sundays.** To check air patrols, he left the consulate very early and went to some vantage point. There he observed the number of planes, their general direction of flight, and times of departure and return. He knew this to be a primitive method, but it was the only one he could use. He dared not risk field glasses, which would have drawn attention to him. He recorded patrol flights carefully, but once the planes took off, they flew rapidly out of sight, so he could never be sure exactly where they went or if they changed direction. But one thing he soon discovered – north of Oahu the Americans conducted scarcely any patrols at all."

– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 75-76



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Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa arrived in Honolulu Harbor (above) aboard Japanese passenger cruise ship *Nitta Maru* on March 27, 1941. *Nitta Maru* was anchored at Pier 8 in Honolulu Harbor, located near the Aloha Tower. (Note: The photo of Honolulu Harbor, including the Aloha Tower and Pier 8, was taken in September 1931). (Photo: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/assetserver/controller/view/search/CHS-48069)

Nitta Maru (新田丸), a Japanese ship built by Mitsubishi Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. in Nagasaki from 1938 to 1939, appears in the port of Nagasaki in March 1940. Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa arrived in Honolulu Harbor aboard *Nitta Maru* on March 27, 1941 under the Japanese pseudonym “Tadashi Morimura”.

3–26. The city of Honolulu and its harbor on 13 January 1941.

(Source: *The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor, The Original Photographs* by Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, and J. Michael Wenger (published in 1991))

"It was a matter of common knowledge that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was the hotbed of espionage in Oahu," said [Major General Charles D.] Herron. "The Consul General himself was always under suspicion no matter who his errand boys were." In 1941 this consulate was one of the busiest in Japan's diplomatic service. It also formed a key link in the long chain of Japanese Naval Intelligence. Japanese agents had long been active in Hawaii, and when Roosevelt based the Fleet in those waters in May 1940, the Japanese Foreign Office requested Consul General Kiichi Gunji to send regular reports on the size, disposition, and activities of the U.S. Navy in Hawaii. This request originated in the Naval General Staff, which, like its Army counterpart, enjoyed the closest possible relations with the Foreign Office and used its representatives abroad for espionage and other intelligence purposes. In turn, Gunji relied heavily on the Honolulu newspapers for his information on the U.S. Fleet. At that time the press consistently reported on the size, numbers, and movements of Richardson's warships, conveniently citing exact names and times of arrival and departure. Gunji returned to Japan on September 11, 1940, and his deputy, Otojiro Okuda, took over as acting consul general…Gunji assured Okuda that he would not find reporting on the U.S. Fleet difficult because the press covered all its movements. Okuda swung into his espionage quickly and efficiently. For a time, as Gunji had predicted, checking on Fleet movements presented no special problems. The local press reported them faithfully, and Okuda extracted the germane items, coded them, and sent them to Tokyo by commercial telegraph. What was public information in Hawaii became classified as soon as it reached the Foreign Ministry, which immediately relayed it to the Naval General Staff. There it all became grist for the intelligence mill. But Okuda was too thorough to depend only on newspapers. He sent his agents to check on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor and to verify press stories…The only individual present with any qualifications for the task proved to be Kohichi Seki, the consulate's treasurer, a frail, rather sickly looking man of thirty-nine. He had attended the Naval Academy at Eta Jima but had been honorably discharged because his health did not meet Navy standards. The Foreign Office secured for Seki's use a copy of *Jane's Fighting Ships*. After about two months of practice in learning the types of American vessels, Seki set forth to scout the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He required no more than an hour to check on Pearl Harbor, which lay within seven miles of the consulate. So long as he stayed off the military reservation and avoided restricted areas, Seki broke no law. He made a practice of taking a taxi to the harbor area, watching directly from the taxi windows, then returning to the consulate to draft a report."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 70-71

"While the Japanese Embassy and the State Department were arranging [Lieutenant Commander Itaru] Tachibana's future, the Germans felt the weight of American displeasure. **On June 16 the State Department ordered all twenty-four German consulates, as well as certain other agencies, closed not later than July 10, for "activities of an improper and unwarranted character."** As an afterthought, it also closed the Italian consulates on June 21. Then, late that month, the FBI arrested twenty-nine persons accused of spying for Germany. None of these moves seriously inconvenienced the Japanese. For various reasons the State Department preferred to keep the Japanese consulates open. According to one story, the United States had hired "a whole gang of burglary experts" to break into the consulate at New York. They would photograph Japanese material and carefully put it back exactly where they found it. This consulate provided such an excellent source of information that the Military Intelligence agencies begged State to hold off. Then, too, with Magic intercepts giving a blow-by-blow account of Japanese transactions, Hirohito's consulates probably were of more value open than closed. Nor did Roosevelt and Hull want to cause trouble in the Pacific while Hitler was brewing such a storm in the Atlantic. Undoubtedly the American housecleaning gave Kita and Okuda many anxious moments. The prospect of having the consulate in Honolulu closed was one matter Kita could not accept with his usual insouciance. **Had Washington closed all Japanese consulates by the early autumn of 1941, it would have been a fearsome blow to Japan's entire intelligence system, especially to [Rear Admiral Minoru] Maeda's Third Bureau, which needed up-to-date, authoritative information on the United States. In particular, by turning the lock on the door at 1742 Nuuanu Street in Honolulu, Washington could have dried up Japan's primary source of information on the U.S. Pacific Fleet.** Then the Japanese would have had to resort to other methods of gathering their intelligence on Kimmel's ships and Oahu's military installations. True, they had a sleeper spy in Hawaii who had been on ice for several years at a princely salary against just such an eventuality."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 151

"All things considered, with the closing of Kita's consulate the whole idea of striking the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor could have passed from the realm of reality back into the shades of fantasy whence Yamamoto had recently managed to lift it. So the consulate remained open, but it had to worry about another indirect threat. The Honolulu press was full of articles on such subjects as espionage, fifth columns, un-American activities, sabotage, and foreign agents. On May 7 the Honolulu *Star-Bulletin* told its readers that upon request of the FBI the Honolulu Police Department had "created the espionage bureau of one lieutenant and four officers effective January 1, 1941." So from New Year's Day the FBI, Navy DIO, and Army Counterintelligence had an ally in the cloak-and-dagger business – Chief of Police William A. Gabrielson and his men. Determined to track the potential Japanese espionage and sabotage establishment in Hawaii to its source, the zealous [FBI agent Robert L.] Shivers took dead aim on the 234 consular agents "who had been appointed by the Consul General of Japan" in Honolulu. He had been prodding J. Edgar Hoover's headquarters on this matter since at least April 1940. He considered these agents "definitely a source of potential danger.""
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 151-152

Proposed Gillette-Dies Congressional Investigation (August-October 1941)

"The fact that the Japanese were spying on military and naval activities was no news to the Americans. But they "were helpless to stop it." [Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Commander (later Vice Admiral) Theodore S.] Wilkinson later testified: **"We could not censor the mails. We could not censor the dispatches. We could not prevent the taking of photographs. We could not arrest Japanese suspects. There was nothing we could do to stop it, and all hands knew that espionage was going on all along, and reports were going back to Japan."** Several political leaders in Washington longed to do something about this deplorable situation. And it is another irony of the Pearl Harbor story that at the same time the Japanese intensified their activities on the intelligence front, Senator Guy M. Gillette of Iowa and Congressman Martin Dies of Texas planned to investigate Japanese subversion. Both men had been interested in the problem for some time; both had studied it carefully, were alarmed at what they found, and thought action should be taken without delay. What is more, both men were on the right track. As chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, Dies was primarily interested in Communist machinations in the United States. But he had also been directing an investigation of Japanese propaganda and espionage. By August Dies and his committee had accumulated enough evidence to conclude that Japanese subversion represented a real threat to the United States. In order "to arouse the whole American people into a sense of impending crisis," he "made arrangements for 52 witnesses to proceed to Washington for public hearings early in September 1941." Before taking final action, Dies wrote to the attorney general on August 27 to ascertain whether the hearings "would be satisfactory from the standpoint of the administration's plans as they related to the Japanese." On September 8 Matthew F. McGuire, acting attorney general, replied that the President, the secretary of state, and the attorney general all felt "quite strongly that hearings such as you contemplate would be inadvisable." But Dies did not accept McGuire's letter as final and continued to prod the executive branch. After conferring with Roosevelt, Dies return to his office, telephoned Hull, and repeated the substance of his conversation with the President. The secretary agreed that the outlook in the Pacific was dark, but he feared that such an investigation would upset the diplomatic talks then under way between Tokyo and Washington. He also knew that the United States was woefully unprepared for war in the Pacific. According to Dies, he told Hull, as he had Roosevelt, that his committee would comply with the administration's wishes. And so the story appeared in the American press on Sunday, September 21, that the plans of the Dies Committee "for exhaustive investigation of Japanese subversive activities" had been called off. The previous day, however, Dies told newspapermen that "the potential Japanese spy system in this country is greater than the Germans ever dreamed of having in the Low Countries." And he added, "It would be a tremendous force to reckon with in the event of war." In less than two weeks Senator Gillette took action. On October 2, in conjunction with Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, he introduced a Senate resolution calling for an investigation of Japanese subversion. He specifically cited "the activities of Japanese consular officials in Hawaii and in the Western States." No one except the Japanese knew how close to home Gillette's remarks struck. On October 3 [Nagao] Kita "referred to Senator Gillette's allegations as 'uninformed rumors.'" And he insisted, "I do not know of any subversive activities that Senator Gillette mentions." That included his own bailiwick. **"The Japanese consulate here was not engaged in any such activities. …Therefore, I see no reason why this consulate should be investigated."** Kita need not have worried. Gillette's proposed investigation swiftly ran afoul of the State Department. On October 11 – even as the "bomb plot" message bounced around Washington – Hull told Gillette that he strongly opposed congressional investigation of Japan's consular officials lest such action interfere with the sensitive American-Japanese diplomatic conversations. In view of the tension between the two countries and the critical international situation, he [Hull] could not approve measures that would offend Japan or might even provoke her to action. So he implored Gillette to drop the matter. "Please, Senator," he begged, **"I appeal to you – don't rock the boat!"** Like Dies, Gillette deferred to the secretary of state's wishes."

– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 255-256

Congressman Martin Dies Jr. (left, Democrat-Texas) planned to hold public hearings on the Japanese espionage in Hawaii in September 1941 until the Roosevelt Administration, including U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, persuaded Congressman Dies to cancel the public hearings and terminate the investigation. U.S. Senator Guy M. Gillette (right, Democrat-Iowa) introduced a Senate resolution calling for an investigation into Japanese espionage activities in Hawaii on October 2, 1941 until U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull requested that Senator Gillette terminate the proposed investigation.

The "Bomb Plot" Message (September 24, 1941)

Photo # 80-G-182874 Pearl Harbor, looking southwest, 30 October 1941

Aerial view of the Naval Operating Base, Pearl Harbor, looking southwest on October 30, 1941. Ford Island Naval Air Station is in the center, with the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard just beyond it, across the channel. The airfield in the upper left-center is the Army's Hickam Field. (*Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives*)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/g100000/g182874c.htm

"But for a successful attack on Kimmel's warships, the Japanese needed exact information about the ships when they were in Pearl Harbor. "It became essential," Tachibana recalled, "to foresee exactly, at least two weeks before hand, whether or not the U.S. Fleet would be in harbor on the designated day of attack; to figure out the status of patrols around Pearl Harbor; to have the Hawaiian attack air force crews familiar with the topography of the Hawaiian district and U.S. warships; and promptly establish firm and reserve intelligence channels through which timely information could be obtained." So on September 24, at the behest of Naval Intelligence, the Foreign Ministry dispatched the most significant set of instructions thus far sent to the Honolulu consulate. "Strict secret" Message No. 83 clearly reflected a new orientation: *Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible: 1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objection to your abbreviating as much as you like.) Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and wet of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.) Area C. East Loch. Area D. Middle Loch. Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes. 2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important), tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)* In effect this message placed over Pearl Harbor an invisible grid whereon Yoshikawa and his assistants could plot the position of each individual ship in its specific anchorage. Heretofore Tokyo had been principally interested in U.S. Fleet movements. Now the Navy wanted precise information on the exact location of vessels in harbor as well. This dispatch became famous as the "bomb plot" message…For a number of reasons the U.S. Army did not translate this dispatch until October 9."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 248-249

The "Bomb Plot" Message No. 83 issued on September 24, 1941

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Honolulu
September 24, 1941

#83

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

23260
ARMY

Trans. 10/9/41 (S)

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

TOP SECRET

From: Honolulu (Kita).
To : Tokyo.
3 December 1941
(PA-K2)

#245 (In 2 parts, complete)

(Military secret).

From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

Meaning		Signal
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units	Preparing to sortie.	1
A number of carriers	Preparing to sortie.	2
Battleship divisions	All departed between 1st and 3rd.	3
Carriers	Several departed between 1st and 3rd.	4
Carriers	All departed between 1st and 3rd.	5
Battleship divisions	All departed between 4th and 6th.	6
Carriers	Several departed between 4th and 6th.	7
Carriers	All departed between 4th and 6th.	8

JD-1: 7370 SECRET (continued) (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

"While those in on Magic paid fascinated attention to the diplomatic messages, one of the most significant tip-offs of the year slipped by unnoticed. On November 15 Tokyo enjoined its Honolulu consulate: **"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."** Unfortunately the Navy did not translate this highly important message until December 3. Yet time still afforded Washington the opportunity to alert Hawaii's defenders. Seldom has so much significance been crammed into so few phrases. Here for the first and only time Tokyo in so many words equated the consular reports with the relations between Japan and the United States. That in itself distinguished this particular dispatch and the Honolulu consulate from the stream of intercepts inundating Army and Naval Intelligence. Tokyo's asking for information on a twice-a-week basis indicated current, continuing interest. And the request to report at irregular intervals was an obvious precaution against establishing a habit pattern. Finally, Tokyo charged the consulate to "take extra care to maintain secrecy." What more evidence could one ask of a fox in the chicken coop? Yet we have no record that this message caused the smallest stir in Washington, let alone inspired anyone to tip off either Kimmel or Short. But Washington was far from asleep at the switch. McCollum put his office on a twenty-four-hour-a-day basis early in November. He "felt that the situation between us and Japan was extremely explosive and would erupt at any time…" He believed that if Japan went to war with the United States, it would begin with an attack on the Fleet."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 355-356

"Sometime after December 7, Shivers told Fielder that he knew "the entire espionage ring centered around [*sic*] the Japanese Consulate, but diplomatic immunity prevented his investigation, and that anything he did might start the overt act which would create war." Yet at this very time [Captain Irving] Mayfield of the DIO [Fourteenth Naval District Intelligence Office] initiated an action which could have blown Yoshikawa's mission and indeed the success of Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor project sky-high. David Sarnoff, president of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), visited Honolulu in mid-November. Mayfield, who had been trying unsuccessfully to procure copies of the Japanese consulate's messages, arranged through Sarnoff "to obtain in a roundabout way certain information from the files of his company." Just how difficult a tussle, if any, Sarnoff had with his conscience we cannot say. But he held a reserve commission as an Army colonel, so presumably his patriotism overcame his legalistic scruples, as it had in Mayfield's case long since. Thus, at last American counterintelligence had access to the files at which it had gazed so hungrily for so long. But luck still favored the Japanese. Their consulate, with fine impartiality, spread its business by month among the Honolulu radio companies, and it so happened that MacKay Radio, not RCA, handled the traffic for November [1941]. The Japanese consulate used the J-19, not the Purple, diplomatic code. [Commander Joseph J.] Rochefort was, in McCollum's words, "the only officer in our Navy who is a top-flight cryptographer and radio man, and who also has a thorough knowledge of the Japanese language." Since he received the J-19 keys within twelve hours of their solution in Washington, he and his unit would have had little difficulty in decoding and translating the messages between Tokyo and Honolulu." – *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 356-357

"Kita promptly answered Tokyo with one of Yoshikawa's meticulous reports on November 18. It was detailed, precise, and suggestive. But the Japanese messages which really raised a fuss in ONI and G-2 were two which the Foreign Ministry dispatched to Nomura on November 29: ***…In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations),and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. (1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME [sic] ["East wind rain"]." (2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE [sic] KUMORI ["North wind cloudy"]. (3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE ["West wind clear"]. This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. Forward as urgent intelligence.*** Tokyo promptly followed this up with an amplification: ***When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts: (1) If it is Japan-U.S. relations, "HIGASHI." (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA." (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N.E.I.): "NISHI." The above will be repeated five times and included at the beginning and end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.*** Tokyo's "winds" dispatches went through the mill on November 28 and 26 respectively. From then on both services knocked themselves out to intercept the implementing messages. Washington directed Rochefort to establish "a listening watch on the most likely frequencies." So he sent four language officers to Aiea, "where they covered on a twenty-four hour basis one or more frequencies in addition to all the known broadcasts from Tokyo. Results were nil." McCollum testified, "We were all looking for it…" And so far as he knew, "we were continuing to look for that after the bombs had started falling on the fleet…"
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 360-361

"By September Yoshikawa had gleaned all he could about the installations at Pearl Harbor, so he no longer had to waste time gathering statistical data, and the ships snuggled against their docks were old friends. Therefore, he had no difficulty in trying to fit his information into the modified "bomb plot" categories, and his past studies plus on-the-spot experience made him sensitive to any change in the military situation. He scouted numerous areas besides Pearl Harbor in trips scattered over many weeks. Mikami remembered taking him to windward Oahu five or six times, both alone and with Kotoshirodo. On these trips Yoshikawa directed Mikami to follow along the Kokokahi Road, with its excellent view of Kaneohe Naval Air Station. Twice the agent and his faithful driver visited Wahiawa, which lies almost in the center of Oahu, conveniently near Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field. On one of these jaunts Yoshikawa tried to enter Schofield Barracks, "but the sentry at the gate refused them permission…because Mikami's taxi did not have proper identification plates." In early autumn Yoshikawa expanded his "sight-seeing" from buses and cars into the air. He donned his brightest aloha shirt and took one of his geisha friends for a tourist flight over Oahu. During this trip he could see Wheeler Field and noted the number and direction of runways. Near the southwest coast of the island the plane swung eastward across Ewa and north of Pearl Harbor. Military security restrictions forbade sight-seeing planes to fly over Pearl Harbor, but Yoshikawa saw the anchorage and Hickam Field clearly. In his bird's eye view of both Wheeler and Hickam, he estimated the number of planes by counting the hangars. The little aircraft then flew east of Aiea and back to Honolulu, the entire flight having taken no more than twenty or thirty minutes. This trip gave Yoshikawa an overall picture of Oahu, firsthand experience of air conditions, a glance at Hickam, which had proved a hard nut to crack, and an aerial view, albeit restricted, of Pearl Harbor. It showed him where any destroyers or other craft might be cruising around or near Oahu. Perhaps most valuable of all, it confirmed the accuracy of his observations from ground level."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 254-255

"On October 25 Yoshikawa's path crossed that of a man whose case is tailor-made to prove the validity of the consular spy's strictures on "other kind of people." This individual was Herr Doktor Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn. Suffice it to say of Kuehn's background that he had joined the Nazi party in 1930. Since April 1936 he and his wife, Friedel, and their family had been established in Honolulu, ostensibly to enable him to study Japanese at the University of Hawaii. He also attempted a career in real estate and in the furniture business, without success. He spent some time in Japan in 1935 and again in 1936. The general picture which Kuehn's career presents is that of a well-bred, fairly well-educated drifter. The Nazi party could have decided quit4e early that this man had the temperament for espionage. In his original statement to the FBI of January 1942, Kuehn made no mention of the interesting fact that during the period 1928 and 1930 he belonged to the German Navy's secret police, although this came out later. Nor did he confide the still more interesting detail that he had been under contract to the Japanese Navy since 1935. In that year he contacted Captain Tadao Yokoi, the Japanese naval attaché in Berlin, and signed an initial contract for two years at a salary of $2,000 a month plus $6,000 bonus at the end of each year, with the contract renewable at the close of each period if all went well. Kuehn also remained discreetly silent about an interview with Kanji Ogawa in Japan that same year, at which time Kuehn discussed intelligence plans with other officers of the Naval General Staff. Ogawa accepted Kuehn, although with some misgivings. He worried about Kuehn's ability to do the job, not so much because he mistrusted his recruit as because the man appeared too nervous and jumpy for such an assignment. Duly approved, the Kuehns settled in Honolulu and made themselves agreeable. The Japanese renewed Kuehn's contract in 1938, although he had earned the reputation at headquarters in Tokyo of being a "money eater." In March 1939 Ogawa stopped off in Honolulu enroute to Washington to give Kuehn a portable radio transmitter of special design with a "quickly devised" aerial. The entire transmitter fitted into a suitcase and had a range of 100 miles. Ogawa also gave Kuehn instructions to lie low. If war came between Japan and the United States, he was to use the equipment to send messages to Japanese submarines waiting off Oahu. These submarines would relay the messages to Japan. Naturally all these goings-on did not pass unnoted. The Kuehns had incurred the suspicions of the District Intelligence Office, and by 1938 or early 1939 the DIO had spotted Kuehn as a probable agent for either Germany or Japan, or both."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 310

"About 1500 [Hawaii Time, December 6] Yoshikawa set out for his last check on the Fleet. His taxi took him to Aiea, then swung off the highway to the Pearl City pier. Then he returned to his office to prepare his report. Once more Kita looked over his draft and pronounced it good. After processing it, Yoshikawa went to the commercial telegraph office to dispatch this, his last message, at 1801. Its final sentence read: "It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm." As each of Kita's last messages reached the Foreign Office in Tokyo, they were passed to the Naval General Staff, where they wound up a few hours apart in Tomioka's Operations Section. He and his associates studied them briefly but carefully. The news from Hawaii was good: no barrage balloons over Pearl Harbor; no torpedo nets around the ships; no long-range air patrol; the bulk of the Fleet snugly in the great base. Of course, the carriers and a number of heavy cruisers had slipped through Japan's fingers and might spell trouble, but one could not expect to have everything one's own way. Tomioka set his encoders to work on each dispatch and sent off the first one at 1700 Japanese time, followed by the second an hour later. "As we sent these final, crucial messages," Tomioka recalled, "I prayed fervently to our ancestral gods that all would go well.""
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 479

Takeo Yoshikawa: World War II Japanese Pearl Harbor Spy

On March 27, 1941, the Japanese liner *Nitta Maru* nuzzled against Pier 8 near Honolulu's famous Aloha Tower on the Hawaiian island of Oahu. One of the disembarking passengers–a slim, 27-year-old man of medium height, his longish, black hair combed back–received a lei greeting from an official of the Japanese Consulate. Vice Consul Otojiro Okuda guided the young man, whose papers identified him as Tadashi Morimura, through customs and drove him to the two-story consulate on Nuuana Avenue.

There, Morimura chatted with Consul General Nagao Kita, was introduced to his co-workers and settled into a cottage in the consular compound. He was given the title of chancellor, which only Kita and Okuda knew would not be his real job.

In reality, the newcomer was Takeo Yoshikawa, a naval reserve ensign. Son of a policeman and a 1933 honor graduate of the Imperial Japanese Naval College, he briefly served aboard a battleship, then underwent submarine and pilot training. His promising career was truncated by a major stomach ailment. Retired after only two years, Yoshikawa was contemplating suicide when the navy offered him a job with its general staff's intelligence division. For the next four years, the young man studied English and pored over everything available on the U.S. Navy and its Pacific Ocean bases. He was told late in 1940 that he was being posted to the American territory of Hawaii. There, posing as junior diplomat Morimura, he was to keep current on the status of the U.S. fleet and its anchorages, reporting his observations to Tokyo by coded telegraph messages. The assignment fit into a plan outlined in January 1941 by Combined Fleet Commander Isoroku Yamamoto. The plan called for an aerial assault on Hawaii as the opening move of a war that seemed inevitable as tensions rose between the United States and Japan. Yoshikawa was to become his country's only military spy in the islands and Yamamoto's most valuable source of current information on Oahu.

Yoshikawa began by familiarizing himself with the principal Hawaiian islands and their military installations, which were concentrated on Oahu. To explore the latter, he frequently relied on a hired cab driven by John Mikami, a Japanese-Hawaiian who often performed chores for the consulate. Other times, the spy used a 1937 Ford chauffeured by Richard Kotoshirodo, a nisei consular clerk. It did not take long for Yoshikawa to scout out the various U.S. Army and Navy bases on central, southern and eastern Oahu. Predictably, the focus of his attention was Pearl Harbor, the nearly landlocked U.S. Pacific Fleet anchorage on the south coast of the island.

When Consul General Kita introduced Yoshikawa to a Japanese-style teahouse in the mountainside Alewa Heights section, just north of downtown Honolulu, the affable intelligence officer knew it would be his favorite operational site. Not only was the teahouse strategically situated but it also fit his penchant for hard drinking and pursuing women. The Shuncho ro (Spring Tide Restaurant) on Makanani Drive was run by a cooperative woman, a native of his own Shikoku Island, and was staffed by genial geishas. Its intelligence value lay in the view from the second floor. From the front windows, Yoshikawa could see Ford Island in the center of Pearl Harbor, only six miles to the west. Just to the left, adjacent to the naval installation, lay the army's Hickam Field. The teahouse conveniently had a telescope or two that enhanced the view.

Yoshikawa wisely did not overuse any one observation post or method as he spied on activities in Pearl Harbor and Hickam airfield. Sometimes, dressed as a laborer, he took a minibus to the cane fields at Aiea to the north of the two bases. From other nearby slopes, he could look down at the submarine facilities in the harbor's Southeast Loch. A pier at Pearl City to the northwest enabled the Japanese operative to view the far side of Ford Island and its airstrip. A close look at the harbor entrance, which might be guarded by anti-submarine nets, eluded him because both sides of the entrance were restricted areas. Without telling them what he was doing with their input, although they surely knew, he used one or more of the consulate's personnel to complement his intelligence gathering.

In keeping with his cover, Yoshikawa avoided illegally entering military bases or stealing classified documents. He shunned cameras and notepads, relying instead on memory. Given American openness, he and his helpers got virtually all the information they needed by legal, though stealthy, means. He supplemented his observations with items of interest gleaned from daily newspapers. Furthermore, U.S. counterintelligence agencies were hampered by laws that prohibited them from probing deeply into the consulate's communications. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military intelligence organizations followed leads that led elsewhere. For example, Captain Irving Mayfield, chief of the naval district intelligence offices, believed that the consulate, despite its presumed involvement in espionage, was not an important part of the [Japanese spy] net. Telephone taps had provided little of value, since the consular staff assumed that the Americans were eavesdropping. Other factors that hamstrung counterintelligence operations were an American fear of alarming the population and ongoing efforts to secure the loyalty of local ethnic Japanese.

Following a time-consuming process, Yoshikawa gradually recorded the island's patterns of military activity. Since the battleships were moored in double rows along Ford Island's southeast side, torpedoes could be used only against the outboard ones. Most vessels were in port every weekend. Air patrols neglected the northern side of Oahu. These and other observations were written up, encoded and transmitted to Tokyo using, in turn, all the cable companies in Honolulu.

By mid-1941, although his information was not always accurate, Yoshikawa had given the Japanese navy invaluable information for its upcoming surprise attack. He knew the individual American warships by name and whether or not they were in port on a specific day. He also eliminated other sites as potential targets, enabling Yamamoto's planners to focus on Pearl Harbor. Your concern over the old whaling port of Lahaina as a possible U.S. anchorage is groundless, the spy reported after a trip to Maui Island, to the southeast. After a glass-bottomed tourist-boat outing with two women co-workers, he described Kaneohe Bay on the windward side of Oahu's Koolau Mountains as too shallow for major fleet units.

American reaction to the growing Axis threat began to give the Honolulu consulate anxious moments, as U.S. authorities clamped down on spies both on the mainland and in Hawaii. Local papers announced that the Honolulu police had established an espionage bureau at the request of the FBI. Less constrained than its military counterparts, the FBI also was intensifying its own look at the consulate's 234 employees. President Franklin Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in the United States, closed American ports to Japanese ships and embargoed the sale of petroleum products to Japan. When German and Italian consulates were closed, there was concern that Japanese consulates might be next. That would have dealt a major blow to Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor planning.

By September, Japan's intelligence gatherers had a largely complete general picture of their Oahu targets. What they now needed were constantly updated data pinpointing warship locations, aircraft strength and the like. On September 24, Tokyo's strictly secret message No. 83 was received at the Honolulu consulate. It requested ship locations keyed to the five geographical zones into which Japanese naval intelligence had divided the waters of Pearl Harbor. Washington codebreakers had this revealing request, known as the bomb plot message, translated within 15 days of its interception. The message was deemed noncritical by the U.S. powers-that-be, however, and was therefore not relayed to military commanders in Hawaii. Yoshikawa and his colleagues, on the other hand, now could have little doubt that their work was feeding plans to attack Pearl Harbor. The consulate's response to the bomb plot message offered suggestions that would refine Tokyo's request and more precisely locate individual targets. This message, too, was intercepted by the Americans–and shrugged off. By this time, Washington was downplaying Japanese subversion in the interests of ongoing diplomatic talks with Tokyo.

Yoshikawa pursued his mission with unrelenting vigor. He used numerous cover ploys to scout places that soon would gain international attention–Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Wheeler, Bellows, Kaneohe and Ewa airfields, Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. In October, he met the man Tokyo had selected to be his successor once the outbreak of war shuttered the consulate. Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn was a Nazi who had moved with his family to Hawaii in 1936 under contract to the Japanese. He was a sleeper, a long-term agent to be activated when needed. Kuehn was anything but an effective agent–in fact, U.S. counterintelligence already had him on its suspect list–but he was the only one available to fill in at a time when Asian faces might be unwelcome in Hawaii. The letter and package Yoshikawa gave Kuehn contained, respectively, an operational message and $14,000 in working funds. Kuehn's vacation at Axis expense was over in more ways than one; he was arrested shortly after the Japanese attack.

In late October, the liner *Taiyo Maru* left Yokohama for Honolulu in a limited relaxation of the shipping freeze. Aboard were three Japanese naval officers ordered to make observations along the route laid out for the attack force, verify the consulate's information, and obtain new data. Although other personnel maintained a brisk traffic between the consulate and the trio on the docked liner during a five-day period, Yoshikawa kept away for security reasons. Nevertheless, the brunt of the new information requirements fell on his shoulders. He worked nearly around the clock to prepare responses, which included maps covering various aspects of Oahu's military dispositions. Despite close U.S. surveillance measures that kept them aboard ship, the visiting officers returned home satisfied that they had successfully completed their mission.

The intelligence-collecting pace paralleled the increased tension that came with a November 5 Tokyo imperial conference decision to prepare a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor for Sunday, December 7, Oahu time. Throughout the month, requests for updated information and replies flashed between Japan and Hawaii. While Yoshikawa and his helpers raced around Oahu, the *Kido Butai*, Japan's attack force, assembled and steamed eastward into the North Pacific. Soon, Yoshikawa was sending biweekly ships in harbor reports to Japan for relay to the approaching task force. Late in the month, the consulate was ordered to destroy its high-level codes and all accumulated secret papers. On December 1, with Emperor Hirohito present, the Japanese Privy Council officially authorized the Pearl Harbor action. The next day, Tokyo flashed a green light to the *Kido Butai* to proceed with the attack.

On December 5, Yoshikawa asked cabbie Mikami to drive him west along a road that has since been replaced by the Moanalua Freeway to a point north of Pearl Harbor. From there, he watched the last of the Pacific Fleet's three aircraft carriers put to sea with her escort of cruisers and destroyers. While the departure of USS Lexington came too late to affect Japan's war plans, the absence of the carriers on December 7 was to have a decisive effect on America's ability to eventually wrest the offensive from Japan. Yoshikawa was asked if the moored U.S. ships were protected by anti-aircraft balloons and anti-torpedo nets. His negative report on these contained a direct reference to a surprise attack, a slip that was caught by American codebreakers, but not translated until the day after the air raid.

At midafternoon on December 6, Yoshikawa climbed into Mikami's taxi for what turned out to be his final reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor from the Pearl City pier. Back at the consulate, he coordinated his report with Kita, then saw that the encoded message went to the RCA communications office for transmittal to Tokyo. The Japanese foreign ministry received it shortly afterward and passed it to the navy general staff for forwarding to the attack force. According to Yoshikawa's reporting, supplemented by coded transpacific telephone conversations with at least one other operative, everything seemed favorable for Sunday's mission. Late that Saturday, Oahu time, the latest target information was in the hands of the *Kido Butai*, now churning due south toward Oahu.

The Japanese consular personnel, not having been forewarned by Tokyo, nervously gathered together as the noise of the surprise raid reached them that fateful Sunday, December 7. Kita and Okuda were dressed for a golfing date. Yoshikawa had been in his cottage. An enterprising Honolulu journalist visiting the consulate for comments provided the first confirmation of what was happening. At midday, local policemen drove past posted guards into the driveway at the rear of the consulate and took over the building. They interrupted a last-minute burning of documents. Shortly afterward, Mikami pulled up in his taxi and asked a policeman to inform the consul general and vice consul that he had arrived to drive them to the golf course. Mikami was told that his fares would not be coming out to play that day.

Yoshikawa and his colleagues remained inside their workplace for more than a week. Driven to a Coast Guard vessel, they were then transported to San Diego. In March 1942, they were placed in an Arizona camp holding numerous interned nisei. Yoshikawa later described this experience as a cruel joke. You see, I couldn't trust them [Japanese-Americans] in Hawaii to help us. They were loyal to the United States. The spy and his companions ultimately were exchanged for American diplomats being held in Japan. During his internment, no outsider learned Yoshikawa's true identity.

Back in his homeland, Yoshikawa married and continued working for naval intelligence until the end of the war. Fearful of arrest when U.S. troops occupied Japan in 1945, he fled into the countryside and posed as a Buddhist monk. He returned to his wife and two children after the occupation, not telling his story to an American audience until 1960. He was a bitter man, unable to earn a living and forced to rely on his wife's insurance sales for subsistence. His government gave him neither honors nor pension. The aging Pearl Harbor spy was left to ask, Why has history cheated me?

This article was written by Wil Deac and originally appeared in the May 1997 issue of *World War II* magazine.

Source: http://www.historynet.com/takeo-yoshikawa-world-war-ii-japanese-pearl-harbor-spy.htm

The Imperial Japanese Consulate staff at Honolulu, Hawaii is photographed few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Takeo Yoshikawa is at center of front row. (Photo: Edit International/http://www.editinternational.com/photos.php?id=47a8838303593)

Takeo Yoshikawa (March 7, 1914-February 20, 1993) was a Japanese spy who worked at the Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii as a “Chancellor” prior to the Imperial Japanese Navy attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Yoshikawa collected detailed information related to the planned attack on Pearl Harbor from March 27, 1941 to December 7, 1941, including troop movements, maps of military bases (including Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field), and the number of airplanes and ships. Yoshikawa also spied on Pearl Harbor by airplane and acquired a bird’s eye view of Wheeler Field and Hickam Field while flying an airplane.



Left photo: Fragment of an actual PURPLE machine from the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, obtained by the United States at the end of World War II. The photograph in the display is that of Hiroshi Oshima shaking hands with Adolf Hitler. The man standing in the middle was Joachim von Ribbentrop. The Roosevelt Administration successfully intercepted Japanese PURPLE code messages involving Japan's plan to attack Pearl Harbor before the bombing of Pearl Harbor before the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The interception of critical PURPLE code messages enabled the Roosevelt Administration to "prepare" for the attack by ordering aircraft carriers to evacuate Pearl Harbor before the bombing raid on December 7, 1941. (Photo: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PURPLE.jpg)

Right photo: Takeo Yoshikawa, a former Japanese spy attached to the Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu in 1941, appears on a TV program in Tokyo, Japan on December 5, 1964. (AP Photo)

Left: Robert L. Shivers, FBI Special Agent in Charge of Hawaii (Honolulu) in 1941. FBI agent Robert L. Shivers was instrumental in persuading the Roosevelt administration to refrain from incarcerating 150,000 people of Japanese ancestry living in Hawaii.
Right: Bernard Julius "Otto" Kuehn, a Nazi German spy and a Nazi Party member who worked for the Imperial Japanese government, was involved in spying on Pearl Harbor while living in Hawaii in 1941. (Both photos: http://honolulu.fbi.gov/history.htm)

Pearl Harbor & Southern Operation (“Nanshinron”)

(Source: *The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor, The Original Photographs* by Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, and J. Michael Wenger)



Imperial Japanese Navy sailors of aircraft carrier *Zuikaku* are seen winching up the anchor on the quarter-deck after leaving Hitokappu Bay on Etorofu Island on the morning of November 26, 1941, enroute to attack Pearl Harbor.
(Photo: http://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=8971)

"*Akagi* hummed with activity as key personnel from every ship crowded her wardroom at Nagumo's call to attend a special conference on the morning of November 23. Here assembled the captains and staffs of the carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, [Captain Kijiro] Imaizumi and the skippers of his three submarines, and the commanding officer of *Kyokuto Maru*, flagship of the tankers. [Admiral Chuichi] Nagumo opened the meeting with an electrifying announcement: **"Our mission is to attack Pearl Harbor."** A wave of excitement ran through the assembly. This was the first time Nagumo had openly revealed the objective to all his commanding officers and staffs, although many present had been privy to the plot for months. Nagumo explained that the attack was not yet an absolute certainty. If negotiations between the United States and Japan proved successful, the task force would e ordered back; otherwise, there would be no alternative but to carry out the strike. He appealed to each individual to do everything in his power to ensure the mission's success. Next, [Rear Admiral Ryunosuke] Kusaka outlined the action they would take in case the enemy spotted the task force en route. If the enemy sighted the entire task force any time before X – 1 Day, Nagumo would turn his ships back to Japan. But if he and his staff believed the Americans had discovered only a portion of the Japanese ships, the task force would change course as conditions directed and proceed. However, if the enemy found them on X-Day or fired on them prior to that date, the Japanese must perforce fight it out. Having made these remarks, Kusaka introduced each succeeding speaker. [Commander Tomatsu] Oishi discussed the task force organization, the route across the Pacific, precautions to be observed, and the duty of each unit during the dangerous voyage."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 373-374



Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier *Zuikaku* anchors at Hitokappu Bay, Etorofu Island, Japan in November 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. (Source: Werneth, Ron, *Beyond Pearl Harbor: The Untold Stories of Japan's Naval Airmen*, Schiffer Military History, Atglen, PA, 2008, p. 66. Book states that the photo is from *Maru* magazine.)
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Zuikaku_Hitokappu_Bay_November_1941.jpg

Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carriers *Zuikaku* (foreground) and *Kaga* (background) sail in the Pacific Ocean in late November 1941 enroute to Hawaii to attack Pearl Harbor. The Imperial Japanese Navy utilized six aircraft carriers (*Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuikaku, Shokaku*) during its attack on Pearl Harbor. Four Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carriers (*Akagi*, *Kaga*, *Hiryu*, and *Soryu*) were sunk during the Battle of Midway in June 1942. (Source: Kure Maritime Museum, *Japanese Naval Warship Photo Album: Aircraft carrier and Seaplane carrier*, Supervisory editor: Kazushige Todaka, p. 68) http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Zuikaku_November_1941.jpg

4–13. Another view of *Kaga* and *Zuikaku* headed for Hawaii.

(Source: *The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor, The Original Photographs* by Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, and J. Michael Wenger (published in 1991))



(Source: *The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor, The Original Photographs* by Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, and J. Michael Wenger

"Hitokappu Bay, an inlet on Etorofu Island in the Kurile Islands group, was the assembly location for the six [aircraft] carriers of the First Air Fleet – the offensive power of the Pearl Harbor raid. Joining the carriers in the anchorage were its support force of two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, eleven destroyers, and three "I" type submarines, plus the crucial supply train of seven tankers. Several warships committed a serious radio security breach during their sortie to the Hitokappu Bay anchorage: each transmitted coded movement reports – reports that could be read by American naval cryptographers in Washington, according to Albert Pelletier one of the Navy's top cryppies at Station US. These Japanese warship movement reports are substantiated by intercept records of Station H. None of the movement reports were shown to the 1945-46 congressional investigation or to the one in 1995. Instead, Congress was told that American radio intelligence had "lost" the warships because each Japanese naval vessel maintained radio silence. Admiral Kimmel's intelligence chief, Edwin Layton, substantiated this claim. During his Capitol Hill testimony in 1946, he said neither the Japanese carriers nor the carrier commanders were ever addressed or heard on Nippon radio frequencies in the twenty-five days preceding Pearl Harbor. But Layton was covering up. The radio intercept reports were available, but Layton failed to inform Admiral Kimmel of the Japanese movement to Hitokappu Bay. In fact, Navy radio monitoring stations at Corregidor, Guam, Hawaii, and Dutch Harbor, Alaska, intercepted the transmissions. Japanese warships and the commanding admirals of the thirty-one-ship Hawaii force broke radio silence and were addressed by Tokyo radio during the twenty-five days from about November 12 through the December 7 "surprise attack." One intercepted message on November 18 defied all security precautions and spelled out H-I-T-O-K-A-P-P-U-B-A-Y. The Roman letters were not even encoded – they were spelled out in clear. Confirmation of this is available from the station H records, but Captain Duane Whitlock, the radio traffic analyst at CAST, denies that such a message was sent. Other warships went on the Japanese naval air waves and confirmed that Hitokappu Bay was the standby location for the Hawaii force. British naval monitors at Singapore and their Dutch counterparts in Java heard the same broadcasts. General Hein ter Poorten, commander of the Netherlands army forces in the DEI [Dutch East Indies], said his cryptologists at *Kamer* 14 had evidence that "showed Japanese naval concentration near the Kuriles."
– *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 46-48

"Over the weekend of November 28-30 diplomatic negotiations between America and Japan collapsed when the United States presented a calculated ten-point proposal that called for settling relations…The American proposal insisted that Japan renounce the war with China, renounce their Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, and renounce the economic plan for Southeast Asia called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Secretary of State Cordell Hull presented the proposal to Ambassador Nomura late in the after of November 26. It contained ten points that Hull called a *modus vivendi* (temporary agreement)…In a handwritten note to Hull, the President said he regarded the proposal as fair but did not believe that Japan would agree. "I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon." From Japan's point of view, renouncing the war in China was impossible. It would have turned the nation's back on hundreds of thousands of Japanese military personnel who had been killed or wounded in the four years of fighting there. To abandon either the Tripartite Pact or the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would have been equally difficult for Japan. Japanese officials felt that their nation's survival depended upon access to the natural resources of Southeast Asia. And her only governmental friends in the world were Germany and Italy."
– *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 217-218

"Emperor Hirohito and his council of advisors, the Liaison Conference, responded to the ultimatum by giving the go-ahead to Admiral Yamamoto: start the war on Monday, December 8, 1941 – Tokyo Time. Yamamoto then sent a message using a prearranged phrase to the Combined Fleet. According to American sources and most Japanese accounts the phrase was broadcast in plain Japanese in the *katakana* naval syllabary. It read: NIITAKA YAMA NOBORE, 1208. In English: CLIMB MOUNT NIITAKA, 1208 REPEAT 1208. At 1:30 A.M. on December 2, the message reached Hawaii. One of Kisner's operators at Station H, Joseph Christie Howard, intercepted the order…He transcribed the message on his code typewriters, entered it in the log book, and put it in the intelligence pipeline. But in the next step of the pipeline, deceit took over. According to Edwin Layton, Hawaii never received the NIITAKA transmission. He developed four different stories that implied that the message was never intercepted or received in Hawaii. But the stories were flawed, for the message was intercepted by Joseph Howard at Station H. For 58 years Howard's account of intercepting Yamamoto's war start message never became public. Howard never testified before any Pearl Harbor investigation, including the Thurmond-Spence inquiry of 1995. During most of Layton's postwar lifetime, the Navy intercept records of Station H remained in locked vaults, classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD, unavailable to the public. Layton certainly had reason to believe that the intercepts would never be declassified and would never be used to contradict the assertions he made about the NIITAKA messages… In truth, the message was intercepted by three Navy listening posts – on Corregidor, Guam, and Hawaii – and was available by December 3 Hawaii Time for delivery to Admiral Hart and General MacArthur in Manila, Admiral Kimmel and General Short in Hawaii, and President Roosevelt's military staff in Washington. But there is no record indicating that any of the officials saw the intercept. None of the Pearl Harbor investigations followed the paper trail of the NIITAKA dispatch that led from Stations CAST, HYPO, or BAKER on Guam…When the English version of the message was prepared (but never introduced into evidence) for Congress in 1945, a cryptographer whose Navy initials are RK interpreted the meaning of NIITAKA YAMA NOBORE, 1208. RK wrote: "This was undoubtedly the prearranged signal for specifying the date for opening hostilities. However, the significance of the phrase is interesting in that it is so appropriately used in this connection. Niitaka Yama is the highest mountain in the Japanese Empire. To climb Niitaka Yama is to accomplish one of the greatest feats – in other words, undertake the task (for carrying out assigned operations). 1208 signifies the 12 month, 8th day, Item time.""
– *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 218-222



Japan's Basic Strategy in December 1941
(Source: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v2%20p1/ch4.htm)



Southern Operations, December 1941-May 1942
(Source: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v2%20p1/ch5.htm)

Composition of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy (December 1941)

Main Body:
Under direct command Commander-in-Chef, Combined Fleet.
Mission: To support overall operations.
6 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer.

Task Force:
Under Commander-in-Chef, 1st Air Fleet.
Mission: **To attack the American Fleet in the Hawaii area** and subsequently support operations of the South Seas and Southern Forces.
6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 11 destroyers, 3 submarines.
[Names of the 6 aircraft carriers: *Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Zuikaku, Shokaku*]

Advance (Submarine) Force:
Under Commander-in-Chef, 6th Fleet.
Mission: **To reconnoiter Hawaiian waters in advance of Pearl Harbor attack**, cooperate with Task Force in execution of attack, and attack enemy naval forces along west coast of the United States.
27 submarines, 1 submarine tender, 1 coastal defense ship.

South Seas Force:
Under Commander-in-Chef, 4th Fleet.
Missions: To occupy Wake; defend and patrol inner South Seas area and protect surface traffic; cooperate with the Army in the successive occupation of Guam and Rabaul.

Southern Forces:
Under over-all command of Cin-C, 2nd Fleet.
Missions: To destroy enemy fleet and air strength in the Philippines, Malaya, and Dutch East Indies areas; act as surface escort and support landings of Army forces in Philippines, Malaya, Borneo, and Thailand; prepare for invasion operations in the Dutch East Indies, Timor, and Burma.

Main Body:
Under direct command Commander-in-Chef, 2nd Fleet.
2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 10 destroyers.

Philippines Force:
Under Commander-in-Chef, 3rd Fleet.
1 aircraft carrier, 5 heavy cruisers, 5 light cruisers, 29 destroyers, 4 torpedo boats, 4 minesweepers, 3 base forces.

Malaya Force:
Under Commander-in-Chef, Southern Expeditionary Fleet.

Source: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v2%20p1/ch5.htm

Pearl Harbor Task Force of the Imperial Japanese Navy in December 1941:
Aircraft carriers: *Kaga, Akagi, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Hiryu, Soryu*
Battleships: *Kirishima, Hiei*
Heavy Crusiers: *Tone,Chikuma*
Light Cruiser: *Abukuma*
Destroyers: *Urakaze, Isokaze, Tanikaze, Hamakaze, Akigumo, Kasumi, Arare, Kagero, Shiranuhi, Sazanami, Ushio*
Submarines: 19 Igo 19, 21 Igo 21, 23 Igo 23
Supply ships: *Kenyo-Maru, Kyokuto-Maru, Kokuyo-Maru, Shinkoku-Maru, Toho-Maru, Nihon-Maru, Toei-Maru, Shiriya*

Source: *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange



Six aircraft carriers of the First Air Fleet (一航空艦隊), a unit of the Imperial Japanese Navy, departed Hitokappu Bay, located next to Etorofu Island, at 0600 [6:00 A.M.] on November 26, 1941 [Japan local time] (and at 1600 [4:00 P.M.] on November 25, 1941 Washington , D.C. local time).



The *Kido Butai*: *Akagi* and three of Nagumo's six carriers shortly before the striking force set sail for Hawaii on 26 November 1941.

A photo of the *Kido Butai* docked at Hitokappu Bay next to Etorofu Island (Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

Photo # 80-G-71198 Japanese planes prepare to take off to attack Pearl Harbor, 7 Dec. 1941

Japanese naval aircraft prepare to take off from an aircraft carrier (reportedly *Shokaku*), possibly during the launch of the second attack wave, to attack Pearl Harbor during the morning of December 7, 1941. Plane in the foreground is a "Zero" Fighter. The original photograph was captured on Attu in 1943. (*Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives Collection.*)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-ja1.htm



The Japanese First Air Fleet, commanded by Admiral Nagumo, departed from Hitokappu Bay for Pearl Harbor on November 26 (Tokyo Time), 1941. Contrary to popular belief, Nagumo broke radio silence during the voyage, carrying on extensive radio communications with other Japanese admirals. His signals were heard in Hawaii, Alaska, and on America's West Coast. In the photograph, a lone Japanese sailor dressed for the cold weather of the North Pacific watches the HIMJS *Kaga* (left) and the HIMJS *Zuikaku* follow in the *Akagi*'s wake. *Imperial Japanese Navy photo.*

(Source: *Day of Deceit* by Robert B. Stinnett)

Photo # 80-G-182259 Japanese planes prepare to take off for the Pearl Harbor attack, 7 Dec. 1941

Japanese Navy Type 99 Carrier Bombers ("Val") prepare to take off from an aircraft carrier during the morning of December 7, 1941. Ship in the background is the carrier Soryu. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives Collection)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-ja1.htm

Japanese bomber pilots receive their orders onboard an aircraft carrier prior to commencing their mission of bombing Pearl Harbor. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto hoped that a quick surprise attack on the U.S. fleet would make the Americans petition for peace, leaving the Pacific open for the Japanese expansion. (Keystone/Getty) http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1691753_1498751,00.html

Photo # NH 50603 Torpedo plane takes off from Shokaku to attack Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

A Japanese Navy Type 97 Carrier Attack Plane ("Kate") takes off from a carrier as the second wave attack is launched during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Ship's crewmen are cheering "Banzai". This ship is either *Zuikaku* or *Shokaku*. (*NHHC Photograph*) http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-ja1.htm

Photo # 80-G-182249 Japanese plane leaves Shokaku to attack Pearl Harbor, 7 Dec. 1941

A Japanese Navy Type 97 Carrier Attack Plane ("Kate") takes off from the aircraft carrier Shokaku, en route to attack Pearl Harbor, during the morning of 7 December 1941. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives Collection)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-ja1.htm



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Original

U. NAVAL AIR STATION, KODIAK ALASKA
NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS

Heading NPG NR 63 F L Z 75L 071830 GBQ TART 0 81

From: CINCPAC | Date 7 DEC 41

To: ALL SHIPS PRESENT AT HAWAIIN AREA.

Info: "URGENT"

DEFERRED unless otherwise checked | ROUTINE | PRIORITY | AIRMAIL | MAILGRAM

AIRRAID ON PEARLHARBOR X THIS IS NO DRILL

07014

RM 58 1910 7DEC

Comdg Off	Exec	Comm	Oper	Supply	Disb	Med'l	Aerog	Pers	Pub Wlfs	Mar Det	A & R	Files	FAD	NRAB	OOD	WDO		

A–Denotes action I–Denotes information X–Denotes copy only

Photo # NH 50930 Japanese aerial photo of Pearl Harbor under attack, 7 Dec. 1941, looking east

A photograph of Battleship Row at the beginning of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U.S.A. that occurred at 7:55 A.M. (Hawaii Time) on December 7, 1941. The explosion in the center is a torpedo strike on the USS *West Virginia*. The attack on Pearl Harbor ended before 10:00 A.M. (Hawaii Time). An Imperial Japanese Navy airman took a photograph of Battleship Row while riding in one of the airplanes.

Photograph taken from a Japanese plane during the torpedo attack on ships moored on both sides of Ford Island. View looks about east, with the supply depot, submarine base and fuel tank farm in the right center distance. A torpedo has just hit USS *West Virginia* on the far side of Ford Island (center). Other battleships moored nearby are (from left): *Nevada*, *Arizona*, *Tennessee* (inboard of *West Virginia*), *Oklahoma* (torpedoed and listing) alongside *Maryland*, and *California*. On the near side of Ford Island, to the left, are light cruisers *Detroit* and *Raleigh*, target and training ship *Utah* and seaplane tender *Tangier*. *Raleigh* and *Utah* have been torpedoed, and *Utah* is listing sharply to port. Japanese planes are visible in the right center (over Ford Island) and over the Navy Yard at right. Japanese writing in the lower right states that the photograph was reproduced by authorization of the Navy Ministry. (NHHC Photograph)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-oa.htm

Photo # 80-G-19942 USS Arizona burning at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

USS *Arizona* (BB-39) sunk and burning furiously on December 7, 1941. Her forward magazines had exploded when she was hit by a Japanese bomb. At left, men on the stern of USS *Tennessee* (BB-43) are playing fire hoses on the water to force burning oil away from their ship. (*Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives Collection*) http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-a/bb39.htm

Photo # 80-G-32719 USS Shaw burning in floating drydock YFD-2, at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941



USS *Shaw* (DD-373) burning in floating drydock *YFD-2* after she was set afire by Japanese dive bombing attacks on December 7, 1941. The burning bow of USS *Nevada* (BB-36) is on the right. At left is a motor launch from USS *San Francisco* (CA-38).
(*Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives Collection*) http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-shw.htm

Photo # 80-G-19943 Wrecks of USS Downes & Cassin, 7 Dec. 1941

The wrecked destroyers USS *Downes* (DD-375) and USS *Cassin* (DD-372) in Drydock One at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, soon after the end of the Japanese air attack. *Cassin* has capsized against *Downes*. USS *Pennsylvania* (BB-38) is astern, occupying the rest of the drydock. The torpedo-damaged cruiser USS *Helena* (CL-50) is in the right distance, beyond the crane. Visible in the center distance is the capsized USS *Oklahoma* (BB-37), with USS *Maryland* (BB-46) alongside. Smoke is from the sunken and burning USS *Arizona* (BB-39), out of view behind *Pennsylvania*. USS *California* (BB-44) is partially visible at the extreme left.
(This image has been attributed to Navy Photographer's Mate Harold Fawcett. *Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives collection.*)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/pearlhbr.htm

The battleship *USS Arizona* belches smoke as it topples over into the sea during a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941. The ship sank with more than 80 percent of its 1,500-man crew. The attack, which left 2,402 Americans dead and 916 missing, broke the backbone of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and forced America out of a policy of isolationism. The Imperial Japanese Navy lost 9 fighter planes, 15 dive bombers, and 5 torpedo bombers during the attack. (AP Photo)

Photo # 80-G-21217 Japanese air attack on Wheeler Field and Schofield Barracks, 7 December 1941

Imperial Japanese Navy pilots attack Wheeler Air Field and Schofield Barracks on December 7, 1941, as seen from a Japanese Navy plane. Most of the smoke comes from planes burning on the Wheeler Field apron in the center.
(Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives collection)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air.htm

Photo # 80-G-21218 Japanese Type 97 Carrier Attack Plane ("Kate") over Hickam Field, 7 December 1941



Japanese Navy Type 97 Carrier Attack Plane ("Kate") flies high over Hickam Army Air Field during the attack on December 7, 1941. Pearl Harbor is in the background, with smoke rising from burning ships off Ford Island and at the Navy Yard.
Photographed from a Japanese plane. *Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives collection.*
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air.htm

Photo # 80-G-32906 Army P-40 destroyed by Japanese attack on Wheeler Field, 7 Dec. 1941

Men examine the burned-out wreckage of a P-40 pursuit aircraft, near Hangar 4 at Wheeler Air Field, following the end of the Japanese raid on December 7, 1941. (Note long blast tubes for the plane's nose machine guns.)
(Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives collection) http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air.htm

Photo # 80-G-32896 Army planes destroyed by Japanese attack on Wheeler Field, 7 Dec. 1941

A U.S. Army aircraft destroyed by Japanese raiders at Wheeler Air Field was photographed later in the day on December 7, 1941, following the end of the attacks. Wreckage includes at least one P-40 and a twin-engine amphibian as well as a wrecked hangar in the background. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives collection)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-air.htm



U.S.S. *West Virginia*, severely damaged; U.S.S. Tennessee, damaged; and U.S.S. *Arizona*, sunk during the Imperial Japanese Navy attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. (Library of Congress Collection) http://www.flickr.com/photos/32912172@N00/2950636384/

A photo of the rear view of hanger No. 11 at Hickam Field in Hawaii on December 7, 1941. (Library of Congress Collection)
http://www.flickr.com/photos/32912172@N00/2950636182/in/photostream/

Photo # NH 83109 Chart of ship positions in Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack, 7 Dec. 1941



Chart showing the positions of ships inside Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese Attack, at about 0800 on 7 December 1941.
The orientation of the compass direction arrow in the chart's center is turned approximately 45 degrees too far in a counterclockwise direction.
Some of the ships moored in "nests" in the northern part of the harbor are listed in incorrect order.
(Collection of Vice Admiral Homer N. Wallin, USN (Retired), 1975; *NHHC Photograph*)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-oa.htm



The large tank farm for the storage of fuel oil, situated near the submarine base at Pearl Harbor, was left untouched by the attackers. Had Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the officer in tactical command of the attack force, not passed up the chance to make a second attack, these tanks, which proved extremely valuable as the U.S. Navy mounted its counteroffensive in early 1942, might have been destroyed. Admiral Fukudome, however, defends Nagumo's decision, on the basis that he had already accomplished what he set out to do. (National Archives: 80-G-182880.)

(Source: *Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy*, Edited by Paul Stillwell)

Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier *Zuikaku* dive bomber pilots pose for a group photo before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in December 1941. The photo was likely taken aboard ship the day before the attack, on December 6, 1941. Front row, from the left: second person, Masataka Fukunaga; third person, Reijiro Otsuka; fourth person, Tamotsu Ema; fifth person, Tohichi Azuma. Second row, fourth person from the left is Kenji Hori.
Source: Werneth, Ron, *Beyond Pearl Harbor: The Untold Stories of Japan's Naval Airmen*, Schiffer Military History, Atglen, PA, 2008, p. 66. Book states that the photo is from the *Arizona* Memorial.
(Photo: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Zuikaku_dive_bomber_pilots_Pearl_Harbor.jpg)

Shigekazu Shimazaki (September 9, 1908-January 9, 1945), was a career officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service during World War II. Shimazaki, who graduated from Eta Jima in 1929, was the leader of the second wave of the air attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.



Imperial Japanese Navy Captain Mitsuo Fuchida (December 3, 1902-May 30, 1976), who announced, “Tora! Tora! Tora!” on his radio on the morning of December 7, 1941, lead the first air wave attacks on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. **Fuchida converted to Christianity after World War II and became a preacher**; Fuchida became a naturalized American citizen in the 1960s.



A photo of Japanese battleship Yamato (大和) under construction at the Kure Naval Base (呉海軍基地), Japan on September 20, 1941. The aircraft carrier HIJMS Hosho is at the extreme right. The supply ship Mamiya is in the center distance.
(Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Commander Shizuo Fukui; U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph)

December 1941. On the flight deck of the carrier *Agaki* en route to Hawaii.

Fuchida, in center wearing white cap, chats with his fellow pilots the day before the attack.

Photographs of Mitsuo Fuchida aboard the aircraft carrier *Akagi* in December 1941 before the air raid on Pearl Harbor.
Source: *God's Samurai: Lead Pilot at Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange (with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon)

Photo # NH 91331 Japanese midget submarine on an Oahu beach, Dec. 1941

Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki's HA-19 midget submarine ran aground on the beaches of Oahu on December 7-8, 1941.

Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki (November 8, 1918-November 29, 1999) was a Japanese naval officer who became the first Japanese prisoner-of-war of World War II captured by American forces. Sakamaki was captured by U.S. Army Sergeant David Akui on the beaches of Oahu on the morning of December 8, 1941, the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Sakamaki attempted to destroy his submarine after his submarine malfunctioned; however, the explosives used to destroy the submarine failed to explode. Kazuo Sakamaki remained a prisoner-of-war until the end of World War II. After World War II, Sakamaki served as a president of a Brazilian subsidiary of Toyota.

Imperial Japanese Military Leaders Behind the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Left: Admiral Shigetarō Shimada (September 24, 1883-June 7, 1976) was Minister of the Navy from October 18, 1941 to July 17, 1944. Admiral Shimada was also the Commander of Kure Naval Station from November 15, 1938 to April 15, 1940. Admiral Shimada was the Commander of the Yokosuka Naval Station for several weeks in 1941 before he was appointed Minister of the Navy.

Right: General Hideki Tojo (December 30, 1884-December 23, 1948) was the Prime Minister of Japan from October 18, 1941 to July 22, 1944 and Minister of War [Army] from 1940 to 1944. Hideki Tojo was tried as a “Class A” war criminal in Tokyo, Japan after World War II.



Left: Admiral Osami Nagano (June 15, 1880-January 5, 1947) was the Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff from April 1941 to February 1944. Admiral Nagano was Minister of the Navy from March 1936 to February 1937 and the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy from February 2, 1937 to December 1, 1937.

Right: Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama (January 1, 1880-September 12, 1945) was Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff from October 1940 to February 1944.

Photo # NH 63430 Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Japanese Navy

Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (April 4, 1884-April 18, 1943) was the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy from August 30, 1939 to April 18, 1943, when he was killed in action. Admiral Yamamoto was killed on Bougainville Island when his transport bomber airplane was shot down by U.S. Army Air Forces fighter pilots operating from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto proposed a Japanese naval attack on Pearl Harbor as early as January 7, 1941. Admiral Yamamoto served as a naval attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. during the 1920s, visited oil fields in Texas, and attended classes at Harvard University.

"Nanshinron" (南進論), a Japanese military term for "South Strike strategy", was a Japanese military strategy for a Japanese invasion of French Indochina (Saigon), Dutch East Indies (Jakarta), British Malaya (Singapore), Hong Kong, Burma, and the Philippines. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in an attempt to sabotage the U.S. Navy and prevent the U.S. Navy from interfering with Imperial Japan's conquest of French Indochina and the oil-rich Dutch East Indies as well as the British colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore. The Imperial Japanese government conquered southeast Asia in an attempt to acquire raw materials for the Japanese family-owned corporations (zaibatsu) and to sustain their military-industrial complex and growing population. Original photograph was in the files of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, USNR. (U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph)

Photo # NH 63423 Adm. Chuichi Nagumo, Japanese Navy

Admiral Chūichi Nagumo (March 25, 1887-July 6, 1944) was the commander of the *Kido Butai* (the carrier battle group). Nagumo was appointed Commander in Chief of the First Air Fleet, the Imperial Japanese Navy's main Carrier battle group, on April 10, 1941. Nagumo committed suicide while defending Saipan in July 1944.



Emperor Hirohito, also known as Emperor Shōwa (April 29, 1901-January 7, 1989), was the Emperor of Japan from December 25, 1926 until his death on January 7, 1989. Emperor Hirohito gave his approval to the Imperial Japanese Navy's proposed military operation to attack Hawaii during a meeting with his military subordinates in November 1941. Emperor Hirohito preferred to solve Japan's dipute with America through diplomacy in early 1941; however, Hirohito capitulated to Japanese Army's demands for an attack on Pearl Harbor by November 1941.

Operations Section, Naval General Staff, December 11, 1941. *Front Row:* Capt. Sadatoshi Tomioka, Chief of Section; Cmdr. HIH Prince Nobuhito Takamatsu; RADM Shigeru Fukudome, Chief, 1st Bureau; Capt. Shigenori Kami; *Back Row:* Cmdr. Nasatomo Nakano; Cmdr. Shigeshi Uchida; Cmdr. Sadamu Sanagi; Lt. Cmdr. Marquis Hironobu Katcho; Cmdr. Yugi Yamamoto; Cmdr. Tatsukichi Miyo.

(Source: *At Dawn We Slept* by Gordon W. Prange)

(Left) RADM Takijiro Onishi, Chief of Staff, 11th Fleet.
(Right) Cmdr. Minoru Genda, Air Staff Officer, 1st Air Fleet.

Pearl Harbor planners Rear Admiral Takijiro Onishi (left) and Commander Minoru Genda (right)
(Source: *At Dawn We Slept* by Gordon W. Prange)

(Top) Capt. Kanji Ogawa, Asst. Chief, 3rd Bureau, Naval General Staff. (Center) RADM Minoru Maeda, Chief, 3rd Bureau, Naval General Staff. (Bottom) Lt. Cmdr. Itaru Tachibana, Intelligence Officer, 3rd Bureau, Naval General Staff.

Imperial Japanese Navy intelligence officers in 1941 (Source: *At Dawn We Slept* by Gordon W. Prange)

GENERAL MINORU GENDA, 84, DIES: PLANNED ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

By PETER B. FLINT
The New York Times
Published: August 17, 1989

General Minoru Genda, who planned the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, died of heart disease in a Tokyo hospital Tuesday on the 44th anniversary of the end of the World War II. He would have been 85 years old yesterday.

General Genda, an early advocate of naval air power over surface vessels, was a native of Hiroshima and a 1924 graduate of the Japanese Naval Academy, where he introduced aerobatics teams that were popularly known as “Genda’s circuses.”

He became a fighter pilot while bombing and strafing cities in China and was increasingly regarded by Japanese leaders as one of the nation's brightest young officers. As a commander in the navy, he was assigned to the general staff and directed to draft the air tactics for the Pearl Harbor assault, which crippled the American Pacific fleet and plunged the United States into World War II. He was aboard one of the carriers that staged the strike on Dec. 7, 1941, but illness kept him from piloting a bomber.

Low-Flying Torpedo Bombers

He is considered responsible for originating attacks by low-flying torpedo bombers, which were used with devastating effect. The assault killed nearly 2,450 Americans, sank or severely damaged 19 ships, destroyed 177 planes and gave Japan control of the central Pacific. When the Japanese entered the Pacific war, he recalled, “I thought we would win, but we misjudged America's real strength. We lacked war materiel, and our national leadership was not up to the task.”

After World War II, he was commissioned a general in the air force [Japan Air Self-Defense Force] and served as chief of staff from 1959 to 1962, when he was elected to the upper house of Parliament. For years he was chairman of the National Defense Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party and served many terms in Parliament, retiring in 1986.

In 1969, General Genda said that if he had been commander-in-chief of the Japanese armed forces in 1941, he would have ordered repeated air attacks on Pearl Harbor and the occupation of the Hawaiian Islands by Japanese forces as a base for an attack on the West Coast of the United States.

Would Have Used A-Bombs

The outspoken, craggy-faced general said that if Japan had possessed atomic bombs, it might have used them against the United States. He also expressed the view that Japan should allow the United States to station nuclear arms on Japanese soil, a statement that prompted a rebuke by party leaders.

General Genda made these remarks during a three-week speaking tour of the United States sponsored by the Naval Institute, a private historical and professional association. Addressing American officers and midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy, he said the idea for the concentrated strike from a task force of aircraft carriers came to him in 1940 while he was watching an American newsreel. His 1969 tour of the United States drew protests from some veterans' groups, but his appearances were generally politely received. Seven years earlier, he received the highest United States honor given to foreigners, the Legion of Merit, for his role in rebuilding the Japanese air force and cooperating closely with the United States.

A Top Fighter Pilot

General Genda was instrumental in arming Japan’s air force with the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter and was considered to be one of the best Japanese pilots of the F-104. By 1960 he had logged 5,000 hours of flying time, 1,000 of them in jets in which he was instructed by Americans. Even with the augmented Japanese air force, he said that, except for limited actions, Japan must rely on American might for its defense.

Asked about his ties with Americans, he replied: “Of course, I get along fine with them. The American pilots especially are a wonderful, congenial bunch of men.” Questioned about the scars of combat, he said, “Wars are fought and then they end, and when they end we don't look back - only forward.”

The general abstained from cigarettes and alcohol and helped keep his trim, muscular body in shape by rising at 4 A.M., exercising, briskly walking his many dogs and getting to bed by 8 P.M. He was a strong advocate of animals' rights. Survivors include his wife and three children.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/17/obituaries/general-minoru-genda-84-dies-planned-attack-on-pearl-harbor.html

"In one nostalgic postwar discussion [Minoru] Genda said, "The attack against Pearl Harbor was the summit of my career as a Navy officer." Indeed, his work on the Hawaiian venture alone will seal his name in the history of the Imperial Navy. For about two weeks he labored in secret aboard *Kaga*. Then in late February he returned to Kanoya for a second conference with Onishi. The basic elements of Genda's draft were:

1. *The attack must catch the enemy completely by surprise*. This point followed the traditions of Japanese military history. If surprise could not be achieved, Genda thought they might as well drop the whole idea. For if the Americans expected the attack, the task force could sail into a well-laid trap. At best bombing would be ineffective, casualties among the attacking planes and crews exorbitantly high, and the danger of fatal damage to the carrier fleet prohibitive.
2. *The main objective of the attack should be U.S. carriers.* In contrast with Yamamoto's original idea, Genda visualized the primary target as the long-range striking arm of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. If Japan could sink America's carriers and escape with the majority of its flattops undamaged, it would have a double advantage. With U.S. naval air power badly shattered and its own still capable of powerful offensive action, in time Japan could destroy other major units of the enemy fleet. Eventually the Imperial Navy could roam the Pacific with impunity. Of course, Genda wished to sink battleships, too, but carriers held first priority.
3. *Another priority target should be U.S. land-based planes on Oahu.* Destruction of as many enemy aircraft as possible – preferably on the ground at the outset of the strike – would secure control of the air over the target. It would also preclude the enemy's following the Japanese aircraft back to the carriers and bombing the task force.
4. *Every available carrier should participate in the operation.* Instead of Yamamoto's tentative suggestion of one or at the most two carrier divisions, Genda, like Onishi, wanted the greatest application of power – the military principle of mass. He wished to inflict maximum damage to the U.S. Fleet. The stronger the carrier force, the better chance the Japanese would have of a successful attack and the better they would be prepared to face unexpected developments at the scene of action.
5. *The attack should utilize all types of bombing – torpedo, dive, and high-level.* Genda placed priority on torpedo bombing; like most Japanese airmen, he considered the aerial torpedo their highest-yield weapon. But he doubted that a successful torpedo attack could be launched in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. In fact, he considered it "practically out of the question." Genda's draft also reminded Onishi that there might be "antitorpedo obstructions" around U.S. warships. Should hard training and enemy countermeasures prove that torpedo bombing was not feasible, the Japanese should rely on dive bombing. This was his second preference because high-level bombing had not proved entirely satisfactory in China.
6. *Fighter planes should play an active part in the attack.* A strong fighter escort should protect the bombers en route to and from Pearl Harbor. Once over the target, they would sweep the skies clear of enemy planes. During the attack other fighters should hover over the carrier fleet to ward off enemy counterstrokes.
7. *The attack should be made in daylight, preferably in the early morning.* Neither the Imperial Navy nor the Army had precise instruments to assist in air strikes under cover of darkness. So Genda suggested that the air armada should take off from the carriers long before sunrise, timed to reach Pearl Harbor at dawn.
8. *Refueling at sea would be necessary.* Most Japanese warships had a limited radius of action. Therefore, tankers had to accompany the task force. Inasmuch as refueling would constitute one of the most knotty problems of the entire operation, it must be studied thoroughly.
9. *All planning must be done in strict secrecy.* Tight security was imperative to prevent the enemy from even guessing that the Japanese were preparing such a dangerous enterprise. Then, too, as Genda stressed, "The success of this attack depends on the outcome of the initial strike." All the more reason why the operation must be a complete surprise."

– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 25-26



Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and his Navy officers study a map.

"Fighters also trained hard in this early period. Communications in particular posed a problem. Before 1941 the Japanese Navy had never sent a fighter unit more than 100 miles from its home base or carrier, and the radiotelephone connection worked only for that distance. Now they planned to dispatch Zeros against a target 250 to 300 miles from the carriers, and at this space they had to use Morse code. So throughout the summer the Navy communications people had to train fighter pilots in this skill. In mid-June 1941 Onishi, Sasaki from the Combined Fleet staff, and Genda visited the Operations Section of the Naval General Staff. There they conferred among others with Miyo, Commander Sadamu Sanagi, and Commander Shigenori Kami. A very bright and practical-minded officer, Kami had general charge of "war-preparation and operational plans." Sanagi, sharp and shrewd, had served in the United States as assistant naval attaché and had traveled in England, France, Germany, and Italy to study aviation. The delegation made a vigorous pitch for the adoption of the Pearl Harbor project as a part of Japan's overall strategy…But the conferees indulged in some tactical discussions about the proposed Pearl Harbor attack. Sasaki and Uchida insisted that battleships should be the prime targets; Genda and Kami were just as forceful that carriers and land-based aircraft must receive top priority. After the meeting Tomioka gave Genda Onishi's report which he had worked out for Yamamoto. Genda took it back to *Akagi* and never showed it to anyone else. Early in June Genda recommended to Nagumo that all high-level bombing leaders go to Kagoshima Naval Airfield to train as Watanabe and Aso had done. Accordingly the sixteen horizontal-bombing leaders of the First Air Fleet set out for intensive training under Furukawa's direction. Genda hoped that at Kagoshima they would work up an intense competitive spirit and that intergroup rivalry would improve their marksmanship. Yamamoto knew even better than Genda that if Japan went to war, esprit de corps would be a strength no less sturdy for being intangible. He also wanted his personnel thoroughly indoctrinated in their jobs and able to work together with the ease of long practice. To this end, in the latter part of July he dispatched Kuroshima to Tokyo in an effort to prevent the kind of impending personnel shuffle that periodically upset the Combined Fleet."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 163

"Thus, by the end of October the Japanese had tied up many a loose operation end of the Pearl Harbor plan. The individual actors from [Vice Admiral Chuichi] Nagumo to the rawest recruit on *Zuikaku* knew their parts. Much remained to be done, but the preparations had reached the point of dress rehearsal. On October 29 [Rear Admiral Sadatoshi] Tomioka and Commander Yugi Yamamoto came to *Nagato* to inform the Combined Fleet of the Naval General Staff's "operational principles, orders, directives, and the central agreement between the Army and Navy." Commander Yamamoto was one of the promising young men with whom Tomioka's organization abounded. The son-in-law of ex-Foreign Minister Toyoda, he had charge of liaison with the Army and overall operations, specifically those concerning China. After [Admiral Osami] Nagano approved the Pearl Harbor project, the Naval General Staff revised its war plan to include the outline of that operation. Then Nagano presented this "modified national defense plan of the Japanese Fleet" to the Emperor for approval. Tomioka, who had conscientiously and stubbornly opposed the Pearl Harbor project, was now in the very thick of it. Once the Naval General Staff accepted [Admiral Isoroku] Yamamoto's scheme, it moved full speed ahead and cooperated with the Combined Fleet in every possible way. Tomioka conferred with Admiral Yamamoto and various members of his staff for several hours. Yamamoto was very pleased to see his bold design incorporated into the blueprint of the Naval General Staff. Hitherto he had authorized the planning, preparation, and training for the proposed attack exclusively on his own initiative. Now that he had the sanction not only of the top brass in Tokyo but of the Emperor himself, he stood on much firmer ground and no longer carried the entire load of responsibility on his own shoulders."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 324

"At 1330 on November 3, Nagumo summoned to *Akagi* his commanders at each level together with their staffs. He could assemble them rapidly because the previous day, for the first time, all the ships scheduled to be a part of the task force had congregated in Ariake Bay. Nagumo had decided that the time had come to inform them of the purpose of their long training. To the best of his hearers' recollection, Nagumo said something like this: "Judging from the diplomatic situation, war with the United States seems unavoidable. In that event we plan to attack the American Fleet in Hawaii. Although final details have not been firmed up, Commanders Genda and Fuchida have mapped out a general plan. They will explain it to you. If, after hearing the explanation, you have any questions, feel free to ask them." Oishi explained the overall outline; then Genda presented the air attack plan, Fuchida, helping with the details. Some of the airmen almost fell out of their seats in their astonishment…A change of pace ensued the next day [November 4, 1941] – a dress rehearsal for Operation Hawaii. [Commander Mitsuo] Fuchida had scheduled many dry runs during October, originating from land bases instead of carriers to save precious fuel. But this time conditions would be as much like the actual attack as Fuchida could make them. So the task force sailed with most of the aircraft aboard their home carriers to a spot about 200 miles from Saeki. The first wave took off at 0700; the second at 0830 followed the general pattern of a defending force, but the Fifth Carrier Division did not participate. About twenty miles from Saeki, Fuchida ordered deployment. At his signal the dive bombers soared to attack level and the torpedo planes sought lower altitude. Below the attacking force the battlewagons of the Japanese Fleet lay in majestic array, just as the planners hope their counterparts would rest in Pearl Harbor. Aboard ship, officers of the Combined Fleet watched with keen interest, Genda among them. Later he would collect reports from the other staff officers to pass to Fuchida. After the first wave hit the "enemy," the second group of level and dive bombers swooped in. No torpedo planes would participate in the second wave because by that time the element of surprise would be lost. This time the high-level planes tore into Saeki Field while the dive bombers concentrated on the ships, particularly *Akagi* and *Soryu*. By 0930 the maneuver was over. The task force arrived back at Ariake Bay at dark, and Nagumo held a critique aboard *Akagi* next morning."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 327-328



Aircraft carrier *Akagi* (赤城) sail for the Indian Ocean on March 26, 1942, shortly after leaving Port Stirling, Celebes Island. Several B5N Kate torpedo bombers appear on the forward flight deck of *Akagi*. Carriers and battleships (in the background) from left to right: *Soryu*, *Hiryu*, *Hiei*, *Kirishima*, *Haruna*, *Kongō*, *Zuikaku*, and *Shokaku*. (Source: Kure Maritime Museum, (edited by Kazushige Todaka), *Japanese Naval Warship Photo Album: Aircraft carrier and Seaplane carrier", p. 25.*)



Commemorative postcard showing Sasebo Naval Dockyard in the early 1930s. Sasebo Naval Dockyard is located approximately 29 miles north of Nagasaki. Sasebo Naval Station, renamed U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo in 1945, has been administered by the U.S. Navy since 1945.

The Bureaucracy of the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy



Prime Minister of Japan Gen. Hideki Tojo and his Cabinet pose for a group portrait in Tokyo on October 18, 1941. (Photo: Mainichi Shinbun)

Emperor Hirohito of Japan delivers his message to War Minister Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo, following the military parade held on the Yoyogi Parade Grounds in Tokyo, Japan on October 21, 1940 to mark the 2600th anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Empire. Chief Aide-de-Camp General Ban Hasunuma stands behind the emperor. (Bettmann/CORBIS)

陸海軍中央指揮組織

CENTRAL COMMAND ORGANIZATION

(一九四一年十二月八日)

8 DECEMBER 1941



In the Army, the following were dual positions:

(a) Deputy-Chief of Army General Staff
(a) Chief, Line of Communications Bureau

(b) Chief, 3rd Bureau-Transportation & Communications
(b) Chief, Transportation & Communications Bureau

(c) Chief, Ordnance Bureau
(c) Chief, Field Ordnance Bureau

(d) Chief, Air Ordnance Bureau
(d) Chief, Field Air Ordnance Bureau

(e) Chief, Intendance Bureau
(e) Chief, Field Intendance Bureau

(f) Chief, Medical Bureau
(f) Chief, Field Medical Bureau

陸軍指揮系統
ARMY CHAIN OF COMMAND

(一九四一年十二月八日)
8 DECEMBER 1941



註
REMARKS

--- 防衛に關し指揮することを示す
Operational control for internal security and air defense

□ 南方作戰充當兵力
Units for Southern Invasion Operation

(1) 大本營豫備
Reserve for Imperial General Headquarters

(2) 第五十六師團の一部
Element of the 56th Div

(3) 第五十五師團の一部
Element of the 55th Div

(4) 第十八師團の一部
Element of the 18th Div

(5) 一九四一年十一月二十日より一九四二年一月五日迄第十四軍に配屬
Attached to 14th Army, 20 Nov 41—5 Jan 42

(6) 一九四一年十一月十五日より十二月二十二日迄第十五軍に配屬
Attached to 15th Army, 15 Nov 41—22 Dec 41

(7) 乘船港發を出發し南方軍の隷下に入つた實際の日次
Actual date placed under Southern Army Command simultaneous to departure from port of embarkation

海軍指揮系統
NAVY CHAIN OF COMMAND

（一九四一年十二月八日）
8 DECEMBER 1941



＊聯合艦隊直属ノ部隊
Units directly attached to Combined Fleet

The former Imperial General Headquarters and War Ministry building in Tokyo. The Army Ministry of Japan, also known as the Ministry of War of Japan, was established in April 1872. The Imperial Japanese Navy Ministry was also established in April 1872.

Imperial Japanese Navy Ministry headquarters in Tokyo circa 1930.
(Source: Japanese book "*Series of Japanese geography and folk culture: Vol. 2*" published by Shinkosha)

(Source for chain of command charts: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v2%20p1/ch4.htm)

The building of the former Imperial Japanese Naval Academy is located at Eta Jima, a small island located south of the city of Hiroshima and west of the former Kure Naval Arsenal.



Imperial Japanese Army Academy in Tokyo, Japan in 1907.
(Source: *A Book: The Century Album of Tokyo Views*, published March 1909)

The Military Policemen of the Imperial Japanese Army, better known as Kenpeitai (憲兵隊), pose for a group photo in in 1935. The Kenpeitai was Imperial Japan's notorious secret police. The Kenpeitai was the equivalent of the Gestapo and the Abwehr. (Source: Japanese book "Showa History Vol.7: February 26 Incident" published by Mainichi Newspapers Company.)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kenpei.JPG

Emperor Hirohito of Japan appears on the front cover of the June 6, 1932 edition (left) and May 21, 1945 editon (right) of *Time* magazine.

Corporate Sponsors of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Toyotaro Yuki (center) was the Governor of the Bank of Japan (July 27, 1937-March 18, 1944) during Japan's invasion of Shanghai (August-November 1937), Rape of Nanking (December 1937), Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), Bataan Death March (May 1942), and Battle of Midway (June 4-7, 1942). The Bank of Japan (日本銀行, left) is Japan's central bank. Mitsubishi (三菱, right), one of the largest family-owned Japanese corporations (also known as zaibatsu (財閥)) during World War II, produced Zero fighter airplanes for the Imperial Japanese Navy.

A wreckage, identified by the U.S. Navy as a Japanese torpedo plane, was salvaged from the bottom of Pearl Harbor following the surprise attack on December 7, 1941. (AP Photo)



A map of the Japanese Empire on December 7, 1941

Emperor Hirohito salutes as he rides past and inspects his troops. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama of the Imperial Japanese Army salutes to his soldiers in June 1943.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto of the Imperial Japanese Navy salutes to his naval pilots in one of the last known photographs of Admiral Yamamoto that was taken shortly before his plane was shot down on April 18, 1943.



Visitors at the Orange Oil Field, near Orange, Texas, U.S.A., circa 1923, photo taken by Shunkichi Nomura. From left to right: Katsunori Wakasa (Engineer, later changed to Takahashi), **Isoroku Yamamoto** (Commander, Imperial Japanese Navy), unknown (possibly Commander Kaku, Imperial Japanese Navy), Kichimatsu Kishi, and Kenji Ide (Admiral, Imperial Japanese Navy)
(Photo: http://hirasaki.net/Family_Stories/Takahashi.htm)



Imperial Japanese Navy Vice Admiral **Osami Nagano** lays a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A. in circa 1927. At the right end of the Japanese delegation is Captain **Isoroku Yamamoto**, the Naval Attaché to the United States. The U.S. Navy officer standing hatless just behind them is Lieutenant Commander Paulus P. Powell, Aide to Vice Admiral Osami Nagano during this visit. Osami Nagano and Isoroku Yamamoto commanded the Imperial Japanese Navy fleet that attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. (Collection of Rear Admiral Paulus P. Powell/U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/prs-for/japan/japrs-xz/i-yamto.htm

Imperial Japanese Government: From Tripartite Pact to Pearl Harbor



Minister of the Army General Hideki Tojo (center) and Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka (right) propose a toast with the German and Italian Ambassadors to Japan and officers from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Japan in September 1940. The occasion was the signing of the Tripartite Pact, a defense agreement between Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.
(Photo: Courtesy of Australian War Memorial) http://john.curtin.edu.au/envoy/expansion.html

Left to right: Japanese envoy Saburo Kurusu, Alfieri, Buti, Italy's Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, Schmidt, Stahmer, Weiszäcker, Mackensen, Adolf Hitler, Meissner, and Woermann appear at the Tripartite Pact conference in Berlin on September 27, 1940.
(Photo: http://adolfhitlerbestpictures.blogspot.com/search/label/As%20a%20Diplomat)

Left to right: Prime Minister of Japan Prince Fumimaro Konoe, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, Minister of the Navy Admiral Zengo Yoshida, and Minister of War General Hideki Tojo meet privately in Tokyo, Japan on August 6, 1940. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

Adolf Hitler talks to Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka during the latter's recent visit to the German capital in Berlin on April 21, 1941, with Dr. Schmidt (in uniform) acting as interpreter. Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, looks on (extreme left). (CORBIS)

Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka visits Berlin, Germany on April 19, 1941. Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on September 27, 1940. (Provided by Keiyosha) http://www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5.html

Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka appears with Fascist Italy's Prime Minister Benito Mussolini in Venice, Italy on April 27, 1941. (Provided by Keiyosha) http://www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5.html

Soviet dictator Josef Stalin (second from right) and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov (third from right) watch Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka signs the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact in Moscow on April 13, 1941.
(Provided by Keiyosha) http://www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5.html

Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka (center) celebrates with Prime Minister of Japan Fumimaro Konoe (third from left) on April 24, 1941. (Provided by Keiyosha) http://www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5.html

"The outbreak of the Russo-German war put Japan on the spot. It was pledged to the Axis and had signed a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. What path should it follow? The Japanese government did not know. Although the prospect of such a war came up for discussion regularly at liaison conferences, curiously enough Konoye's Cabinet made no advance decision concerning a possible German attack on the Soviet Union. One Japanese who had no doubt of his position was Matsuoka. Irrespective of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, which he himself had negotiated, and without pausing to consult the Cabinet, he gained an immediate audience with the Emperor. There in the Imperial Palace he proffered his advice: "…now that the German-Soviet War has started Japan, too, must cooperate with Germany and attack Russia. To do this, it would be better for the time being to refrain from action in the south. Sooner or later Japan would have to fight there. Ultimately Japan would be fighting the Soviets, America and England simultaneously." Konoye [sic] tells us, "The Emperor was greatly astonished," and well he might be. The prospect of tackling the bear, the lion, and the eagle simultaneously, with side excursions into Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies, while still entwined in the dragon's tail, could not have appealed to a sensible man. As Japan hesitated at the crossroads, on June 29 Nomura gave the Foreign Ministry an excellent summary of American attitudes as he saw them: "The U.S.A. does not wish to make double-front operations. Consequently it goes without saying that she desires peace in the Pacific, but, as you know, she is hastily making provision for the time when this may be impossible…" He warned that if the United States stopped the talks, this would start a chain reaction: "*severance of economic relations, then, our advance to the south, and finally our clash with Britain and the U.S.A.* [Nomura's italics]." He urged that Tokyo think up some way to realize a Japanese-American understanding. But the Foreign Office paid little attention to Nomura's wise, well-reasoned warnings. The fatal decision was already in the making. The Emperor himself presided on July 2 over one of the most important conferences ever held in Tokyo, a major milestone on the tragic road to war. The document which issued from this conference did not rule out the possibility of eventual war with the Soviet Union, but it concentrated heavily on the strategy of "Southward Ho!" Its essence was this: The government had resolved to dominate East Asia and to that end pledged to win the war in China, take over Southeast Asia, and, if the Germans crushed the Russians – which at the moment seemed likely – strike the Soviet Union. Some of the explanatory notes attached to the formal decision were far more explicit than the basic document itself. For instance: *2… The Imperial Government will continue all necessary diplomatic negotiations with reference to the Southern Regions and also carry out various other plans as may be necessary. In case the diplomatic negotiations break down, preparations for a war with England and America will also be carried forward. First of all, the plans which have been laid with reference to French Indo-China and Thai [sic] will be prosecuted, with a view to consolidating our position in the southern territories. In carrying out the plans outlined in the foregoing article, we will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and America.* There it was, in black and white. Japan wanted the treasures of Southeast Asia so badly that it would fight any power or combination of powers to secure them. Here was an elastic program designed to fit all contingencies. It would give here, expand there, to suit the needs of the moment. It also demonstrated one of the major weaknesses which eventually led to the downfall of the Axis: an ambition so all-encompassing that Germany and Japan scattered their shots over an impossibly large area." – *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 143-144



Shigenori Togo (left, December 10, 1882-July 23, 1950) was the Foreign Minister of Imperial Japan from October 18, 1941 to September 1, 1942 and from April 1945 to August 1945; Shigenori Togo was the Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1938 to 1940. Yosuke "Frank" Matsuoka (right, March 3, 1880-June 26, 1946), who lived in Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. for several years and graduated from University of Oregon Law School in 1900, was Foreign Minister of Imperial Japan from 1940 to 1941 and President of South Manchuria Railroad from 1935 to 1939. Both men were tried for war crimes at the Tokyo Trials in 1946. (Both photos: Alfred Eisenstaedt/Time Life)

Emperor Hirohito of Japan delivers his message to War Minister Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo, following the military parade held on the Yoyogi Parade Grounds in Tokyo, Japan on October 21, 1940 to mark the 2600th anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Empire. Chief Aide-de-Camp General Ban Hasunuma stands behind the emperor. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



Emperor Hirohito of Japan reviews his troops during the imperial inspection in Tokyo, Japan on June 12, 1941. The inspection featured the fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of the Young Peoples' Schools in Japan. More than 30,000 Peoples' representatives gathered in Tokyo for the celebration. (Bettmann/CORBIS)

Three German generals and a Japanese general (right) examine a globe during a meeting in Germany on March 29, 1941. (Photo: © CORBIS)

The famous Mori Unit of the Imperial Japanese Army pushes its way forward around the Honan Battlefront in China in an area north of the Yangtze River on November 27, 1941, in pursuit, says the Japanese caption, of "the fast dwindling remnants of Chiang's once mighty army." (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)

Captured Japanese image shows Imperial Japan's Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo (center, in uniform) visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, Japan in October 1941. (Photo: Time Life)

Imperial Japanese Army General Hideki Tojo (front row, center) appears with his Cabinet in Tokyo, Japan on October 21, 1941. (Provided by Keiyosha) http://www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5.html

General Hideki Tojo, the new Prime Minister of Japan, gives a statement to newspapermen at a press conference held at his official residence in Tokyo on November 7, 1941, shortly after the first cabinet meeting under his leadership was held. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)

Pearl Harbor is filled with burning and damaged ships following the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. Battleship Row (center) is obscured by heavy smoke. (Photo: © CORBIS)

Japanese navy officers announce the outbreak of war between Japan and the U.S. at the Ministry of the Navy in Tokyo, Japan on December 8, 1941. (Provided by Mainichi Newspaper) http://www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichibei/negotiation/index5.html

American Provocation and Prior Knowledge



TWL and Jeremiah Smith Jr. at Meiji Shinto shrine in Tokyo, 1927. J. P. Morgan & Co. had organized the huge loan to Japan for reconstruction after the 1924 earthquake. Now the Japanese had a new financial proposal to assist their expansionist strategy in Manchuria.

Thomas W. Lamont (TWL) (third from right), a partner of J.P. Morgan & Co. banking firm in New York City, and Jeremiah Smith Jr. (second from right), a member of Herrick, Smith, Donald & Farley law firm in Boston, visit the Meiji (Shinto) Shrine in Tokyo, Japan in 1927. Thomas W. Lamont and Jeremiah Smith Jr. were members of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1927. Both Thomas W. Lamont and Jeremiah Smith Jr. earned a Bachelor of Arts degree at Harvard University in 1892.
(Source: *The Ambassador from Wall Street: The Story of Thomas W. Lamont, J. P. Morgan's Chief Executive* by Edward M. Lamont)

Crown Prince Hirohito of Japan (left) and U.S. Army Brigadier General Frank R. McCoy, later a Major General and a member of the Roberts Commission, inspect several field hospitals in Tokyo, Japan in 1923, shortly after a major earthquake devastated Tokyo and the surrounding areas.

Japanese Ambassador Katsuji Debuchi (left) signs the Kellogg-Briand Pact an hour prior to the ratification ceremony on July 24, 1929 while U.S. Secretary of State Henry Stimson looks on. (CORBIS)

This photograph shows the U.S. embassy in Tokyo. The chancery (office building) is at the center, and on either side are apartments for the embassy staff. Visible beyond the chancery roof is the top of the Japanese Diet building. (Courtesy of Mrs. Henri Smith-Hutton.)

(Source: *Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy*, Edited by Paul Stillwell)

Joseph C. Grew (standing), the American Ambassador to Imperial Japan, delivers a speech at an America-Japan Society dinner in March 1936. Prime Minister of Japan Koki Hirota, who served as the Prime Minister from March 9, 1936 to February 2, 1937, is seated three persons from Grew's right. The Japanese naval officer at the extreme right is Admiral Mineo Osumi, Minister of the Navy. Koki Hirota was convicted of war crimes at the Tokyo Trials in 1948 and executed by hanging at Sugamo Prison in Tokyo on December 23, 1948. Admiral Mineo Osumi, who served as the Minister of the Navy from 1931 to 1932 and from 1933 to 1936, was killed in action in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War on February 5, 1941. (Source: *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years 1904-1945, Volume 2* by Joseph C. Grew)

Left: U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew chats with Kichisaburo Nomura, the designated Japanese Ambassador to the United States of America, at the Tokyo train station in Tokyo, Japan in January 1941 as Nomura leaves for America. (Provided by Mainichi Newspaper)
Right: Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura carries the Emperor's letter of credentials to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the White house in Washington, D.C. on February 14, 1941. Ambassador Nomura arrived in Washington, D.C. on February 11, 1941.
(Photo: http://www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichibei/popup/pop_03.html)

United States Ambassador to Japan Joseph Clark Grew (left) and Foreign Minister of Japan Admiral Teijiro Toyoda smile for camera on October 2, 1941 when Minister Toyoda made the customary call upon the dean of the Tokyo diplomatic Corps after he assumed office. Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, who opposed the Tripartite Pact and war with Soviet Union, served as Foreign Minister of Japan from July 18, 1941 to October 18, 1941. (Bettmann/CORBIS)

President Franklin D. Roosevelt shakes hands with Henry L. Stimson, a longtime Counsel of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts [a law firm in New York City] and a member of the Republican Party, at the White House on July 10, 1940 after the Senate confirmed his nomination as Secretary of War. (Bettmann/CORBIS)

U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt buys the first of the U.S. government's Defense Savings Bonds from his Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. in Washington, D.C., U.S.A. on May 1, 1941. President Roosevelt called this "a frank and

clear appeal for financial support to pay for our arming and to pay for the American Existence of later generations. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

Secretary of War Henry Stimson (far left) and Army Gen. George C. Marshall (second from right) watch as President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Draft Bill in the Oval Office in Washington, D.C. on September 16, 1940. (Bettmann/CORBIS)

ON OCTOBER 29, 1940, the first numbers were drawn by Secretary of War Stimson under the Selective Service Act. On this occasion Roosevelt addressed the nation. "Our democratic Army," said he, "has existed for one purpose only: the defense of our freedom."

U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (left) watches U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (wearing a blindfold) pick a draft number from a container on October 29, 1940. The Roosevelt administration initiated America's first peacetime draft via the Selective Service Act.

Photo # NH 74175-KN U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt



U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt attends Armistice Day ceremonies at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia, United States of America on November 11, 1940.

In the front row are, left to right: Captain Daniel J. Callaghan, Naval Aide to the President; President Franklin Delano Roosevelt; and Colonel Edwin M. Watson, Military Aide to the President. Secret Service Agents Thomas J. Qualters and Guy H. Spaman are in the second row, immediately behind the President. In the third row are, left to right: Lieutenant Colonel Omar Bradley, U.S. Army; Secretary of War Henry Stimson; Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations; and General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff.

(Donation of Lieutenant Commander George A. Carroll, USN (Retired); U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h74000/h74175kc.htm



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1937.

My dear Admiral Nomura:-

Your very kind letter came while I was on my cruise to South America and since then, as you know, I have been very busy with the session of the Congress. It is, indeed, good to hear from you again and I hope that one of these days you will be able to pay us another visit in Washington.

As I have often told you, I hope the day will come when I can visit Japan. I have much interest in the great accomplishments of the Japanese people and I should much like to see many of my Japanese friends again.

With my warm regards,

Always sincerely,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura,
Tokio,
Japan.

Letter written April 6, 1937 from the White House by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Japanese Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, who would serve as the Japanese Ambassador to America from February 14, 1941 until December 8, 1941, when America declared war on Japan. Kichisaburo Nomura was a Japanese naval attaché to the United States at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. from December 1914 to June 1918. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from March 17, 1913 to August 26, 1920. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an executive order on the night of July 25, 1941 to freeze Japanese assets after the Imperial Japanese Army marched into French Indochina.
(Photo: Alfred Eisenstaedt/Time Life)



STATE OF NEW YORK
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
ALBANY

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
GOVERNOR

November 6, 1929

Vice-Admiral K. Nomura,
Imperial Japanese Navy,
Tokio, Japan.

My dear Admiral Nomura:

Many thanks for your very delightful note. I am particularly sorry to have missed your visit when your squadron was in New York City as I should have much liked to renew our old acquaintance and to talk over the old days in Washington.

Perhaps you will be sent as a delegate to the new naval conference in London and will pass through the United States. If so, I hope you will surely let us know.

Some day when I am through with this task of being Governor, I am counting on going to Japan with Mrs. Roosevelt. In the meantime, please accept my very kindest regards and the hope that we shall meet soon.

Faithfully yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

FDR-MM

A November 6, 1929 letter written by New York Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt to Japanese Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura. (Photo: Alfred Eisenstaedt/Time Life)

Japanese Ambassador to America Kichisaburo Nomura appears on the front cover of the September 22, 1941 edition of *Time* magazine.

Photo # NH 81942 SecNav Frank Knox with Adms. Yarnell, Stark & Richardson, Oct. 1940

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox (right center) confers with Admiral James O. Richardson (right), Commander in Chief of United States Fleet, in the Navy Secretary's Office in Washington, D.C. on October 10, 1940. Also present are Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, USN (Retired) (left) and Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Richardson was in Washington, D.C. to protest the continued basing of the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
(Collection of Admiral Harold R. Stark; U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-r/j-richdn.htm

EXHIBIT NO. 40 (HART INQUIRY)

JAN. 24, 1941.

Op-12B-9-McC
(SC)A7-2(2)/FF1
Serial 09112

Secret

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

(1) Air bombing attack.
(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
(3) Sabotage.
(4) Submarine attack.
(5) Mining.
(6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactory. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be a primary importance.

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Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched.
(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives
(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-air craft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand, the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(6) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense

against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

You concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the

Page 563

security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Frank Knox

The Honorable The SECRETARY OF WAR.

Copies to: CINC, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
Com14
Op-22
Op-30

War Department
Washington, February 7, 1941.

SECRET

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured-forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to you other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War.

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Memorandum Endorsement

NAVY DEPARTMENT, February 13, 1941.

Op-30B-AJ
(SC)A7-2(2)/FFI
D-27446

From: Director, Naval Districts Division.
To: Director, War Plans Division.
Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. (SecWar ltr, of Feb. 7, 1941 to SecNav.)

1. Returned. It is recommended that a copy of the subject letter be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

/s/ Alex Sharp,
ALEX SHARP.

(Pencil Notation: Done 015712 of 11 Feb. M.)

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(Source: http://pearlharboronline.com/warnings.htm)

Naval Intelligence & McCollum's "Eight-Action Memorandum"



Left: Rear Admiral (later Admiral) Richmond Kelly Turner, Navy War Plans Officer at the Department of the Navy in 1941
Center: Rear Admiral (later Admiral) Royal E. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations in December 1941
Right: Admiral Claude C. Bloch, Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District at Pearl Harbor (1940-1942)

Left: Captain (later Rear Admiral) Walter S. Anderson was the Director of Naval Intelligence from June 1939 to January 1941.
Center: Captain (later Admiral) Alan Goodrich Kirk was the Director of Naval Intelligence from March 1941 to October 1941. Admiral Kirk was the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from July 4, 1949 to Oct. 6, 1951; Admiral Kirk was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Right: Captian (later Rear Admiral) Theodore S. Wilkinson was the Director of Naval Intelligence from October 1941 to July 1942.

Note: Lieutenant Commander (later Rear Admiral) Arthur H. McCollum (left), who was born in Nagasaki, Japan in 1898 to Baptist missionaries parents, was the author of an "eight-action memorandum" he produced on October 7, 1940 that encouraged the Roosevelt Administration to take a more aggressive approach toward Japan and incite Japan into attacking America. Both Edwin T. Layton and Joseph J. Rochefort studied the Japanese language in Japan from August 1929 to August 1932.

Left to right: Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, Lt. Com. (later Rear Adm.) Arthur H. McCollum, Captain Laurance F. Safford

Left to right: Lt. Com. (later Rear Admiral) Edwin T. Layton, Commander Joseph John Rochefort, Lt. Com. Alwin D. Kramer

Army Intelligence Officers:



Left to right: Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow

Photo # 80-G-16864 Bridge scene on USS Wasp during the Guadalcanal landings, 7 August 1942

Scene on the carrier USS *Wasp* (CV-7) during operations off Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942. Among those present are (from left to right, in the right center) Commander D.F. Smith (hatless); Captain Forrest P. Sherman, Commanding Officer (wearing helmet); **Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes**, Commander Task Group 61.1 (facing camera); and Lieutenant Commander Wallace M. Beakley, Commander *Wasp* Air Group, who is making his report to Rear Admiral Noyes. Captain (later Rear Admiral) Leigh Noyes, was the Director of Naval Communications in 1941. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-w/cv7.htm

Pre-Pearl Harbor Army and Navy Intelligence Officers & Headquarters Officers:
Rear Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations [Washington, D.C.]
Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Navy War Plans Officer in Washington, D.C.
Captain Walter S. Anderson, Director of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D.C.
Captain Jules James, second Director of Naval Intelligence (January 15, 1941-March 1941)
Captain Alan G. Kirk, third Director of Naval Intelligence (March 1941-October 1941)
Captain Theodore S. Wilkinson, fourth Director of Naval Intelligence (October 1, 1941-December 7, 1941)
Captain Laurance F. Safford, Commanding Officer, Station US in Washington, D.C.
Captain Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Comunications in Washington, D.C.
Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of Far East Section at the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D.C.
Captain William A. Heard, Far East Division, Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D.C.
Lieutenant Commander Edwin T. Layton, Pacific Fleet intellignence officer at Pearl Harbor
Lieutenant Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, Commander of Station HYPO at Pearl Harbor Naval Yard (July 1941-December 1941); Commander of the Navy's Communications Intelligence Unit on Oahu beginning in May 1941
Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Kramer, Officer in Charge of the Translation Section (OP-20-GZ) (February 1939-May 1942); U.S. Navy courier in Washington, D.C.
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, U.S. Army courier in Washington, D.C.
Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of the Military Intelligence (G-2) Division of the War Department
Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division of the War Department

"Lieutenant Commander McCollum's five-page memorandum of October 1940 put forward a startling plan – a plan intended to engineer a situation that would mobilize a reluctant American into joining Britain's struggle against the German armed forces then overrunning Europe. Its eight actions called for virtually inciting a Japanese attack on American ground, air, and naval forces in Hawaii, as well as on British and Dutch colonial outposts in the Pacific region. Opinion polls in the summer of 1940 indicated that a majority of Americans did not want the country involved in Europe's wars. Yet FDR's military and State Department leaders agreed that a victorious Nazi Germany would threaten the national security of the United States. They felt that Americans needed a call to action. McCollum would be an essential part of this plan. His code name was F-2. He oversaw the routing of communications intelligence to FDR from early 1940 to December 7, 1941, and provided the President with intelligence reports on Japanese military and diplomatic strategy. Every intercepted and decoded Japanese military and diplomatic report destined for the White House went through the Far East Asia section of ONI, which he oversaw. The section served as a clearinghouse for all categories of intelligence reports, not only on Japan but on all the other nations of eastern Asia. Each report prepared by McCollum for the President was based on radio intercepts gathered and decoded by a worldwide network of American military cryptographers and radio intercept operators. McCollum's office was an element of Station US, a secret American cryptographic center located at the main naval headquarters at 18th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W., about four blocks from the White House. Few people in America's government or military knew as much about Japan's activities and intentions as Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum. He felt that war with Japan was inevitable and that the United States should provoke it at a time which suited U.S. interests. In his October 1940 memorandum McCollum advocated eight actions that he predicted would lead to a Japanese attack on the United States:

A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek.
D. Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. Fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.

McCollum's eight-action memo was dated October 7, 1940, and was addressed and forwarded to two of Roosevelt's most trusted military advisors: Navy captains Walter S. Anderson and Dudley W. Knox. Anderson was the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence and had direct White House access to FDR. Knox was a naval strategist and chief of the ONI library."
– *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 7-8

"Two major decisions involving Japan and the Far East took place on October 8, 1940 – the day after McCollum wrote his memo. First, the State Department told Americans to evacuate Far East countries as quickly as possible. Then President Roosevelt brought about Action F – keep the United States Fleet based in Hawaiian waters – during an extended Oval Office luncheon with the fleet's commander, Admiral James O. Richardson, and former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William D. Leahy, a favored presidential confidant. When Richardson heard the proposal, he exploded: "Mr. President, senior officers of the Navy do not have the trust and confidence in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific." Richardson did not approve of Roosevelt's plan to place the fleet in harm's way. He strongly disagreed with two of FDR's lunchtime points: 1. FDR's willingness to sacrifice a ship of the Navy in order to provoke what he called a Japanese "mistake," and 2. Richardson quoted the President as saying: **"Sooner or later the Japanese would commit an overt act against the United States and the nation would be willing to enter the war."**…For Richardson, the safety of his men and warships was paramount and the policy was no laughing matter. Richardson stood up to Roosevelt. Doing so ended his naval career. On October 26, 1940, a White House leak to the Washington-based Kiplinger Newsletter predicted that Richardson would be removed as commander-in-chief. The admiral was relieved of his command on February 1, 1941, during a major restructuring of the Navy. The sea command held by Richardson – Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (CINCUS) – was modified. In his restructuring, Roosevelt approved a two-ocean Navy and created the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. Skipping over more senior naval officers the President picked Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel to head the Pacific Fleet and promoted him to four-star rank. The job had been offered to Rear Admiral Chester Nimitz in the fall of 1940, but Nimitz "begged off" because he lacked seniority. Roosevelt had carefully selected and placed naval officers in key fleet-command positions who would not obstruct is provocation policies. One of them was Admiral Harold Stark, his chief of naval operations since August 1939, an all too faithful servant of the President."
– *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 10-12

"Throughout 1941, it seems, provoking Japan into an overt act of war was the principal policy that guided FDR's actions toward Japan. Army and Navy directives containing the "overt act" phrase were sent to Pacific commanders. Roosevelt's cabinet members, most notably Secretary of War Henry Stimson, are on record favoring the policy, according to Stimson's diary. Stimson's diary entries of 1941 place him with nine other Americans who knew or were associated with this policy of provocation during 1941. Roosevelt's "fingerprints" can be found on each of McCollum's proposals. **One of the most shocking was Action D, the deliberate deployment of American warships within or adjacent to the territorial waters of Japan. During secret White House meetings, Roosevelt personally took charge of Action D. He called the provocations "pop-up" cruises: "I just want them to keep popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing. I don't mind losing one or two cruisers, but do not take a chance on losing five or six."** Admiral Husband Kimmel, the Pacific Fleet commander, objected to the pop-up cruises, saying: "It is ill-advised and will result in war if we make this move."…**From March through July 1941, White House records show that FDR ignored international law and dispatched naval task groups into Japanese waters on three such pop-up cruises. One of the most provocative was a sortie into the Bungo Strait southeast of Honshu, the principal access to Japan's Inland Sea.** The strait separates the home islands of Kyushu and Shikoku, and was a favored operational area for the warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1941. Japan's naval ministry registered a protest with Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo: "On the night of July 31, 1941, Japanese fleet units at anchor in Sukumo Bay (in the Bungo Strait, off the island of Shikoku) picked up the sound of propellers approaching Bungo Channel from the eastward. Duty destroyers of the Japanese navy investigated and sighted two darkened cruisers that disappeared in a southerly direction behind a smoke screen when they were challenged." The protest concluded: "Japanese naval officers believe the vessels were United States cruisers." – *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 9-10



Left: Dr. Gordon W. Prange's book *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* was published in 1981.
Right: Robert B. Stinnett's book *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* was published in 2000.

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E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By AT NARS, Date 1-24-95

OP-16-F-2 ONI 7 OCTOBER 1940

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES.

1. THE UNITED STATES TODAY FINDS HERSELF CONFRONTED BY A HOSTILE GERMANY AND ITALY IN EUROPE AND BY AN EQUALLY HOSTILE JAPAN IN THE ORIENT. RUSSIA, THE GREAT LAND LINK BETWEEN THESE TWO GROUPS OF HOSTILE POWERS, IS AT PRESENT NEUTRAL, BUT IN ALL PROBABILITY FAVORABLY INCLINED TOWARDS THE AXIS POWERS, AND HER FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THESE POWERS MAY BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO INCREASING SUCCESS IN THEIR PROSECUTION OF THE WAR IN EUROPE. GERMANY AND ITALY HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN WAR ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE AND ALL OF EUROPE IS EITHER UNDER THEIR MILITARY CONTROL OR HAS BEEN FORCED INTO SUBSERVIENCE. ONLY THE BRITISH EMPIRE IS ACTIVELY OPPOSING BY WAR THE GROWING WORLD DOMINANCE OF GERMANY AND ITALY AND THEIR SATELLITES.

2. THE UNITED STATES AT FIRST REMAINED COOLLY ALOOF FROM THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT GERMANY AND ITALY ATTEMPTED BY EVERY METHOD WITHIN THEIR POWER TO FOSTER A CONTINUATION OF AMERICAN INDIFFERENCE TO THE OUTCOME OF THE STRUGGLE IN EUROPE. PARADOXICALLY, EVERY SUCCESS OF GERMAN AND ITALIAN ARMS HAS LED TO FURTHER INCREASES IN UNITED STATES SYMPATHY FOR AND MATERIAL SUPPORT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, UNTIL AT THE PRESENT TIME THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STANDS COMMITTED TO A POLICY OF REGARDING EVERY SUPPORT SHORT OF WAR WITH THE CHANCES RAPIDLY INCREASING THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BECOME A FULL FLEDGED ALLY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. THE FINAL FAILURE OF GERMAN AND ITALIAN DIPLOMACY TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES IN THE ROLE OF A DISINTERESTED SPECTATOR HAS FORCED THEM TO ADOPT THE POLICY OF DEVELOPING THREATS TO U.S. SECURITY IN OTHER SPHERES OF THE WORLD, NOTABLY BY THE THREAT OF REVOLUTIONS IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA BY AXIS-DOMINATED GROUPS AND BY THE STIMULATION OF JAPAN TO FURTHER AGGRESSIONS AND THREATS IN THE FAR EAST IN THE HOPE THAT BY THESE MEANS THE UNITED STATES WOULD BECOME SO CONFUSED IN THOUGHT AND FEARFUL OF HER OWN IMME DIATE SECURITY AS TO CAUSE HER TO BECOME SO PREOCCUPIED IN PURELY DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS AS TO VIRTUALLY PRECLUDE U.S. AID TO GREAT BRITAIN IN ANY FORM. AS A RESULT OF THIS POLICY, GERMANY AND ITALY HAVE LATELY CONCLUDED A MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN DIRECTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. IF THE PUBLISHED TERMS OF THIS TREATY AND THE POINTED UTTERANCES OF GERMAN, ITALIAN AND JAPANESE LEADERS CAN BE BELIEVED, AND THERE SEEMS NO GROUND ON WHICH TO DOUBT EITHER, THE THREE TOTALITARIAN POWERS AGREE TO MAKE WAR ON THE UNITED STATES, SHOULD SHE COME TO THE ASSISTANCE OF ENGLAND, OR SHOULD SHE ATTEMPT TO FORCIBLY INTERFERE WITH JAPAN'S AIMS IN THE ORIENT AND,

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FURTHERMORE, GERMANY AND ITALY EXPRESSLY RESERVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHETHER AMERICAN AID TO BRITAIN, SHORT OF WAR, IS A CAUSE FOR WAR OR NOT AFTER THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DEFEATING ENGLAND. IN OTHER WORDS, AFTER ENGLAND HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF HER ENEMIES WILL DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH AN ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES. DUE TO GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS, NEITHER GERMANY NOR ITALY ARE IN A POSITION TO OFFER ANY MATERIAL AID TO JAPAN. JAPAN, ON THE CONTRARY, CAN BE OF MUCH HELP TO BOTH GERMANY AND ITALY BY THREATENING AND POSSIBLY EVEN ATTACKING BRITISH DOMINIONS AND SUPPLY ROUTES FROM AUSTRALIA, INDIA AND THE DUTCH EAST INDIES, THUS MATERIALLY WEAKENING BRITAINS'S POSITION IN OPPOSITION TO THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE. IN EXCHANGE FOR THIS SERVICE, JAPAN RECEIVES A FREE HAND TO SEIZE ALL OF ASIA THAT SHE CAN FIND IT POSSIBLE TO GRAB, WITH THE ADDED PROMISE THAT GERMANY AND ITALY WILL DO ALL IN THEIR POWER TO KEEP U.S. ATTENTION SO ATTRACTED AS TO PREVENT THE UNITED STATES FROM TAKING POSITIVE AGGRESSIVE ACTION AGAINST JAPAN. HERE AGAIN WE HAVE ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE AXIS-JAPANESE DIPLOMACY WHICH IS AIMED AT KEEPING AMERICAN POWER IMMOBILIZED, AND BY THREATS AND ALARMS TO SO CONFUSE AMERICAN THOUGHT AS TO PRECLUDE PROMPT DECISIVE ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES IN EITHER SPHERE OF ACTION. IT CANNOT BE EMPHASIZED TOO STRONGLY THAT THE LAST THING DESIRED BY EITHER THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE OR BY JAPAN IN THE FAR EAST IS PROMPT, WARLIKE ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES IN EITHER THEATER OF OPERATIONS.

3. AN EXAMINATION OF THE SITUATION IN EUROPE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS LITTLE THAT WE CAN DO NOW, IMMEDIATELY, TO HELP BRITAIN THAT IS NOT ALREADY BEING DONE. WE HAVE NO TRAINED ARMY TO SEND TO THE ASSISTANCE OF ENGLAND, NOR WILL WE HAVE FOR AT LEAST A YEAR. WE ARE NOW TRYING TO INCREASE THE FLOW OF MATERIALS TO ENGLAND AND TO BOLSTER THE DEFENSE OF ENGLAND IN EVERY PRACTICABLE WAY AND THIS AID WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE INCREASED. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS LITTLE THAT GERMANY OR ITALY CAN DO AGAINST US AS LONG AS ENGLAND CONTINUES IN THE WAR AND HER NAVY MAINTAINS CONTROL OF THE ATLANTIC. THE ONE DANGER TO OUR POSITION LIES IN THE POSSIBLE EARLY DEFEAT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE WITH THE BRITISH FLEET FALLING INTACT INTO THE HANDS OF THE AXIS POWERS. THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH AN EVENT OCCURRING WOULD BE MATERIALLY LESSENED WERE WE ACTUALLY ALLIED IN WAR WITH THE BRITISH OR AT THE VERY LEAST WERE TAKING ACTIVE MEASURES TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE ON BRITAIN IN OTHER SPHERES OF ACTION. TO SUM UP: THE THREAT TO OUR SECURITY IN THE ATLANTIC REMAINS SMALL SO LONG AS THE BRITISH FLEET REMAINS DOMINANT IN THAT OCEAN AND FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES.

4. IN THE PACIFIC, JAPAN BY VIRTUE OF HER ALLIANCE WITH GERMANY AND ITALY IS A DEFINITE THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND ONCE THE BRITISH EMPIRE IS GONE THE POWER OF JAPAN-GERMANY AND ITALY IS TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. A POWERFUL LAND ATTACK BY GERMANY AND ITALY THROUGH THE BALKANS AND NORTH AFRICA AGAINST THE SUEZ CANAL WITH A JAPANESE THREAT OR ATTACK ON SINGAPORE WOULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS RESULTS FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE. COULD JAPAN BE DIVERTED OR NEUTRALIZED, THE FRUITS OF A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON THE SUEZ CANAL COULD NOT BE AS FAR REACHING AND BENEFICIAL TO THE AXIS POWERS AS IF SUCH A SUCCESS WAS ALSO ACCOMPANIED BY THE VIRTUAL ELIMINATION OF BRITISH SEA POWER FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN, THUS

OPENING UP A EUROPEAN SUPPLY ROUTE FOR JAPAN AND A SEA ROUTE FOR EASTERN RAW MATERIALS TO REACH GERMANY AND ITALY. JAPAN MUST BE DIVERTED IF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN (?) BLOCKADE OF EUROPE AND POSSIBLY JAPAN (?) IS TO REMAIN EVEN PARTIALLY IN EFFECT.

5. WHILE AS POINTED OUT IN PARAGRAPH (3) THERE IS LITTLE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO IMMEDIATELY RETRIEVE THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES IS ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY NULLIFY JAPANESE AGGRESSIVE ACTION, AND DO IT WITHOUT LESSENING U.S. MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO GREAT BRITAIN.

6. AN EXAMINATION OF JAPAN'S PRESENT POSITION AS OPPOSED TO THE UNITED STATES REVEALS A SITUATION AS FOLLOWS:

ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
1. GEOGRAPHICALLY STRONG POSITION OF JAPANESE ISLANDS.	1. A MILLION AND A HALF MEN ENGAGED IN AN EXHAUSTING WAR ON THE ASIATIC CONTINENT.
2. A HIGHLY CENTRALIZED STRONG CAPABLE GOVERNMENT.	2. DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND FOOD SUPPLY SEVERELY STRAIGHTENED.
3. RIGID CONTROL OF ECONOMY ON A WAR BASIS.	3. A SERIOUS LACK OF SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS FOR WAR. NOTABLY OIL, IRON AND COTTON.
4. A PEOPLE INURED TO HARDSHIP AND WAR.	4. TOTALLY CUT OFF FROM SUPPLIES FROM EUROPE.
5. A POWERFUL ARMY.	5. DEPENDENT UPON DISTANT OVERSEAS ROUTES FOR ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES.
6. A SKILLFUL NAVY ABOUT 2/3 THE STRENGTH OF THE U.S. NAVY.	6. INCAPABLE OF INCREASING MANUFACTURE AND SUPPLY OF WAR MATERIALS WITHOUT FREE ACCESS TO U.S. OR EUROPEAN MARKETS.
7. SOME STOCKS OF RAW MATERIALS.	7. MAJOR CITIES AND INDUSTRIAL CENTERS EXTREMELY VULNERABLE TO AIR ATTACK.
8. WEATHER UNTIL APRIL RENDERING DIRECT SEA OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF JAPAN DIFFICULT.	

7. IN THE PACIFIC THE UNITED STATES POSSESSES A VERY STRONG DEFENSIVE POSITION AND A NAVY AND NAVAL AIR FORCE AT PRESENT IN THAT OCEAN CAPABLE OF LONG DISTANCE OFFENSIVE OPERATION. THERE ARE CERTAIN OTHER FACTORS WHICH AT THE PRESENT TIME ARE STRONGLY IN OUR FAVOR, VIZ:..

A. PHILIPPINE ISLANDS STILL HELD BY THE UNITED STATES.
B. FRIENDLY AND POSSIBLY ALLIED GOVERNMENT IN CONTROL OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIES.
C. BRITISH STILL HOLD HONGKONG AND SINGAPORE AND ARE FAVORABLE TO US.
D. IMPORTANT CHINESE ARMIES ARE STILL IN THE FIELD IN CHINA AGAINST JAPAN.
E. A SMALL U.S. NAVAL FORCE CAPABLE OF SERIOUSLY THREATENING JAPAN'S SOUTHERN SUPPLY ROUTES

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By AT NARS, Date 1-29-95

ALREADY IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS.

F. A CONSIDERABLE DUTCH NAVAL FORCE IS IN THE ORIENT THAT WOULD BE OF VALUE IF ALLIED TO U.S.

8. A CONSIDERATION OF THE FOREGOING LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT PROMPT AGGRESSIVE NAVAL ACTION AGAINST JAPAN BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD RENDER JAPAN INCAPABLE OF AFFORDING ANY HELP TO GERMANY AND ITALY IN THEIR ATTACK ON ENGLAND AND THAT JAPAN ITSELF WOULD BE FACED WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH HER NAVY COULD BE FORCED TO FIGHT ON MOST UNFAVORABLE TERMS OR ACCEPT FAIRLY EARLY COLLAPSE OF THE COUNTRY THROUGH THE FORCE OF BLOCKADE. A PROMPT AND EARLY DECLARATION OF WAR AFTER ENTERING INTO SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS WITH ENGLAND AND HOLLAND, WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN BRINGING ABOUT THE EARLY COLLAPSE OF JAPAN AND THUS ELEIMINATING OUR ENEMY IN THE PACIFIC BEFORE GERMANY AND ITALY COULD STRIKE AT US EFFECTIVELY. FURTHERMORE, ELIMINATION OF JAPAN MUST SURELY STRENGTHEN BRITAIN'S POSITION AGAINST GERMANY AND ITALY AND, IN ADDITION, SUCH ACTION WOULD INCREASE THE CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT OF ALL NATIONS WHO TEND TO BE FRIENDLY TOWARDS US.

9. IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT IN THE PRESENT STATE OF POLITICAL OPINION THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS CAPABLE OF DECLARING WAR AGAINST JAPAN WITHOUT MORE ADO; AND IT IS BARELY POSSIBLE THAT VIGOROUS ACTION ON OUR PART MIGHT LEAD THE JAPANESE TO MODIFY THEIR ATTITUDE. THEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION IS SUGGESTED:

A. MAKE AN ARRANGEMENT WITH BRITAIN FOR THE USE OF BRITISH BASES IN THE PACIFIC, PARTICULARLY SINGAPORE.
B. MAKE AN ARRANGEMENT WITH HOLLAND FOR THE USE OF BASE FACILITIES AND ACQUISITION OF SUPPLIES IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES.
C. GIVE ALL POSSIBLE AID TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT OF CHIANG-KAI-SHEK.
D. SEND A DIVISION OF LONG RANGE HEAVY CRUISERS TO THE ORIENT, PHILIPPINES, OR SINGAPORE.
E. SEND TWO DIVISIONS OF SUBMARINES TO THE ORIENT.
F. KEEP THE MAIN STRENGTH OF THE U.S. FLEET NOW IN THE PACIFIC IN THE VICINITY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
G. INSIST THAT THE DUTCH REFUSE TO GRANT JAPANESE DEMANDS FOR UNDUE ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS, PARTICULARLY OIL.
H. COMPLETELY EMBARGO ALL U.S. TRADE WITH JAPAN, IN COLLABORATION WITH A SIMILAR EMBARGO IMPOSED BY THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

10. IF BY THESE MEANS JAPAN COULD BE LED TO COMMIT AN OVERT ACT OF WAR, SO MUCH THE BETTER. AT ALL EVENTS WE MUST BE FULLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE THREAT OF WAR.

A.H. McCOLLUM ✓

CC-OP-16
OP-16-F
FILE

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By AI NARS, Date 1-24-95

OP-16-F-2 ONI

7 October 1940

[redacted]

Summary

1. The United States is faced by a hostile combination of powers in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

2. British naval control of the Atlantic prevents hostile action against the United States in this area.

3. Japan's growing hostility presages an attempt to open sea communications between Japan and the Mediterranean by an attack on the British lines of communication in the Indian Ocean.

4. Japan must be diverted if British opposition in Europe is to remain effective.

5. The United States naval forces now in the Pacific are capable of so containing and harassing Japan as to nullify her assistance to Germany and Italy.

6. It is to the interest of the United States to eliminate Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan.

7. In the absence of United States ability to take the political offensive, additional naval forces should be sent to the orient and agreements entered into with Holland and England that would serve as an effective check against Japanese encroachments in South-eastern Asia.

[redacted]

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By AT NARS, Date 1-24-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMENT BY CAPTAIN KNOX

IT IS UNQUESTIONABLY TO OUT GENERAL INTEREST THAT BRITAIN BE NOT LICKED - JUST NOW SHE HAS A STALEMATE AND PROBABLY CANT DO BETTER. WE OUGHT TO MAKE IT CERTAIN THAT SHE AT LEAST GETS A STALEMATE. FOR THIS SHE WILL PROBABLY NEED FROM US SUBSTANTIAL FURTHER DESTROYERS AND AIR RIENFORCEMENTS TO ENGLAND. WE SHOULD NOT PRECIPITATE ANYTHING IN THE ORIENT THAT WOULD HAMPER OUR ABILITY TO DO THIS - SO LONG AS PROBABILITY CONTINUES.

IF ENGLAND REMAINS STABLE, JAPAN WILL BE CAUTIOUS IN THE ORIENT. HENCE OUR ASSISTANCE TO ENGLAND IN THE ATLANTIC IS ALSO PROTECTION TO HER AND US IN THE ORIENT.

HOWEVER, I CONCUR IN YOUR COURSES OF ACTION WE MUST BE READY ON BOTH SIDES AND PROBABLY STRONG ENOUGH TO CARE FOR BOTH.

D.W.K.

RE YOUR #6: - NO REASON FOR BARTLESHIPS NOT VISITING WEST COAST IN BUNCHES.

The machine. The keyboard of a RIP-5 code typewriter, made by Underwood, showing the difference between Morse Code and Japanese naval *kana*. Note, for example, that Morse Code "B" is "HA" in *kana*. *Photo by Robert Stinnett.*

The eccentric Lieutenant Commander Joseph J. Rochefort (with raised hand) commanded station HYPO in 1941. He is shown here in a game of dominoes aboard the USS *Indianapolis* in 1940. *Photo by Carl Mydans,* © Life Magazine.

Where they worked. Station HYPO occupied a portion of the basement of the Administration Building of the Fourteenth Naval District in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard in 1941. Rochefort supervised the cryptographic operations from the center of the large interior space. Sorting and statistical machinery (at right) aided in solving the Japanese naval 5-Num code. *Photo by Robert Stinnett; art by Frank Pennock, Jr., based on a plot furnished by Captain Thomas Dyer.*

(Source: *Day of Deceit* by Robert B. Stinnett)

NAV. SEC. GROUP

The Code Breakers: Laurence F. Safford (above left) was head of the navy's OP-20-G cryptographic unit whose experience of Japanese machine codes assisted William F. Friedman's (above right) army team in constructing the first Purple decoding machine (below) in 1939.

J. COSTELLO



(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)



From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
April 17th, 1941.

#239. (Part 3 of 3)

Secret outside the department.

VI. The activities of our two countries in the Southwestern Pacific:

Since there is the danger that an advance southward militarily by our Empire would lead to war between the United States and Japan, it is held that our progress in that direction must be conducted by peaceful means without resorting to the sword. It has been made clear to me that if we do thus, the United States will support our economic penetration thither. I must emphasize that this premise is the one and only basis of the present proposal for an understanding.

VII. The policy of the Two Nations Concerning the Political Stabilization of the Pacific:

Through this clause the countries of Europe will suffer some reverses but our Empire will have all to gain and nothing to lose.

(Message incomplete)

(Copy sent to O-3, 12:00 noon, April 19th)

16448 Trans. 4-19-41 (7)

ARMY

The Purple Code: Japan's top secret diplomatic communications, such as this message to its Washington ambassador as sent (above left) and decrypted (above right), were enciphered on an electric typewriter connected to a Type 97 coding machine similar to the device (below) captured on Guam in 1944.

J. COSTELLO

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

"Both the FBI and DIO kept a partial watch on activities at the Japanese consulate and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) steamship line. But either of them could have done little to cut off Yoshikawa, Seki, or Kotoshirodo. As host nation usually bends over backward to let accredited diplomatic and consular personnel go their ways so long as they operate within the letter of the law. And Kita and Okuda were very careful to have their people carry on "legal espionage." To the best of our knowledge, no one from the consulate ever entered a restricted military area unless at the invitation of the American authorities. There is no record that the Japanese ever stole or photographed classified information. They violated no law in pausing to look at the imposing spectacle of men-of-war moored in Pearl Harbor. In fact, the base was an open book by its very nature. And the individual services could do nothing about this. Pearl Harbor was too big, and in too open a position, to be hidden or camouflaged from either sea or land view. The only way to cut off observation would have been to make the entire island of Oahu a restricted military reservation – something no American government could tolerate. The very law the Americans swore to uphold and protect tripped them up. This law guaranteed the privacy of the airways, and the local companies very properly refused to give the FBI, Army Intelligence, or Navy Intelligence copies of the consulate's messages – until early December 1941, when it was too little and too late. But irony of ironies, Washington was scooping up these and other Japanese diplomatic messages by the bucketful. The basic story is as follows: The Japanese used several diplomatic codes, the most secret of which was an exceedingly complicated cipher system known as Purple. Tokyo had a childlike faith in the complete infallibility of its diplomatic codes. It never credited the Americans with the ability to crack the Purple system. In fact, the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) under the tireless direction of Lieutenant Colonel William F. Friedman, succeeded in doing so as early as August 1940, after eighteen to twenty months of the most intense labor. Rated "the world's greatest cryptologist," Friedman, though quiet and unassuming, possessed a drive and tenacity that refused to recognize the word "impossible." The decrypting of Purple and its brother systems earned the name Magic. Friedman paid a high price for his magnificent gift to his country. In December 1940 he suffered a nervous collapse from overwork, and as 1941 opened, he was under treatment in Walter Reed General Hospital in Washington. The "individual genius…of Harry Larry Clark, one of the younger civilian cryptanalysts," triggered the breakthrough. The Navy assisted throughout 1939 and 1940 by furnishing the intercepts and taking over all other Japanese diplomatic systems so that the Army could concentrate on Purple. "The Army provided the solution and wiring diagram; the Navy provided the funds and manufacturing facilities." From the summer of 1940 on, therefore, U.S. Intelligence had been reading Japan's diplomatic messages. This meant that the U.S. Government had full knowledge of virtually all the traffic which passed between the Foreign Office in Tokyo and its most important embassies and consulates abroad. So Washington knew Tokyo's instructions to Nomura and his reports from the embassy. U.S. cryptanalysts were also reading lower-grade Japanese diplomatic ciphers, notably the so-called J codes, the current one being J-19. These were mainly in use between the Foreign Ministry and many consulates, including Honolulu. Thus, the United States also picked up the traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu about the U.S. Pacific Fleet. By the fall of 1941 American policy makers actually knew more than Nomura about his country's intentions, for Tokyo was by no means candid with its ambassador. The United States Army, Navy, and State departments acknowledged the enormous worth of the Magic data and leaned heavily upon them for command decisions. But Magic was not a cure-all or an enchanted key to the mazes of all Japanese thinking. Its messages revealed only what the Foreign Office gave its own diplomats. And the Foreign Ministry itself was not omniscient. The Army and Navy dictated Japanese foreign policy, and they did not always clue in the foreign minister and his associates until matters had proceeded well along – sometimes too far. So Magic could not answer all the questions the United States wanted to ask. For instance, in 1941 U.S. Intelligence had not yet broken through the chain of Japanese naval codes. Generally speaking, military codes are more difficult to break than diplomatic, and in addition, the Japanese Navy prudently changed some of its codes several times during 1941. Hence Washington did not know of the orders Yamamoto sent to the ships of the Combined Fleet or the messages which the Naval General Staff radioed to the Pearl Harbor task force as it sailed across the northern Pacific to Hawaii."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 80-81

"Eight Purple decrypting machines existed in 1941. Washington had four – two each for the Army and Navy. The switches and "intricate rat's-nest of wiring" seldom cooled off. In November 1941 "the diplomatic traffic…averaged about 26 messages a day." To avoid duplication of effort, the services divided the messages by date of origin in Tokyo, the Navy taking the odd days, the Army the even. In April 1941a machine went to Cavite; it was transferred in August to Corregidor [Philippines], where the Communications Intelligence Unit had been assigned the Purple, Red, and J codes. Stark approved sending this machine because Philippines were "the best place to intercept Japanese traffic and receive the information during that time…" Any benefit to Admiral Hart "was a secondary consideration." A copy of all of this unit's diplomatic translations went daily to the Army locally. In addition, all Purple and some Red and J-19 "were immediately enciphered and sent to Washington." These cryptologists also maintained liaison with their British opposites at Singapore and furnished Washington with anything of interest from that source. London received two Purple machines in January 1941. By July of that year Pearl Harbor could have had one, "but only at the expense of Washington." Then the question arose of a third for the British. The "best compromise" was to send the machine to London "and at the same time order parts of more machines." So around "September or early October" London had its third apparatus, and a requisition for stepping switches for four more machines was "bogged down in the War Production Board…" Thus, Hawaii did not receive a Purple machine."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 81-82

Martin-Bellinger Report

U.S. Army Air Forces Major General Frederick L. Martin (left), who was the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force at Hickam Field on December 7, 1941, and U.S. Navy Admiral Patrick N.L. Bellinger (right) co-authored the Martin-Bellinger Report, a military report that described various scenarios of a possible Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbor, on March 31, 1941. Major General Frederick L. Martin was relieved of his command at Hickam Field shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

"In its final form this historic work became famous to all students of the Pacific war as the Martin-Bellinger Report. It speaks for itself clearly and crisply. Its "Summary of the Situation" observed, among other things:
(c) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period…
(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.
The document then considered the capability of Japan in terms of actual strength: *"(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers."* One notes a striking difference from Kimmel's Pacific Fleet letter of February 15. The two airmen, Martin and Bellinger, estimated that enemy carriers would be "supported by fast cruisers," instead of vice versa. These experienced exponents of aerial warfare were thinking along the same lines as Genda. The report continued: *"The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure than an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise…"* Here in a nutshell was the dilemma of Oahu's defenders – the need for a 360-degree arc of patrol without the planes necessary to accomplish such a mission. In the area of "Possible Enemy Action," the authors virtually foretold the future:
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.
(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.
(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.
...(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force… Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack…'
The possibility of such undersea craft prowling into the Hawaiian area was a nasty one. Actually [Major General Frederick L.] Martin and [Rear Admiral Patrick N.L.] Bellinger went somewhat ahead of Onishi and Genda's original plan for a Pearl Harbor attack, which did not envisage the use of submarines. What then could Kimmel, Bloch, and Short do about a potential Japanese attack? Martin and Bellinger had this answer: *(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.* Thus, into two short sentences Martin and Bellinger unknowingly compressed an awesome American tragedy…Martin and Bellinger could not have done a much better job of mind reading had they actually looked over the shoulders of Yamamoto, Onishi, Genda – and others. For in Japan the Pearl Harbor circle was widening even as Oahu's planners labored over their report. The final document [Martin-Bellinger Report] bore the date of March 31, 1941, approximately the same time that Yamamoto put his Combined Fleet staff to work on his design."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 93-95



The last prewar change of command of the fleet took place on 1 February 1941 on board the flagship *Pennsylvania*. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, new commander in chief, is at the microphone shaking hands with his predecessor, Admiral James O. Richardson. Compare this scene of spit-and-polish formality with the much less resplendent scene (page 261) when Admiral Nimitz assumed command of the fleet on board the submarine *Grayling* eleven months later. (Tai Sing Loo photo; courtesy of Mrs. Evelyn Lee.)

Change of command ceremony on February 1, 1941 (Source: *Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy*, Edited by Paul Stillwell)



General George C. Marshall appears on the front cover of the July 29, 1940 (left) and October 19, 1942 (right) editions of *Time* magazine.

Joint Board Meeting takes place on November 26, 1941. Seated around the table, from left to right: Brig. Gen. Harold F. Loomis, Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Maj. Gen. William Bryden, General George C. Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark, Rear Adm. Royal E. Ingersoll, Rear Adm. John H. Towers, and Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner. (Photo: U.S. Army/Naval Institute Collection/Corbis)

Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall appears with members of his General Staff in his office at the War Department in Washington, D.C. on November 26, 1941. Left to right: Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow (War Plans officer), Brig. Gen. R.A. Wheeler, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles (Intelligence officer), Maj. Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold (Aviation officer), Gen. Marshall (seated), Brig. Gen. W.H. Haislip, Brig. Gen. Harry L Twaddle, and Maj. Gen. William Bryden. The only member of the General Staff not present during the meeting is Major General R.C. Moore. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)



(Source: *At Dawn We Slept* by Gordon W. Prange)

"At his meeting with the President on the afternoon of April 16 [, 1941] General Marshall had no opportunity to discuss the broad issues that he had raised with his War Department advisers that morning. The President seemed interested instead in exploring a number of immediate steps to aid the British. He directed Marshall and Stark to examine cargoes ready for shipment to Greece and Yugoslavia to see if any could be diverted to General Wavell. He also asked them to reanalyze the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the possible relocation of British ground forces if they were withdrawn from that area, and the potential field of action for the Eastern Mediterranean fleet after its withdrawal. He lingered for a moment on the importance of Dakar, setting off a discussion of the importance of West Africa to future American strategy. In the week that followed, the Navy outlined for its forces in the Atlantic a Western Hemisphere Defense Plan that put into effect the President's mid-April decision on patrolling. Admiral King indicated that the Western Hemisphere extended from approximately 26 degrees West (a boundary that ran just west of Iceland and included most of the Azores), westward to the International Date Line in the Pacific, to include the Hawaiian Islands and the Aleutians. The territorial extension was not so important as the reminder that "Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval ships or aircraft of belligerents other than those powers having sovereignty over territory in the Western Hemisphere is to be viewed as possibly actuated by an unfriendly interest toward shipping or territory in the Western Hemisphere." Secretary Stimson was disappointed that Roosevelt had not gone further. He wanted not only escorts for ships but early shifting of a large part of the Pacific Fleet to Atlantic waters. His wishes were contrary to the firm convictions of the Secretary of State, who believed that the Pacific Fleet had to stay at Pearl Harbor to exercise a calming effect on the Japanese. Deeply involved in negotiations with Japan, Hull was certain that the removal of part of the Navy from the Pacific would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. For more than two months, during which the Secretary of State urged postponement of the transfer and Admiral Stark, to Stimson's dismay, blew hot and cold on the proposition, the Secretary of War worked doggedly to encourage the President to make the shift. In this effort he relied heavily on Marshall's current high standing with the White House and the State Department to win his point. When Stimson told General Marshall on April 23 that the President now was convinced that the Pacific Fleet had to remain at Pearl Harbor, the Chief of Staff strongly dissented. "Marshall felt," recorded Stimson, "that with our heavy bombers and our new fine pursuit planes, the land force could put up such a defense that the Japs wouldn't dare attack Hawaii, particularly such a long distance from home." On the following day the Secretary took the Chief of Staff with him to the White House to assure the President that Hawaii was impregnable. The land defense, Marshall said, was sufficient to keep off the Japanese, and the air defense could be reinforced from the mainland if necessary. Knox agreed."
– *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942* by Forrest C. Pogue, p. 134-135 (published in 1966)

"On April 1, exactly one day after the dating of the Martin-Bellinger Report, Naval Intelligence in Washington alerted the commandants of all naval districts – including the Fourteenth at Hawaii – as follows: *"Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows [sic] the Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect."* Another link in the chain of prediction! If Japan took the plunge, the defenders could expect it to be on a Saturday, Sunday, or national holiday. While military leaders on Oahu were busy developing plans to meet a possible Japanese attack, many Americans conceived of Hawaii as an impregnable fortress. A vast protective belt of water shielded Oahu on all sides. Some military experts considered the great area of "vacant sea" to the north the best and most likely avenue of approach for the enemy, but by the same token it provided an open highway of exposure and detection. The undeniable argument that Japan had a vast ocean in which to approach Oahu could be countered by the simple fact that Hawaii commanded all seaways in the central Pacific. Moreover, a screen of outlying bases into which the United Sates was pouring millions of defense dollars flanked Oahu. Midway lay 1,300 miles to the northwest; Wake about another 1,000 miles west and somewhat southward. Johnston Island, a white spear of land, barely crested the waves 700 miles to the southwest, with Palmyra 1,000 miles due south. Still other American and British possessions stretched beyond this defensive rim. Up in the Aleutians a new naval and air base at Dutch Harbor guarded the northern Pacific and flanked Japan's shortest line of approach to the West Cost. U.S. naval strength was concentrated heavily at Pearl Harbor. Here, at any time the Fleet moved out in stately maneuver, one could see fighting craft of all descriptions – six to eight battleships; two or three aircraft carriers; numerous heavy and light cruisers; dozens of destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, and auxiliary craft. Oil storage tanks, dry docks, workshops, and many other shore installations made Pearl Harbor virtually an independent maintenance base. Here, in the "Navy behind the Navy," the entire Fleet could dock, fuel, supply, and undergo repairs. From this great mid-Pacific pivotal point it could swing into action at a moment's notice and strike hard at the enemy in any direction. Hawaii was proud of its guardian of the seas. "If there were ever men and a fleet ready for any emergency," bragged the Honolulu *Advertiser* on February 1, 1941, "it's Uncle Sam's fighting ships." The Army, too, bent every effort to make good the boast that Pearl Harbor was "the best defended naval base in the world." In 1941 Oahu had a strong garrison of about 25,000 troops. Armed with all the tools of modern warfare, kept rugged and alert by constant field exercises, these soldiers were expertly trained in the defense of the island. And if the Japanese sideslipped the American outer defense posts or succeeded in fighting through the Pacific Fleet, the Hawaiian Air Force stood ready to help smash any attack. Bombers stationed at Hickam Field gave the Air force potent scoring punch, and the latest fighter planes organized in effective squadrons at Wheeler Field assured mastery of the skies over Oahu. In case the enemy got too close or tried to land there, field guns stood ready. Well could [Gen. Walter C.] Short say on April 7: "Here in Hawaii we all live in a citadel or gigantically fortified island."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 96-97

"The Navy noted on the same day – November 4 – a significant phenomenon which it reported to Kimmel, Hart, and certain naval district commandants, including Bloch: Japan appeared to be withdrawing all its merchant vessels from the Western Hemisphere. Intelligence expert Captain Ellis M. Zacharias considered the removal of commercial shipping back to Japan one of the "earliest indications of hostilities." Naval Intelligence "had long realized that…" More and more Togo bore down on the harassed Nomura. On November 5 he sent the ambassador an actual deadline: "Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realized that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one…" Why the twenty-fifth? On that date (November 26, Japanese time) the task force would sortie from Hitokappu Bay. To reach an agreement before the First Air Fleet got under way would save the Japanese a considerable investment in time, fuel, and manpower. No one in authority in Washington was spoiling for a fight with Japan. On the contrary, Marshall and Stark sent Roosevelt on November 5 a joint estimate in which they affirmed bluntly: "At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific." [Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Harold R.] Stark and [Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C.] Marshall pointed out: "If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated decision will still have not been reached…" Therefore, **"War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance." They recommended "military action against Japan" only in certain contingencies, the first being "A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies…"** Little more than a month of peace remained when [Kichisaburo] Nomura and Wakasugi called on Hull and his assistant Joseph W. Ballantine at 0900 on November 7. Nomura relayed his government's expressed wish to resume the conversations and handed Hull a document embodying Proposal A. He also asked for an interview with the President, which was later arranged for the tenth. As always, the meeting was personally cordial, but Hull could not see that Proposal A contained anything "fundamentally new or offering any real recessions from the position consistently maintained by the Japanese Government." That afternoon Roosevelt summoned his Cabinet. The President started the session by asking [Secretary of State Cordell] Hull if he had anything in mind. Hull had plenty and spoke for some fifteen minutes on "the dangers of the international situation." He [Hull] went over the conversations with Japan, emphasizing that in his opinion **"relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time."** This was an uncanny prognostication, considering that the Naval General Staff and the Combined Fleet had just issued their operational orders. This awareness that Japan might break out anywhere at any time did not help [Admiral Husband] Kimmel. That very day, November 7, [Adm. Harold R.] Stark wrote once more, regretfully turning down Kimmel's request for more destroyers and the two new battleships *North Carolina* and *Washington*. He ended on a worried note: "Things seem to be moving steadily toward a crisis in the Pacific…A month may see, literally, most anything…"

– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 335-337
"Now it so happened that at 1430 on November 27, after Short had left Kimmel's conference, his chief of staff, Colonel Tige Phillips, brought him War Department Message No. 472, signed "Marshall," which read: *Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot be avoided* ***the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act****. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but* ***these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent****. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five [the Army's basic war plan] so far as they pertain to Japan.* ***Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.*** Short went over the message with Phillips almost word for word. He received the impression "that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii and be regarded by Japan as an overt act." It therefore behooved him to be circumspect because the Japanese "were apparently looking for excuses."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 402

"That afternoon or early evening [on November 27, 1941] Lieutenant Harold S. Burr, Bloch's liaison officer with Short's headquarters, took the message to Captain John B. Earle, Bloch's chief of staff. Earle promptly escorted Burr to Kimmel's office. The dispatch arrived at an opportune moment. Kimmel had just received a similar, even stronger message from the Navy Department: *This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of the naval task forces indicates [sic] an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 [the Navy's basic war plan]. Inform district and army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department…*"
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 405-406

"Thus, once more Tokyo insisted upon November 25 as the cutoff date. And on the fifteenth the Foreign Ministry had sent instructions to Washington, as well as several other Japanese diplomatic missions, for destroying code machines in the event of emergency. On the seventeenth, at 1030, Nomura presented Kurusu to Hull. The secretary of state took an immediate dislike to the new envoy. Nevertheless, whatever his personal bias, Hull complimented Kurusu on the way he had "handled his relations with the public since coming to this country. He also spoke highly of the respect and confidence in which the Secretary and his associates hold the Japanese Ambassador." The three diplomats adjourned to the White House for an appointment with the President at 1100. Although they talked together for an hour and a quarter, nothing new developed. Nomura took a certain comfort from Roosevelt's quoting William Jennings Bryan: "There is no last word between friends." When Hull, Nomura, and Kurusu met on the eighteenth, they faced the difficulty of working out a Japanese-American rapprochement while Japan was still tied to Germany." – *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 358

"As the cold dusk of December 6 closed over Washington, the men of Safford's shop were duly thankful that Togo's long opus arrived in English, so they did not have to translate it or worry about phraseology, but correcting a mistake in the key took some time. At around 1630 Safford said, "There is nothing I can do but get in your way and make you nervous. I am going home." By about 1900 they had finished decoding the thirteen parts so far received. Then they spent some two hours making the requisite copies, with help from their Army opposites. Kramer telephoned Wilkinson at about 2100 and received authority to make the necessary rounds. He also called the usual recipients to see if they would be in. He had no luck in raising Stark, who had gone to the National Theater to see *The Student Prince*. After finishing his calls, Kramer telephoned his wife, Mary, to commandeer her as chauffeur. When he scrambled into the car, his wife sensed "an air of tenseness about him." They first stopped at the White House office building, where Kramer left Roosevelt's copy in the customary locked pouch with Lieutenant Schulz in the latter's cubbyhole in the mailroom. Schulz carried the locked pouch to the main White House. "Someone from the usher's office" accompanied him to the President's study and announced him. He saw Roosevelt seated at his desk, with Harry Hopkins "pacing back and forth slowly, not more than 10 feet away." Roosevelt's big hand grasped the sheaf of about fifteen typewritten pages, and he read carefully for about ten minutes. Then he passed the material to Hopkins, who also read it and handed it back, whereupon **the President turned to him and said, "This means war."**"
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 474-475

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 14A
APPROVED BY THE [redacted]
MARCH 10, 1925

RADIOGRAM

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

FROM: WAR DEPARTMENT
BUREAU AGO
AG 381 (11-27-41)MC-E

ehb - 1712

[redacted]

PRIORITY

[redacted]

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

SECRET

COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
472 FORT SHAFTER, T.H.

Auth: T. A. G.
Initials: OCE
Date, NOV 27 1941

NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE PERIOD JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT PERIOD IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT COMMA REPEAT CANNOT COMMA BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT PERIOD THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT COMMA REPEAT NOT COMMA BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE PERIOD PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT COMMA REPEAT NOT COMMA TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT PERIOD REPORT MEASURES TAKEN PERIOD SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN PERIOD LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS

MARSHALL

WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER: PLEASE SEND SAME RADIOGRAM TO:

COMMANDING GENERAL, CARIBBEAN DEFENSE COMMAND,
QUARRY HEIGHTS, C.Z.

SECRET

ADJUTANT GENERAL.

This original should be returned to The AGO upon completion of action in order that same may become permanent record in AGO files.

*See note on page 2 of basic memo. ehb

(Source: *Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement* by Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee)

NAVAL MESSAGE — NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER | ADDRESSEES | MESSAGE PRECEDENCE

FROM: OPNAV
RELEASED BY: INGERSOLL
DATE: NOV 27 1941

FOR ACTION: CINCAF CINCPAC — PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED

TOR CODEROOM:
DECODED BY:
PARAPHRASED BY: SHALL

INFORMATION: CINCLANT SPENAVO — PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED

4544-16

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

272337 CR 0921

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING. NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC HAVE CEASED AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAP TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATES AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER THE PHILIPPINES OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO. EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL46X INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES. A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT. SPENAVO INFORM BRITISH. CONTINENTAL DISTRICT GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST SABOTAGE.

12....ORIGINATOR RECORD COPY TO WPD WARDEPT... CNO

NOV 28 '41 PM

FILE(88)

4544-16

IN

WPD, WDGS

SECRET

SEE ART 76(4) NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

495

(Source: *Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement* by Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee)

"For months before December 7, 1941, Stimson had expected eventual war with Japan. It seems – in retrospect – that he should have foreseen the Pearl Harbor attack. After all, the Japanese had a reputation for striking without warning, a reputation dating at least from 1904, when they launched the Russo-Japanese war with a surprise blow at Port Arthur. The Navy in its Hawaiian maneuvers of 1932 staged a successful raid on Pearl Harbor with carrier-borne aircraft, and thereafter American war planners repeatedly calculated on the probability of the enemy's beginning hostilities in that way. In January, 1941, Ambassador Grew in Tokyo warned Washington of rumors that Japan might begin war without declaring it, and begin it with an assault upon Hawaii from the air. The "Magic" intercepts of Japanese communications in the fall of 1941, if the pieces of the puzzle had been properly put together, would have spelled out the very time as well as the place of the attack. The fact is that Stimson did see the danger early in the year. On January 24 the Secretary of the navy, writing to the Secretary of War about the Hawaiian situation, reported that the "dangers envisaged in the order of importance and probability" were these: first, an "air bombing attack"; second, an "air torpedo plane attack" and third, "sabotage." Stimson wrote back: "In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort." Stimson considered Hawaii "the best equipped of all our overseas departments," though he conceded that it was lacking in pursuit and patrol planes, anti-aircraft guns, barrage balloons, and "aircraft warning service." To overcome this last deficiency, he worked hard to provide radar equipment, though he failed to check up to see how much of it, or how little, was actually ready and in use. Various investigations by war planners showed that only a continuous, long-range, wide-arc reconnaissance by air could give adequate warning of an enemy approach. Yet Stimson did little or nothing to make additional patrol planes available for Hawaii." – *Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft* by Richard N. Current, p. 164-165

"Instead, as the crisis with Japan developed, he concentrated more and more upon sending bombers to the Philippines. On the Philippines, not Hawaii – on offense, not defense – he focused the greater part of his attention. His Philippine preoccupation shines through his handling of what he considered the War Department's final alert to the Army outpost commanders. This so-called "war warning" was dispatched from Washington on November 27. Three facts about it should be noted. First, Stimson and not Roosevelt or Marshall took the initiative in making the decision to send the message (in a telephone conversation with the President that morning, as Stimson recorded, "I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert"). Second, he was thinking primarily, and at first exclusively, of the Philippines ("The main question has been over the message that we shall send to MacArthur"). Third, the wording of the alert, in the form or forms it ultimately took, was complex. At Stimson's instance, General Gerow and Colonel Bundy composed a draft of the message, then presented it to a conference of Stimson, Knox, and Stark (Marshall being absent from Washington that day). The draft began by saying simply that negotiations with Japan had terminated. After calling up Hull, the War Secretary corrected the first sentence to read: "Negotiations with Japan *appear* to be terminated *to all practical purposes* with only the *barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue*." As if to offset the ambiguities he thus introduced, Stimson added to the second sentence these words: "hostile action possible at any moment." The rest of the message he examined carefully and approved without change." – *Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft* by Richard N. Current, p. 166

"All along he had been thinking of MacArthur in the Philippines, but he finally decided to send warnings to the rest of the outpost commanders also. The Army commander at Pearl Harbor was General Walter C. Short. To the message intended for him was added a caution against alarming the civilian population of Oahu. Here is the complete dispatch as sent to General Short: *"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."* To General Short, this message was not very informative. It told him, on the one hand, that hostile action was possible and, on the other hand, that negotiations might be resumed. It told him to let the Japanese commit the first overt act, but not to let this consideration jeopardize his defense. He was to take such reconnaissance measures as he deemed necessary, and yet he was not to carry them out in such a way as to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. He was left with the inference that, if and when hostilities came, his job would not be to drive attackers off from his own base. Instead, he was told, "you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five." So far as it applied to Japan, this war plan called for defending the Philippines, raiding Japanese installations and communications, and cooperating with the Dutch and the British in the southwestern Pacific."
– *Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft* by Richard N. Current, p. 167-168

"To General Short, then, the wording of this "war warning," taken by itself, was ambiguous and misleading enough. But he did not and could not take that message by itself. It was only one of several that he received, and the others confounded his confusion. From G-2 and from General Arnold he got instructions to be on the lookout for sabotage. His superiors might have expected something other than sabotage if they had interpreted aright the Japanese "bomb plot" message of September 24 which had been intercepted and decoded. In this communication the Japanese government asked its consul general in Hawaii for detailed information about the precise berthing of the ships in Pearl Harbor. This information, one might have reasoned, was not intended for saboteurs, as they would get their data by local observations of their own. General Short did not have access to this or other "Magic" intercepts, and he was stopped by a recent Supreme Court decision from tapping Japanese communications, himself. Having been asked to "report measures taken," he immediately replied to the War Department: "Report [Hawaiian] department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy re URAD [your radio message] four seven two twenty seventh." This reply General Marshall brought to Stimson's desk for the Secretary's eye. After all, it was a response to what was actually Stimson's own "war warning," sent out over Marshall's name during Marshall's absence. With the message from Short was one from MacArthur, and apparently the two were clipped together, Short's underneath. Stimson paid close attention to the one on top, that is, MacArthur's. His mind, as usual, was on the Philippines. If he as much as looked at Short's, he never gave it a second thought. Afterwards he could not remember ever having seen it, though he must have, for his initials, in his own hand, were on it. Stimson and Short misunderstood each other completely, because Stimson was concerned with only his own "war warning," while Short was responding to a whole group of warnings he had received. Stimson never inquired into the sabotage warnings that the War Department had sent. He never questioned (till after December 7) the sufficiency of Short's reply. He never ordered any answer to it. He left the Hawaiian commander to take it for granted that the War Department was satisfied with his antisabotage measures – which included bunching his planes on the ground in such a way as to make them useless for defense and vulnerable as targets in case of an air attack."
– *Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft* by Richard N. Current, p. 168-169

"In the last week of November the negotiations with Japan were still going on, but they were going on badly. There was a consideration of a six-month and then of a three-month truce. So little hope for anything was held out that on the 24th a "quasi alert" was sent to the Pacific commands. Next day word came in, through the broken Japanese code, that several divisions of Japanese troops were boarding ship at Shanghai. On the 26th Hull believed that Japan was "poised for attack" but he made one further "honest effort to keep our conversations going." He gave some proposals to the Japanese but his pessimism continued. While Nomura and his fellow negotiator Saburo Kurusu took Hull's recommendations off for study, the Secretary of State confided to Stimson and Knox on the 27th that the matter "is now in the hands of you and Knox – the Army and the Navy." On that same day the Secretary of War took some part of the matter into his own hands. He suggested to the President, who like Hull believed the "talks had been called off," that a "final alert" should be sent to the Pacific to put the forces on the "qui vive for any attack." The President agreed. And so that afternoon Stimson, Knox, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Leonard T. Gerow of the War Plans Division sat down to work out a text for the final warning. General Marshall was away for the day at troop maneuvers. The two military men revealed in discussion a "not unnatural" tendency "to seek for more time." Stimson replied that he too would like more time but not at the cost of the humiliation of the United States or at the cost of "reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part." He then called Cordell Hull to obtain an exact statement of the existing situation. With this statement in mind he introduced some qualifying phrases in the text which h then served as the basis for the "final alert" prepared in the War Plans Division and sent under General Marshall's signature to the Pacific commands. The first sentence and the last seven words of the second sentence in the alert were written by Stimson himself. He approved the rest. The message, Number 472, read:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.
This message was sent on November 27. To the alert, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, replied as follows: *Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy [as prescribed in your radio message] four seven two twenty seventh.* This reply, like the others received in answer to the final alert, was passed through the Secretary's office where Stimson put his initials on it."
– *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* by Elting E. Morison, 526-528

Atlantic Charter Conference & Negotiations with the Japanese Ambassador

Photo # NH 67209 Leaders on board HMS Prince of Wales during Atlantic Charter conference, 1941

Atlantic Charter Conference, 10-12 August 1941. Conference leaders during Church services on the after deck of HMS *Prince of Wales*, in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. American President Franklin D. Roosevelt (left) and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill are seated in the foreground. Standing directly behind them are Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S. Navy; General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army; General Sir John Dill, British Army; Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S. Navy; and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, Royal Navy. American envoy Harry Hopkins (far left) is seen talking with Union Pacific Railroad chairman and special envoy William Averell Harriman in the background.
(Donation of Vice Admiral Harry Sanders, USN (Retired), 1969; *U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph*)
Source: http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h67000/h67209c.htm



President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Lend-Lease Bill in Washington, D.C. on March 11, 1941. President Roosevelt ordered an economic embargo on Imperial Japan on July 24, 1941 and ordered an oil embargo on Imperial Japan on August 1, 1941. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill are shown as they sat on the big forward deck of H.M.S. Prince of Wales to relax, chat and breathe a bit of salt air during their Atlantic meeting on August 15, 1941. Behind the two at right are: Admiral

E.J. King, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Commander, and Gen. George C. Marshall (extreme right). In the more distant background (center) stands Sumner Welles, U.S. Under Secretary of State and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

The Atlantic Charter is signed, August 1941, aboard the British battleship *Prince of Wales*. Roosevelt and his advisers also agree to join Britain in preventing "further encroachment by Japan in the southwest Pacific" even though such measures "might lead to war." Left to right: General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff; Franklin Roosevelt; Winston Churchill; Admiral Ernest King, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. *(National Archives)*

(Source: *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* by John Toland)

Patriotic San Franciscans heartily endorsed FDR's embargo—called for in McCollum's October 1941 memorandum—of exports to Japan during a July demonstration at the NYK Line pier. San Francisco Call-Bulletin *photo by Jack Fay. Bancroft Library Collection.*

Note: McCollum's memorandum was issued in October 1940. (Source: *Day of Deceit* by Robert B. Stinnett)

Secretary of State Cordell Hull (center) walks with Japanese Ambassador to America Kichisaburo Nomura (left) Japanese envoy Saburo Kurusu (right) upon their arrival in Washington, D.C. in November 1941 for diplomatic talks a few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor. General Hideki Tojo and his Cabinet withheld vital information concerning the proposed attack on Pearl Harbor from Kichisaburo Nomura; Nomura was not informed about the Imperial Japanese Navy attack on Pearl Harbor until after the incident. (Photo: Thomas D. McAvoy/Time Life)

"At noon that same, November 25, Stimson went to the "War Cabinet" meeting in the White House at which the President "brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." As Stimson said, "It was a difficult proposition." "*We* were likely to be attacked"! The pronoun, as Stimson here used it, was broad and inclusive. It included the British and the Dutch, who in his own and his colleagues' thinking were already our Pacific allies in effect. Earlier in the year, American, British, and Dutch staff officers in the Far East had agreed that "joint military counteraction" should be undertaken if Japan attacked or directly threatened the territory of either the United States or Great Britain or the Netherlands – or, for that matter, if Japan should "move forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees or south of 10 degrees North" or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands. Stimson repeatedly had tried to get Roosevelt to approve war plans based on this A.B.D. agreement, and Roosevelt had refused to commit himself. Nevertheless, the British and the Dutch in the Pacific were, in the language of the administration, identified with us. On that November 25 the White House conferees were expecting Japan to strike soon at British or Dutch but not American soil. They were confident that the Japanese would not dare to start hostilities against the United States. That is precisely the reason why the question "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot" was, as Stimson put it, such a "difficult proposition." Since, as he and his associates supposed, the Japanese would not actually fire the "first shot" as against the United States, the problem was how to maneuver them into the position of *seeming* to do so when they moved upon Dutch or British possessions in the Pacific. To this problem the men in the White House proceeded to seek solutions. As Stimson recorded: "Hull laid out his general broad propositions on which the thing should be rested – the freedom of the seas and the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy of world aggression. The others brought out the fact that any such expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing that." That is to say, Secretary Hull at first proposed putting the matter to the American people this way: the Japanese have fired the first shot at us by infringing our freedom of the seas and by allying themselves with the Germans in a program of aggression against the world, of which we are a part. Others added these arguments: the Japanese have fired the first shot at us by threatening an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and by threatening to cut off our rubber supply from Malaya. Then Stimson, recalling Roosevelt's secret warning to Japan of August 17, put it this way: the Japanese have fired the first shot at us by disregarding that near-ultimatum."
– *Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft* by Richard N. Current, p. 155-157

"That October the Japanese, already entrenched in Indo-China, stood poised for new and wider adventures in the southwestern Pacific. Not that they seemed to menace directly the United States or its territories, but they did appear ready to strike out against the colonies of Great Britain or the Netherlands. Stimson, preoccupied with his old proconsular domain, the Philippines, was preparing a "strategy of national defense" with which to forestall the Japanese. He was thinking now in terms of air rather than sea power. His idea was to make the Philippines a base for B-17 bombers which could attack any Japanese expedition daring to move southward past the islands. He wanted to put in the Philippines at least a hundred of the Flying Fortresses, and he calculated on October 6 that he could provide that many in about three months. On October 21, when only a few had arrived, he reported to the President: "even this imperfect threat, if not promptly called by the Japanese, bids fair to stop Japan's march to the South and secure the safety of Singapore." To gain time for assembling his air armada in the Philippines, he was willing to see Roosevelt and Hull keep up their month-old conversations with Ambassador Nomura, but he did not want them to concede anything but talk. When, in September, Premier Konoye proposed to meet Roosevelt in the Pacific, Stimson favored "stringing out negotiations" but opposed an actual conference or even a preliminary discussion of concrete terms. And when, early in November, the "troubleshooter" Saburo Kurusu headed for Washington to join Nomura, Stimson commented to himself: "Japan is sending somebody to us who, I think, will bring us a proposal impossible of acceptance." He was not quite so much concerned about the need for gaining time, however, as were General Marshall and Admiral Stark. On November 5 they sent the President a joint Army-Navy memorandum advising that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." Apparently impressed by this memorandum, Roosevelt the next day told Stimson he thought he might propose to Kurusu a six months' truce during which neither Japan nor the United States would make any military advance or increase of armaments in the Far East. Stimson did not like this truce plan. It would check his own scheme of building up an overpowering air force in the Philippines, and the Chinese would object to it, as he told Roosevelt. "I reminded him that it has always been our historic policy since the Washington conference not to leave the Chinese and Japanese alone together, because the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese knew it." (Here Stimson was a bit forgetful. Just ten years before, in the fall of 1931 [i.e. Mukden Incident], he himself had insisted on leaving the Chinese and the Japanese alone together, in spite of strong objections from China and the League [of Nations].) After listening to Stimson, the President turned from talk of truce to talk of war. On the following day (November 7) he polled his Cabinet on the question of the southwestern Pacific – "whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be." Should we strike first? What should the tactics be? Would the people back us up? One by one the Secretaries – Hull, Stimson, and the rest – expressed their opinion that the public would support the government, and Roosevelt agreed. Stimson was pleased. This, he rejoiced in his diary, was much the best Cabinet meeting yet. His colleagues seemed to be coming around to his idea of an offensive-defensive move from the Philippines. "The thing would have been much stronger if the Cabinet had known – and they did not know except in the case of Hull and the President – what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we are to pitch in." For Stimson, the next step was to send poison gas to the Philippines, for ultimate use against the Japanese, who, he told the President, had already used it against the Chinese."

– *Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft* by Richard N. Current, p. 152-154

Japanese Ambassadorto America Kichisaburo Nomura (left), U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull (center), and Japanese special envoy Saburo Kurusu are seen departing after meeting with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the White House in November 1941, where they discussed foreign relations between Japan and America. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura (left), the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, and special envoy Saburo Kuruso smile as they leave a brief meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull in Washington, D.C., U.S.A. on December 7, 1941, just after the Imperial Japanese Navy attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii Territory. (© CORBIS)

"At 0238 Eastern Standard Time, Tokyo had sent off Part 14 of its reply to the American proposals. By the time [Lieutenant Commander Alwin D.] Kramer reached his office in Washington at about 0730 the document was awaiting him. It ended: **"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."** This fourteenth part was not a formal declaration of war; it did not even rupture diplomatic relations. It merely broke off the discussions. While Kramer prepared packets of the entire message for delivery, [U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Arthur H.] McCollum was "trying to digest the 13 parts of this thing" when Wilkinson sent for him. The two men went to Stark's office and talked briefly with him. Shortly after they left the CNO, Kramer delivered the fourteenth part to McCollum, who took it up with Wilkinson. They immediately returned to Stark's office and "pointed out to him the virulence and tenor of the language. …" Someone made the remark that "it looked right there that that was enough to indicate that we could expect war." Wilkinson suggested that an additional warning be sent to Pearl Harbor. Some discussion ensued, but "nothing was done at that time." Kramer delivered the President's copies of the morning's harvest to the White House around 0940. At about 1000 Beardall gave Roosevelt the material. As he remembered, Roosevelt read the fourteenth part, shook his head, and said "that it looked as though the Japs are going to sever negotiations, break off negotiations." Just as the fourteenth part seemed to back away from the final break, so the President's reaction was milder than on the previous day. Next, Kramer walked over to State; he reached Hull's office at 0950. He delivered his folder personally to Knox, who arrived five minutes later. From State, Kramer returned to his office, which he reached at 1020. No wonder his "most vivid impressions of that morning" were of "urgency and perspiration" from chasing about the Navy Department, to the White House and State, back to his office "as quickly as possible to see if anything new had come in," put it through the mill, "and then to dash out with it again." On the War Department side, Lieutenant John Schindel prepared to deliver the State Department's copies. He telephoned John F. Stone, a Foreign Service officer serving as Hull's assistant, at 0730, asking him to get the secretary out of bed to receive the famous message. Schindel hand-carried it shortly thereafter. [Colonel Rufus S.] Bratton received the fourteenth part at his office between 0830 and 0900. He assembled the entire message and read it through "to see just exactly what it meant." While he was thus occupied, an intercept of a much shorter message from [Foreign Minister Shigenori] Togo to [Ambassador Kichisaburo] Nomura crossed his desk: **"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 P.M. on the 7th, your time."** This "immediately stunned" Bratton "into frenzied activity…" The document "was peculiarly worded and the implication was inescapable that it was of vital importance." One can readily see why. For one thing, it activated the fourteen-part message. For another, Sunday was not a normal working day for the diplomatic corps. And no other directive from Tokyo to its embassy in Washington had ever specified a precise hour for a meeting. Convinced that "the Japanese were going to attack some American installation in the Pacific area," Bratton "just wiped everything else" out of his mind and turned his office over to his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel C. Clyde Dusenbury. Yet Bratton never imagined that the United States installation in danger might be Pearl Harbor. As he later explained, "Nobody in ONI, nobody in G-2, knew that any major element of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning the 7th of December. We all thought they had gone to sea…because that was part of the war plan, and they had been given a war warning." He believed that a warning should go to the field commanders in all Pacific areas, but he had no authority to send one. So he hurried off, trying to find someone who could take action. But Marshall, Gerow, and Miles were not in their offices. In any cases, Miles "could not issue a command message." With time slipping by, Bratton decided at about 0900 to telephone Marshall's quarters. An orderly informed him that the general had gone horseback riding. Bratton requested that he find the general and give him an urgent message to phone, that it was "vitally important" that Bratton "communicate with him at the earliest practicable moment." This request, made on a Sunday in a time of crisis and in such terms as Bratton used, clearly indicated that an emergency had arisen, but evidently no one delivered the message. Unfortunately no one was on duty in the War Department at that hour who could or would act promptly in Marshall's absence. Clocks in the War Department showed nearly 1030 when the general returned Bratton's call. The colonel explained that he had "a most important message" that Marshall "must see at once…" He offered to bring it out, but Marshall answered, "No, don't bother to do that. I am coming down to my office. You can give it to me then." Bratton clearly recalled having spoken with Marshall, but the Chief of Staff did not recollect talking directly with him. At about the same moment, Stimson and Knox began their meeting with the secretary of state. As Stimson recorded in his diary, "Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering when the blow will strike…" This was just about the time Nagumo's pilots began preparing for their devastating blow.""

– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 485-487

"In Washington Bratton grew more restive with each passing moment. Time ticked away, and still the Chief of Staff did not show up at the War Department. Miles arrived shortly after Bratton's call. Both the fourteenth section and the 1300 message struck [Brigadier General Sherman] Miles forcibly. To him they meant two things: "(1) That war is very likely because of the language used by the Japanese, and (2) something is going to happen coincident with 1 o'clock Washington time." Not until about 1125- just as Nagumo's carriers were turning into the wind preparing for takeoff – did Marshall appear. Miles and Bratton promptly descended upon him. When they walked in, Marshall was reading the entire Japanese reply while Bratton inwardly squirmed with impatience. Both he and Miles tried to interrupt Marshall and persuade him to read the other message which Bratton clutched in his hand. They might as well have tried to deflect a glacier. After a seeming eternity Marshall finished and accepted the trigger dispatch. He had no doubt that the time designated therein "had some very definite significance…" He asked Miles and Bratton what they thought this portended. Both replied that they "were convinced it meant Japanese hostile action against some American installation in the Pacific at or shortly after 1 o'clock that afternoon." About this time [Brigadier General Leonard T.] Gerow came in with [Colonel Charles W.] Bundy, in charge of Pacific Affairs in War Plans. They concurred in this judgment. But exactly what American installation? Miles urged an immediate warning to the Philippines, Panama, the West Coast, and Hawaii. Yet no one mentioned the timing of the 1300 message as it related to Hawaii. After some discussion everyone concurred "in urging that our outlying possessions be given an additional alert at once by the fastest possible means." So Marshall pulled up "a piece of scratch paper" and wrote out a longhand message. Then he picked up the White House phone and called Stark, probably at 1140. He informed the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] "in a guarded way" what he proposed to do. When Stark answered this call, he had been discussing this identical Japanese message with Schuirmann. Stark told Marshall that "we had sent them so much already" that he "hesitated to send more." That ended the conversation for the moment. Nevertheless, Miles and Bratton continued to urge Marshall to send the warnings. Within a minute or so Stark called Marshall back. He "would go along with" him and offered the use of his naval communications, which "were quite rapid when the occasion demanded it." Marshall replied that he believed "he could get it through very quickly." Stark then asked him to include in the dispatch "instructions to his people to inform their naval opposites." Marshall did so and instructed Bratton to take the draft to the message center for dispatch "at once by the fastest safe means." As Bratton went out the door, Gerow called after him, "If there is any question of priority, give the Philippines first priority." It lacked but a few minutes of noon in Washington. There was "an awful urgency" about the deadline. Yet no one seems to have seriously considered telephoning. The Navy seldom used the scrambler for secret information because [Captain Leigh] Noyes had warned not to depend on it for security. Marshall later testified that even if he had used the phone, he would have called first MacArthur, then Panama. Very shortly Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. French, officer in charge of the War Department Signal Center, "heard some commotion over in the code room" and left his office to investigate. He found Bratton, message in hand, "very much exercised." French had "never seen him more excited." Bratton handed French the draft. "The Chief of Staff wants this sent at once by the fastest safe means," he emphasized. French looked over Marshall's hasty scrawl and replied, "Well, will you help me get this into readable script? Neither I nor my clerk here can read General Marshall's handwriting." So Bratton read it to one of French's clerks, who typed it out from Bratton's reading. This took a few minutes. The message now read: **"Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication. Marshall."** Bratton glanced at his watch. The time was about 1158. On Nagumo's task force the clocks read 0158 Tokyo time December 8 – 0628 December 7, local time. Fuchida's first wave was circling the carriers preparatory to its flight of destruction. Leaving French to process his precious message, Bratton returned to Marshall's office. "Go back and find out how long it is going to take for this message to be delivered to the addressees," the Chief of Staff directed him. So Bratton hurried back to French and asked Marshall's question. After "a little figuring mentally," French informed him, "It will take about 30 or 40 minutes for it to be delivered to the person to whom it is addressed." This did not mean that [Lt. Gen. Walter C.] Short would have it in his hands in that time. It would have to be deciphered, decoded, and delivered. Bratton assumed that the Army had direct communication with Hawaii and did not find out to the contrary until several days after the attack. The first message went to the Caribbean Defense Command promptly at 1200. Six minutes later the word went out to [Gen. Douglas] MacArthur [in the Philippines], that for the Presidio [San Francisco] following at 1211. But the warning for Hawaii hit a snag. When French checked with his Signal Center, he discovered that atmospheric conditions had blocked of the channel to Honolulu since about 1030. The heavy static interfered even with San Francisco. French considered going to the Navy but decided that commercial service would provide quicker and safer transmission. He had a direct teletype to Western Union in Washington, which could handle the message straight to San Francisco, transfer it there to RCA, and thence to Honolulu. He had learned the previous day that RCA was installing a teletype circuit to Hawaiian Department Headquarters. So he sent the dispatch to Western Union at 1217."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 493-495

Japanese envoy Saburo Kurusu (left) and Imperial Japanese Ambassador to America Kichisaburo Nomura laugh while waiting for talks with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull about reducing tensions between America and Japan at the State Department in Washington, D.C. in 1941. **Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the White House on November 17, 1941 and again on November 27, 1941.** Saburo Kurusu arrived in Washington, D.C. by ship on November 15, 1941 from Japan via Honolulu. Saburo Kurusu was the Imperial Japanese Ambassador to Nazi Germany from 1939 to November 1941. Saburo Kurusu's wife Alice Jay [Kurusu] was an American of European descent; Saburo Kurusu and his wife lived in Japan throughout the remainder of World War II. (Photo: Thomas D. McAvoy/Time Life)

The White House as seen from Pennsylvania Avenue was ablaze with light late on the night of December 7, 1941, just hours after the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii Territory. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)



William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan (center), who served as a Director of OSS during World War II, and CBS war correspondent Edward R. Murrow (right) met with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the White House on the night of December 7, 1941, hours after the Imperial Japanese Navy bombed Pearl Harbor. William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1932 to 1957; Edward R. Murrow was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1934 to 1964.

"Throughout the evening of December 7, Roosevelt conferred with congressional and military leaders. He decided his first wartime move would come the next morning, December 8, when he would ask Congress to declare that a state of war existed between Japan and the United States. He prepared a rough draft of what later became his "Day of Infamy" speech. Then he invited [Edward R.] Murrow and [William J. "Wild Bill"] Donovan into the study for a midnight snack of sandwiches and cold beer. Chief Usher Crim noted that the three men spent twenty-five minutes together in the study before Roosevelt retired to his adjoining bedroom. Crim's arrival and departure notations in the Usher Book comprise the only official record; there were no official minutes of the meeting. Only Donovan has hinted at what went on: the conversation was mostly about public reaction to the attack. He sensed that this was FDR's overriding concern." – *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 3

Photo # 208-CN-3992 President Franklin D. Roosevelt addresses Congress



Addressing the United States Congress, in a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives. This photograph, from U.S. Office of War Information files in the National Archives, has long been identified as the President delivering his war message on December 8, 1941, the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. However, a note with the original photograph states that the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (Hyde Park, New York) has said that the view is not of that event. If that is the case, it may represent the 1941 or 1942 State of the Union Address, as the presiding officers (seated behind the President) are Vice President Henry A. Wallace and House Speaker Sam Rayburn. (Photographed by Harris & Ewing, Washington, D.C. *Photograph from Office of War Information collection, U.S. National Archives.*)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-aftr.htm

U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt is pictured during the dramatic moments before the joint session of Congress in Washington, D.C. around 12:30 P.M. on December 8, 1941, as he asked Congress to declare a state of war against Japan for its "unprovoked and dastardly attack." On the right is his son, James Roosevelt. In the background are Vice President Henry A. Wallace (left) and Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn. Both the Senate and the House complied with his request almost immediately. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appears with his “War Cabinet” in the modern Cabinet Room in 1941. (Library of Congress)

Cabinet members watch with mixed emotions as President Franklin D. Roosevelt, wearing a black armband, signs the declaration of war against Japan at 4:10 p.m. Washington, D.C. time on December 8, 1941. Imperial Japanese Navy planes bombed Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941 in a surprise attack that destroyed a large portion of the fleet there, prompting the war declaration.
(Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)



Left photo: U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whose grandfather Warren Delano was a partner of Russell & Co. opium syndicate, relaxes in his chair after signing a declaration of war statement against Japan at the White House in Washington, D.C. on December 8, 1941.
(Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)
Right photo: Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson observes a globe.

Photo # NH 93290 Adm. Harold R. Stark receives medal from President Roosevelt, April 1942

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt congratulates U.S. Navy Admiral Harold R. Stark after Admiral Stark received a Gold Star in lieu of a second Distinguished Service Medal, in ceremonies at the White House in April 1942.
(Collection of Admiral Harold R. Stark; U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h93000/h93290c.htm

1941: Year of the Snake

U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes administers the oath of office to U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on the east portico of the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 20, 1941. Charles Evans Hughes retired as the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court on June 30, 1941. Charles Evans Hughes was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1930 to 1946. (Photo: Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division)

"I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again; your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." – President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940

1941 Timeline – Events Leading to Pearl Harbor:
January 20 – Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes swears in U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt for his third term.
January 27 – U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew delivers a message to the State Department warning the U.S. government about a possible Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbor.
February 1 – Admiral Husband Kimmel replaces Admiral James O. Richardson as Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Pacific Fleet.
February 8 – The U.S. House of Representatives passes the Lend-Lease Act (260–165).
February 14 – Kichisaburo Nomura presents his credentials to Pres. Roosevelt and begins his duties as Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.
March 8 – The U.S. Senate passes the Lend-Lease Act (60–31).
March 11 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signs the Lend-Lease Act into law.
March 27 – Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa arrives in Honolulu, Hawaii and begins to study the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.
March 31 – Major General Frederick L. Martin and U.S. Navy Admiral Patrick N.L. Bellinger co-authored the Martin-Bellinger Report, a military report that described various scenarios of a possible Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbor.
April 9 – The U.S. acquires full military defense rights in Greenland.
April 13 – The Soviet Union and Japan sign a neutrality pact.
April 23 – The America First Committee holds its first mass rally in New York City, with Charles Lindbergh as keynote speaker.
May 1 – The first Defense Bonds and Defense Savings Stamps go on sale in the United States, to help fund the greatly increased production of military equipment.
May 27 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt proclaims an "unlimited national emergency."
June 16 – All Nazi German consulates in the United States are ordered closed and their staffs to leave the country by July 10.
June 21 – All Fascist Italian consulates in the United States are ordered closed.
June 22 – Nazi Germany invades the Soviet Union (*Operation Barbarossa*).
July 7 – American forces take over the defense of Iceland from the British.
July 26 – In response to the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt orders the seizure of all Japanese assets in the United States and imposed an oil and gasoline trade embargo on Japan on August 1, 1941.
July 26 – General Douglas MacArthur is named commander of all U.S. forces in the Philippines; the Philippines Army is ordered nationalized by President Roosevelt.
July 31 – *New York Herald Tribune* publishes an article about Nazi German financier Fritz Thyssen's bank account with Union Banking Corporation and Prescott S. Bush's ties to Union Banking Corporation.
August 10-12 – President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill meet aboard HMS *Prince of Wales*, in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland and establish the Atlantic Charter.
September 24 – Imperial Japanese Foreign Ministry issues the "bomb plot" message to the Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu.
September 29-October 1 – The First Moscow Conference begins; U.S. representative Averill Harriman and British representative Lord Beaverbrook meet with Josef Stalin and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to arrange urgent assistance for Russia.
October 17 – Destroyer USS *Kearny* is torpedoed and damaged near Iceland, killing 11 American sailors.
October 18 – General Hideki Tojo becomes the Prime Minister of Japan.
October 30 – Franklin Delano Roosevelt approves US$1 billion in Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union.
October 31 – The destroyer USS *Reuben James* is torpedoed by a German U-boat near Iceland, killing more than 100 U.S. Navy sailors.
November 17 – Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura and envoy Saburo Kurusu meet with President Roosevelt at the White House.
November 26 (Japan time) – Imperial Japanese Navy Combined Fleet departs Japan enroute to Pearl Harbor.
November 26 – Secretary of State Cordell Hull issues the Ten Points, also known as the Hull Notes.
December 7 (Dec. 8 Japan time) – The Imperial Japanese Navy launches a surprise attack on the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor
December 8 – The United States officially declares war on Empire of Japan.
December 8 (Dec. 7 American time) – Imperial Japan launches invasions in Hong Kong, Malaya, Manila, Singapore, and the Philippines.
December 10 – U.S. military surrenders Guam to Imperial Japan.
December 11 – Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy declare war on America; America reciprocates by declaring war on both nations.
December 18 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signs Executive Order 8983 establishing a commission to investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack (Roberts Commission)
December 22 – U.S. military surrenders Wake Island to Imperial Japan.

1941 Timeline – Overseas:
March 1 – Bulgaria signs the Tripartite Pact, thus joining the Axis powers.
April 6 – Nazi Germany invades Yugoslavia and Greece.
April 18 – Prime Minister of Greece Alexandros Koryzis commits suicide as German troops approach Athens.
April 27 – Nazi German troops enter Athens.
May 2-31 – Great Britain invades Iraq in the Anglo-Iraqi War and overthrows the pro-Nazi Iraqi Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Gailani
May 5 – Emperor Haile Selassie enters Addis Ababa, Ethiopia which had been liberated from Italian forces.
May 10 – The British House of Commons is damaged by the Luftwaffe in an air raid; Rudolf Hess parachutes into Scotland, claiming to be on a peace mission.
June 5 – Four thousand residents of Chungking, Republic of China are asphyxiated in a bomb shelter during the Bombing of Chungking.
June 8 – British and Free French forces invade Syria.
June 23 – Hungary and Slovakia declare war on the Soviet Union.
June 25 – Finland attacks the Soviet Union to seek the opportunity of revenge in the Continuation War.
July 4 – The mass murder of Polish scientists and writers is committed by Nazi German troops in Lwów (Lviv, Ukraine).
August 25 –September 17, 1941: United Kingdom and Soviet forces invades Iran (later known as Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran).
September 8 – The Siege of Leningrad begins. Nazi Germany begins a siege against Leningrad [St. Petersburg] (Sept. 8, 1941-Jan. 27, 1944)
September 16 – Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran is forced to resign in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran ("The Shah" who went into exile in America in 1979), under pressure from the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
October 2, 1941-January 7, 1942 – Nazi German military fights the Soviet Red Army at the Battle of Moscow.
December 25 – Sir Mark Aitchison Young, the Governor of Hong Kong, surrenders to Imperial Japanese Army Lt. Gen. Takashi Sakai at the The Peninsula Hotel [Hong Kong] in Hong Kong.

Timeline of Events on December 7, 1941 (Eastern Standard Time) Leading Up to the Attack

0238 – Japanese government issues Part 14 of its reply ("Part 14 Message") to the American proposals.
0730 – U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Kramer receives Part 14 Message and "1:00 P.M. (1300 Eastern Standard Time) Reply" Message at his office in Washington, D.C.
0830-0900 – Colonel Rufus S. Bratton received the Part 14 Message at his office in Washington, D.C.
0900 – Colonel Bratton calls Gen. George C. Marshall's quarters; Gen. Marshall was riding on horseback.
0940 – Lt. Com. Kramer delivers Part 14 Message to the White House.
0950 – Lt. Com. Kramer delivers Part 14 Message to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the State Department.
0955 – Lt. Com. Kramer delivers Part 14 Message to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox at the State Department.
1000 – President Franklin Delano Roosevelt reads the Part 14 Message at the White House.
1030 (0030 Tokyo Time, December 8) – Ambassador Joseph C. Grew delivers Pres. Roosevelt's message to the Emperor in Tokyo
1030 – Gen. George C. Marshall returns Colonel Bratton's telephone call.
1125 (0555 Hawaii Time) – Gen. George C. Marshall reads the Part 14 Message at his office in Washington, D.C.
1140 (0610 Hawaii Time) – Imperial Japanese Navy pilots begin taking off for Pearl Harbor.
1150 (0620 Hawaii Time) – The first attack wave (183 Japanese planes) begin flying in formation en route to Pearl Harbor.
1206 – Gen. Georce C. Marshall's warning dispatch is issued to Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines.
1210-1223 (0640-0653 Hawaii Time) – A Japanese submarine is sunk outside Pearl Harbor.
1217 (0647 Hawaii Time) – Gen. Marshall's warning dispatch to Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short in Hawaii is sent via Western Union.
1230 (0700 Hawaii Time) – Admiral Husband Kimmel wakes up at his quarters in Hawaii.
1245 (0715 Hawaii Time) – The second attack wave take off for Pearl Harbor.
1323 (0753 Hawaii Time) – Commander Mitsuo Fuchida announces "Tora! Tora! Tora!"
1325 (0755 Hawaii Time) – The Imperial Japanese Navy attack on Pearl Harbor begins.
1328 (0758 Hawaii Time) – U.S. Navy in Hawaii issues the message: "AIR RAID, PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL".
1340 – Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox informs President Franklin D. Roosevelt by phone that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.
1405 – President Franklin D. Roosevelt informs Secretary of State Cordell Hull by phone that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.
1405 – Japanese Ambassador to America Kichisaburo Nomura and Japanese envoy Saburo Kurusu arrive at the State Department.
1420 – Secretary of State Cordell Hull receives Japanese diplomats Nomura and Kurusu at the State Department.
2230 (1130 Philippine Time, December 8) – Imperial Japanese Navy attacks Clark Field in the Philippines.

Note: Eastern Standard Time (Washington, D.C. Time) was 5 hours, 30 minutes ahead of Hawaii Time (Honolulu Time) on December 7, 1941. All hours listed are Eastern Standard Time unless otherwise noted.



President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the joint congressional resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the United States and Japan in the executive office of the White House at 4:10 p.m. on December 8, 1941. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)

Photo # NH 62429 Pres. Roosevelt with Gov. Stainback and senior officers at Pearl Harbor, July 1944



President Franklin D. Roosevelt (seated, center) poses with Hawaii Territorial Governor Ingram M. Stainback (seated, left) and Army Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson (seated, right) on board USS *Baltimore* (CA-68) at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on July 26, 1944. Standing directly behind them are Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (left) and Rear Admiral William R. Furlong (right). Conversing in the left background are U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur (far left) and Admiral William D. Leahy. (Collection of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-g/r-ghorml.htm

General Douglas MacArthur was the Commander of the U.S. forces in the Philippines on December 8, 1941 (Manila time) when the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor. The Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Clark Field in the Philippines nine hours after the Pearl Harbor raid. Although Imperial Japanese military attacked and later conquered the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur was never relieved of his duties or reprimanded (i.e. court-martial, demotion) for his actions in the Philippines, unlike Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short.



Left to right: U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and U.S. Navy Admiral Chester W. Nimitz on board the USS *Baltimore* in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U.S.A. on July 26, 1944. (Photo: http://www.mishalov.com/roosevelt-obit.html)

National Affairs: PEARL HARBOR: HENRY STIMSON'S VIEW

Time magazine; Monday, Apr. 01, 1946

In its fifth month of prospecting, the Pearl Harbor Committee at last unearthed a rich find—a broad, deep vein of comment and discussion of the 1941 tragedy by ex-War Secretary Henry L. Stimson, studded with pure history in the form of notes from his diary. Significant excerpts:

Nov. 5. Matters are crystallizing . . . Japan is sending to us someone who, I think, will bring us a proposal impossible of acceptance. . . .

Nov. 6. I left for the White House and had about an hour's talk with the President—on the whole a good talk. . . . We talked about the Far Eastern situation and the approaching conference with the messenger who is coming from Japan. The President outlined what he thought he might say. He was trying to think of something which would give us further time. He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for six months. . . .

I told him I frankly saw two great objections: first, that it tied up our hands just at a time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the Philippines; and, second, that the Chinese would feel that any such arrangement was a desertion of them.

Nov. 7. Cabinet meeting this afternoon. The President opened with telling the story of Lincoln and his Cabinet—how he polled the Cabinet and found them all polling NO and then he said, "The Ayes have it."

With that he started to have what he said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on the question of the Far East—whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be.

He went around the table—first Hull and then myself, and then around through the whole number and it was unanimous in feeling the country would support us. He said that this time the vote IS unanimous, he feeling the same way. . . .

Nov. 25. General Marshall and I went to the White House, where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself.

The President brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. **The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves**. . . .

When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that a Japanese expedition had started. Five divisions had come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships—thirty, forty or fifty ships—and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the President. . . .

Nov. 27. The main question has been over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. . . . On talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert; namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack. . . .

Nov. 28. G-2 had sent me a summary of the information in regard to the movements of the Japanese in the Far East and it amounted to such a formidable statement of dangerous possibilities that I decided to take it to the President before he got up.

(2 of 3)

He branched into an analysis of the situation himself as he sat there on his bed, saying there were three alternatives and only three that he could see before us—first, to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once.

I told him . . . . I did not think anyone would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of the other two my choice was the latter one. . . .

[At a War Cabinet meeting at noon] it was now the opinion of everyone that if this [Japanese] expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo-China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam . . . it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, The Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines.

It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. . . . If this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indo-China, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot. . . .

It became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't think we could do, or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn't think we could do—that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight.*

The President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from himself to the Emperor . . . I said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the United States . . . reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. I pointed out that he had better send his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and then make his speech to Congress as a separate and more understandable thing to the people of the United States. . . .

The President asked Hull and Knox and myself to try to draft such papers. . . .

Dec. 2. The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country. He said that he was going to take the matters right up when he left us.

Dec. 7. Just about 2 o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me up on the telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me, "Have you heard the news? . . . They have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii. . . ."

My first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people.

Re-reading his diary, Henry Stimson summarized:

With the aid of "hindsight," I [have] reached the opinion that the War Plans Division of the General Staff would have placed itself and the safety of the country in a sounder position if it had transmitted to General Short more information than it did. . . .

(3 of 3)

[Yet] General Short had been told the two essential facts: 1) a war with Japan is threatening, 2) hostile action by Japan is possible at any moment. Given these two facts, both of which were stated without equivocation in the message of Nov. 27, the outpost commander should be on the alert to make his fight. . . .

To cluster his airplanes in such groups and positions that in an emergency they could not take the air for several hours, and to keep his antiaircraft ammunition so stored that it could not be promptly and immediately available, and to use his best reconnaissance system, the radar, only for a very small fraction of the day and night, in my opinion betrayed a misconception of his real duty which was almost beyond belief. . . .

I have tried to review these various responsibilities with fairness to both the outpost commander and the Staff officers at home. I am particularly led to do so because of the difficulty of reproducing now the background and atmosphere under which the entire Army was then working.

Our General Staff officers were working under a terrific pressure in the face of global war which they felt was probably imminent. Yet they were surrounded, outside their offices and almost throughout the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief in danger which now seems incredible. . . .

* The War Cabinet agreed that the U.S. must fight if Japan 1) attacked U.S., British or Dutch territory, or 2) moved her forces in Indo-China west of 100° longitude or south of 10° latitude.

Source: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,792673,00.html

Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Pearl Harbor" Speech

Mr. Vice President, and Mr. Speaker, and Members of the Senate and House of Representatives:

Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in the American Island of Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to our Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. And while this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or of armed attack.

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.

Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island. And this morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation.

As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.

But always will our whole Nation remember the character of the onslaught against us.

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us.

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger.

With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph—so help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

Source: http://www.milestonedocuments.com/documents/full-text/franklin-d-roosevelts-pearl-harbor-speech/

Photo # 80-G-451125 East side of Pearl Harbor, with Submarine Base in center, 13 Oct. 1941

Aerial view of the Submarine Base at Pearl Harbor in Oahu, Hawaii, with part of the supply depot beyond and the fuel farm at right, looking north on October 13, 1941. Note the fuel tank across the road from the submarine base, painted to resemble a building. The building beside the submarine ascent tower (in left center, shaped like an upsidedown "U") housed the U.S. Fleet Headquarters at the time of the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. Office of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, was in the upper left corner of the building's top floor.
(Official U.S. Navy Photograph; National Archives Collection)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/g450000/g451125c.htm

Photo # NH 57100 Admiral H.E. Kimmel with Captains W.S. Delany & W.W. Smith

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (center), Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet, confers with his Chief of Staff, Captain William W. Smith (right), and his Operations Officer and Assistant Chief of Staff, Captain Walter S. Delany (left), at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in 1941. (U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-k/h-kimml.htm

But the embargo was not so effective that it prevented Japan from fighting. Japanese naval tankers had little difficulty obtaining oil from America's West Coast refineries. In spring 1941, the *Nisshin Maru* filled up its holds at the Associated Oil refinery in Port Costa, California. *US Navy photo.*



US Navy radio direction finders tracked tankers like the *Nisshin Maru* across the Pacific beginning October 1, 1940. One of the tankers whose track is shown here, the *Kyokuto Maru,* was later assigned as flagship for the eight tankers that would refuel the First Air Fleet during their voyage to and from the Pearl Harbor assault. *National Archives, Seattle, Washington.*

(Source: *Day of Deceit* by Robert B. Stinnett)

"**The area in which Japan was most vulnerable to American sanctions was oil.** The President had consistently resisted the pressure to stop the flow, lest total cutoff trigger a Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies, thus extending the European war to Asia and making the defeat of Hitler that more difficult. Now, on August 1, after long, serious discussions, Roosevelt slammed an embargo on high-octane gasoline as well as crude oil. This put Japan in a tight spot, for it could not possibly meet its extensive oil needs by producing synthetics, exploiting oil in northern Sakhalin, or purchasing it from Iran or Peru. Japan estimated that its Navy would be disabled in two years, and important industries paralyzed in less than half that time. Tomioka calculated that the stock on hand in July could fill only 75 percent of the requirements for two years of combat. In addition, the fleet had always estimated that it would need 500,000 tons in reserve for the Great All-Out Battle. Against these grim figures, peacetime consumption of the Japanese Navy ran to 300,000 tons every month. What is more, these estimates did not include any margin for loss through tanker sinkings or storage fires. The United States had no desire to strangle Japan. Thinking Americans realized that the many fine qualities of the Japanese people, flowing in productive channels, could be a strength and a blessing to all Asia. On the other hand, the United States had no intention of subsidizing Japanese expansion in Asia while at the same time opposing German expansion in Europe. Japan had invited American sanctions by its move south. And it was typical of the Japanese in the context of the day that they did not consider pulling in their horns or seeking to obtain oil by peaceful means." – *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 169

"Grew received Roosevelt's message for the Emperor at 2230 December 7, Japan time. Inasmuch as the dispatch had left Washington around 2100 (Eastern Standard Time) on the sixth and it showed that the Japanese post office had received it at noon Tokyo time on the seventh, this meant that the Japanese had held it up ten and a half hours – another incident revealing that Japanese officialdom was not exactly eager for prompt communication with Washington on this particular day. It so happened that on November 29 Lieutenant Colonel Morio Tomura of the Communications Section of the Army General Staff had asked Tateki Shirao, chief of the Censorship Office of the Ministry of Communications, to delay by five hours the delivery of all incoming and outgoing cables except those of the Japanese government. Then, on December 6, the holdup schedule was changed to five hours one day, ten the next. Thus, December 7 was a ten-hour day, which is why the Japanese sat on the President's message to the Emperor such a long time…Grew took the decoded message to Togo at about a quarter past midnight and asked for an audience with the Emperor so that he might present it in person since he "did not want any doubt as to getting it in his hands." After some quibbling Togo agreed to present Grew's request to Hirohito. With that Grew left the Foreign Ministry. It was then about 0030 on December 8, Japan time (1030 December 7 in Washington, 0500 in Hawaii) – less than three hours before Fuchida's first wave would strike."
– *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 476-477

"In essence China was the touchstone of Japanese-American relations, yet China was only part of the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a concept the very fluidity of which made the democracies uneasy. The Japanese never tired of expounding the principle in the loftiest phrases but fought shy of actually stating in geographical terms just what "Greater East Asia" covered. Presumably it would expand as Japan moved outward to include all that the traffic would bear. To the Japanese the fulfillment of this dream was imperative. "I am convinced that the firm establishment of a Mutual Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia is absolutely necessary to the continued existence of this country," declared Japan's premier, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, on January 24. Japan had a long list of grievances against the United States, the foremost being the recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the nonrecognition of Manchukuo. The very presence in Asia of the United States, along with the European powers, was a constant irritation to Japanese pride. The press lost no occasion to assure such intruders that Japan would slam the Open Door in their faces. "Japan must remove all elements in East Asia which will interfere with its plans," asserted the influential Yomiuri. "Britain, the United States, France and the Netherlands must be forced out of the Far East. Asia is the territory of the Asiatics…On a number of scores the Japanese objected vociferously to American aid to Great Britain and to Anglo-American cooperation. In the first place, Britain was at war with Japan's allies, Germany and Italy, so what helped the British hindered the Axis. In the second, Japan considered that Washington's bolstering of London perpetuated the remnants of British colonialism and hence the obnoxious presence of European flags on Asian soil. Japanese anger also focused on the embargoes which the United States had slapped on American exports to Japan. By the end of 1940 Washington had cut it off from all vital war materials except petroleum. As far back as 1938 the United States had placed Japan under the so-called moral embargo. The termination on January 26, 1940, of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 removed the legal obstacle to actual restrictions. Beginning in July 1940, Washington placed all exports of aviation fuel and high-grade scrap iron and steel under federal license and control. In September 1940, after Japanese forces moved into northern Indochina, Roosevelt finally announced an embargo on scrap iron and steel to Japan. Thus, by the end of that year Japan had begun to experience a real pinch and a shadow of genuine fear mingled with its resentment of these discriminatory measures. Tokyo also had an old bone to pick with Washington – the immigration policy which excluded Japanese from American shores and refused United States citizenship to those Japanese residents not actually born there. Above all, Japan considered America's huge naval expansion program aimed directly at it. Since the stationing of a large segment of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940, the United States Navy had stood athwart Japan's path – a navy which Japanese admirals thought capable of menacing their nation's very existence." – *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 4-5

Members of the United States Marine Corps Fourth Marine Regiment Band march in the International Settlement area of Shanghai, China on November 28, 1941 (November 27 Washington, D.C. time), only ten days before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and America's into World War II. The Imperial Japanese Army occupied Shanghai, Nanking, and eastern China from December 1937 to September 9, 1945. The Imperial Japanese Army occupied the International Settlement area of Shanghai beginning on December 8, 1941 (Japan time). (Photo: http://www.fourthmarinesband.com/)

Troops of the First Battalion, Fourth Marines of the United States Marine Corps march down Nanking Road in Shanghai, China on November 28, 1941, on their way to the quays of the Whangpoo River preparatory to embarking on U.S. President Line ships for the Philippine Islands. The Marines share the crowded streets with examples of every mode of transportation available. (Photo: http://www.fourthmarinesband.com/)

Investigation of Pearl Harbor

Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry, & Congressional Hearings

Members of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's committee to investigate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the island of Oahu (also known as the Roberts Commission) on December 7, 1941 are photographed as they returned to the Royal Hawaiian Hotel where they have been staying since December 22, 1941. The group photo was first published on December 29, 1941. Left to right are Admiral William H. Standley, Associate U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, Admiral Joseph N. Reeves, Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, and Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy. Admiral Standley, Admiral Reeves and General McCoy were retired. Admiral Standley and General McCoy were members of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1941. (Photo: http://libweb.hawaii.edu/digicoll/hwrd/HWRD_html/HWRD41.html)

Executive Order 8983 Establishing a Commission to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack.
December 18, 1941

Pursuant to the authority in me vested by the Constitution of the United States, I hereby appoint as a commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the following: Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman; Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired; Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired; Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army.

The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned, and if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor.

The Commission will convene at the call of its Chairman at Washington, D.C., will thereafter proceed with its professional and clerical assistants to Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and any other places it may deem necessary to visit for the completion of its inquiry. It will then return to Washington, D.C., and submit its report direct to the President of the United States.

The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own procedure, to employ such professional and clerical assistants as it may deem necessary, to fix the compensation and allowances of such assistants, to incur all necessary expenses for services and supplies, and to direct such travel of members and employees at public expense as it may deem necessary in the accomplishment of its mission. Each of the members of the Commission and each of its professional assistants, including civilian advisers and any Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers so employed, detailed, or assigned shall receive payment of his actual and necessary expenses for transportation, and in addition and in lieu of all other allowances for expenses while absent from the place of his residence or station in connection with the business of the Commission, a per diem allowance of twenty-five dollars. All of the expenses of the Commission shall be paid by Army disbursing officers from allocations to be made to the War Department for that purpose from the Emergency Fund for the President.

All executive officers and agencies of the United States are directed to furnish the Commission such facilities, services, and cooperation as it may request of them from time to time.

Citation: John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16065.

Source: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16065

"The presidential commission of inquiry chose, nonetheless, to overlook or ignore the possibility that the navy department might have broken into the consular traffic. No attempt was made to look at the records, or to reexamine Wilkinson under oath, in the two days of questioning that the commission contented itself with after returning to Washington. This may have been because after Roberts left Honolulu on 10 January, he took advantage of the Pullman car that carried the commission members across country from San Francisco to begin writing up his report. Friday, 23 January 1942, found Justice Roberts putting the finishing touches to the report, after some late-night discussion of his findings three days earlier with Secretary Stimson and Supreme Court Chief Justice [sic] Felix Frankfurter. The final draft was not agreed to without some bitter debate between the two admirals on the commission. Reeves was convinced that Kimmel was wholly to blame. Standley believed that this view did not show the whole picture. Standley admitted years later that he had only agreed not to submit a minority report after being persuaded that such a divisive opinion would threaten the war effort. "The findings as to sins of commission presented true enough statements," he wrote, "but the many sins of omission in the picture were omitted from our findings because the President in his executive order setting up the Commission had specifically limited its jurisdiction." The Roberts Commission report was written with the intention of keeping Magic, a vital intelligence source, secret. It carefully omitted any mention of Magic. While concealing Washington's sins of omission it exaggerated the errors of commission of the local commanders. So when Roosevelt read through the long report on that Saturday, he was no doubt reassured to find that by shifting the burden of responsibility from the war and navy departments, the commission's findings had not damaged the credibility of key members of his administration. He summoned Marvin O. Macintyre, the White House secretary. Tossing the report onto his desk, he said, "Mac, give that to the Sunday papers in full.""
– *And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway, Breaking the Secrets* by Rear Adm. Edwin T. Layton (USN, Ret.), p. 350

The Roberts Commission investigated the attack, beginning in late December 1941. Commission members, left to right, are Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, Admiral William H. Standley, Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, Major General Frank B. McCoy, and Walter B. Howe. (United Press International [Acme].)

Walter B. Howe, a member of Scroll & Key at Yale University, was the Recorder of the Roberts Commission.
(Source: *Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy*, Edited by Paul Stillwell)

"Soon after Knox returned to Washington, the President informed him that he wanted "to appoint a commission consisting of two Army and two Navy officers and a third civilian to investigate the responsibility for the losses at Hawaii and to make recommendations." Late in the afternoon of December 15 Knox phoned Stimson accordingly. He also asked Stimson's opinion of a certain "Federal judge in Chicago" as the civilian member. Deciding that this man was not "an outstanding judge," Stimson preferred Supreme Court Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts. Before 0900 the next morning Stimson phoned Marshall, informing him that he had decided upon Major General Frank B. McCoy [Frank R. McCoy] as one Army member of the projected board. He asked Marshall to pick an air officer because he believed that the commission "should have an airman in view of the fact that the problem was really one of air and the problem of delinquency connected with it was also connected with air." The Chief of Staff agreed, later reporting that he considered Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney "the best man." So Stimson relayed his suggestions for the Army members to Knox, who accepted Justice Roberts instead of his own nominee. At Stimson's suggestion and with Knox's concurrence, Roosevelt selected Roberts. He was a good choice to direct the investigation. Congressman Roy O. Woodruff of Michigan placed great faith in Roberts. "His presence and position on the Board alone would be sufficient to assure the Nation of a thorough, searching, and honest investigation of conditions and causes of the disaster of December 7." Roberts had come to national attention when President Calvin Coolidge appointed him the special government prosecutor in the Teapot Dome and Elk Hill trial. On December 17 the Roberts Commission met informally with Stimson and Knox in the former's office at his request. Knox "told them in considerable detail and with great effect what he saw on his recent visit to Hawaii." Stimson informed the commission that "the Army and Navy wanted to cooperate fully" and offered Roberts every possible assistance. It is indicative of the psychological frenzy and fuzzy thinking of those December days that Stimson, so much the lawyer, met with and instructed a commission to investigate a case in which he was involved and that he permitted them to hear from Knox, also involved, what amounted to unsworn testimony which might be highly prejudicial. To be just, the situation was enough to make a lawyer tear his hair. One literally could not find qualified commission members genuinely without prejudice. Only little green men from Mars could have reviewed this problem with coldly impersonal, judicial eyes. Every thinking man and woman in the country had read about the Pearl Harbor attack, and few indeed could hear testimony concerning the case with complete objectivity. What is more, in the closely knit armed services of 1941 almost any officer was bound to have dozens of friends stationed in Hawaii and so could not fail to be emotionally involved. No wonder Stimson and Knox paid particular attention to their recommendations for membership on the commission. On the basis of their previous records, those selected appeared highly qualified. First in seniority stood sixty-nine-year-old Admiral William H. Standley, USN (Retired). He had been "a very outstanding chief of Naval Operations" from 1933 to 1937. Roberts described him as "one of the keenest and ablest men I have ever known and one of the fairest." This assessment speaks well for Roberts's own fairness because Standley gave the chairman some difficult moments. Next came Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, USN (Retired)." – *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 592-593

Photo # NH 50799 Adm. C.W. Nimitz on board USS Grayling, 31 December 1941

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN (center) presents awards on board USS *Grayling* (SS-209), at the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base, following ceremonies in which he took command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet on December 31, 1941. The former fleet commander, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel is standing to the right, in a white uniform with two-star insignia. (Admiral Nimitz has just presented the Navy Cross to Ensign F.M. Fisler, USNR. Others receiving awards, standing left-to-right in line behind Nimitz and Fisler, are: Ensign C.F. Gimber, USNR; AMM1c L.H. Wagoner (also awarded the Navy Cross); AMM1c W.B. Watson; R3c H.C. Cupps; R2c W.W. Warlick and AMM2c C.C. Forbes. They were the crew of a Navy bomber. USS *Pelias* (AS-14) is in the background.) (U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/cmd/cincpc1a.htm

Photo # NH 62021 Adm. C.W. Nimitz addresses officers at Pearl Harbor, 31 Dec. 1941

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN (right center), the Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific Fleet, addresses senior officers at Pearl Harbor in front of the Torpedo Building at Quarry Point on December 31, 1941, the day he assumed command. Standing at right is Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, who had held the command until December 17, 1941.

Standing in line at left are (right to left): Vice Admiral William S. Pye; Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, U.S. Army, (probably); Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch; Rear Admiral William R. Furlong (almost completely hidden behind Rear Adm. Bloch); Rear Admiral John H. Newton; Rear Admiral Thomas Withers; Rear Admiral Milo F. Draemel. Last two officers on left (not listed in order, and one nearly hidden) are possibly Captain Harold C. Train and Rear Admiral William L. Calhoun. (Collection of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN; U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h62000/h62021c.htm

Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin (left, rear), Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short (left, front), Rear Admiral Patrick N.L. Bellinger (center, rear), Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten (center, front), and Admiral Husband Kimmel (right) pose for a group photo in Hawaii in September 1941. The Roberts Commission, an independent commission that investigated the Pearl Harbor attack, accused General Short and Admiral Kimmel of "dereliction of duty" for failing to prevent the Imperial Japanese Navy from attacking Pearl Harbor. The Roosevelt administration deliberately withheld vital information from the two officers prior to the military attack on Pearl Harbor.
(Source: *The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor, The Original Photographs* by Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, and J. Michael Wenger)

"Alarmed by the criticism leveled at the Administration and fearing that a congressional investigation would harm the war effort and provide political fodder for the 1942 elections, President Roosevelt sought a way to defuse the critics and called upon Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter for advice. Full disclosure of the pre-Pearl Harbor information – including McCollum's eight actions – would have compromised American codebreaking and disclosed the U.S. success in solving the various Japanese cryptographic systems. Therefore the President headed off a proposed congressional inquiry by appointing a five-man board of inquiry, headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts of the United States Supreme Court. Frankfurter endorsed Roberts as the most "forthright of men." But because of the need to maintain military secrecy the Roberts Commission was understandably unable to conduct a full examination or a public discussion of the Japanese naval intercepts. None of the U.S. Navy's intercept operators testified or produced their radio logs and documents. Nothing was revealed about them. President Roosevelt approved the Roberts Commission's report on Saturday, January 24, 1942. It concluded that the attack was successful due to failures and errors of judgment by Admiral Kimmel and George Short. They were charged with dereliction of duty. At the same tie the commission cleared General George Marshall and Admiral Harold Stark of any wrongdoing, saying they had fulfilled their command obligations. The 13,000-page report said that Japan's success "resulted largely from a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and naval circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East." The United Press story, written by Joseph L. Myler, received front-page play throughout the nation. Myler wrote of the report: "After thorough investigations in Washington and Hawaii, it told an amazing story of lack of preparation, arbitrary conclusions reached by Kimmel and Short in conflict with the advice from Washington." **Admiral James Richardson condemned the findings. "It is the most unfair, unjust, and deceptively dishonest document ever printed by the Government Printing Office. I cannot conceive of honorable men serving on the commission without greatest regret and deepest feeling of shame."**" – *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 254-255

Photo # NH 70490 Adm. Harold R. Stark and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox on a train in the U.K., 1943

U.S. Navy Admiral Harold R. Stark (left), Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox (right) read in their railway car in Great Britain while coming back from a visit to Scapa Flow in September 1943. William Franklin "Frank" Knox was the Secretary of the Navy from July 11, 1940 until his death on April 28, 1944. Admiral Harold R. Stark was the Chief of Naval Operations from August 1, 1939 to March 26, 1942. (Photo: U.S. Navy)

U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall (L) reviews a map with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson in 1942. General George C. Marshall was the U.S. Army Chief of Staff from September 1, 1939 to November 18, 1945. Henry L. Stimson served as Secretary of War from July 10, 1940 until his resignation on September 21, 1945. (Photo: Thomas D. McAvoy/Time Life)

Members and staff of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in 1944. From left to right: Maj. Henry C. Clausen, unknown, unknown, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, and unknown. The identites of the other three "judges" were Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, Col. Charles W. West, and Col. Harry A. Toulmin Jr. **Lieutenant General George Grunert was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1944 and 1945.** (Source: *Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement* by Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee)

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

6 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR ARMY PERSONNEL CONCERNED:

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents and information in your possession or under your control, and to afford him the fullest possible cooperation and assistance. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and freely and the persons interrogated should volunteer any pertinent information of which they may have knowledge. Copies of any papers required by Major Clausen should be furnished him.

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson's memorandum concerning U.S. Army Major Henry C. Clausen's investigation into Pearl Harbor. (Source: *Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement* by Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee)

"On January 25, 1942, the Roberts Report was published. Newspaper readers, now that they had what were represented as the facts, could draw their own conclusions. And now – in the newspapers – General Short himself had a chance to learn the findings of the board. He was unprepared for what he read. True, he had been relieved from command of the Hawaiian Department, but he had been directed to proceed to Oklahoma City "on temporary duty" and then, "on further notice," to report in Washington for "further temporary duty." He was expecting nothing more than some new assignment. When he discovered that he, along with Kimmel, was receiving all the obloquy for Pearl Harbor, he telephoned General Marshall and asked whether he should retire. Marshall advised him to "stand pat" but told him he would consider this conversation as "authority" for his retirement if it should become necessary. The next day, January 26, Marshall recommended to Stimson that Short's application for retirement be accepted "today" and "quietly without any publicity at the moment." But Stimson did not accept Short's application that day. He waited a whole month. There was a reason for Stimson's delay. He was facing another dilemma. If he let Short go without court-martialing him, he would invite public c criticism for allowing a guilty man – vide the Roberts Report – to escape. If, on the other hand, he ordered a court-martial first, he would leave himself open to evidence and argument which might tar him along with Short as guilty of at least contributory negligence. The Judge Advocate General, Myron C. Cramer, was cautioning Stimson that it would be very hard to make the charges against Short stick. Cramer suggested a way out of the dilemma: retire Short now – but leave the threat of a future court-martial hanging over his head! That was simple enough, but there remained the complication of devising a verbal formula by which Short's retirement could be accepted without embarrassing the administration. Day after day the administration leaders fretted over this problem of wording. President Roosevelt himself suggested that Short and Kimmel be required to agree that their retirement would be "no bar" to "subsequent court-martial proceedings." But Attorney-General Biddle in a memo to Stimson objected to mention a court-martial at all, lest Kimmel and Short, after their retirement, demand an early trial. And the Judge Advocate General in a memo to Marshall warned that at their trial, if they were granted one, "the defense would certainly attempt to pass part of the blame to the War Department." Stimson himself, in a letter to Knox, January 14, 1942, proposed the essence of the "saving clause," as he termed it, part of which was finally used: "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any action on behalf of the Government." He added: "Any reasons we want to give for our action can be said to the press." Two weeks later the administration published a statement incorporating the Stimson formula, and in a supplementary announcement he and Knox gave the reasons they wanted to give. The statement said that the retirement applications of the two commanders had been accepted "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action." The supplementary announcement informed the people that court-martial preparations had been ordered on the basis of the Roberts Report "alleging" derelictions of duty, but that no trial would be held until "such time as the public interest and safety would permit." Stimson and Knox were never to find conditions suitable for holding the court-martial. Short and Kimmel themselves could not demand a hearing, for the Secretaries had required them to waive their rights to a prompt trial. And when the two-year statutory period for instituting court-martial proceedings was about to expire, the Secretaries requested them also to waive the statue of limitations, which they did."
– *Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft* by Richard N. Current, p. 172-174

"All in all, the generals had given the Secretary [of War Henry L. Stimson] a rather rough time. He was not satisfied with the way their inquiry was going. And when they finally drew up their conclusions, in the fall of 1944, he was still less satisfied. The main points of their report, briefly summarized, were these: The Pearl Harbor attack was a surprise to all concerned – to the public at large, to the Hawaiian command, and to the War Department. The extent of the disaster was due to failures both on the scene and in Washington. General Short failed adequately to alert his command for war. The War Department, knowing the type of alert he had taken, failed to direct him to take a more suitable one and also failed to keep him fully enough informed about American-Japanese relations that he might have corrected his own error. Stimson refused to let the Army Board's findings stand unchallenged. He assigned the assistant recorder of the Board, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry C. Clausen, to a one-man mission of re-investigation. Except for the last week of the Board's hearings, testimony regarding the "Magic" intercepts had been excluded. The later witnesses having referred to phases of that subject, Clausen was supposed to complete the evidence by gathering information on it from some of the earlier witnesses, since scattered all over the world. The tendency of Clausen's re-examination was to strengthen the case against General Short by showing that the general knew more than had previously appeared, and the Secretary of War less, about the precise warlike intentions of the Japanese in 1941. When confronted by Clausen, many of the witnesses changed the testimony they earlier had sworn to, or added to it, or professed to have forgotten certain things. Clausen did not give General Short another chance to speak. Nor did Clausen call upon Stimson to appear again as a witness, nor did he look into the Stimson diary."
– *Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft* by Richard N. Current, p. 178-179

Photo # 80-G-46137 Members of Naval Court of Inquiry into the Pearl Harbor Attack

Members of the Navy Court of Inquiry appear at the Navy Department in Washington, D.C. during a session of their examination of the circumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1944. In the center is Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired), President of the Court. Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired) is at left, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired) is at right. Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1942 to 1948. The photograph was released on 24 July 1944.
(*Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives collection.*)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-aftr.htm

"Monday, August 28 [, 1944], was a memorable day for Kimmel. The court received the documents Kimmel had fought to obtain. Stark objected not to the contents, "but because their use here may compromise many years of hard work the results of which are most important to the Nation's future interest." The court, however, did not sustain his objections, and into the record went a large bloc of Magic and a few consular messages. This represented a tribute to Kimmel's iron will and tenacity of purpose and to his legal team, especially Rugg, who directed the effort. According to Lavender, the dispatches which triggered the most response were some of the "bomb plot" series. Yet we have a peculiar twist at this point in the Pearl Harbor story. The original "bomb plot" message of September 24, 1941, does not appear in the Navy court's exhibits. This was the dispatch which divided Pearl Harbor into areas for use in espionage reporting and which set forth specifics Tokyo wanted from the Honolulu consulate. Whatever the reason for its omission, the fact that this key dispatch did not appear in the exhibits may help explain why a number of witnesses discounted the importance of the few "bomb plot" series messages under consideration. Nevertheless, Kimmel had won his point. At considerable risk to the security of Magic, the Navy Department had given the court all the documents for which Kimmel through Lavender had asked, excepting the ever-elusive "winds execute." Revelation of the Magic and consular documents clarified a number of ambiguities in the preceding testimony. Now the court faced what amounted to another investigation. The principal questions had become these: Was information available in Washington which one could reasonably argue had tipped off Japanese intentions? And if so, had someone in Washington deliberately withheld information from Kimmel?" – *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 628

Photo # NH 77348 Adm. J.O. Richardson takes the oath before Congressional Pearl Harbor Investigation

Admiral James O. Richardson of the U.S. Navy takes the oath prior to giving testimony during a Congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack during World War II. Admiral James O. Richardson was the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet from January 1940 until February 1941. He retired on October 1, 1942, but remained on active duty during the rest of World War II. (*NHHC Photograph.*)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/ph-aftr.htm

Admiral James O. Richardson (left) talks to Admiral Husband Kimmel during a recess at Pearl Harbor Hearings in Washington, D.C. on December 8, 1945. Lieutenant Edward B. Hanify, member of Kimmel's counsel, is seen standing between the two officers.
(© Bettmann/CORBIS)

View of the opening of hearings by the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee in Washington, D.C. on November 15, 1945. First witnesses, Rear Admiral T.B. Inglis and Colonel Bernard Thielen, are shown in the center background, giving their testimony about the attack. Seated at right center are senator Alben Barkley, chairman of the Senate group of the joint bi-partisan committee, and Representative Jere Cooper, chairman of the House group. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel, who was commander of the Pacific fleet at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack and who was removed from his command shortly after, tells his own side of the story before the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee in Washington, D.C., U.S.A. on January 15, 1946. Admiral Kimmel is seated at left, seated at right are Senator Owen Brewster of Maine; Senator Walter F. George, Georgia; Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky, chairman; and Rep. Jere Cooper of Tennessee. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

Marshall testifying on December 6, 1945. The table for the congressional committee is perpendicular to Marshall. Percy Greaves (extreme left), chief researcher for the Republicans, leans over to confer with Senator Homer Ferguson. Next to Ferguson, almost obscured, is the other Republican senator on the committee, Owen Brewster. *(Wide World)*

(Source: *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* by John Toland)

Rear view. Behind Marshall are General Short's counsel (hand to face), the general, and Counselor Bragg. Extreme right center, Admiral Kimmel leans back. Both Short and Kimmel show their disbelief of Marshall's testimony. *(Wide World)*

(Source: *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* by John Toland)

"The key evidence of what really happened began to be concealed as early as December 11, 1941, only four days after the attack. The first step in the clean-up came from Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, the Navy's Director of Communications. He instituted the fifty-four-year censorship policy that consigned the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese military and diplomatic intercepts and the relevant directives to Navy vaults. "Destroy all notes or anything in writing," Noyes told a group of his subordinates on December 11. Among the group was Commander Laurance Safford, head of Station US (appointed captain in January 1942). Though head of the Navy's cryptographic efforts, Safford reported to Noyes through Naval Communications, since it controlled all categories of service-involving communications. Safford implied that some destruction of records was carried out and added that he felt no shame or embarrassment in ordering his staff to destroy all unofficial notes. At first Noyes denied ever issuing the destruction order, but later he admitted: "I may have instructed my subordinates to destroy personal memoranda. Nothing was said to destroy official records." Noyes was on shaky legal ground. Personal memoranda prepared in Navy offices by Navy personnel belong to the people of the United States if the files concern naval matters. They cannot be destroyed except by authority of Congress. Noyes' destruction directive was issued just a few days before the formation of the presidential board of inquiries headed by Justice Roberts. His dictate set a policy that effectively excluded Japanese military intercepts from all Pearl Harbor investigations. Noyes said it was common practice to destroy "intercept stuff" after three or four months. However, some files escaped destruction. Every naval officer involved in the intercept and cryptographic operations (including those at outlying facilities) maintained a personal file at Station US for classified documents. The McCollum memorandum, for example, was discovered by the author [Robert B. Stinnett] in January 1995 in the personal classified file of Arthur McCollum." – *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 255-256

"Two weeks after Japan surrendered in August 1945, the Navy blocked public access to the pre-Pearl Harbor intercepts by classifying the documents TOP SECRET. Even Congress was cut out of the intercept loop. The Navy's order was sweeping: it gagged the cryptographers and radio intercept operators who had obtained the Japanese fleet's radio messages during the fall of 1941. Fleet Admiral Ernest King oversaw the censorship. He threatened imprisonment and loss of Navy and veteran's benefits to any naval personnel who disclosed the success of the code-breaking. He prophesied that "writings of irresponsible people" would test the loyalty of all concerned. "The Navy Department does not intend to dignify any stories concerning successes in Ultra [code breaking] by official denials or confirmations. I repeat that it is most important that leaks and partial disclosures be not fortified or reinforced nor further discussion stimulated by additional statements of those who know the facts from the inside." King then reminded the code-breakers of the legal obligations embedded in their secrecy oath. The oath applied to all naval personnel, even those discharged: "The oath which you have taken must not be violated.""" – *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 256

"When the congressional investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack began on November 15, 1945, Americans believed they would be given full details on breaking the Japanese code prior to the attack. Witnesses introduced intercepts into evidence and read decrypted messages to the senators and representatives of the Joint Committee. It was a total sham. None of the details involving the interception, decoding, or dissemination of the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese naval messages saw the light of day. Only diplomatic messages were released. Republicans suspected a stranglehold but could not pierce [Admiral Ernest] King's gag order. Senator Owen Brewster (R., Maine) set off political fireworks when he was blocked from obtaining monitor records from the Navy's intercept stations. But all Brewster achieved was rhetoric; he never got testimony or records of the military intercepts." – *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett, p. 257

"The court held no session on Friday, September 1 [, 1944], probably to accommodate the schedule of the next witness, General Marshall. The Army could use a witness of stature before the Navy court, and Marshall certainly filled the bill. At the same time, as he explained to the court on September 2, after Pearl Harbor his "whole attention was turned to other things from that instant, and I didn't see a record or look at a thing until, as a matter of fact, the last day or two, trying to get something for this board – so I haven't probed into the matter. I was busy with something else. That was water over the dam." Asked how he rated Short, Marshall replied laconically, "Very superior officer." He considered Hawaii "far and away the most heavily provided installation of ours in or out of the country, for defense. It had had first priority in the Army for years…" Marshall did not claim perfect memory. His testimony is laced with such replies as "I do not recall," "I have no recollection," "I don't know about that." He did not remember his whereabouts on the night of Saturday, December 6, and evidently considered the point of little interest. "I don't know where I was. I never thought of it until this instant." He had no memory one way or the other about seeing Short's answer to the warning message of November 27 [, 1941]. Such replies can be frustrating to a court or board trying to pin down specifics." – *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* by Gordon W. Prange, p. 629

Photo # K-16224 Admiral Ernest J. King, circa 1942-44

Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, photographed at the Navy Department, circa 1942-1944. **Admiral Ernest J. King oversaw the censorship of pre-Pearl Harbor intercepts shortly after the end of World War II and "threatened imprisonment and loss of Navy and veteran's benefits to any naval personnel who disclosed the success of the code-breaking."**
(Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-k/ej-kng.htm



U.S. Army General George C. Marshall is sworn in to testify at the Joint Congressional Committee Pearl Harbor Investigations hearings in Washington, D.C. in December 1945. (Photo: Sam Shere/Time Life)

U.S. Army General George C. Marshall testifies at the Joint Congressional Committee Pearl Harbor Investigations hearings. Washington, D.C. in December 1945. (Photo: Sam Shere/Time Life)

Retired Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (February 26, 1882-May 14, 1968) testifies at the Pearl Harbor Hearing in 1946. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel retired from the Navy on March 1, 1942. (Photo: George Skadding/Time Life)

Retired U.S. Army Major General Walter C. Short (March 30, 1880-March 9, 1949) appears at the Pearl Harbor Hearing in 1946. Major General Walter C. Short retired from the Army on February 28, 1942. Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were allowed to retire despite a demotion in rank. Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were never subjected to a formal court-martial. The U.S. Congress exonerated Admiral Kimmel and General Short in a resolution in May 1999. (Photo: Marie Hansen/Time Life)

Pearl Harbor & Special Interest: Council on Foreign Relations in 1941

Council on Foreign Relations, a private organization where prominent “gentlemen” discuss foreign affairs behind closed doors, is located on the southwest corner of Park Avenue and 68th Street in midtown Manhattan in New York City, one block west of the 68th Street and Hunter College subway station.

Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations (1940-1942)

Name	Year	Occupation in 1941
Isaiah Bowman	1921-1950	President of Johns Hopkins University (1935-1948)
John W. Davis	1921-1955	Member of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed [law firm] (1921-1955)
Norman H. Davis	1921-1944	President of the Council on Foreign Relations (1936-1944); Chairman of American Red Cross (1938-1944)
Stephen P. Duggan	1921-1950	Director of Institute of International Education (1919-1946)
Edwin F. Gay	1921-1945	Professor of Economic History at Harvard University (1924-1936)
Frank L. Polk	1921-1943	Member of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed [law firm] (1914-1943)
Whitney H. Shepardson	1921-1966	Treasurer of the Council on Foreign Relations (1933-1941)
Allen W. Dulles	1927-1969	Member of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm]; Secretary of CFR (1933-1944)
Russell C. Leffingwell	1927-1960	Partner of J.P. Morgan & Co. [banking firm] (1923-1950)
George O. May	1927-1953	Senior Partner of Price, Waterhouse & Co. public accountants (1911-1961)
Hamilton Fish Armstrong	1928-1972	Editor of *Foreign Affairs* magazine (1928-1972)
Frank Altschul	1934-1972	Chairman of General American Investors Co., Inc.
Philip C. Jessup	1934-1942	Professor of International Law at Columbia University (1934-1946)
Harold W. Dodds	1935-1943	President of Princeton University (1933-1957)
Leon Fraser	1936-1945	Chairman and President of Bank for International Settlements (1933-1935)
John H. Williams	1937-1964	Vice President of Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1936-1947)
Lewis W. Douglas	1940-1964	President of Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York (1940-1947)
Edward Warner	1940-1949	Member of the Civil Aeronautics Board (1939-1945)



Left to right: Isaiah Bowman, John W. Davis, Norman H. Davis, Frank L. Polk, Allen W. Dulles, Russell C. Leffingwell

Prominent Members of the Council on Foreign Relations (1940-1942)



Joseph C. Grew, Henry L. Stimson, Sumner Welles, William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, Adm. William H. Standley, Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy

Allan Sproul, Thomas W. Lamont, Winthrop W. Aldrich, Gordon S. Rentschler, Harold Stanley, Frederick M. Warburg



George L. Harrison, W. Averell Harriman, Thomas J. Watson Sr., Alfred P. Sloan Jr., Gerard Swope, Juan T. Trippe



Arthur Hays Sulzberger, Eugene Meyer, Henry R. Luce, William S. Paley, Edward R. Murrow, Raymond B. Fosdick



Charles Seymour, James B. Conant, John J. McCloy, (Justice) Felix Frankfurter, John Foster Dulles, Allen Wardwell

Prominent Members of the Council on Foreign Relations (1940-1942)

Name	CFR Membership (Year)	Primary Occupation in 1941 (including December 7, 1941)
Joseph C. Grew	1928-1959	U.S. Ambassador to Imperial Japan (1932-1941)
Henry L. Stimson	1924-1929, 1934-1950	U.S. Secretary of War (1940-1945)
Sumner Welles	1934-1959	Under Secretary of State (1937-1943)
William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan	1932-1957	Director of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (1942-1945)
Adm. William H. Standley	1938-1947	Member of the Roberts Commission (1941-1942)
Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy	1938-1953	Member of the Roberts Commission (1941-1942)
Allan Sproul	1935-1955	President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1941-1956)
Thomas W. Lamont	1921-1947	Partner of J.P. Morgan & Co. (1911-1948)
Winthrop W. Aldrich	1927-1973	Chairman of Chase National Bank (1934-1953)
Gordon S. Rentschler	1930-1947	Chairman of National City Bank of New York [Citibank] (1940-1948)
Harold Stanley	1925-1959	Partner of Morgan Stanley & Co. [bank] (1941-1955)
Frederick M. Warburg	1933-1970	Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. [bank] (1931-1973)
George L. Harrison	1929-1953	President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1928-1940)
W. Averell Harriman	1923-1986	Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. [bank] (1931-1946)
Thomas J. Watson Sr.	1924-1955	President of International Business Machines Corp. [IBM] (1914-1949)
Alfred P. Sloan Jr.	1933-1965	Chairman of the board of General Motors Corp. (1937-1956)
Gerard Swope	1924-1950	President of General Electric Co. (1922-1940, 1942-1945)
George H. Bucher	1939-1947	President of Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. (1938-1946)
Juan Terry Trippe	1933-1976	President of Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1927-1964)
Arthur Hays Sulzberger	1927-1968	President of The New York Times Co. (1935-1957)
Eugene Meyer	1930-1958	Publisher of *The Washington Post* (1933-1946)
Henry R. Luce	1934-1966	Editor-in-Chief of Time, Inc. (1923-1964)
William S. Paley	1936-1989	President of Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] (1928-1946)
Edward R. Murrow	1934-1964	CBS war correspondent (1939-1945)
Raymond B. Fosdick	1921-1971	President of The Rockefeller Foundation (1936-1948)
Edward C. Carter	1927-1954	Secretary General of the Institute of Pacific Relations (1933-1946)
James R. Angell	1928-1948	President of the English-Speaking Union of the U.S. (1939-1946)
Charles Seymour	1921-1961	President of Yale University (1937-1950)
James B. Conant	1934-1976	President of Harvard University (1933-1953)
John J. McCloy	1940-1989	Assistant Secretary of War (1941-1945)
Felix Frankfurter	1932-1964	Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1939-1962)
John Foster Dulles	1921-1959	Member of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm] (1911-1949)
Allen Wardwell	1921-1953	Member of Davis, Polk & Wardwell [law firm] (1909-1953)
Irving S. Olds	1935-1962	Chairman of the board of United States Steel Corp. (1940-1952)
E. Roland Harriman	1933-1969	Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. [bank] (1931-1978)
John M. Schiff	1938-1986	Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. [bank] (1931-1977)
Arthur H. Dean	1938-1987	Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm] (1929-1976)
Henry de Forest Baldwin	1928-1947	Member of Lord, Day & Lord [law firm] (1900-1947)
Allen T. Klots	1934-1964	Member of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts [law firm] (1921-1965)
Thomas D. Thacher	1935-1950	Partner of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett [law firm] (1914-25, 1933-1943)
Herbert H. Lehman	1921-1963	Governor of New York (1933-1942)
Beardsley Ruml	1927-1959	Treasurer of R.H. Macy & Co. [Macy's department store] (1934-1945)
Cass Canfield	1923-1985	President of Harper & Brothers [later Harper & Row] (1931-1945)
John D. Rockefeller III	1931-1978	Trustee of Princeton University (1937-1967)
Henry M. Wriston	1926-1978	President of Brown University (1937-1955)
Edmund E. Day	1932-1944	President of Cornell University (1937-1949)
Ray Lyman Wilbur	1929-1948	President of Stanford University (1916-1943)
Ernest M. Hopkins	1930-1953	President of Dartmouth College (1916-1945)
Karl T. Compton	1936-1953	President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1930-1948)
William Phillips	1931-1967	U.S. Ambassador to Fascist Italy (1936-1941)
Alexander W. Weddell	1935-1944	U.S. Ambassador to Fascist Spain (1939-1942)
Spruille Braden	1935-1966	U.S. Ambassador to Colombia (1939-1942)
Norman Armour	1938-1977	U.S. Ambassador to Argentina (1939-1944)
George S. Messersmith	1938-1959	U.S. Ambassador to Cuba (1940-1942)
Leland Harrison	1935-1950	U.S. Minister to Switzerland (1937-1947)
Lincoln MacVeagh	1935-1971	U.S. Ambassador to Greece (1933-1941, 1943-1947)
Adm. Arthur J. Hepburn	1934-1957	Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet (1936-1938); Commandant of 12th Naval District [San Francisco] (1938-1941) Chairman of the General Board (1942-1945)
Rear Adm. Clark H. Woodward	1938-1958	Commandant of Brooklyn Navy Yard (1937-1941); Commandant of Third Naval District (1937-1941)
Rear Adm. Harry E. Yarnell	1940-1953	Commandant of Pearl Harbor Naval Station (1933-1936); Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic Fleet (1936-1939)
Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum	1939-1951	Commander, Hawaiian Department (Honolulu) (1935-1937); Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command (1940-1943)

Pearl Harbor & Special Interest: Skull & Bones in 1941

The Order of Skull & Bones, a secret society founded in 1832 by William Huntington Russell, is located at Yale University on High Street in New Haven, Connecticut.



Henry R. Luce, W. Averell Harriman, Prescott S. Bush, Henry L. Stimson, Robert Lovett, E. Roland Harriman

Harold Stanley, George L. Harrison, Harvey H. Bundy, Artemus L. Gates, Robert A. Taft, Charles Seymour



Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (left) entertains his assistants John J. McCloy (center), the Assistant Secretary of War (1941-1945) and Robert A. Lovett (right), the Assistant Secretary of War for Air (1941-1945), on April 22, 1941. Henry L. Stimson and Robert A. Lovett were members of Skull & Bones. Henry L. Stimson and John J. McCloy were members of the Council on Foreign Relations during World War II. John J. McCloy served as Chairman and CEO of Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City after World War II; Robert A. Lovett served as Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co., a banking firm in New York City, before and after World War II. John J. McCloy served as a member of the Warren Commission in 1963 and 1964. (Photo: *Time* Magazine/*The Wise Men* by Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas)



Colonel William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan (left) sits beside Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish in 1941. Archibald MacLeish was a member of Skull & Bones. (Photo: John Phillips/Time Life)

Prominent Members of Skull & Bones (December 7, 1941)

Government Officials:
Henry L. Stimson (S&B 1888) – Secretary of War (1911-1913, 1940-1945)
Robert A. Lovett (S&B 1918) – Assistant Secretary of War for Air (1941-1945)
Artemus L. Gates (S&B 1918) – Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air (1941-1945)
Harvey H. Bundy (S&B 1909) – Special Assistant to the Secretary of War (1941-1945); Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1934-1963)
Robert A. Taft (S&B 1910) – U.S. Senator (R-Ohio, 1939-1953)
John Martin Vorys (S&B 1918) – U.S. Congressman (R-Ohio, 1939-1959)
James Wolcott Wadsworth Jr. (S&B 1898) – U.S. Congressman (R-New York, 1933-1951)
Archibald MacLeish (S&B 1915) – Librarian of Congress (1939-1944)

Bankers:
Prescott S. Bush (S&B 1917) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1972)
E. Roland Harriman (S&B 1917) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1978)
Knight Woolley (S&B 1917) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1982)
Ray Morris (S&B 1901) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1956)
Harold Stanley (S&B 1908) – Partner of Morgan, Stanley & Co. (1941-1955)
Pierre Jay (S&B 1892) – Chairman of the board of Fiduciary Trust Company [New York City] (1930-1945)
Mortimer Norton Buckner (S&B 1895) – Chairman of the board of New York Trust Company (1921-1942)
Frank P. Shepard (S&B 1917) – Vice President of Bankers Trust Co. (1934-1960)
Charles Jacob Stewart (S&B 1918) – Vice President of New York Trust Co. (1935-1949)
Henry P. Davison Jr. (S&B 1920) – Partner (1929-1940) and Vice President (1940-1942) of J.P. Morgan & Co.
Walter Seth Logan (S&B 1910) – Vice President and General Counsel of Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1928-1953)
Roger B. Shepard (S&B 1908) – Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (1940-1953)

Businessmen:
W. Averell Harriman (S&B 1913) – Chairman of the board of Union Pacific Railroad Co. (1932-1946); Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1946)
George L. Harrison (S&B 1910) – President of New York Life Insurance Co. (1941-1948)
H. Neil Mallon (S&B 1917) – President of Dresser Industries, Inc. (1929-1958)
Frank Ford Russell (S&B 1926) – President of National Aviation Corp. (1939-1954)
Frederick E. Weyerhaeuser (S&B 1896) – President of Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. (1937-1945)
Henry John Heinz II (S&B 1931) – President of H.J. Heinz Company (1941-1959)
Morehead Patterson (S&B 1920) – President of American Machine & Foundry Co. (1941-1943, 1947-1958)
George Herbert Walker Jr. (S&B 1927) – General Partner of G.H. Walker & Co. (1929-1974)
Chauncey Jerome Hamlin (S&B 1903) – Member of the New York Stock Exchange (1941-1963)

Lawyers:
Henry Waters Taft (S&B 1880) – Partner of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft [law firm in New York City] (1899-1945)
William Lloyd Kitchel (S&B 1892) – Partner of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft [law firm in New York City] (1914-1945)
Henry DeForest Baldwin (S&B 1885) – Member of Lord, Day & Lord [law firm in New York City] (1900-1947)
Sherman Baldwin (S&B 1919) – Member of Lord, Day & Lord [law firm in New York City] (1929-1969)
Thomas D. Thacher (S&B 1904) – Partner of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett [law firm in New York City] (1933-1943)
Allen T. Klots (S&B 1909) – Member of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts [law firm in New York City] (1921-1965)
Charles M. Spofford (S&B 1924) – Member of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed [law firm in New York City] (1940-1950, 1952-1973)
Morris Hadley (S&B 1916) – Partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy [law firm in New York City] (1924-1979)
Dean Sage (S&B 1897) – Member of Sage, Gray, Todd & Sims [law firm in New York City] (1905-1943)
Edward Bancroft Twombly (S&B 1912) – Partner of Putney, Twombly, Hall & Skidmore [law firm in New York City] (1919-1966)
Marcien Jenckes (S&B 1921) – Member of Choate, Hall & Stewart [law firm in Boston] (1927-1971)
George Frederick Baer Appel (S&B 1924) – Partner of Townsend, Elliott & Munson [law firm in Philadelphia] (1938-1970)
Henry Cornick Coke (S&B 1926) – Member of Coke & Coke [law firm in Dallas, Texas] (1930-1977)
Richard Marden Davis (S&B 1933) – Partner of Davis, Graham & Stubbs [law firm in Denver] (1937-c.1982)
William Singer Moorhead (S&B 1906) – Member of Moorhead & Knox [law firm in Pittsburgh] (1917-1952)

Others:
Charles Seymour (S&B 1908) – President of Yale University (1937-1950); Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1939-1945)
Carl A. Lohmann (S&B 1910) – Secretary of Yale University (1927-1953)
August Sidney Lovett (S&B 1913) – Chaplain of Yale University (1932-1958)
Henry R. Luce (S&B 1920) – Editor-in-Chief of Time, Inc. (1923-1964)
William H. Cowles (S&B 1887) – Publisher of *Spokane Spokesman-Review* (1893-1946)
Henry W. Hobson (S&B 1914) – Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Diocese of Southern Ohio (1931-1959)
Henry Sloane Coffin (S&B 1897) – President of Union Theological Seminary (1926-1945)
Edwin A. Burtt (S&B 1915) – Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University (1931-1960)
Frederic C. Walcott (S&B 1891) – Regent of the Smithsonian Institution (1941-1948)
Stanhope Bayne-Jones (S&B 1910) – Professor of Bacteriology at Yale School of Medicine (1932-1947)
Robert D. French (S&B 1910) – Professor of English at Yale University (1930-1953)
F. Trubee Davison (S&B 1918) – President of the American Museum of Natural History (1933-1951)



Admiral Kimmel (front row, center) and his staff gather on board the flagship *Pennsylvania* in the summer of 1941. Lieutenant Commander Layton is third from right in the middle row. Lieutenant Commander Waldo Drake, author of another article in this book, is fifth from left in the same row. (Courtesy of Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, USN, Ret.)

(Source: *Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy*, Edited by Paul Stillwell)

Admiral Yamamoto (fifth from right, front row) and his Combined Fleet staff in early 1942, shortly after they shifted from the *Nagato* to the new flagship *Yamato*. (Courtesy of Captain Roger Pineau, USNR, Ret.)

(Source: *Air Raid: Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy*, Edited by Paul Stillwell)

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS & MEMORANDUMS RELATED TO PEARL HARBOR

Documents published in Robert B. Stinnett's book *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor*:



HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL: ..... (date)

Request that the following {*Secret / *Confidential / *[redacted]} official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is {*Priority. / *[redacted] / *[redacted]}

*Strike out words not applicable.

..... Signature and Title

Sent as Radiogram No.	Message Center No.	Time Filed	Check	Code Clerk

PI WAR PRTY

WASHN DC 611 PM NOV 27 1941

CG

HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

472 27TH NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE STOP JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT STOP IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT COMMA REPEAT CANNOT COMMA BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT STOP THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT COMMA REPEAT NOT COMMA BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE STOP PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT COMMA REPEAT NOT COMMA TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT STOP REPORT MEASURES TAKEN STOP SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN STOP LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS

MARSHALL

Approved for Transmission:

..... Adjutant General

TRUE COPY
O M Cutler
O M CUTLER
LT COL INFANTRY

1162/27

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380-5)

Source: General Short's papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

Though it is signed "MARSHALL," this November 27, 1941, war warning message was originated by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, acting on the orders of President Roosevelt. It directs the Hawaiian US Army commander, Lieutenant General Walter Short, to follow an official US government desire: "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act."

A SERIES OF WAR WARNINGS ISSUED BY THE US GOVERNMENT



SEALED SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE — NAVY DEPARTMENT

'Phone Ext. No. Op-12. Br. 2992 — Addressees — Message Precedence

From: Chief of Naval Operations. — To. CinCaf, CinCpac, Coml1, Coml2, Coml3, Coml5 — Priority

Released by: [signature] — Routine

Date November 24, 1941. — Deferred

TOR Code Room — Priority

Decoded by — Spenavo London, CinClant. — Routine

Paraphased by — Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with DEFERRED precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for DEFERRED and MAIL DELIVERY.

Date Time GCT

TOP SECRET

TEXT CinCaf, CinCpac, Coms Eleven Twelve, Thirteen, and Fifteen for action Spenavo London and CinClant for info XX

CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL X THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY X CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS DISPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADDRS TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS X UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMMUNICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION X GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY

SECRET

Copy to WPD, War Dept) and to Op-12 but no other distribution.

plus Fleet Headquarters

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (Sec. Art. 76(4) Navy Regulations.)

CINCAF CINCPAC CINCLANT — SECM 29/CETYH (Rmko) — HCM 33/FUDEX (code) — Coms 11, 12, 13, 15 - ECM 18/COSIP

Source: RG 80, PHLO, MMRB, Archives II.

Prediction of a Japanese "surprise aggressive movement in any direction" came from Rear Admiral Royal Ingersoll, assistant chief of naval operations, on November 24, 1941. Upon receiving this message on the super secret US Navy CETYH circuit (see lower right), Admiral Husband E. Kimmel pulled the Pacific Fleet out of a North Pacific reconnaissance mission.



SEALED SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE — NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER 0912 Ext. 2002

FROM Chief of Naval Operations

RELEASED BY Ingersoll

DATE November 27, 1941.

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

ADDRESSEES

FOR ACTION: CINCAP, CINCPAC

INFORMATION: CINCLANT, SPENAVO

MESSAGE PRECEDENCE

FOR ACTION: PRIORITY X; ROUTINE; DEFERRED

INFORMATION: PRIORITY; ROUTINE; DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

GKVJL BVKLW 272337 0921

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE TIME GCT

HEELS

NEXT

MM THIS DESPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING X NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC HAVE CEASED AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS X THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATES AN AMPHIPIOUS EXPEDITION ~~PHOBABLY~~ AGAINST EITHER THE PHILIPPINES THAI OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO X EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL46X INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES X A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT X SPENAVO INFORM BRITISH.

CONTINENTAL DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA directed take appropriate measures against sabotage, espionage & subversive activities but not alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. MM

COPY TO WPD DEPT

encyphered calls

BY PAB RM-35

SECRET

SEE NAVY

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

The US Navy's war warning message of November 27, 1941, authored by Rear Admiral Royal Ingersoll (top left), omitted the crucial orders of President Roosevelt that called for US military forces to let Japan commit the first overt act. The omission was corrected the next day.

NAVAL MESSAGE — NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER Op-12 Ext. 2092

FROM Chief of Naval Operations

RELEASED BY H R Stark

DATE November 28, 1941

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

ADDRESSEES

FOR ACTION: COM PNHCP, COM PSNCP

INFORMATION: CINCPAC, COM PHCP

MESSAGE PRECEDENCE

FOR ACTION: PRIORITY X, ROUTINE, DEFERRED

INFORMATION: PRIORITY, ROUTINE, DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

R 866

290110

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

RNTVL — DATE — TIME — GCT

TEXT HOT ZZ

REFER TO MY 272338 X ARMY HAS SENT FOLLOWING TO COMMANDER WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND QUOTE NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE X JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT X IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT X THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE X PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT X REPORT MEASURES TAKEN X A SEPARATE MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO G-2 NINTH CORPS AREA BE SUBVERSIVE

TOP SECRET

(page one of two)

SEE ART. 76(4) NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

16-4178-

Source: Rg 38, Station US papers, MMRB, Archives II.

On Friday, November 28, 1941, Admiral Harold Stark, the chief of naval operations, restored the previous day's omission by twice repeating that the United States desired that Japan commit the first overt act.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By DLR NARS, Date 1-26-95

NAVAL MESSAGE ( ) NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER Op-12 Ext. 2992

FROM Chief of Naval Operations

RELEASED BY

DATE November 28, 1941

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

	ADDRESSEES	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FOR ACTION	COM PWNCF COM PSNCF	PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
INFORMATION	CINCPAC COM PNCF	PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

Y 90110

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

CONT'D (Page two)

ACTIVITIES IN UNITED STATES X SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN X LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS X UNQUOTE XX WPL52 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO PACIFIC AREA AND WILL NOT BE PLACED IN EFFECT IN THAT AREA EXCEPT AS NOW IN FORCE IN SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AND PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER X UNDERTAKE NO OFFENSIVE ACTION UNTIL JAPAN HAS COMMITTED AN OVERT ACT X BE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL46 SO FAR AS THEY APPLY TO JAPAN IN CASE HOSTILITIES OCCUR XZ.

TOP SECRET

FIMUC

ECM 25

Orig: Op 12
Copy to: Op 30, 38, WPD

SECRET

(page two of two)

SEE ART 76(4) NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL: ..... (date)

Request that the following {*Secret / *[redacted] / *[redacted]} official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is {*Priority. / *[redacted] / *[redacted]}

*Strike out words not applicable.

..... Signature and Title

Sent as Radiogram No.	Message Center No.	Time Filed	Check	Code Clerk

Approved for Transmission:

..... Adjutant General

114 WAR KR 189 WD PRTY

WASHN DC 842P NOV 28 1941

C G

HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER T H

462 28TH CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT PAREN SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY DASH FORTY FIVE END PAREN STOP ALSO DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS COMMA PROPERTY COMMA AND EQUIPMENT AGAINST SABOTAGE COMMA PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE STOP THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MEAN THAT ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES ARE AUTHORIZED STOP PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY COMMA AVOIDING UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM STOP TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS

ADAMS

TRUE COPY
O M Cutler
O M CUTLER
LT COL INFANTRY

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380-5)

Form H.D. No. 1173 (Revised)—1084 Honolulu 10-10-40 8M.

Source: Papers of Lt. Gen. Walter Short, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.

A second warning to prepare for subversive activities and sabotage in Hawaii was issued to Lieutenant General Walter Short by the US Army Adjutant General, Emory Adams, on Friday, November 28, 1941. Adams warned Short not to precipate publicity or alarm.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL: .....(date)

Request that the following {*Secret / [redacted]} official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is {*Priority. / [redacted]}

*Strike out words not applicable.

/sgd/ Thomas H. Green,
THOMAS H. GREEN,
Lt. Colonel, [illegible]
Department Judge Advocate.

Sent as Radiogram No.	Message Center No.	Time Filed	Check	Code Clerk

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D C

Approved for Transmission:

.....
Adjutant General

RE YOUR SECRET RADIO FOUR EIGHT TWO TWENTY EIGHTH COMMA FULL PRECAUTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT PAREN PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY DASH FORTY FIVE END PAREN AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS INCLUDING PERSONNEL AD EQUIPMENT STOP AS REGARDS PROTECTION OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS SUCH AS POWER PLANTS COMMA TELEPHONE EXCHANGES AND HIGHWAY BRIDGES COMMA THIS HEADQUARTERS BY CONFIDENTIAL LETTER DATED JUNE NINETEEN NINETEEN FORTY ONE REQUESTED THE GOVERNOR OF THE TERRITORY TO USE THE BROAD POWERS VESTED IN HIM BY SECTION SIXTY SEVEN OF THE ORGANIC ACT WHICH PROVIDES COMMA IN EFFECT COMMA THAT THE GOVERNOR MAY CALL UPON THE COMMANDERS OF MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII TO PREVENT OR SUPPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE COMMA INVASION COMMA INSURRECTION ETC STOP PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY STATED THE GOVERNOR ON JUNE TWENTIETH CONFIDENTIALLY MADE A FORMAL WRITTEN DEMAND ON THIS HEADQUARTERS TO FURNISH AND CONTINUE TO FURNISH SUCH ADEQUATE PROTECTION AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT SABOTAGE COMMA AND LAWLESS VIOLENCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH COMMA BEING COMMITTED AGAINST VITAL INSTALLATIONS AND STRUCTURES IN THE TERRITORY STOP PURSUANT TO THE FOREGOING REQUEST APPROPRIATE

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380-5)

-1-

Form H.D. No. 1173 (Revised)—1664 Honolulu 10-10-40 SM.

Source: Walter Short papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.

General Short issued this reply to the three US Army war warnings sent him from Washington. Since two of the directives warned him to anticipate subversive and sabotage activities, Short followed orders.

APPENDIX C

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL: ..... (date)

Request that the following {*Secret / *Confidential / *Restricted} official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is {*Priority. / *Routine. / *Deferred.}

*Strike out words not applicable.

..... Signature and Title

Sent as Radiogram No.	Message Center No.	Time Filed	Check	Code Clerk

Approved for Transmission:

..... Adjutant General

PAGE TWO

MILITARY PROTECTION IS NOW BEING AFFORDED VITAL CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS STOP IN THIS CONNECTION COMMA AT THE INSTIGATION OF THIS HEADQUARTERS THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU ON JUNE THIRTIETH NINETEEN FORTY ONE ENACTED AN ORDNANCE WHICH PERMITS THE COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT COMMA TO CLOSE COMMA OR RESTRICT THE USE OF AND TRAVEL UPON COMMA ANY HIGHWAY WITHIN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU COMMA WHENEVER THE COMMANDING GENERAL DEEMS SUCH ACTION NECESSARY IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE STOP THE AUTHORITY THUS GIVEN HAS NOT YET BEEN EXERCISED STOP RELATIONS WITH F B I AND ALL OTHER FEDERAL AND TERRITORIAL OFFICIALS ARE AND HAVE BEEN CORDIAL AND MUTUAL COOPERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN ON ALL PERTINENT MATTERS

SHORT

ENC SEC BY
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC
2:45 P 29 NOV 41

TRUE COPY
O M Cutler
O M CUTLER
LT COL INFAN TRY

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an e copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be r and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and v no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380

Form H.D. No. 1173 (Revised)—1604 Honolulu 10-10-40 8M.

authority NND 710056
By M&E NARA Date 5-20-71

P 9 J RADIOGRAM 0-4-c

605P

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY NOVEMBER 28, 1941

557A M.

From FORT SHAFTER TH

To CHIEF OF STAFF

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 959 NOVEMBER 27TH

REPORT DEPARTMENT ALERTED TO PREVENT SABOTAGE PERIOD

LIAISON WITH NAVY REURAD FOUR SEVEN TWO TWENTY SEVENTH

SHORT

Noted Gen Sturdevant

46 A G O
DEC 8 941
Received

NOTED - CHIEF OF STAFF

NOTED, WPD RPS

(18-7-11)

FILE NOV 28 1941

Action Copy

A-12 11-41

P.R. 11/24/41



DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 710058
By MdF NARA Date 5-20-

PO 14
325P

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

NOVEMBER 28, 1941
453A M.

From MANILA PI

To GENERAL GEORGE C MARSHALL

SECRET

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1004 NOVEMBER TWENTY EIGHTH
PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR RADIO SIX
TWO FOUR AIR RECONNAISSANCE HAS BEEN EXTENDED AND
INTENSIFIED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NAVY STOP GROUND
SECURITY MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN STOP WITHIN THE
LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY PRESENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
OF THIS THEATRE OF OPERATIONS EVERYTHING IS IN READINESS
FOR THE CONDUCT OF A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE STOP INTIMATE
LIAISON AND COOPERATION AND CORDIAL RELATIONS EXIST
BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY

MACARTHUR

46 A G O
DEC 3 '941
Received

Noted Hq S
(Stimson)
MARSHALL - CHIEF OF STAFF

NOTED, WPD R.L.B

SECRET

Action Copy

F.R.

P.M. 4:30/11

Source: RG80, PHLO, MMRB, Archives II.

General Douglas MacArthur assured Washington that he was not about to conduct offensive operations against Japan from his US Army command post in Manila. His reply to let Japan commit the first overt act was just what was desired by the White House: "Everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense."

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

SECRET

BY AUTHORITY OF A. C. OF S., WPD

12/3/41. ....G4C-7.....
Date Initials

(46/Gen/3 Oct 1 (12-1-41))

December 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (Through Secretary, General Staff)

Subject: Far East Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Carribean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

MARSHALL

Noted O.C.S. 12/3/41 jmc

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

Code messages as sent out Radios as follows dispatched 11:52 AM, 12-7-41, by Code Room, WDGC:

12.00 #733 to CO, USAFFE, Manila, P.I.;
12.17 #529 to CO, Haw. Dept., Ft. Shafter. TH.
12.00 #519 to CO, Crbn. Def. Cmd., Quarry Heights, CZ.
12.11 #16 to CO, Fourth Army, Pres. of San Fco., Cal.
ehb - 1705.

NR JAN - 3 1962

SECRET

Source: RG 80, PHLO, MMRB, Archives II.

Hawaii was last on the US Army list to receive this warning that Japan had set a Washington, DC, deadline of 1 P.M., Sunday, December 7, 1941. The time corresponded to 7:30 A.M., Sunday December 7, 1941, in Hawaii—less than 30 minutes to the first Japanese bomb drop. This message did not reach Lieutenant General Walter Short until mid-afternoon, Sunday December 7, 1941, about 6 hours after the first bombs fell on Pearl Harbor.

SELECTED INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS, 1940–41

25 November 1941

From: CinC Combined Fleet
To: First Air Fleet
(Pearl Harbor Attack Force)

The task force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air raid is planned for the dawn of X-day (exact date to be given by later order).

Upon completion of the air raid, the task force, keeping close coordination and guarding against the enemy's counterattack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan.

Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the task force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and reassemble.

Source: See Vice Admiral Homer N. Wallin, *Pearl Harbor* (Naval History Division, US Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 86. For a similar dispatch see United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) Naval Analysis Division, *The Campaigns of the Pacific War,* US Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 50.

This message, stripped of all communications data but following the form of the US Navy's intercept messages, was published in 1968 in a book written by Vice Admiral Homer N. Wallin. The message is from Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy, to Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, commander of the First Air Fleet, Japan's carrier force. It indicates that Yamamoto broke radio silence and directed Nagumo to advance into Hawaiian waters and deal the United States Fleet in Hawaii a mortal blow. Wallin writes that the date is Tokyo Time, which would correspond to November 24, 1941, in the United States. On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel called off an air and sea search for a Japanese carrier force and pulled the Pacific Fleet from the North Pacific when he was directed by Washington not to precipitate Japanese action. US Naval intercept records concerning November 24, 1941, Japanese naval dispatches have not been released.

THE CAMPAIGNS *of the* PACIFIC WAR

Japanese Naval Despatches Ordering Commencement of Hostilities

5 November 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval General Staff
To: CinC Combined Fleet

1. In view of the fact that it is feared war has become unavoidable with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, and for the self preservation and future existence of the Empire, the various preparations for war operations will be completed by the first part of December.
2. The CinC of the Combined Fleet will effect the required preparations for war operations.
3. Execution of details will be as directed by Chief of the Naval General Staff.

5 November 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval General Staff
To: CinC China Area Fleet

1. In view of the fact that it is feared war has become unavoidable with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, and for the self preservation and future existence of the Empire, the various preparations for war operations will be completed by the first part of December.
2. The CinC Combined Fleet will effect the required preparations for war operations in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Order, No. 1.
3. The CinC of the China Area Fleet will continue operations against China and at the same time effect required preparations for war operations.
4. Execution of details will be directed by Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Source: United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, (USGPO, 1946), p. 49.

These two radio dispatches originated by Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of the Japanese Navy's General Staff, appear to be the possible source of statements delivered by General George C. Marshall during a secret press briefing on November 15, 1941. In his briefing, Marshall disclosed that the United States had broken Japanese codes, predicted that America was on the brink of war with the Japanese, and expected the danger period would include the first ten days of December 1941. See Nagano's period for the war's start in paragraph 1; see further details in chapter 10 herein.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

16 September 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Gasoline and Oil Exports to Japan.

1. Highly reliable information has been received that on 20 August 1940 the Japanese Consul General at San Francisco informed his government that in spite of the restrictions on exports of petroleum products from the United States, no difficulty had been experienced in arranging for shipments of ordinary gasoline and of crude petroleum.

2. The Consul General at San Francisco informed his government in detail as follows:

(a) All the details connected with applications for export permits for petroleum products are being left in the hands of American agents by the Mitsui and Mitsubishi companies of San Francisco. These American agencies from whom the oil is bought go ahead and make suitable arrangements with the government authorities at Washington.

(b) The Mitsubishi agency at San Francisco has been notified by the local office of the Associated Oil Company that of the applications for export permits already filed in Washington by the Associated Oil Company export licenses have been granted for about 22,000 tons of Kettleman Hill crude oil and for a similar amount of other California crude oil. This material was applied for as "special blend" crude oil.

(c) Considering results so far, there would appear to be no chance of securing export licenses for aviation gasoline contracted for prior to 1 August nor that export permits will be issued for this material on the basis that exports should be permitted because the companies were under contract prior to the application of the export license system.

(d) Recently ordinary gasoline was loaded on board vessels of the Mitsui and Mitsubishi companies in the amount of some 85,000 barrels. Permits for the export of this gasoline were granted on application for the export of ordinary freight.

[redacted]

Source: Station US papers, RG 38, MMRB, Archives II.

On September 16, 1940, President Roosevelt learned that Japan had found ways to evade his embargo on petroleum. Japan's consul-general in San Francisco claimed that there was no difficulty in arranging for purchase of ordinary gasoline or crude petroleum. A ton of oil equals 7.3 barrels. Though signed by Captain Walter S. Anderson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, this report was originated by F-2, Commander Arthur McCollum.

(e) American oil dealers in the San Francisco area selling to Mitsui and Mitsubishi, of which the principal one is the Associated Oil Company, feel that there will be no difficulty about continuing the shipment of ordinary gasoline to Japan.

W.S. Anderson.

Original to Aide to the President.
CC - C.N.O.
M.I.D.
State
File (2) ✓
Treasury

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

23 February 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Japanese Army Advisors to Bolivia.

1. Highly reliable information indicates that confidential conversations are in progress between Bolivia and Japan, having for their object the sending of a Japanese Military Mission to Bolivia to serve as instructors for the Bolivian Army. It is also proposed that a number of Bolivian Army officers be sent to Japan to study in Japanese Army schools. The Japanese Army is strongly in favor of concluding an agreement with Bolivia along the above lines.

W.S. Anderson.

Original to Aide to President.
CC - C.N.O.
M.I.D.
State
File ✓

16-F Has seen

Source: RG 38, Station US Papers, MMRB, Archives II.

The first Japanese communications intelligence documents that can be verified as routed to President Roosevelt were originated in Arthur McCollum's F-2 office (above and following page) and signed by Captain Walter S. Anderson, Director of Naval Intelligence, on February 23, 1940. The notation "16-F Has seen" refers to Captain W. B. Heard, who was in overall charge of ONI foreign intelligence. The term "highly reliable information" is a synonym for communications intelligence, which in this case probably refers to Japan's Tsu series of codes—or possibly to their Red machine, which predated the Purple machine. The Purple Code was solved by United States cryptographers in September 1940.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

23 February 1940.

[redacted]

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Japanese diplomatic pressure for oil rights in Portuguese Timor.

1. Highly reliable information has been received that the Japanese have been engaged during the last year in diplomatic negotiations with Portugal to obtain for SAPT, a company in Timor, the rights to drill for and produce oil on the island of Timor. The Japanese have some connection with SAPT, probably through the Japanese "South Seas Development Co." which has a branch in Timor.

2. Indications are that Portugal, under pressure from Great Britain, has granted or is about to grant monopoly rights for oil exploration in that part of the island lying east of 125° E. longitude to the Timor Petroleum Company (believed to be Australian). Previous tests by Belgian interests proved the presence of oil in this area.

3. In December the Japanese Foreign Office informed its Lisbon representative that it was important that they contest the granting of monopoly rights to the Timor Petroleum Company and get some compromise offer from Portugal.

4. The Japanese Minister at Lisbon, in January, advised the Japanese Foreign Office, "It is not only worthwhile but necessary for us, from the standpoint of national policy, to force ourselves into the scene in order to acquire rights even at the expense of straining Japanese-Portuguese relations. For this purpose, I think there is no way of solving the difficulty except by application of pressure backed by force."

H.S. Anderson.

Original to Aide to President
CC - C.N.O.
M.I.D.
State
File

16 F Has been

[redacted]

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2
776:777 (GZ-8)

8 February, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subject: Reorganization and intensification of the Japanese intelligence activities in the United States.

1. A decision by the Japanese government to appreciably strengthen its espionage activities in the United States in cooperation with the Germans and Italians, is indicated by the attached memorandum which, based on highly reliable information, gives the substance of two directives dated January 30, 1941, from Foreign Minister Matsuoka to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

JULES JAMES,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Acting Director of Naval Intelligence.

Distribution:

Naval Aide to the President	:Original.
C.N.O.	:(1)
Secretary of State	:(1)
M.I.D.	:(1)
File	:(2)

Source: Station US Papers, RG 38, Modern Military Branch, Archives II.

On February 8, 1941, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum sent to President Roosevelt an intelligence report outlining Japanese plans to change from propaganda activities to espionage activities in the United States. Japan's Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, sent the strategy to Japanese missions in the United States, writing that the policy was instituted to prepare for the worst.

M E M O R A N D U M

From Foreign Minister Matsuoka
to Japanese Ambassador, Washington.
Dated January 30, 1941

These instructions classified as "Foreign Office Secret".

Heretofore, we have placed emphasis on publicity and propaganda work in the United States. In view of the critical situation in the recent relations between the two countries, and for the purpose of being prepared for the worst, we have decided to alter this policy. Taking into consideration the small amount of funds we have at our disposal, we have decided to deemphasize propaganda for the time being, and instead, to strengthen our intelligence work.

Though we must give the matter of intelligence work our further study - in this connection we are at present conferring with the Intelligence Bureau - we have mapped out a fundamental program, the outline of which is contained in my supplementary cable. (See below).

Please, therefore, reorganize your intelligence set-up and put this new program into effect as soon as possible.

Cable copies of this message, as "Minister's orders" to Canada, Mexico, (a copy to be relayed from Mexico to Mexicali), San Francisco, (copies from San Francisco to Honolulu, Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver,) New York, New Orleans, and Chicago.

- -

FROM CINCAF 050935 CR283 XJMS 5 MAR 1941

SECRET - CI10

LRHMY

HAVERECEIVED FROM BRITISH FOLLOWING IN A PPROXIMATE NUMBERS REFERRING TO FIVE NUMERAL SYSTE M EFFECTIVE DECEMBER TO FEBRUARY X FIVE HUNDRED BO OK VALUE X FOUR THOUSAND SUBTRACTOR GROUPS X HALF THOUSAND WORKSHEETS WITH CIPHER REMOVED X AND TWO HUNDRED NINETY INDICATOR SUBTRACTORS FOR SHS NUMB ERS X HAVE ARRANGED SECURE METHOD OF EXCHANGING FU RTHER RECOVERIES BY CABLE X BRITISH EMPLOY THREE O FFICERS TWENTY CLERKS ON THIS SYSTEM ALONE X THEYN ARE DELAYING ATTACK ON CURRENT CIPHER TABLE UNTIL MIDMARCH TO ACCUMULATE TRAFFIC AND OBTAIN FURTHER BOOK VALUES FROM PRECEDING PERIOD X DUE COLLATERAL INFORMATION AVAILABBE HERE AND CAPABILITY RAPID EX CHANGE WITH ENGLISH CAVITE WILL ASSUME THIS SYSTEM AS ONLY NAVY ASSIGNMENT X REQUEST DEPT FORWARD RE SULTS TO DATE AND TECHNIQUE ADVICE IF CONSIDERED H ELPFUL WPL

Source: This dispatch can be found in the Station US papers, RG 38, MMRB, Archives II.

A major controversy concerning whether America and her Allies had solved the Japanese Navy's 5-Numeral code system prior to Pearl Harbor has been under examination by journalists and historians since the end of World War II. If the system was solved prior to the attack, then the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands knew the precise plans for Japan's "surprise attack." Most Radio Tokyo transmissions directing Japanese warships to attack Hawaii were sent over radio waves in the 5-Number system and intercepted by US, British, and Dutch monitoring facilities in the Pacific.

On March 5, 1941, Admiral Thomas Hart, commander-in-chief of the US Asiatic Fleet, informed Admiral Harold R. Stark, FDR's Chief of Naval Operations, that the British monitor unit at Singapore had produced and exchanged solutions of the 5-Number code with the Asiatic Fleet. Hart said Station CAST on Cavite (he meant Corregidor) was in on the exchange and solution. A handwritten note at the middle-right asserts that OP20-A (Captain Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Communications) on March 5, 1941, authorized the removal of this dispatch from the Navy files and the substitution of a dummy message. This dispatch was not presented to Congress during the investigations of 1945–46 or 1995. Nor was it sent to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii.

At the bottom, a handwritten note indicates the USS Sepulga *will bring United States solutions of the 5-Num code to Manila about March 26, 1941. Ensign Laurence MacKallor, who transported the Purple machine to CAST on the* Sepulga, *carried solutions to the 5-Num code as well. Apparently the reference is to the 5-Num code, additive version 6, in effect January 15, 1941, to July 1, 1941.*



REPRODUCED AT THE NATION ARCHIVES

DETERMINED TO BE ADMINISTRATIVE MAIL
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By NARS, Date 1/21/

(NAVY DEPARTMENT)

From OPNAV
Date: 25 March 1941
NITE to All Addressees
ROUTINE to
PRIORITY to

INFORMATION ACTION

To COM 16

To CINCAF
Chief of Staff US Army

(do not write in this space)

MEACH

HERE TODAY 2[illegible]1500 CR
(TIME)

FOLLOWING PLAN F[illegible] COORDINATION BETWEEN ASIATIC COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF ARMY AND NAVY PROPOSED X ARMY INTERCEPT UNIT [illegible] NAVY DECRYPTING UNIT COPIES OF ALL INTERCEPTS IN ORANGE DIPLOMATIC SYSTEMS FORWARDING SAME BY LANDWIRE OR OTHER RAPID AND SECURE MEANS X COM 16 FURNISH COMBINED CHINESE PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT TRANSLATIONS OF ABOVE MESSAGES [illegible] TO ARMY X DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT LOCALLY X FOREGOING IS ADDITIONAL TO FORWARDING OF INTERCEPTS TO WASHINGTON BY BOTH SERVICES X DELIVER COMBINED GENERAL EXACT TRANSLATION THIS MESSAGE CX AND BWE TOMORROW

SECRET

20-A

20-G

Make original only Deliver to Communication Watch Officer to person. (See Art.76(4), Navy Regulations)

983

TOP SECRET

GAT OF

GI-10

COPY

Source: Station US papers, RG 38, MMBR, Archives II.

Station CAST was ordered to furnish rapid translations of Japanese diplomatic messages to General Douglas MacArthur in this March 25, 1941, order from Rear Admiral Royal Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, received a copy (upper right). The initials at lower left indicate that Laurance Safford, 20-G, commander of Station US, and 20-A, Captain Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Communications, saw this dispatch. Initials EJK probably are those of Admiral Ernest J. King. A glaring omission is to be noted: nothing indicates this message was seen by Admiral Kimmel, the Pacific Fleet commander.



FT SHAFTER 5/6/41 AEM -36-
FR TOKYO MATUOKA
TO KOSHI BERLIN
5/5/41
-PURPLE-

NO. CA 370

TR 5/6

GJQMF BKVPV IREMS
73-13 XX 15397

C A E U V V P P B B G L A A C E G O L L E E U G A
A I X A Z K I A O C N T J C C O B C C O A J P A I
T U K U F I F U U X W I P I K W F B T N O E U A H
E U J Y I M U A T A Z B D F U S L W D K I W O O A
G O E I A S C S N T A Z P J M Y O J K H B R E G R
O U M I S V A M J O E U P P I H A X R A Z R B O V
L J I X U Y I S H E J E A Z P I L F F R P F V H G

Source: Station US papers. RG 38, MMBR, Archives II.

His fellow soldiers at Fort Shafter never informed Lieutenant General Walter Short that the Purple Code messages of the Japanese Foreign Ministry were being intercepted at Station FIVE, a US Army intercept facility just steps away from the Fort Shafter command post in Hawaii. This intercept of May 6, 1941, indicates that interception, decoding, and translation of Purple messages obtained by Station FIVE were speedy—they took only one day. The translation (next page) indicates that Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka was concerned by a German report that the United States was reading his code messages and asked his ambassador to Germany, Baron Hiroshi Oshima, to check with the Berlin authorities.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By XJR NARS, Date 1-26-95

From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
To : Berlin (Oshima)
5 May 1941
(Purple-CA)

#370

[redacted]

Please express our appreciation to STAAMAA for the information in question and ask him if it is not possible to give us the authority for the statement that it has been fairly reliably established that the U.S. government is reading our code messages, so that we might take appropriate action.

Reply requested.

All copies destroyed except
(1) This original
(2) copy to Gen. Marburgne



C

12-5-41

CAVITE TEST

0511 Bearings 12 hours 4th: YOKO Ø TAHA 8 NENO 1 at 2, KANE 1 at 348, YUKE 3 at 92, SUKA 4 at 258, HEFU 4 at 80, METE 6 at 110, NIRA 9 at 358, 8 YUNA at 30

0522 Bearings 12 hours 8th: FUO 4 and SUKE 7 330. IDENTS FOLLOW: COMBINED FLEET HORI 2 FUMA 7 FUNE 4 KONE 8 MANO 8 RIHE 1 SETU 7 TEKE 9 TUWI 4 UI 2 WAKA 3 YOWI Ø. FIRST FLEET MIRE Ø.

0533 SECOND FLEET HEI 3 IRI Ø MENO 7 NNU 4 NEYO 2 YUHE 4. THIRD FLEET JRO 1 SIA 3 SOYU Ø. FOURTH FLEET HEMI 2 MORU 2. FIFTH FLEET ENE 9 UFU 1. SUBFORCE WAHI 8. AIRRONS COMB FLT HEHO 7 RAT

0544 RATI 3 YON 7 YUNE 8. COMB AIR FORCE HIME 6 MONO 1 REHE 8 SIHA 1 YONO 1X CHINA SEAS FLEET TAKE 6 YOKO Ø. NORTH CHINA FLEET KOKU 6 SAYA 7. SOUTH CHINA FLEET EKE 4 KANE 1 NNO 9.

Rw

Source: This TESTM dispatch can be found in the Station US papers, RG 38, MMRB, Archives II.

Cryptographers at CAST intercepted radio broadcasts involving the First Air Fleet five days before the attack. These broadcasts provide convincing evidence that carrier units violated radio silence; they were intercepted by American cryptographers and radio operators on Corregidor. The First Air Fleet's radio-call signs (Yobidashi Fugo) *reserved for the Hawaii attack were obtained by Station CAST in advance of the raid, according to this report received at Station HYPO on December 5, 1941. The evidence is startling: HE HO 7, YO N 7, and YU NE 8, identified by CAST as the air (carrier) squadrons of Japan's Combined Fleet, were the exclusive radio-call signs assigned for the Hawaii force. This information could only be generated from radio broadcasts in the 5-Num code, additive version 7; it confirms the reports of the Twelfth Naval District and the SS* Lurline *of hearing Japanese transmissions from the North Pacific.*

CAST's dispatch identified the twelve secret radio-call signs for Admiral Yamamoto: HO RI 2, FU MA 7, FU NE 4, KO NE 8, MA NO 8, RI HE 1, SE TU 7, TE KE 9, TU WI 4, U I 2, WA KA 3, and YO WI Ø. Japan's submarine fleet commander took to the airwaves, broke radio silence, and was uncovered as WA HI 8.

This information was transmitted to Station HYPO over the Navy's secret TESTM radio circuit. Rodney Whitten, of the HYPO staff, signed his initials to the dispatch and confirmed that it was received in Hawaii. Admiral Kimmel was never given this information.

JAPANESE CODES

4-22-71

TOP SECRET

MR. TOLSON:

RE: JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES CODES DURING WORLD WAR II

Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor

I have checked with L. Woodrow Newpher, Chief of the Cryptanalysis-Translation Section of the Laboratory, and William A. Branigan, Chief of the Espionage Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division, both of whom were in the Bureau prior to World War II and have knowledge of such matters. They advised that to their knowledge the Japanese were never able to break United States codes prior to Pearl Harbor or during the War. Mr. Newpher also advised that a very reliable book, entitled "The Code Breakers" by David Kahn on pages 582-585 also states that Japan was not successful in breaking United States codes.

On the other hand, according to the above agents, the U. S. Navy did break the Japanese military code prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and this directly attributed to the United States victory in the battle at Midway Island and in Japanese Admiral Yamamoto's being shot down in the Pacific. The Bureau also broke an open code in one Japanese case which was handled by our New York Office. During the War, Japan changed its codes several times but the military services were able to break some of them and they, as well as the Bureau, were able to read some messages.

It is suggested that any details which could be made available be obtained through the National Security Agency, which assumed the cryptanalytic duties formerly handled by the military services during the War.

REC-40 100-97-1-507

ST. 10

R. R. BEAVER

18 MAY 25 1971

RRB:crt

* The logical person to contact at the office of the National Security Agency is Dr. Louis W. Tordella, Deputy Director, at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland - telephone number [redacted]

TOP SECRET

F-241

53 JUN 8 1971

XEROX JUN 1 1971

Source: FBI report #100-97-1-507, FBI headquarters, FOIA Section, Washington, DC.

The FBI confirmed that the US Navy did break the Japanese military code prior to the attack. The information was passed on to Clyde Tolson, assistant to J. Edgar Hoover, by R. R. Beaver on April 22, 1971.

APPENDIX E

THIRTY-SIX AMERICANS CLEARED TO READ THE JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY INTERCEPTS IN 1941

Thirty-six Americans were cleared for unrestricted access to decoded and translated Japanese diplomatic and military intercepts obtained by American cryptographic personnel in 1941. The following list of their names, compiled by the author from routing slips found in the Station US papers at Archives II, includes more officials than previously revealed:

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Washington, DC
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Washington, DC
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Washington, DC
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Washington, DC
General George Marshall, Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC
Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC
Rear Admiral Royal Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC
Captain Theodore Wilkinson, fourth Director of Naval Intelligence in 1941 (October 1, 1941–December 7, 1941), Washington, DC
Captain Walter S. Anderson, Director of Naval Intelligence, Washington, DC
Captain Jules James, second Director of Naval Intelligence (January 15, 1941–March 1941), Washington, DC
Captain Alan G. Kirk, third Director of Naval Intelligence (March–October 1941), Washington, DC
Captain Laurance Safford, Commanding Officer, Station US, Washington, DC

Captain Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Communications, Washington, DC
Captain Roland M. Brainard, Ship Movement Officer, US Navy, Washington, DC
General Douglas MacArthur, Commander US Army forces (Philippines), Manila
Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Army Intelligence, Washington, DC
Admiral Thomas Hart, Commander of the Asiatic Fleet, Manila
Colonel Rufus Bratton, US Army courier, Washington, DC
Lieutenant Commander Alwin Kramer, US Navy courier, Washington, DC
Captain John Beardall, naval aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Washington, DC (May–December 1941)
Lieutenant Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, Commander, Station HYPO, Pearl Harbor Naval Yard (July–December 1941)
Lieutenant Rudolph Fabian, Co-commander, Station CAST, Corregidor, Philippines
Lieutenant John Lietwiler, Co-commander, Station CAST, Corregidor, Philippines
Captain William A. Heard, Far East Division, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, DC
Captain Howard Bode, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, DC
Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Navy War Plans Officer, Washington, DC
Commander Arthur McCollum, head of Far East Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, DC
Lieutenant Commander Ethelbert Watts, assistant to McCollum, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, DC
Major Rodney Boone, USMC, assistant to Arthur McCollum, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, DC
Lieutenant Commander Edwin Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer, Pearl Harbor
Lieutenant Robert Weeks, communications intelligence aide to Admiral Ernest J. King, commander-in-chief, Atlantic Fleet, Newport, Rhode Island
Agnes Meyer Driscoll, chief civilian cryptanalyst for the US Navy, Washington, DC
Ensign Prescott Currier, assistant to Driscoll, Washington, DC
Colonel William Friedman, US Army cryptanalyst, Washington, DC
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor (access restricted)
Lieutenant General Walter Short, commanding general Hawaiian Department, US Army, Fort Shafter, Oahu (access restricted)

Source: White House Route logs and Station US files, RG 38, MMRB, Archives II.

NOTES

A guide for quotations, sources, and events:
The principal end notes refer to:

PHPT (Pearl Harbor Part) A thirty-nine-volume transcript of eight official United States investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack that were held between December 22, 1941 and May 31, 1946. The volumes were numbered by the US Government Printing Office as parts 1 through 39 in the original publication at Washington, DC in 1946. Most major libraries in the United States carry the entire set. The eight investigations were:

1. Roberts Commission, December 22, 1941 to January 23, 1942 (Parts 22 through 25, PHPT 22–25).
2. Inquiry by Admiral Thomas Hart, February 12, 1944 to June 15, 1944 (PHPT 26).
3. Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings, August 7, 1944 to October 6, 1944 (PHPT 27–31).
4. Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24, 1944 to September 27, 1944 (PHPT 32–33).
5. Clarke Proceedings, September 20, 1944 to August 4, 1945 (PHPT 34).
6. Clausen Proceedings, December 1, 1944 to September 14, 1945 (PHPT 35).
7. Hewitt Proceedings, May 14, 1945 to July 11, 1945 (PHPT 36–38).
8. Hearings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, November 15, 1945 to May 31, 1946. Parts 1–11 are transcripts of testimony. Parts 12–21 are exhibits of JOINT.

During the course of research for this book between 1982 and 1999, the National Archives made major changes in its archival policy. A new facility called Archives II was constructed on the campus of the University of Maryland at College Park, Maryland, a community within the Beltway. In 1994 military records were split between Archives I (7th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington DC) and Archives II (College Park). Timothy Nenninger, head of military records at Archives II, provided details concerning the storage policy of United States military records for readers of this book: "The several hundred thousand cubic feet of permanently valuable military records accessioned by the National Archives, which date from the period of the American Revolution to the 1960s and 1970s, have been split between the National Archives Building in downtown Washington and the new archival facility Archives II at College Park, Maryland. Military records pre-dating World War II are housed in the National Archives Building in Washington; military records from World War II and after are stored in Archives II at College Park." Nenninger's office and his staff of archivists are located in Room 2400, A-II at College Park, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001. Telephone (301) 713-7250. The major Record Groups that Mr. Nenninger and his predecessor, Clarence Lyons, made available to the author through Freedom of Information Act requests (FOIA) are:

PHLO is a collection of documents obtained for the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, abbreviated in this book as JOINT. The investigation was conducted by a special committee appointed by the US

(Source: *Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor* by Robert B. Stinnett)

Documents published in Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton's book *And I Was There*:

STREAMLINED INDEX OF TRANSLATIONS AND MEMORANDA RE PEARL HARBOR (1941) - CONT'D

TRANSLATION Date	By	JD#	SIS#	OTHER #	BRIEF
**Dec. 1	A	6943	(25552) (25553)	Tokyo 985	The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured - broken. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. Will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is. (Nov. 30, 1941.) [Note: Coded message forwarded by Com 16 as GYROY #10001, #10014, or #10027. Also forwarded from London as Admiralty #104 and #105. Admiralty #11539 advised "Tokyo to Berlin #985 of immediate interest."]
*Dec. 1	A	6944	(25554) (25555)	Tokyo 986	The Imperial Govt. can no longer continue negotiations with the U.S. The proposal presented by the U.S. on the 26th contains one insulting clause. It is clearly a trick. The U.S. has decided to regard Japan as an enemy. (Nov. 30, 1941.) [Forwarded by Com 16 as GYROY #10001, #10014, or #10029.]
*Dec. 1	M	6983	-	Tokyo 865	To prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that the negotiations are continuing. The above is for only your information. (GY Log #6428.)
**Dec. 1	M	6984	-	Tokyo 2444	The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. (GY Log #6432.)
*Dec. 2	M	6985	25609	Tokyo 2409	Hidden Word Code (Nov. 27, 1941 - J19). For later additions see:
		7122	25830	Tokyo 2432	
				Tokyo 2433 (?)	
		7214	25943	Tokyo 2450	
		7360		Tokyo 2431	
***Dec. 4	M	7001	-	-	JD #7001 is believed to be the (missing) translation of the Winds Message.
**Dec. 3	A	7017	25640	Tokyo 867	Washington burn all codes except one copy of "Oite" (Pa-K2) and "L" (LA). Stop using the code machine and destroy it completely. When you have finished this, wire back "HARUNA." Destroy all message files and other secret documents. (Dec. 2, 1941.)

1944 OP-20-G listing of Japanese diplomatic intercepts—asterisks indicated that this intelligence was of critical importance. ROCHEFORT PAPERS

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

WDCSA/381 Philippines (12-4-41)

November 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF:
(For inclusion in special Philippine file)

Subject: Air Offensive Against Japan.

While talking informally on November 19, General Marshall directed that information be obtained referring to an air offensive against the Japanese Empire.

Specifically, he wanted answers to the questions--what General MacArthur would attack in Japan (from bases in the Vladivostok area) if war were declared December 1, 1941; what data we have assembled in Washington on the subject; what appears to us to be profitable systems of objectives, and how much of our data was presented to and was taken to the Philippines by General Brereton.

As of this date, the following data have been assembled:

1. Before General Brereton's departure for the Philippines, all of his discussions were based on the employment of the Philippine Air Force on the strategic defensive. With the very small offensive force projected for the Philippine Air Force (never over two heavy bombardment groups), a sustained air offensive against the Japanese Empire was never discussed. The conception of the employment of the offensive Air Force at that time was limited to operations against lines of communication from Japan proper. Specific objectives for this attack would obviously consist almost wholly of shipping in the northern approaches to the China seas. Japanese naval bases in the islands off Formosa and at the mandated islands (from bases in New Britain) were discussed, but no data are available as to the details of those naval bases.

2. General Brereton did take with him, however, separate Air Staff studies on the steel and petroleum industries and on the electric power establishment in Japan.

3. Shortly after General Brereton's arrival in the Philippines, G-2 received cable requests for data on objectives in Japan. In reply thereto there have been mailed to General MacArthur a series of maps showing the location of approximately 600 industrial objectives, in Japan proper. He has also been informed that objectives folder data to support these maps are in preparation and will be forwarded to him at the earliest possible date. The present status of this project (now under way in the Chief of Air Corps branch office at Bolling Field) indicates that about one-third of the total projected number of objective folders may be completed and prepared for shipment to the Philippines

SECRET

Map and memorandum detailing the extent of preparations for a strategic-bombing offensive against Japan. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, SECRETARY OF WAR SECRET FILE

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

November 25, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China.

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by previous agreement.

Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten to thirty ships , some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment.

The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government.

I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field.

Henry L Stimson

Secretary of War.

November 27, 1941.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am sending herewith the English estimate and the original of your report sent to the President Tuesday afternoon.

We found this in due course in the inside pocket of the coat of a very distinguished gentleman.

I am,

Very sincerely yours,

Pa Watson

EDWIN M. WATSON.

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
The Secretary of War.

ember 25, 1941

ent towards

learned through Magic
Vichy Government that
troops into Indo-China
previous agreement.

i to the effect that a
of 10,000 tons displace-
the Yangtse River below
t as 50,000, but more
is ship concentration
s deck-load of one vessel

Military Intelligence
r information, this is
logical follow-up of
overnment.

other information in

L Stimson

tary of War.

The "missing" 25 November communication and covering note. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, SECRETARY OF WAR SECRET FILE

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

259

P.M. approved of draft of this telegram 8.30 pm 7.12.41. Subsequently in view of news of Japanese commencement of hostilities instructions were given to cancel it. J.G.M. 7.12.41

Draft Telegram to Lord Halifax, Washington.

Most Immediate. Most Secret.

1. From your recent telegrams we understand we can rely on armed support of United States if we become involved in hostilities with Japan in the following circumstances:-

(a) Japanese invasion of Malaya or Netherlands East Indies.

(b) Action on our part in the Kra Isthmus to forestall or repel Japanese landing in that Isthmus.

(c) Action on our part in Kra Isthmus in event of Japanese encroachment on Thailand by force or threat of force (President's 3rd hypothesis in your Telegram No. 5519 of December 1).

2. We read your Telegram 5653 (of December 6) as meaning that in President Roosevelt's view we should be justified in attacking at sea any Japanese expedition sailing in direction of Thailand or Malaya (and presumably East Indies). We ourselves should desire to have this latitude.

Telegram drafted half an hour before the Pearl Harbor attack by Churchill confirming that Roosevelt *had* guaranteed U.S. armed support even if Britain made a preemptive attack on the Japanese. PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE, PRIME MINISTER'S FILES

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

(ed)

O MO 2 All Fleets
DE
HA HU 6 TOKYO Radio
- SC U W 90

From: TU HI Ø17. Secty, COMBINED FLEET.
Action: YA MI 9 ~~FIRST~~ C/S COMBINED FLEET
Info: Missing. (Probably Chief Tokyo Comm. Office)*

2300/24 November 1941 (TOI 11/25003G WE H155A) H

[redacted] Serial [illegible]

Additions to Call List "RA TO YO"

1. Additions to the "surface force" section (pages 1 and 2).

CALL	UNIT
SE TA to HI TE (6 calls)	E (British Malay) Force. H (Dutch Indies) Force. M (Philippine) Force. N (Japan) Force. AA (Wake) Occupation Force. G (Guam) Occupation Force.
HI SE to MU HU	Main Force.
FO I to N SE	Flagship of Maru Force.
S HO to HO A	Striking Force.
SE HI to MU HU	Flagship of Striking Force.
NI HI to MU KU	Air Force (Southern Force).
SI YO to RU RO	Ship-shore administrative offices of Commander Air Force (Southern Force).
MI SO to KO MU	Advance Expeditionary Force.
SE HI to SI NU	Flagship of Advance Expeditionary Force.
HO RU to O NA	Submarine Force (Southern Force).
KI NU to HA SO	Flagship of Submarine Force (Southern Force).
RU HE to SE MU	Southern Force.

JN 5 0063 Z ffH (cron) Navy Trans 11/29/45 [redacted]

F

JN-25 intercepts of Japanese operational orders before war broke out. Although not fully decrypted until 1945 they reveal clear signs of the scale and direction of the impending attack. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, SRN SERIES

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

(db)

WA SE ß
DE
hm FU o
I 30

Combined Fleet.
TOKYO Radio

included

From: YO NI ßß Combined Fleet, CinC.
Action: SE TU 7 Combined Fleet.

12/011500/I 1941 (TOI 12/022100 ß XT 4155 A) - H

[redacted] Serial 676

This despatch is Top Secret.

This order is effective at 1730 on 2 December:

[redacted] Combined Fleet Serial) # 10.

Climb NIITAKAYAMA 1208, repeat 12081

Comment: Interpreted freely, above means "Attack on 8 December". Explanation: this was undoubtedly the prearranged signal for specifying the date for opening hostilities. However, the significance of the phrase is interesting in that it is so appropriately used in this connection.

NIITAKAYAMA is the highest mountain in the Japanese Empire. To climb NIITAKAYAMA is to accomplish one of the greatest feats. In other words undertake the task (of carrying out assigned operations). 1208 signifies the 12th month, 8th day, Tokyo time.

C I Comm. Jr. Intercepted 2100, 2 Dec 1941.

LBH

F

(JAPANESE)

JN 5 0012 Z (HK) Navy from [redacted]

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

NAVAL MESSAGE — NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER — ADDRESSEES — MESSAGE PRECEDENCE

FROM OPNAV

RELEASED BY ADM INGERSOLL

DATE 27 NOV 1941

FOR ACTION: CINCAF, CINCPAC — PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED: PRIORITY

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

INFORMATION: CINCLANT, SPENAVO — PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED

Signed for by McDowell - Op-12B

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

272337 (CR 921)

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING X NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC HAVE CEASED AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS X THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATES AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER THE PHILIPPINES THAI OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO X EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL46X INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES X A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT X SPENAVO INFORM BRITISH CONTINENTAL DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST SABOTAGE

Signed for by McDowell - Op-12B

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SEE ART 76(4) NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

The navy's 27 November 1941 alert that was phrased to warn both the Asiatic and Pacific fleet commanders of impending war, but clearly applied primarily to the former. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, PEARL HARBOR LIAISON OFFICE

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

FROM

RELEASED BY RADM BRAINARD

DATE 2 DEC. 1941

FOR ACTION: CINCAF

ROUTINE
DEFERRED

FOR CODEROOM 2356

DECODED BY CALLAN

PARAPHRASED BY GLUNT

INFORMATION

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

Ø12356CRØ313

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENC

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

PRESIDENT DIRECTS THAT THE FOLLOWING BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

AND WITHIN TWO DAYS IF POSSIBLE AFTER RECEIPT THIS DESPATCH.
CHARTER 3 SMALL VESSELS TO FORM A "DEFENSIVE INFORMATION PATROL"
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH IDENTITY AS U.S. MEN-OF-WAR

ARE COMMANDED BY A NAVAL OFFICER AND TO MOUNT A SMALL GUN AND 1
MACHINE GUN WOULD SUFFICE. FILIPINO CREWS MAY BE EMPLOYED WITH
MINIMUM NUMBER NAVAL RATINGS TO ACCOMPLISH PURPOSE WHICH IS TO OBSERVE
AND REPORT BY RADIO JAPANESE MOVEMENTS IN WEST CHINA SEA AND GU

OF SIAM. 1 VESSEL TO BE STATIONED BETWEEN HAINAN AND HUE ONE
VESSEL OFF THE INDO-CHINA COAST BETWEEN CAMRANH BAY AND CAPE ST.

JAQUES AND ONE VESSEL OFF POINTE DE CAMAU. USE OF ISABEL AUTHOR
ED BY PRESIDENT AS ONE OF THE THREE BUT NOT OTHER NAVAL VESSELS.

REPORT MEASURES TAKEN TO CARRY OUT PRESIDENTS VIEWS. AT SAME TI
INFORM ME AS TO WHAT RECONNAISSANCE MEASURES ARE BEING REGULARLY

PERFORMED AT SEA BY BOTH ARMY AND NAVY WHETHER BY AIR SURFACE VE
SELS OR SUBMARINES AND YOUR OPINION AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

THESE LATTER MEASURES.

FILES...CNO..GENERAL...2Ø 0

DISTRIBUTION...38...ORIGINATOR...RECORD COPY..12

CLASSIFIED DELETED

SEE NAVY

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

The president's order to the Asiatic Fleet to send out three expendable vessels on what appears to have been a "fishbait" mission. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, PEARL HARBOR LIAISON OFFICE

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

~~123916x~~(wm) (CY-1: 123916)

I KA MI (GUADALCANAL Oper. For.)
DE: SO SU FU (RABAUL Comm. Unit)
U TU 785 W 176

From: ?
Action: RO MI 2 (SOLOMONS Defense Force)
RO RO 8 ?
RU TA 2 (Air Group #204)
YO YO 2 (Air Flotilla #26)

(Ballale Garrison Comdr.)
Info: NO KA 1 ?

4/131755/I 8943 (TCI 4/140009/I on 4990 A kcs) bt

#? From: CinC Southeastern Air Fleet.

On 18 April CinC Combined Fleet will visit RXE, R___ and RXT in accordance following schedule:

1. Depart RR at 0600 in a medium attack plane escorted by 6 fighters. Arrive RXZ at 0800. Proceed by minesweeper to R__ arriving at 0840. (___have minesweeper ready at #1 Base). Depart R____ at 0945 in above minesweeper and arrive RXZ at 1030? (- - - - - - -). Depart RXZ at 1100? ~~xxx~~ in medium attack plane and arrive RXF at 1110. ~~xxxxxx~~ - - - - - - -. Depart RXF at 1400 in medium attack plane and arrive RR at ~~1545~~ 1540.

2. At each of the above places the Commander-in-Chief will make short tour of inspection and at _____ he will visit the sick and wounded, but current operations should continue. Each force commander - - - -

JN-3: 2825 (MR) (Japanese) (S) Navy Trans. 4/141705/Q(?)

The decrypted intercept of Admiral Yamamoto's scheduled tour of Bougainville bases that became his death warrant. Note five-minute disparity in minesweeper trip, because of tides. NATIONAL ARCHIVES, SRN SERIES

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

SECRET

II

The Navy Department Decrypting Unit had been assisting Pearl Harbor in the solution of the Jap Naval Operations Code for about a year, and had handled solution single-handed before this "project" was assigned to Pearl Harbor in 1941. The British C.I. Unit in Singapore had been evacuated to Ceylon and then withdrawn to East Africa, so that it was temporarily in a state of "suspended animation" so far as its cryptanalytical efforts were concerned. The Asiatic C.I. Unit had been evacuated (by submarine) from Corregidor to Australia during March, April, and early May, 1942: there they joined the enthusiastic but inexperienced Australian C.I. Unit at Canberra and were just getting on their feet again when Midway was fought. So the whole burden of communication intelligence (in the Pacific) fell on Pearl Harbor and Washington. It is true that the Navy Department was turning out more "key recoveries" and "code values" than Pearl Harbor. (They had more personnel to assign to this project.) However, Pearl Harbor was always several days ahead in its information—because it was adjacent to the Intercept Station—and in this instance made a correct evaluation of available evidence while the Navy Department busted cold.'

Neither John Redman nor Wenger were inclined to share credit with anyone else, let alone admit a blunder, so they proceeded to bluff their way through. They told the Director of Naval Communications (Capt. Joseph R. Redman) that they had spotted the change of date, that Pearl Harbor had missed the boat on this occasion, and that without the warning from Washington, Midway and parts of the Hawaiian Islands would have been captured! It is presumed that Captain Redman told this to Vice Admiral Horne, to Vice Admiral Willson, and to Admiral King. This could be verified by questioning these Admirals - if they still remember the incident.

The exposure of the above-mentioned fraud did not come until October, 1943, when Commander J. S. Holtwick was ordered to the Navy Department for a short period of temporary duty prior to going to Chungking for liaison duty with the Chinese Government. Holtwick called on the D.N.C. (Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman) to pay his respects. In the course of conversation, Admiral Redman casually remarked that Pearl Harbor had missed the boat at the Battle of Midway but the Navy Department had saved the day. This took Holtwick's breath away, but he managed to say that Admiral Nimitz thought the reverse was true. Admiral Redman then said that the Commander in Chief must have been misinformed, to which Holtwick replied:

> "Admiral Nimitz read the official dispatches and drew his own conclusions. Also, he has just given me a letter of commendation for my part in the work."

(Incidentally, Admiral Nimitz gave similar letters of commendation to Dyer, Wright, Rochefort (FJ), and others.)

-4-

A page from the anonymous wartime memorandum accusing certain members of the navy department of conspiring to sack Rochefort. ADMIRAL SHOWERS

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

SECRET

June 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Admiral.

Subject: Commander Rochefort Recommendation for Medal Award.

1. I do not concur in the recommendation that Commander Rochefort be awarded a Distinguished Service Medal.

2. This officer is not the originator of this particular service, though he has been very active in it, and, while he has apparently performed his present duties in a highly successful manner, he has merely efficiently used the tools previously prepared for his use.

3. Ground-work, prepared over a period of many years, is the result of the efforts of many officers and it would seem hardly befitting to award a medal only to the officer who happens to be in a position to reap the benefits, at a particular time, unless in actual combat operation with the enemy.

4. The work of Corregidor, Belconnen and the Navy Department has been, I think, of as high an order as that done in Honolulu. However, these Officers in Charge performed a more or less mechanical, technical job in utilizing a tool already forged to their use.

5. I consider that equal credit is due to the COMINCH Planning Section for the correct evaluation of enemy intentions, based upon all sorts of intelligence, and strategical application of that intelligence. In this particular case radio intelligence was invaluable.

OK K

6. I recommend that you disapprove this recommendation ation and other similar ones which may be received, particularly at this time.

Done K

7. I do recommend, however, that a "Well Done" be sent from COMINCH to the stations and units concerned in their particular private cipher system. Despatch attached for your release if you approve.

Respectfully,

RUSSELL WILLSON
Chief of Staff.

King rejected the recommended award to Rochefort. Notations indicate King's acceptance of the advice of his chief of staff. ROCHEFORT PAPERS

(Source: *And I Was There* by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton)

Statement Regarding Winds Message

by Captain L.F. Safford, US Navy
[Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to Congressional Resolution 27]

Related Resource: Pearl Harbor Frequently Asked Question

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25 January 1946

STATEMENT REGARDING WINDS MESSAGE

by Captain L.F. Safford, USN

PREVIEW
There was a Winds Message. It meant War--and we knew it meant War. By the best estimate that can be made from my recollection and the circumstantial evidence now available, the "Winds Message" was part of a Japanese Overseas "News" Broadcast from Station JAP (Tokyo) on 11980 kilocycles beginning at 1330 Greenwich Civil Time on Thursday, December 4, 1941. This time corresponded to 10:30 p.m. Tokyo time and 8:30 a.m. Washington time, December 4, 1941. The broadcast was probably in Japanese Morse code, and was originally written in the Kata-Kana form of written, plain-language Japanese. It was intercepted by the U.S. Navy at the big radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland, which serves the Navy Department. It was recorded on a special typewriter, developed by the Navy, which types the Roman-letter equivalents of the Japanese characters. The Winds Message broadcast was forwarded to the Navy Department by TWX (teletypewriter exchange) from the teletype-transmitter in the "Intercept" receiving room at Cheltenham to "WA91," the page-printer located beside the GY Watch Officer's desk, in the Navy Department Communication Intelligence Unit under my command. I saw the Winds Message typed in page form on yellow teletype paper, with the translation written below. I immediately forwarded this message to my Commanding Officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN), thus fully discharging my responsibility in the matter.

--1--

PREPARATIONS FOR INTERCEPTION
There are various sources of the so-called "Winds Code," two of which have already been introduced as evidence: Tokyo Circular 2353 on page 154 of Exhibit No. 1 and Tokyo Circular 2354 on page 155 of Exhibit No. 1. The most important source was Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet secret dispatch 281430 of November 28, 1941, addressed for information to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and Commandant 14th Naval District--thus letting them in on the secret. I had taken no action personally on the first tip-off (Tokyo Circular 2354), because I was still awaiting the instruction of higher authority. CINCAF 281430 together with Tokyo Circular 2353 and other collateral intercept information apparently made an impression upon the Director of Naval Intelligence, for he immediately sent word to me, through the Director of Naval Communications, that he wished the Communication Intelligence Organization to make every attempt to intercept any message sent in accordance with the Winds Codes. It was a request from Admiral Wilkinson and an order from Admiral Noyes. I hastened to comply, with the secondary motive that it would be a feather in our cap if the Navy got it and our sister service didn't.

Just about the time I received Admiral Wilkinson's request, I was shown Tokyo to Washington Serial 843, dated November 27, 1941, prescribing a "schedule of (Tokyo News) Broadcasts," which gave me something tangible to work with as well as giving added meaning to the Winds Code. The "November 29 deadline" indicated that the Winds Code might be used to notify overseas officials as to things which would "automatically begin to happen." Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354 blueprinted what this action would be. Tokyo Serial 843 implied that such notification would be made. After a conference with my subordinates, I drafted a summary of Tokyo Serial 843

--2--

(or had Kramer do it for me), had it coded in the COPEK system, and released it myself at 6 p.m. (Washington time) on November 28, 1941. This secret message was transmitted "Priority" to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts for action, and to the

Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet for information, and may be identified as OPNAV 282301. This took care of our overseas Communication Intelligence Units: they now had all the available technical information on the subject. I know that they monitored the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts; I also know that Corregidor monitored the Tokyo Morse Broadcasts; in fact, Corregidor and Heeia went beyond their instructions and guarded the Tokyo Broadcasts 24 hours a day. Captain Rochefort and Commander Leitwiler can verify this.

I discussed the situation with Commander Welker, in charge of the intercept and direction-finder stations, and with Chief Radioman Lewis, his technical assistant. Our prospects for interception looked somewhat dubious. We were not encouraged when a day or two later Washington and Rio objected to the new frequency assignments and Rome complained about the poor quality of the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts.

I would like to digress long enough to invite the attention of the Committee to the fact that OPNAV 282301 is not included in the "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches" (Exhibit No. 37), and that Tokyo Serial 843 (JD-1 #6899: SIS #25446) is not included in the "Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic Messages" (Exhibit No. 1). Three other relevant intercepts not appearing in Exhibit No. 1 are also of interest at this point, namely: Washington to Tokyo Serial 1197 of November 27, 1941 (JD-1 #6908: SIS #25476), Rio to Tokyo Serial 482 of November 30, 1941 (JD-1 #6982: SIS #25571), Rome to Tokyo Serial 768 of November 29, 1941 (JD-1 #6981: SIS #25604). These 5 documents should be introduced as evidence for purposes of record.

--3--

Welker, Lewis and I agreed that 5160 kilocycles would probably come in nicely at Manila and at Pearl Harbor. Station JHL was of too low power to reach the greater distances to the continental United States. 9430 kilocycles appeared a bit high for a night frequency in winter, as far as the West Coast was concerned. There did not seem to be a remote possibility of the 11980 kilocycles and 12265 kilocycles being heard by any station in the Pacific Ocean or along either shore at the time of day scheduled. Nevertheless, we decided to have Bainbridge Island monitor the Tokyo Morse Code Broadcasts on the chance that the times given in Tokyo Serial 843 might not be given in Tokyo time or the schedules could be heard because of freak conditions. We did not order Bainbridge Island to monitor the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts because its two sound recorders were guarding the two ends of the Tokyo-San Francisco radio telephone circuit. Our estimates for Bainbridge Island were closely realized: excellent receivability at the wrong time of day and almost a complete "black-out" of reception on the higher frequencies during the period scheduled for the Winds Message broadcast.

We agreed that the best chance of intercepting the listed schedules (other than those on 5160 kilocycles) was on the East Coast of the United States. During the winter months the East Coast had good reception of Tokyo during the few hours included in the schedules. Our best bet was Cheltenham, which had been guarding the MAM (Tokyo) Broadcasts to Japanese Merchant Vessels, so we had up-to-the-minute data on the receivability of Tokyo. According to my memory we decided to play safe and have all East Coast intercept stations monitor the Tokyo Broadcasts. We agreed it would be impossible to hear Voice Broadcasts from Tokyo on the East Coast and therefore did not attempt it. We did not order Guam or Imperial Beach (California) to monitor any of the Tokyo broadcast schedules.

--4--

Commander Welker or I sent TWX messages directing the intercept stations at Bainbridge Island (Washington) and at Cheltenham (Maryland) to monitor the schedules given in Tokyo Serial 843 as first priority and to forward all plain-language Japanese intercepts on these schedules to the Navy Department by teletype. We may have sent these instructions to other stations also. We did not want English or coded messages--only written Japanese. We gave the same instructions to both stations, and sent them out immediately after releasing the previously-mentioned OPNAV 282301.

I have confirmation of the above orders plus knowledge of existing receiving conditions in the monthly reports from Cheltenham, Winter Harbor, and Bainbridge Island, extracts from which are quoted below:

Station "M" (Cheltenham) -- Operations -- November 1941
Receiving conditions throughout the month were very good on all frequencies. Atmospheric disturbances have been at a minimum. Orders received from OP-20-GX at 2315 (GCT) November 28, via teletype to give highest priority to various broadcasts at designated Japanese broadcast stations. These schedules were covered and found to be press broadcasts sent in both Kana and English. Log sheets were forwarded to OP-20-GX daily with regular traffic files.

Station "M" (Cheltenham) -- Operations -- December 1941
Receiving conditions during the month were fair to good on all frequencies. At 2300, 7 December 1941, telephone orders received from OP-20-GX to drop the Tokyo JJC/MAM schedules and assignments; continued watch for Orange activity.

Station "W" (Winter Harbor) -- Operations -- December 1941
Receiving Conditions in General. Daily attempts were made to intercept Tokyo and Osaka channels employed to Europe, but only on a few occasions was any intercept possible.

--5--

Station "S" (Bainbridge Island) -- Operations -- November 1941
During the month of November a sharp increase has been noticed in the amount of message traffic sent on the Kana General Information Broadcasts. Where before we seldom averaged more than one or two such messages monthly, it is now not unusual for two or three such messages to appear daily. These messages are sent in both number code and Kana.

On 28 November, a directive was received by TWX from Op-20-GX which called for coverage of the following stations at times specified, with priority transmission of intercepted material by TWX. Times listed were given as PST. Because the use of PST time designation is unusual, we asked for a verification, but were told that time zone was uncertain and verification was not possible.

PST	(GCT)	STATION	FREQUENCY
0100	(0900)	JVJ	12275
0130	(0930)	JUO	9430
0200	(1000)	JVJ	12275
0300	(1100)	JHL	5160
0400	(1200)	JHL	5160
0500	(1300)	JHL	5160
0530	(1330)	JHP	11980

Since the time zone indicated was not certain we were faced with the possibility that the time could be either GCT, PST, zone -9, or even a combination of these. As soon as the directive was received we started copying all broadcasts of this same type which were readable at "S". We found that in some cases other stations were tied in with the Stations listed in the original directive, and that although we could not copy the station listed we could copy the cornetted channel carrying the same broadcast. The stations and time that we can copy are listed below. Time used is GCT.

GCT	STATION	FREQUENCY	CORNETTED WITH
0000	JVJ	12275	JUP
0030	JUD	15880	JVJ/JAU2
0100	JUD	15880	JVJ
0130	JVJ	12275	
0200	JVJ	12275	
0230	JVJ	12275	JUP/JUD
0300	JVJ	12275	JUD
0330	JVJ	12275	JUD
0400	JVJ	12275	
0430	JVJ	12275	
0500	JVJ	12275	JUD
1300	JHL	5160	
2200	JVJ	12275	
2300	JVJ	12275	
2330	JVJ	12275	

--6--

At my instructions, or at least with my concurrence, Commander Welker consulted with his opposite number in the War Department, Captain Schukraft, and ascertained that the Army was monitoring for the Winds Message at San Francisco, and possibly elsewhere, but was not monitoring for the Winds Messages anywhere on the East Coast of the United States. I do not know what sort of instructions the Army gave its intercept stations. I do not know why the Army failed to monitor for the Winds Message on the East Coast of the United States: Colonel Sadtler or Colonel Schukraft may remember. I believe that the above-mentioned conference was held before we issued instruction to our own intercept stations.

The F.C.C. was requested by the War Department to monitor for the Winds Message on the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts and was given the code words of Tokyo Circular 2353 but without their meaning. The F.C.C. was not furnished the Tokyo Broadcast Schedules nor any mention of the fact that the Winds Message could come by Morse code. The F.C.C. was requested to monitor the Winds Message at its monitor station at Portland, Oregon, and also at one of its monitoring stations on the East Coast of the United States. The latter request was not complied with because the F.C.C. doubted if voice broadcasts from Tokyo could be heard on the East Coast of the United States. The F.C.C. monitor station at Honolulu also monitored for the Winds Message, at the request of the local military authorities. The F.C.C. monitor station at Portland, Oregon, could not possibly have intercepted the same Winds Message that Cheltenham did because Cheltenham was monitoring for Morse code, exclusively, and the F.C.C. station at Portland was monitoring for voice, exclusively.

--7--

In addition to the stations previously named, the Winds Message was monitored for at the following localities, to my personal knowledge:

Heeia, T.H.	(U.S. Navy)	Voice only
Corregidor, P.I.	(U.S. Navy)	Voice and Morse
Singapore	(British Intelligence)	-?-
Australia	(Australian Intelligence)	-?-
Java	(NEI Intelligence)	-?-

Intercept stations in Canada, England, and China probably watched for it too. And, of course, the Japanese diplomatic and consular stations listened for the Winds Message themselves on their own receiving sets.

On December 1, 1941, I was shown the translation of Tokyo Circular 2444 (Exhibit No. 1 - page 209), advising that London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila had been ordered to destroy their code machines, and instructing Washington to retain its machine regardless of other instruction. The significance of the Winds Message now became very clear to me and I began to take the matter most seriously. So did Colonel Sadtler, over in the War Department. The only means by which Tokyo could announce its decisions of peace or war to its overseas diplomatic representatives who had destroyed their regular codes was by means of the emergency Winds Code. This applied to London and the Far East but not to Washington. Higher authority in the War and Navy Departments likewise took a greatly increased interest in the Winds Message, and began heckling me as to the possibility of having missed it. I instituted a daily check of the incoming teletype messages to see that our intercept stations were doing as much as could be expected of them.

--8--

One evening, about December 1, 1941, I drove out to Station "M" at Cheltenham, Maryland, and remained until about midnight. The primary purpose of my visit was to inspect the new landline telegraph for direction-finder control which had been completed at Cheltenham and the Navy Department, which was scheduled to be placed in service on December 1, 1941, but which had been delayed by installation difficulties at some of the outlying stations. I made a personal check of the Winds Message watch and, as I recall, found that Chief Radioman Wigle was monitoring the Tokyo News Broadcasts 24 hours a day and had assigned qualified Kana operators to this duty. I have further documentary proof that Cheltenham was monitoring the Tokyo broadcasts in the fact that between 1200 and 1500 GCT, on December 6, 1941, Cheltenham intercepted and forwarded to the Navy Department Tokyo Serials 902-2 and 904, plus two other messages. This is entered in the GY log for December 6, 1941: Items Nos. 6609, 6610, 6618, and 6619. These messages were transmitted by Station JAH (Tokyo) to San Francisco on 7630 kilocycles. The Tokyo-San Francisco circuit was not a regular Cheltenham assignment.

I may summarize the preparations for interception by stating that the United States Navy listened for the Winds Message at Cheltenham, Maryland, and did everything that it possibly could to intercept it elsewhere, and that the other Services did all that they considered reasonable.

--9--

INTERCEPTION

There is no basis for assuming that the Winds Message had to be sent on a Voice Broadcast. In 1941, the Japanese Government was sending out "General Information Broadcasts" as well as "Domei News" to its Diplomatic and Consular Officials in foreign lands. This

was partly to give speedier service, partly to permit use of the Japanese Morse Code and the Kata-Kana form of written Japanese, and partly to be independent of foreign communication systems in emergency. Each office had its own Japanese radio operator and its own short-wave receiving set. We knew it. The United States Government was doing the same thing itself, with a Navy radio operator serving at each post. The German Government was doing likewise but was a bit ahead of us, with machine reception. We used to "sample" these broadcasts periodically until the F.C.C.'s Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service came into existence and relieved the U.S. Navy of this duty. I wish to reiterate that neither Japan, the United States, nor Germany was dependent on Voice broadcasts for direct communication from the seat of government to overseas officials. The radio schedules listed in Tokyo Serial 843 were in Morse (i.e., dot-and-dash) code exclusively: either Japanese Morse, International Morse, or both. We expected that the Winds Message would be sent in Morse Code--and it was. If the Winds Message had been sent on a Voice broadcast the U.S. Navy would have missed it, unless it came on a schedule receivable at Pearl Harbor or Corregidor.

--10--

The original documents giving details of the interception of the Winds Message are not available. Therefore it is necessary to reconstruct the situation from circumstantial evidence and by process of elimination. Collateral information has been plotted or recorded on a single sheet, a reduced-size photograph of which is appended. This graph tells the story better than words and shows just what actually happened. It should convince the most skeptical. As I have previously testified, the frequency, distances, and time of day were such that the Winds Message could be heard on the East Coasts of the United States and Canada, while it was a physical impossibility for it to be heard (except under freak conditions) on the West Coast of the United States and Canada, Pearl Harbor, Manila, Java, and Singapore. Everything checks perfectly: there is no element of doubt as to conditions of radio wave propagation.

The Winds Message could be heard also in the North Atlantic Ocean, British Isles, and Western Europe, but it could not be heard in Burma, Australia, or in Rio de Janeiro. It was sent on the so-called "European Schedule" of Tokyo's big foreign broadcasting station "J-A-P" and was intended for London. We knew that the Japanese Ambassador in London had destroyed his secret codes three days previously: this was the only way that Tokyo could get news to him secretly. Reception or non-reception at other points was irrelevant. Tokyo knew full well, before the Winds Message was sent, that it probably would not be received in Washington or in Rio. That was immaterial--the Winds Message was intended for London. Our ability to intercept it was due partly to good luck, partly to my foresight, and partly to the high quality of the Navy operators and receiving apparatus at Cheltenham.

--11--

The Winds Message broadcast was forwarded by teletype (TWX) from Cheltenham to the Navy Department (Op-20-GY) shortly before 9:00 a.m. on December 4, 1941. Kramer distinctly recalls that the Winds Message was shown to him by the GY Watch Officer after 8:30 a.m. on that date. It was my recollection, as stated in previous testimony, that I had first seen the Winds Message a little after eight a.m. on December 4, 1941. The Winds Message broadcast was about 200 words long, with the code words prescribed in Tokyo Circular 2353 appearing in the middle of the message, whereas we had expected to find the code words of Tokyo Circular 2354 in a Morse broadcast. All three "code words" were used, but the expression meaning "North Wind Cloudy" was in the negative form.

When I first saw the Winds Message, it had already been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge of the Translation Section of the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit. Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramer's handwriting, the following free translations:

"War with England (including NEI, etc.)
War with the U.S.
Peace with Russia."

I am not sure of the order; but it was the same as in the broadcast and I think England appeared first. I think Kramer used "U.S." rather than "United States." It is possible that the words "No war," instead of "Peace," were used to describe Japan's intentions with regards to Russia.

--12--

"This is ***it***!" said Kramer as he handed me the Winds Message. This was the broadcast we had strained every nerve to intercept. This was the feather in our cap. This was the tip-off which would prevent the U.S. Pacific Fleet being surprised at Pearl Harbor the way the

Russians had been surprised at Port Arthur. [The editor cannot help commenting on this statement: Neither Capt. Safford, nor anyone else in the United States could possibly have had this particular reaction to this message. War with Japan was widely anticipated by this time ("War warning" messages had been sent to the Pacific commands the previous week), but the target of any Japanese attack on the U.S. was almost universally expected to be the Philippines. I will refrain from commenting on what this patently untrue interpretation suggests about Capt. Safford's agenda or the veracity of the rest of his statement. --pwc] This was what the Navy Communication Intelligence had been preparing for since its establishment in 1924--War with Japan!

--13--

DISTRIBUTION

I immediately sent the original of the Winds Message up to the Director of Naval Communications (Read Admiral Noyes) by one of the officers serving under me and told him to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track him down and not take "no" for an answer, and, if he could not find him in a reasonable time to let me know. I did not explain the nature or significance of the Winds Message to this officer. In a few minutes I received a report to the effect that the message had been delivered.

It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at the time that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the Winds Message to the War Department, to the "Magic" distribution list in the Navy Department, and to the Naval Aide to the President. For that reason, no immediate distribution of the smooth translation of the Winds Message was made in the Navy Department. The six or seven copies for the Army were rushed over to the War Department as rapidly as possible: here the Navy's responsibility ended. The individual smooth translations for authorized Navy Department officials and the White House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941 in accordance with standard operating procedure. I have no reason for believing that the Army failed to make a prompt distribution of its translations of the Winds Message.

I am thoroughly satisfied in my own mind that Admiral Noyes telephoned to everyone on his list without delay: I cannot bring myself to imagine otherwise. There is some question as to whether the Admiral was understood, but this only shows the unreliability of telephone messages. Any misunderstanding of what Admiral Noyes said was of negligible effect because written translations of the Winds Message were distributed within

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2 or 3 hours of his telephone calls. In fact it was not until 1944 that any suggestion or criticism was offered that any official on the "Magic" distribution list -- Navy, Army, State Department, or White House -- had not been notified that the Winds Message had been received or that the Winds Message had been translated in any terms other than War and Peace.

My final verification of the fact that the Winds Message translation was typed and distributed lies in the fact that about December 15, 1941, I saw a copy of it in the special folder of messages which were being assembled for Admiral Noyes to present to the Roberts Commission. I checked these over with Kramer for completeness as well as for the elimination of irrelevant material. Kramer told me in 1944 that he had shown Assistant Secretary Forrestal a special set of Pre-Pearl Harbor messages about December 10, 1941, when Secretary Knox was making his personal investigation at Pearl Harbor, and that he discussed those messages with Mr. Forrestal for about two hours. This set of messages was apparently the basis and possibly the identical file that was given Admiral Noyes and shown to the Roberts Commission via Admiral Wilkinson. This was the last time I saw the Winds Message. I believe that the translation of the Winds Message was given the JD-1 Serial number of 7001, because this number is missing and unaccounted for, and comes within the range of messages translated on December 3 and 4, 1941.

The distribution of the Winds Message was the responsibility of Naval Intelligence and not Naval Communications. I had no responsibility in the matter after forwarding the original message to Admiral Noyes and after checking Kramer's "folder" to see that the messages were presented in a logical and understandable order.

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ACTION TAKEN AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE WINDS MESSAGE

About an hour after I had sent the original Winds Message up to Admiral Noyes I received a call from him on the inter-phone to the effect that we ought to tell Guam to burn their excess codes and ciphers. I replied that I was in full agreement but there were other odds and ends to be taken care of, and that I would have some messages ready for his approval by noon.

As a direct results of the Winds Message and other contemporaneous information from intercepted Japanese messages, I prepared the following secret messages:

OPNAV 041754 (Priority) -- Not yet introduced as evidence
OPNAV 042000 (Priority) -- Not yet introduced as evidence
OPNAV 042017 (Deferred) -- Page 44 of Exhibit No. 37
OPNAV 042018 (Deferred) -- Not yet introduced as evidence
OPNAV 042019 (Deferred) -- Not yet introduced as evidence

I took four of these messages up to Admiral Noyes' office, cleared them through the Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Captain Joseph R. Redman) and made an appointment to see the Admiral with his secretary, as per office instruction. I was called to his office shortly before 3:00 p.m.

OPNAV 041754 was a correction to a previous Priority message, and was sent in response to a Priority service message requesting verification of the last four groups of ONPAV 040343 (page 43 of Exhibit No. 37). I released this message myself during the noon hour to save time.

OPNAV Priority 042000 for action of CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 16, COM 14, Guam and Samoa, made a "new Intelligence" cipher effective immediately and directed the immediate destruction of the old cipher by Guam and Samoa. This message was released by Admiral Noyes himself, and is the most

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important of the five which were sent on this occasion because the precedence did give some idea of urgency.

OPNAV Deferred 042017, for action of Guam and for information of CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14 and COM 16 was sent in the new cipher made effective by OPNAV 042000. It directed Guam to destroy excess cryptographic aids and other secret matter. This message was rewritten by Admiral Noyes and was released by Admiral Ingersoll. My original wording was much stronger than the message actually sent, because I had directed the destruction of everything except the system in which sent and the current edition of the Direction Finder Code. However, I was not trying to use this message as the vehicle for a war warning as I had the day before in OPNAV 031855 (page 41, Exhibit No. 37). I was just trying to insure that Guam "stripped ship" before a Japanese Commando-raid from Saipan, 100 miles away, captured a complete allowance of codes and ciphers, a matter for which I was officially responsible. Admiral Noyes made no mention of a war warning when he directed me to prepare this message and I feel sure he did not have any such warning in mind when he toned down my original draft. This message had to be sent "for Information" to CINCPAC, and others, as notification that Guam's allowance of codes and ciphers was being reduced, and as a reminder to Guam to notify the addressees what systems would be available for its future communications. This message was sent DEFERRED to insure that OPNAV 042000 would arrive well in advance and thus avoid confusion and unnecessary messages at this critical time.

OPNAV 042018 and OPNAV 042019 are not important except that they help establish the date the Winds Message was intercepted and the time and date that the unsent warning message, prepared by Commander McCollum, was seen by me.

EVALUATION OF THE WINDS MESSAGE
Evaluation of the Winds Message was not based on JD-1 #6850 and #6875 alone. CINCAF 281430 gave much stronger translations of Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354, which dispelled any doubt as to whether or not WAR was meant by the literal translation:

"Japan -- (blank) relations are in danger."
This message contained official British translation furnished by Singapore, from which I quote:

"NISHI NISHI ENGLAND INCLUDING OCCUPATION OF THAI OR INVASION OF MALAY AND N.E.I."

That means war, no matter how worded. No one disputed this British translation in November-December, 1941: in fact our own translation was considered consistent with it.

Two confirmations of the British translation came from the official Netherlands East Indies Government translations of Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354. Colonel Thorpe, the Senior Army Intelligence Officer in Java, sent an official message via the Navy

addressed to General Miles, the Chief of Army Intelligence in Washington, which is a matter of record in previous Pearl Harbor investigations. This message may be identified as Alusna Batavia 031030 dated December 3, 1941. I quote from this message:

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"FROM THORPE FOR MILES WAR DEPT. CODE INTERCEPT:
JAPAN WILL NOTIFY HER CONSULS OF WAR DECISION IN HER FOREIGN BROADCASTS AS WEATHER REPORT AT END.
EAST WIND RAIN UNITED STATES;
NORTH WIND CLOUDY RUSSIA;
WEST WIND CLEAR ENGLAND WITH ATTACK ON THAILAND MALAY AND DUTCH EAST INDIES".

Copies of this message were circulated in the Navy Department, and the Chief of Naval Operations was indicated as receiving a copy.

Consul General Foote, our Senior Diplomatic Representative in the Netherlands East Indies, on December 4, 1941 (Java time), which is December 3, 1941 (Washington time), sent a similar message to the Secretary of State, from which I quote:

WHEN CRISIS LEADING TO WORST ARISES FOLLOWING WILL BE BROADCAST AT END WEATHER REPORTS:
ONE EAST WIND RAIN WAR WITH UNITED STATES,
TWO NORTH WIND CLOUDY WAR WITH RUSSIA,
THREE WEST WIND CLEAR WAR WITH BRITAIN INCLUDING ATTACK ON THAILAND OR MALAYA AND DUTCH INDIES.

WHEN THREAT OF CRISIS EXISTS FOLLOWING WILL BE USED FIVE TIMES IN TEXTS OF GENERAL REPORTS AND RADIO BROADCASTS:
ONE HIGASHI EAST AMERICA,
TWO KITA NORTH RUSSIA,
THREE NISHI WEST BRITAIN WITH ADVANCE INTO THAILAND AND ATTACK ON MALAYA AND DUTCH INDIES.

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This message was received in the State Department at 9:19 a.m., on December 4, 1941 (Washington time). Copies were forwarded to the War and Navy Departments by the State Department Liaison Officer, Mr. Orme Wilson. They were given a wide circulation in the Navy Department.

My own evaluation of the foregoing, on December 4, 1941, was about as follows:

(A) The Basic Japanese War Plan was divided into 3 categories or provided for 3 contingencies, any or all of which might be followed, namely:
    (1) War with the United States
    (2) War with Russia
    (3) War with England including the invasion of Thailand and the capture of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.
(B) The Winds Message gave us the answer in all 3 cases: Affirmative for the 1st and 3rd categories, and Negative for the 2nd.
(C) The Winds Message was probably a "Signal of Execute" of some sort

The "Signal of Execute" theory received strong confirmation from a secret message received from the Philippines in the early afternoon of December 4, 1941. This message informed us that the Japanese Navy had introduced a new cipher system for its so-called "Operations Code" at 0600 GCT that date. This time was 7 1/2 hours before the Winds Message was broadcast. I might add that there was only one J-A-P European broadcast per day, so the times coincided as closely as possible. I would like to add

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also that my subordinates on Corregidor spotted and reported this change only nine hours after it was made. The message may be identified as Commandant 16th Naval District Priority 041502 dated December 4, 1941, and was addressed to Naval Operations and the Commandant 14th Naval District but not to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. So far as I know, this message has not been introduced as evidence before any previous investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster. In fact, this is the first time it has ever been mentioned except to Admiral Hart. The unusual hour and unusual date at which the Japanese Navy changed its "Operations Code," combined with the Winds Message and other collateral information available in the Navy Department, made this message highly significant as the probable "Signal of Execute" to the Japanese Navy. Up till now the Winds Message has had to bear a double burden in my testimony.

As I have previously testified, we expected that if the Japanese did suddenly attack the United States this attack would come on a week-end or national holiday. In fact, a warning message to this effect had been sent out in April, 1941 (page 1 of Exhibit No. 37). The War Department over-emphasized the imminence of War as forecast by the "November 29, deadline" and predicted that the Japanese would strike during the week-end of November 29-30, 1941. The Navy Department estimated the situation more accurately -- the Japanese armada which had been concentrating for the Southern invasion was too far from any conceivable objective to give serious consideration to this date. Also the covering Naval forces were not yet deployed and other signs indicated that the U.S. Army estimate was a bit premature.

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The next week-end, December 6-7, 1941, was just the reverse. The Winds Message and the change of the Naval Operations Code came in the middle of the week: 2 days to Saturday and 3 days to Sunday. It was unthinkable that the Japanese would surrender their hopes of surprise by delaying until the week-end of December 13-14, 1941. This was not crystal gazing or "intuition" -- it was just the plain, common sense acceptance of a self-evident proposition. Colonel Sadtler saw it, and so did Captain Joseph R. Redman, U.S.N. -- according to Colonel Sadtler's testimony in 1944, before the Army Board of Investigation. The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday December 6, 1941, or Sunday, December 7, 1941. The War and Navy Departments had been given 72 hours' advance notification of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese themselves.

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Notes: Although Captain Safford is highly regarded as the "father" of US Navy communications intelligence, his statement is extremely controversial and does not represent the opinion of the Naval Historical Center.

For further information on the “Winds” code messages, see: Dept. of Defense. *The “Magic” Background of Pearl Harbor*. vol.5. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978): pp.51-54, “Part D-Special Studies, The ‘Winds’ Code.” The text accompanying “Part-D” includes the following remarks: “It will be apparent from the foregoing that American intelligence agencies throughout the world were maintaining a constant watch in order to intercept a ‘Winds’ code message which would indicate that Japan was breaking off relations with the United States. However, the Federal Communications Commission has no record of intercepting a message other than those mentioned above which indicate, after the attack on Pearl Harbor had already begun, that Japan would break off relations with England. Furthermore, there is no document in American Communication Intelligence files which indicates receipt of any ‘Winds’ code message announcing the severance of relations between Japan and the United States. The preliminary ‘Winds’ code messages pointed only to the breaking of relations with Great Britain, Russia, or the United States, and gave no hint as to the possibility of an attack upon Pearl Harbor. In the light of all other evidence available concerning Japan’s intentions to go to war, it is apparent that even if the ‘Winds’ messages had never existed, United States’ authorities would have been just as well informed of Japan’s intentions to go to war.“

Documents referred to by Captain Safford in the above essay should be located in Record Group 457 at the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

Source: "Collection of Papers Related to the 'Winds Execute' Message, U.S. Navy, 1945," SRH-210, located in Record Group 457 at the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

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06 March 2006

Source: http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/winds.htm

Captain Laurance F. Safford

A Casualty List of people who perished as a result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941

Name	Rank or Age	Branch or Civilian	Station
Aaron, Hubert Charles Titus	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Abercrombie, Samuel Adolphus	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Adams, Jesse Leroy	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Tennessee
Adams, John Kalauwae	age 18	Civilian	Honolulu
Adams, Joseph Kanehoa	age 50	Civilian	Honolulu
Adams, Robert Franklin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Adkins, Howard Lucas	F.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Adkins, Marvin Birch	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Adkison, James Dillion	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Agola, Mathew Joe	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Aguirre, Reyner Aceves	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Aguon, Gregorio San Nicolas	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ahern, Richard James	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Akina, August	age 37	Civilian	Hickam Field
Albanese, Salvatore J.	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Alberovsky, Francis Severin	Bmkr.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Albright, Galen Winston	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Aldridge, Thomas Elwood	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Aldridge, Willard Henry	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Alexander, Elvis Author	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Alexander, Hugh R.	Lt.Cmdr	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Allen, Eric , Jr.	Lieutenant (jg)	United States Navy	USS Enterprise
Allen, Moses Anderson	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Allen, Robert G.	PVT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Allen, Robert Lee	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Allen, Stanley W.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Oklahoma
Allen, Thomas Benton	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Allen, William Clayborn	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Allen, William Lewis	S.K.2c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Alley, Jay Edgar	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Allison, Andrew K.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Allison, Hal Jake	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Allison, J. T.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Alois, Ralph	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Alten, Ernest Mathew	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Amon, Frederick Purdy	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Amundson, Leo DeVere	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Anderberg, William Robert	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Anderson, Arnold Leo	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Anderson, Charles Titus	C.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Anderson, Delbert Jake	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Anderson, Donald William	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Anderson, Garland C.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Anderson, Harry	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Anderson, Howard Taisey	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Anderson, Irwin Corinthis	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Anderson, James Pickins , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Anderson, Lawrence Donald	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Anderson, Manfred Carl	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Anderson, Robert Adair	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Anderson, William T.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Andrews, Brainerd Wells	C.C.M.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Angelich, Jerry Mike	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Angle, Earnest Hersea	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Annunziato, Frank John	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Anthony, Glenn Samuel	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Aplin, James Raymond	C.W.T.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Apple, Robert William	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Aprea, Frank Anthony	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Aquino, Zoilo	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Arakaki, Nancy Masako	age 8	Civilian	Honolulu
Arbuckle, William Delanno	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Arickx, Leon	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Arledge, Eston	S.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Armstrong, Kenneth Berton	Mldr.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Arnaud, Achilles	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Arneberg, Harold Raymond	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Vestal
Arnesen, Robert Arne	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Arnold, Claude Duran , Jr.	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Arnold, Thell	S.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Arnott, Robert Everett	Ph.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Arrant, John Anderson	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Arthurholz, Marley Richard	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Artley, Daryle Edward	Q.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Arvidson, Carl Harry	C.M.M.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ashby, Welborn Lee	F.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Ashmore, Wilburn James	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Atchison, John Calvin	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Atkins, Gerald Arthur	H.A.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Auld, John Cuthbert	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Austin, John Arnold	C.W.O	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Austin, Laverne Alfred	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Autry, Eligah T. , Jr.	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Avery, Robert L.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Aves, Willard Charles	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Aydell, Miller Xavier	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ayers, Dee Cumpie	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Backman, Walter Howard	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Badilla, Manuel Domonic	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bailey, George Richmond	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Bailey, Gerald John	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Bailey, James Edward	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Downes
Bailey, Robert Edward	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Bailey, Wilbur Houston	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Baird, Billy Bryon	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bajorims, Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Baker, George W.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Baker, Glen	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Baker, Henry Ernest , Jr.	Cox	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Baker, J. W.	T.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Dobbin
Baker, Robert Dewey	C.M.M	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ball, James William	F.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Ball, William V.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ballance, Wilbur Frank	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Bandemer, Harold William	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Bandy, Wayne Lynn	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bangert, John Henry	F.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Banks, Layton Thomas	Cox	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Baraga, Joseph	SGT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Barber, Leroy Kenneth	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Barber, Malcolm John	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Barber, Randolph Harold	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Bardon, Charles Thomas	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bargerhuff, Benjamin E. , Jr.	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Barker, Loren Joe	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Barksdale, James M.	SSGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Barncord, Cecil Everett	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Barner, Walter Ray	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Barnes, Charles Edward	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Barnes, Delmar Hayes	Lieutenant (jg)	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Barnett, William Leroy	F.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Barnett, William Thermon	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Barrett, Wilbur Clayton	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Barron, Thomas Noble	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Pennsylvania
Barta, Joseph	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Bartek, Frank Joseph , Jr.	F.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Bartlett, David William	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Bartlett, Paul Clement	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bates, Edward Munroe , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Bates, Harold Eugene	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Bates, Robert Alvin	Ph.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bator, Edward	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Battles, Ralph Curtis	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Bauer, Harold Walter	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Baum, Earl Paul	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Bays, Donald E.	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Bazetti, Michael Louis	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Beal, Albert Quentin	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Bean, Howard Warren	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Beardsley, Loren Leigh	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Beasley, Leland V.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Beaton, Freddie	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Beaumont, James Ammon	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Beck, George Richard	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Becker, Marvin Otto	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Becker, Wesley Paulson	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Beckwith, Thomas Stewart	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Bedford, Purdy Renaker	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Beerman, Henry Carl	C.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Beggs, Harold Eugene	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bell, Hershel Homer	F.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bell, Richard Leroy	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bellamy, James Curtis	O.S.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Belt, Everett Ray , Jr.	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Belt, Walter Sidney , Jr.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Benford, Sam Austin	Bkr.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bennett, Gordon R. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Bennett, Robert James	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Bennett, William Edmond , Jr.	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bennion, Mervyn Sharp	Captain	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Benson, James Thomas	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bergin, Roger Joseph	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Berkanski, Albert Charles	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bernard, Frank Peter	S.F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Berry, Gordon Eugene	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Berry, James Winford	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bersch, Arthur Anthony	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bertie, George Allan , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bibby, Charles Henry	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bickel, Kenneth Robert	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bicknell, Dale Deen	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bielka, Rudolph Paul	Lt.Cmdr	United States Navy	USS Utah
Bigham, Virgil Cornelius	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Bills, Mathew T.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Bilyi, Anthony	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Bingham, James Robert	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Bircher, Frederick Robert	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Bird, John Arthur	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Birdsell, Rayon Delois	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Birge, George Albert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bishop, Grover Barron	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bishop, Millard Charles	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bishop, Wesley Horner , Jr.	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Black, James Theron	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Black, John Edward	Lieutenant (jg)	United States Navy	USS Utah
Black, Waldean	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Blackburn, Harding Coolidge	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Blackburn, John Thomas	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Blackwell, Henry C.	SGT	United States Army	Camp Malakole
Blais, Albert Edward	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Blake, James Monroe	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Blakley, William Thomas	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Blanchard, Albert Richard	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Blanchard, William Eugene	Bmkr.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Blankenship, Henry Wilbur	Ph.M.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Blankenship, Theron A.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Blanton, Atticus Lee	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Blaylock, Clarence Arvis	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Bledsoe, Herman	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Blieffert, Richmond Frederick	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Blitz, Leo	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Blitz, Rudolph	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Block, Ivan Lee	Ph.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Blount, John Andrew , Jr.	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS California
Blount, Wayman Boney	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bock, John George , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Bodecker, Regis James	Y.1c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Boemer, Paul Louis	Cox	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Boggess, Roy Eugene	S.F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bohlender, Sam	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bolan, George P.	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Bolen, Albert James	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Bolling, Gerald Revese	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bolling, Walter Karr	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bond, Burnis Leroy	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Bonebrake, Buford Earl	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bonfiglio, William John	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Bonnie, Felix	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Booe, James Brazier	BMSTP	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Booth, Robert Sinclair , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Booton, Charlie Vinton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Booze, Asbury Legare	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Borgelt, Harold W.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Borger, Richard	C.M.M.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Boring, James Bryce	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Borovich, Joseph John	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Borusky, Edwin Charles	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Bosley, Kenneth Leroy	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Boswell, Frank G.	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Boudreaux, Ralph McHenry	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Boviall, Walter Robert	A.M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bowden, Edward Daniel	F.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Bowers, Robert K.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS California
Bowman, Howard Alton	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Boxrucker, Lawrence Anton	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Boyd, Charles Andrew	C.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Boydstun, Don Jasper	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Boydstun, R. L.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Boyer, Fred Hunter	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Boyle, Arthur F.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Boynton, Raymond Devere	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Brabbzson, Oran Merrill	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bradley, Bruce Dean	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bradley, Carl Merrill	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Braga, Charles , Jr.	Y.2c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Brakke, Kenneth Gay	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brandt, Billy O.	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Brandt, Oris Vernelle	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Branham, George Ohara	Mldr.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Breedlove, Jack Asbury	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Brekken, Evan Benhart	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Brewer, Randall Walter	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Brewer, Robert Leroy	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Brickley, Eugene	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Bridges, James Leon	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bridges, Paul Hyatt	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bridie, Robert Maurice	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brier, Claire Raymond	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Maryland
Briggs, Lyle Lee	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Brignole, Erminio Joseph	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brittan, Charles Edward	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Britton, Thomas Alonzo	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Nevada
Broadhead, Johnnie Cecil	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brock, Walter Pershing	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bromley, George Edward	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bromley, Jimmie	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brooks, B. J. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Brooks, Ennis Edgar	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Brooks, Robert Neal	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Brooks, William	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Broome, Loy Raymond	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brooner, Allen Ottis	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Brophy, Myron Alonzo	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brower, Rennie V. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Brown, Benjamin Lee	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Downes
Brown, Charles Darling	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Brown, Charles Martin	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brown, Clyde C.	CPL	United States Army	Camp Malakole
Brown, Elwyn Leroy	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brown, Frank George	Q.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brown, Pallas Franklin	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Brown, Richard Corbett	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brown, Riley Mirville	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Brown, Robert S.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Brown, Walter Scott	A.M.M.2c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Brown, Wesley James	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Brown, William Howard	Sea.2c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Browne, Frederick Arthur	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Browne, Harry Lamont	C.M.M.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Browning, Tilmon David	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Brownlee, William John	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Brubaker, Brooks J.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Bruesewitz, William G.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Brummwell, Malcolm J.	2nd.Lt	United States Army	Hickam Field
Brune, James William	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Brunner, William Frank	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Bryan, Leland Howard	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bryant, Claude L.	CPL	United States Army	Ft Kamehameha
Bryant, Lloyd Glenn	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bubb, Eugene R.	PVT	United States Army	Ft Kamehameha
Buchanan, James Rufus	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Buckley, Jack C.	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Buckley, John Daniel	A.O.M.3c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Budd, Robert Emile	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bugarin, Feliciano Todias	O.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Buhr, Clarence Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Burch, Earl George	Bkr.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Burden, Ralph Leon	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Burdette, Ralph Warren	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Burger, Oliver Kenneth	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Burgess, John Edwin , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Burk, Millard , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Burke, Frank Edmond , Jr.	S.K.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Burlison, Weldon C.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Burnett, Charlie Leroy	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Burns, Edward J.	1st.SGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Burns, John Edward	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Bush, Joseph	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Bush, Samuel Jackson	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Busick, Dewey Olney	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Buss, Robert P.	CPL	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Butcher, David Adrian	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Butler, James Warren	F.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Butler, John Dabney	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Butts, Rodger Cornelius	S.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Byrd, Charles Dewitt	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Byrd, Theodore F.	PFC	United States Army	Wheeler Field

Cabay, Louis Clarence	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cade, Richard Esh	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Caldwell, Charles , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Callaghan, James Thomas	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Callahan, Archie , Jr.	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Camden, Raymond Edward	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Camery, Raymond Ralph	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Camm, William Fielden	Y.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Campa, Ralph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Campbell, Burdette Charles	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Campbell, William Clarence	Cox	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Campbell, William Vane	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Campiglia, Francis Edward	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Cannon, George H.	1st.Lt	United States Marine Corps	Midway Island NAS
Caplinger, Donald William	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Carey, Francis Lloyd	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cargile, Murry Randolph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Carlisle, Robert Wayne	Sea.1c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Carlson, Harry Ludwig	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Carlson, Lawrence Robert	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Carmack, Harold Milton	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Carney, Harold Francis	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Caro, Joseph I.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Carpenter, Elmer Lemuel	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Carpenter, Robert Nelson	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Carreira, John	age 51	Civilian	Hickam Field
Carroll, Guy Wayne	Q.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Carroll, Joseph William	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Carroll, Robert Lewis	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Carter, Burton Lowell	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Carter, Howard Frederick	Cox	United States Navy	USS Dobbin
Carter, Lloyd George	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Carter, Paxton Turner	W.O	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Carter, William John	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Casey, James Warren	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cashen, Malachy J.	CPL	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Cashman, Edward J.	TSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Casilan, Epifanio Miranda	O.S.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Casinger, Edward Eugene	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Caskey, Clarence Merton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Casola, Biacio	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Castleberry, Claude W. , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Casto, Charles Ray	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Casto, Richard Eugene	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Catsos, George	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cebert, Dean W.	PVT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Chace, Raymond Vincent	C.S.K.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Chadwick, Charles Bruce	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Chadwick, Harold	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Chagnon, Joseph J.	SGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Chambers, Eugene L.	PFC	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Chandler, Donald Ross	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Chapman, Donal V.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Chapman, Naaman N.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Charlton, Charles Nicholas	W.T.1c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona

Chernucha, Harry Gregory	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cheshire, James Thomas	C.Ph.M.P	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Chess, Patrick Lloyd	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Chester, Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Chestnutt, George V. , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Chong, Patrick Kahamokupuni	age 30	Civilian	Honolulu
Christensen, Elmer Emil	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Christensen, Lloyd Raymond	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Christian, William Garnett	Bkr.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Christiansen, Edward Lee	Bkr.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Christiansen, Hans C.	2nd.Lt	United States Army	Bellows Field
Christopher, Harold Jensen	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Nevada
Church, Leroy R.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Cihlar, Lawrence John	Ph.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cisco, Luther Elvin	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Clapp, Marvin John	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Downes
Clark, Cullen Benjamin	F.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Clark, David , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Clark, George Francis	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Clark, John Crawford Todd	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Clark, Malcolm	Bkr.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Clark, Monroe M.	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Clark, Robert William , Jr.	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Clarke, Robert Eugene	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Clash, Donald	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Clayton, Gerald Lee	S.K.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Clayton, Robert Roland	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Clement, Hubert Paul	F.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Clemmens, Claude Albert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Clendenning, Lee I.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Clifford, Floyd Francis	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Clift, Ray Emerson	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Clippard, Lloyd Dale	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Cloues, Edward Blanchard	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Clough, Edward Jay	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cobb, Ballard Burgher	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Coburn, Walter Overton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cockrum, Kenneth Earl	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Coffin, Robert	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Coffman, Marshall Herman	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cohn, Mitchell	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Enterprise
Coke, George Anderson	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Cole, Charles Warren	SGT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Cole, David Lester	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Cole, Francis Eugene	M.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Colegrove, Willett S. , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Collier, John	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Collier, Linald Long , Jr.	Bkr.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Collier, Walter Leon	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Collins, Austin	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Collins, Billy Murl	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Collins, James Earl	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Collins, Thomas W.	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Downes
Comstock, Harold Kenneth	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Conant, Clarence Albert	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field

Conlin, Bernard Eugene	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Conlin, James Leo	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Connelly, Richard Earl	C.Q.M.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Conner, Joseph Ucline	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Connolly, John Gaynor	C.W.O	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Connolly, Keefe Richard	H.A.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Conrad, Homer Milton , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Conrad, Robert Frank	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Conrad, Walter Ralph	Q.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Conway, Edward Leroy	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Cook, Grant Clark , Jr.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Cook, Joseph William	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Cooper, Clarence Eugene	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cooper, Frank Bernard	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Cooper, Kenneth Erven	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cooper, Kenneth James	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Corbin, Leon John	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Corcoran, Gerard John	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Corey, Ernest Eugene	Ph.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Corn, Robert Livingston	F.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Cornelius, P. W.	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Corning, Russell Dale	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Corzatt, Beoin Hume	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Coster, Richard Lee	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Costill, Harold Kendall	F.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Costin, Louis Albert	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Cotner, Leo Paul	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Cottier, Charles Edwin	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Couhig, John H.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Coulter, Arthur Lee	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cowan, William	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cowden, Joel Beman	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cox, Gerald Clinton	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cox, William Milford	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Coyne, William , Jr.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Craft, Harley Wade	C.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Craig, James Edwin	Lt.Cmdr	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Craig, John William	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Crain, John Reeves	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Crawley, Wallace Dewight	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Creech, William C.	PFC	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Cremean, Alva J.	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Cremeens, Louis Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Crim, Warren Harding	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Criscuolo, Michael	Y.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Criswell, Wilfred John	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Croft, Theodore Wheeler	A.O.M1.c	United States Navy	Ford Island NAS
Cromwell, Howard Don	C.M.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Crossett, David Lloyd	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Crow, Howard Daniel	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Maryland
Crowder, Samuel Warwick	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Crowe, Cecil Thomas	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Crowley, Thomas Ewing	Lt.Cmdr	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cruthirds, John E.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Curry, William McKnight	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma

Curry, William Joseph	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Curtis, Herbert S. , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Curtis, Lloyd B.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Curtis, Lyle Carl	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cutrer, Lloyd Henry	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Cybulski, Harold Bernard	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cychosz, Francis Anton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Cyriack, Glenn Gerald	S.K.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Czarnecki, Stanley	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Czekajski, Theophil	S.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Da Torre, Otreste	PFC	United States Army	Ft Kamehameha
Dahlheimer, Richard Norbert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dains, John L.	2nd.Lt	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Daly, Edward Carlyle	Cox	United States Navy	USS Downes
Daniel, Lloyd Maxton	Y.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Danik, Andrew Joseph	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Darby, Marshall Eugene , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Darch, Phillip Zane	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dasenbrock, Louis H.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Daugherty, Paul Eugene	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Davenport, Ernest J.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Davenport, James Watson , Jr.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Davis, Allen Arthur	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Davis, Billy Rex	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Davis, Edward Hope	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Davis, Frederick Curtis	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Nevada
Davis, John Quitman	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Davis, Milton Henry	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Davis, Murle Melvin	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Davis, Myrle Clarence	F.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Davis, Thomas Ray	S.F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Davis, Virgil Denton	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Davis, Walter Mindred	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dawson, James Berkley	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Day, Francis Daniel	C.W.T.P	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Day, William John	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
De Armoun, Donald Edwin	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
De Castro, Vicente	O.S.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
De Polis, Frank J.	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Dean, Lyle Bernard	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Deetz, John Wesley	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Defenbaugh, Russell C.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Delles, Leslie Phillip	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Delong, Frederick Eugene	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Dennis, Leroy	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Denson, Eugene B.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Deritis, Russell Edwin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Derrington, Ralph Alva	C.M.M.P	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Derthick, James H.	SGT	United States Army (Reserve)	Wheeler Field
Dewitt, John James	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dial, John Buchanan	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dick, Francis Edward	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Dick, Ralph R.	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dickens, Ernest Boggio	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Dickerson, Richard A.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field

Dieckhoff, Douglas R.	S.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Dill, Leaman Robert	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Dine, John George	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dineen, Robert Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dobbins, Richard Henry	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Dobey, Milton Paul , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Doernenburg, Kenneth E.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Doherty, George Walter	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Doherty, John Albert	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dompier, Marshall Leonard	S.K.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Donald, John Malcolm	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Donohue, Ned Burton	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dority, John Monroe	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dorr, Carl David	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Dosick, Stanley Daniel	Sea.1c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Dosser, William Hugh	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Dougherty, Ralph McClearn	F.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Douglas, Norman W.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Downing, Eugene Victor	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Downs, Jack A.	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Doyle, Bernard Vincent	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Doyle, Wand B.	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dreesbach, Herbert Allen	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Drefahl, Elmer Edwin	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Driver, Bill Lester	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Drum, Donald Landford	F.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Drwall, Stanislaw Frank	Pmkr.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Duane, William	C.B.M.P	United States Navy	USS Vestal
Ducolon, Fred John	Cox	United States Navy	USS Enterprise
Ducrest, Louis Felix	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Duff, Robert C. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Dugger, Guy	F.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Duke, Lee Herwin	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Duke, Robert Edward	C.C.Std.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dukes, Billie Joe	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Dukes, Lonnie William	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Dullum, Jerald Fraser	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dunaway, Kenneth Leroy	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dunham, Elmer Marvin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dunn, George S. , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Dunnam, Robert Wesley	PVT	United States Marine Corps (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Dupree, Arthur Joseph	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Duquette, Donat George , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Ft Kamehameha
Durham, William Teasdale	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Durio, Russell	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Durkee, Edward Norman	C.M.M.A	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Durning, Thomas Roy , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Durr, Clement Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Dusset, Cyril Isaac	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Duveene, John	1st.SGT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Dvorak, Alvin Albert	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Dye, Tommy	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Dyer, Buford Harvey	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Dyer, Daniel A. , Jr.	TSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Eakes, Wallace Eldred	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma

Eaton, Emory Lowell	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ebel, Walter Charles	C.T.C.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Eberhardt, Eugene Keller	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Eberhart, Vincent Henry	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Echols, Charles Louie , Jr.	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Echols, Edward Wesley	Cox	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Echternkamp, Henry Clarence	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Edling, Robert Norris	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Edmonds, Clifton Earle	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Edmonston, David Bell	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Edmunds, Bruce Roosevelt	Y.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Edwards, Harry Lee	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Edwards, Lyle O.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Edwards, Roland Wayne	F.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Eernisse, William Frederick	Ptr.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Egbert, Leon	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Egnew, Robert Ross	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ehlert, Casper	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ehrmantraut, Frank , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Eichelberger, Paul R.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Eidsvig, Vernon Jerome	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Eldred, Philip Ward	age 36	Civilian	Hickam Field
Elliott, Byron G.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Ellis, Earl Maurice	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ellis, Francis Arnold , Jr.	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ellis, Richard Everrett	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ellis, Wilbur Danner	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ellison, Bruce Harry	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ellsberry, Julius	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Elwell, Royal	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Elyard, Harold C.	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Embrey, Bill Eugene	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Emery, Jack Marvin	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Emery, John Marvin	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Emery, Wesley Vernon	S.K.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Endicott, Ronald Burdette	F.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Enger, Stanley Gordon	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
England, John Charles	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Oklahoma
England, Richard Boyd	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Erbes, Leland Earl	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Erickson, Robert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ernest, Robert William	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Erskine, Robert Charles	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Erwin, Stanley Joe	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Erwin, Walton Aluard	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Estep, Carl James	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Estes, Carl Edwen	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Estes, Forrest Jesse	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Etchason, Leslie Edgar	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Eulberg, Richard Henry	F.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Evans, David Delton	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Evans, Evan Frederick	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Evans, Mickey Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Evans, Paul Anthony	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Evans, William Orville	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Evans, Woodrow Wilson	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Everett, James	SSGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Ewell, Alfred Adam	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Eyed, George	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Faddis, George Leon	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Fadon, Paul J.	SGT	United States Army	Schofield Barracks
Fairchild, Malcolm W.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Fairchild, Willard E.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Fallis, Alvin E.	Ph.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fansler, Edgar Arthur	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Farfan, Ignacio Camacho	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Farley, Alfred Jack	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Farmer, John Wilson	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Farmer, Luther James	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Faufata, Matilda Kaliko	age 12	Civilian	Honolulu
Favreau, Arthur Armond	PFC	United States Army	Ft Shafter
Fecho, Lawrence Herman	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Fegurgur, Nicolas San Nicolas	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Feldman, Jack H.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Fellman, Paul V.	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Ferguson, Charlton Hanna	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ferguson, Marvin Lee , Jr.	AS	United States Navy	USS California
Ferris, Homer E.	TSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Fess, John Junior	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fiander, Stuart H.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Field, Arnold E.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Fields, Bernard	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Fields, Reliford	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fields, Robert Auswell	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Fife, Ralph Elmer	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Filkins, George Arthur	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fincher, Allen Brady	ACK	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Fincher, Dexter Wilson	SGT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Finley, Woodrow Wilson	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Finnegan, William Michael	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Finney, Patrick L.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Firth, Henry Amis	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fischer, Leslie Henry	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fisher, Delbert Ray	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fisher, James Anderson	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fisher, Robert Ray	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fisk, Charles Porter , III.	Y.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fitch, Simon	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fitzgerald, Kent Blake	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Fitzsimmons, Eugene James	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Flaherty, Francis Charles	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Oklahoma
Flanagan, James Monroe	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Flannery, James Lowell	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Flannery, Robert Joseph	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Fleetwood, Donald Eugene	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Floege, Frank Norman	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Flores, Jose San Nicolas	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Florese, Felicismo	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Flory, Max Edward	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Foley, Walter Charles	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma

Fones, George Everett	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Foote, George Perry	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ford, George Calvin	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ford, Jack C.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ford, William Walker	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Foreman, Elmer Lee	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Formoe, Clarence Melvin	A.M.M.1c	United States Navy (Reserve)	Kaneohe NAS
Fortenberry, Alvie Charles	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Foss, Rodney Shelton	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	Kaneohe NAS
Foster, Rowena Kamohaulani	age 3	Civilian	Pearl City
Foth, Jack	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Fowler, George Parten	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Fox, Daniel Russell	Lt.Col	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Fox, Gilbert Roy	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Fox, Jack W.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Fox, Lee , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	Kaneohe NAS
Frank, Leroy George	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Frazier, John William	Cox	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Frederick, Charles Donald	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Free, Paul B.	SSGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Free, Thomas Augusta	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Free, William Thomas	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
French, John Edmund	Lt.Cmdr	United States Navy	USS Arizona
French, Joy Carol	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
French, Walter R.	PVT	United States Army	Schofield Barracks
Frizzell, Robert Niven	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Frye, Neil Daniel	M.A.T.T.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Fugate, Fred	C.C.Std.P	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Fugate, Kay Ivan	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Fulton, Robert Wilson	A.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Funk, Frank Francis	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Funk, Lawrence Henry	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Furr, Tedd McKinley	C.C.M.A	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Fuzi, Eugene Dash	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Gabriele, Angelo Michael	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Gager, Roy Arthur	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gagne, Leo E. A.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Galajdik, Michael	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Galaszewski, Stanley C.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Gallagher, Russell E.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Ganas, Nickolas Steve	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Gandre, Melvyn Amour	Q.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Gannam, George K.	SSGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Gantner, Samuel Merritt	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Gara, Martin Anthony	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Garcia, Claude Ralph	S.F.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Garcia, Jesus Francisco	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Garcia, Robert Stillman	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Gardner, Arthur Joseph	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Gargaro, Ernest Russell	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Garlington, Raymond Wesley	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Garrett, Orville Wilmer	S.F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Garrett, Robert R.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Garris, Eugene	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gartin, Gerald Ernest	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Gary, Thomas Jones	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Gaudette, William Frank	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gaudrault, Joseph L. B.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Gaultney, Ralph Martin	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gaver, Henry Hamilton , Jr.	2nd.Lt	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Gazecki, Philip Robert	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Gebhardt, Kenneth Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gebser, Paul Heino	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Geer, Kenneth Floyd	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Geise, Marvin Frederick	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Geller, Leonard Richard	FIc	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gemienhardt, Samuel Henry , Jr.	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
George, George Themistocles	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gholston, Roscoe	Y.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gibson, Billy Edwin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gibson, George Harvey	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Giesa, George Edward	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Giesen, Karl Anthony	Y.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gifford, Quentin John	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gift, Kenneth Mace	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Gilbert, George H.	Ensign	United States Navy	USS California
Gilbert, George	F.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gilbert, Tom	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Giles, Thomas Robert	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Gill, Richard Eugene	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gillette, Warren Clayton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gilliard, Benjamin Edward	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ginn, James Blackburn	Lieutenant (jg)	United States Navy	USS Maryland
Giovenazzo, Michael James	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Givens, Harold Reuben	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gleason, James J.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Glenn, Arthur	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gobbin, Angelo	S.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Goetsch, Herman August	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Goff, Wiley Coy	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Goggin, Daryl Henry	W.O	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Goldwater, Jack Reginald	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gomez, Charles Clay , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gomez, Edward , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gonsalves, Emma	age 34	Civilian	Honolulu
Gonzales, Bibian Bernard	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Gonzalez, Manuel	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Enterprise
Gooch, George Merton	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Good, Joseph E.	SSGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Good, Leland	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gooding, Robert Henry	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Goodwin, Clifford George	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Goodwin, Myron Eugene	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Goodwin, Robert	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Goodwin, William Arthur	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gordon, Duff	C.M.Smth.P	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gordon, Peter Charles , Jr.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gosnell, Paul Gustavus	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Gossard, James E. , Jr.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Gosselin, Edward Webb	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona

Gosselin, Joseph Adjutor	R.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Goudy, Allen E. W.	PVT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Gould, Arthur	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS West Virginia
Gould, Harry Lee	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gove, Rupert Clair	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gowey, Claude Oliver	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Graham, Wesley Ernest	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Grandpre, Arthur M.	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Granger, Raymond Edward	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Grant, Lawrence Everett	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gray, Albert James	Sea.1c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Gray, Lawrence Moore	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gray, William James , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Green, Glen Hubert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Greene, John Sherman	1st.Lt	United States Army	Hickam Field
Greenfield, Carroll Gale	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Greenwald, Robert Donald	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Gregoire, Charles Norman	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Griffin, Daniel Thornburg	A.M.M.1c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Griffin, Lawrence J.	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Griffin, Reese Olin	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Griffith, Thomas Edward	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Griffiths, Robert Alfred	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Grissinger, Robert Beryle	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Grosnickle, Warren Wilbert	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gross, Edgar David	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gross, Milton Henry	C.S.K.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gross, Roy Arthur	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Dobbin
Grow, Vernon Neslie	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Grundstrom, Richard Gunner	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Guisinger, Daniel L. , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gullachson, Arthur K.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Gummerson, Elwood R.	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Gurganus, William Ike	C.E.M.A	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Gurley, Jesse Herbert	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Gusie, William Fred	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Guthrie, James E.	SSGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Guttmann, Joseph Herman	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Guy, George Hormer	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Haas, Curtis Junior	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Haase, Clarence Frederick	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Haden, Samuel William	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Haffner, Floyd Bates	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Haines, Robert Wesley	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hall, Hubert Preston	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hall, John Rudolph	C.B.M.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hall, Ted	PVT	United States Marine Corps (Reserve)	USS Oklahoma
Hallmark, Johnnie W.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Halloran, William Ignatius	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Halterman, Robert Emile	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Halvorsen, Harry John	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Ham, Harold William	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hamel, Don Edgar	Fld.Mus	United States Marine Corps (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Hamilton, Clarence James	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hamilton, Edwin Carrell	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Hamilton, William Holman	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hamlin, Dale Reuben	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hammerud, George Winston	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hampton, J. D.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hampton, Ted W. , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hampton, Walter Lewis	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hann, Eugene Paul	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hanna, David Darling	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hannon, Francis Leon	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hansen, Carlyle B.	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hansen, Harvey Ralph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hanson, George	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hanson, Helmer Ansel	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Hanzel, Edward Joseph	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Harada, Ai	age 54	Civilian	Honolulu
Hardin, Charles Eugene	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hargraves, Kenneth William	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Harker, Charles Ward	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Harmon, William D.	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Harr, Robert Joseph	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Harrington, Keith Homer	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Harris, Charles Houston	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Harris, Daniel Fletcher	C.F.C.P	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Harris, George Ellsworth	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Harris, Hiram Dennis	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Harris, James William	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Harris, Louis Edward , Jr.	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Harris, Noble Burnice	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Harris, Peter John	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Harriss, Hugh Braddock	H.A.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Hartford, Carlton H.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Hartley, Alvin	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hartley, Kenneth Jay	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Hartsoe, Max June	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hartson, Lonnie Moss	S.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Harveson, Herold Aloysius	Lieutenant (jg)	United States Navy	USS Utah
Hasenfuss, William E. , Jr.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Hasl, James Thomas	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hasty, Ardrey Vernon	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Hatate, Kisa	age 41	Civilian	Honolulu
Haughey, John Thomas	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Haven, Edward Stanley , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Haverfield, James Wallace	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Havins, Harvey Linfille	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hawkins, Anthony , Jr.	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Hawkins, Russell Dean	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hayden, Albert Eugene	C.E.M.P	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hayes, John Doran	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hayes, Kenneth Merle	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Haynes, Curtis James	Q.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hays, Alfred	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Hays, William Henry	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hazdovac, Jack Claudius	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Head, Frank Bernard	C.Y.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Head, Harold Lloyd	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma

Headington, Robert Wayne	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Heater, Verrel Roy	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Heath, Alfred Grant	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Heath, Francis Colston	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Nevada
Heavin, Hadley Irvin	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Hebel, Francis F.	Lieutenant (jg)	United States Navy	USS Enterprise
Hebel, Robert Lee	S.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Heckendorn, Warren Guy	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hedger, Jess Laxton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hedrick, Paul Henry	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Heely, Leo Shinn	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Heidt, Edward Joseph	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Heidt, Wesley John	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Heim, Gerald Leroy	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Hellstern, William Francis	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Helm, Merritt Cameron	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Helton, Floyd Dee	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hembree, Thomas	AS	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Henderson, Gilbert Allen	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Henderson, William Walter	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hendricksen, Frank	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Henrichsen, Jimmie Lee	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Henry, Otis Wellington	PVT	United States Marine Corps (Reserve)	USS Oklahoma
Henson, William Ed , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Herber, Harvey Christopher	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Herbert, George	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Herbert, Joseph C.	SSGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Herrick, Paul Edward	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Herring, James Junior	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Herriott, Robert Asher , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hesler, Austin Henry	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hess, Darrel Miller	F.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hessdorfer, Anthony Joseph	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hibbard, Robert Arnold	Bkr.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hickman, Arthur Lee	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hickok, Warren Paul	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Hicks, Elmer Orville	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hicks, Ralph Dueard	Ptr2c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Higa, Fred Masayoshi	age 21	Civilian	Honolulu
Hildebrand, John A. , Jr.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Hill, Bartley Talor	A.O.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hill, Clifford Dale	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Hill, Edwin Joseph	C.W.O	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Hillman, Merle Chester , Jr.	Ph.M.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Hilt, Fred Albert	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Hilton, Wilson Woodrow	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hindman, Frank Weaver	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hines, Arvel Clay	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Hirasaki, Jackie Yoneto	age 8	Civilian	Honolulu
Hirasaki, Jitsuo	age 48	Civilian	Honolulu
Hirasaki, Robert Yoshito	age 3	Civilian	Honolulu
Hirasaki, Shirley Kinue	age 2	Civilian	Honolulu
Hiskett, Denis Hubert	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hislop, William	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Hitrik, Albert Joseph	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Downes

Hittorff, Joseph Parker , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hoag, Frank Samuel , Jr.	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hoard, Herbert John	C.S.K.P	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hodges, Garris Vada	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hodges, Howard David	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Hoelscher, Lester John	H.A.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hoffman, Joseph Warren	Mus.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Holland, Claude Herbert , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hollenbach, Paul Zepp	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Holley, Paul Elston	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Hollis, Ralph	Lieutenant (jg)	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Hollowell, George Sanford	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Holm, Kenneth Laurence	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Holmes, Harry Randolph	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Holmes, Lowell D.	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Holmes, Robert Kimball	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Holzhauer, James William	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Holzworth, Walter	Mgy.SGT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Homer, Henry Vernon	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hood, Earl A.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Hood, Joseph Earnest	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Hookano, Kamiko	age 35	Civilian	Kaneohe NAS
Hope, Harold W.	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Hopkins, Edwin Chester	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hopkins, Homer David	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Horan, John J.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Horan, Vincent M.	CPL	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Hord, Chester George	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Horn, Melvin Freeland	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Horner, James Albert	PFC	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Horrell, Harvey Howard	S.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Horrocks, James William	C.G.M.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Horton, William David	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Hosler, John Emmet	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Houde, Emery Lyle	Bkr.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
House, Clem Raymond	C.W.T.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Housel, John James	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Howard, Elmo	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Howard, George F.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Howard, Rolan George	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Howe, Darrell Robert	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Howell, Leroy	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hoyt, Clarence E.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Hrusecky, Charles Lewis	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Hryniewicz, Frank A.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hubbard, Haywood , Jr.	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hubner, Edgar E.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Hudgell, Alfred William	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Tennessee
Hudnall, Robert Chilton	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Hudson, Charles Eugene	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hudson, Ira Duane	F.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Huff, Robert Glenn	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Huffman, Clyde Franklin	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hughes, Bernard Thomas	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hughes, Edward Rhys	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field

Hughes, Lewis Burton , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hughes, Marvin Austin	PVT	United States Marine Corps (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Hughey, James Clynton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Huie, Doyne Conley	H.A.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hull, Robert L.	PVT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Hultgren, Lorentz Emanuel	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Hultman, Donald Standly	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Humphrey, Henry J.	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Hunter, Robert Melvin	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Oklahoma
Hunter, Robert Fredrick	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Huntington, Henry Louis	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hurd, Willard Hardy	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hurley, Wendell Ray	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Huval, Ivan Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hux, Leslie Creade	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Huys, Arthur Albert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Hyde, William Hughes	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Iak, Joseph Claude	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ibbotson, Howard Burt	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Inamine, Paul S.	age 19	Civilian	Honolulu
Ingalls, Richard Fitch	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ingalls, Theodore A.	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ingraham, David Archie	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ingram, George Washington	Sea.2c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Irish, Robert Clement	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Isham, Orville Adalbert	C.G.M.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Isom, Luther James	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Iversen, Earl Henry	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Iversen, Norman Kenneth	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Iverson, Claydon Ignatius C.	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ivey, Charles Andrew , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Izumi, Robert Seiko	age 25	Civilian	Honolulu
Jackson, David William	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Utah
Jackson, David Paul , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jackson, Lowell Bruce	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Vestal
Jackson, Robert Woods	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jackson, William Clarence	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Jackson, Willie	O.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Jacobs, Richard William	Sea.2c	United States Navy	Wake Island
Jacobs, Richard Fredrick	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Jacobson, Dave	M.SGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Jacobson, Herbert Barney	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
James, Challis Rudolph	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
James, John Burditt	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jante, Edwin Earl	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Janz, Clifford Thurston	Lieutenant	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jarding, George William	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Jastrzemski, Edwin Charles	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jayne, Kenneth Lyle	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Jeans, Victor Lawrence	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jedrysik, Joseph	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Jeffrey, Ira W.	Ensign	United States Navy	USS California
Jeffries, Keith	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jencuis, Joseph Herbert	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Jenkins, Robert Henry Dawson	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Jensen, Keith Marlow	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jensen, Theodore Que	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Jenson, Jesse Bennett	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Jerrison, Donald D.	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Johann, Paul Frederick	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Johannes, Charles Homer	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Johnson, Billy James	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Johnson, Carl Andreas	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Johnson, Carl Spencer	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Johnson, David Andrew , Jr.	O.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Johnson, Donald Walter	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Johnson, Edmund Russell	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Johnson, Edward Dale	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Johnson, Flavous B. M.	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Johnson, George Edward	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Helena
Johnson, James Rodman	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Johnson, John Russell	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Johnson, Joseph Morris	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Johnson, Melvin Grant	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Johnson, Olaf A.	PFC	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Johnson, Robert Henry	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Johnson, Samuel Earle	Commander	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Johnson, Sterling Conrad	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Johnston, Jim Hal	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Jolley, Berry Stanley	Sea.2c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Jones, Charles William	M.2c	United States Navy	USS Vestal
Jones, Charles Alan	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Jones, Daniel Pugh	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jones, Edmon Ethmer	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jones, Edward Watkin	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Jones, Ernest	M.A.T.T.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Jones, Floyd Baxter	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jones, Fred M.	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Jones, George Edwin	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Downes
Jones, Harry Cecil	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jones, Henry , Jr.	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jones, Herbert C.	Ensign	United States Navy	USS California
Jones, Homer Lloyd	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jones, Hugh Junior	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jones, Jerry	M.A.T.T.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Jones, Leland	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jones, Leroy Henry	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Jones, Quincy Eugene	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Jones, Rodney Wallace	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Jones, Thomas Raymond	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Jones, Warren Allen	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jones, Willard Worth	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jones, Woodrow Wilson	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Jordan, Julian Bethune	Lieutenant	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Jordan, Wesley Vernie	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Joyce, Calvin Wilbur	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Joyner, Theodore K.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Judd, Albert John	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Juedes, William Arthur	S.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Jurashen, Thomas Valentine	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma

Kaelin, John Louis	Y.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Utah
Kagarice, Harold Lee	C.S.K.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kahookele, David	age 23	Civilian	Honolulu
Kaiser, Robert Oscar	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kalinowski, Henry	PVT	United States Marine Corps (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Kampmeyer, Eric T.	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Kane, Albert Utley	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Karabon, Joseph Nicholas	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Karli, John Albert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Katt, Eugene Louis	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kaufman, Harry	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Keaton, Vernon Paul	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Kechner, Vincent John	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Keen, Billy Mack	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Keener, Arlie Glen	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Keffer, Howard Verne	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Keil, Ralph Henry	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Keith, George Richard	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Keller, Donald Garrett	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Keller, Paul Daniel	Mldr.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kelley, James Dennis	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kelley, Joe Marion	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Kelley, Robert R.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Kelley, Sanford V. , Jr.	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Kellogg, Wilbur Leroy	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kelly, Robert Lee	C.E.M.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kempf, Warren Joseph	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Keninger, Leo Thomas	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Keniston, Donald Lee	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Keniston, Kenneth Howard	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kennard, Kenneth Frank	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kennedy, William Henry	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Kennington, Charles Cecil	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kennington, Milton Homer	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kent, Texas Thomas , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kent, William Harrison	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Kerestes, Elmer Tom	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Kerrigan, Raymond Joseph	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Vestal
Kesler, David Leland	Bkr.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Kidd, Isaac Campbell	Rear Admiral	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kiehn, Ronald William	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kieselbach, Charles Ermin	C.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kim, Soon Chip	age 66	Civilian	Wahiawa
Kimmey, Robert Doyle	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Kimura, Tomaso	age 19	Civilian	Waipahu
Kinder, Andrew J.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
King, Andrew	AS	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
King, Gordon Blane	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
King, Leander Cleaveland	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
King, Lewis Meyer	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
King, Marion E. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
King, Orvell Vaniel , Jr.	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Nevada
King, Robert Nicholas , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Kinney, Frederick William	Mus.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kinney, Gilbert Livingston	Q.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Kirchhoff, Wilbur Albert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kirkpatrick, Thomas Larcy	Captain	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Klann, Edward	S.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Klasing, William August	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Klein, Otto C.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Kleist, Chester Fredrick	Cox	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Kline, Robert Edwin	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Klopp, Francis Lawrence	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Klubertanz, Roderick Otto	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Knight, Milton Jewel , Jr.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Knight, Robert Wagner	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Knipp, Verne Francis	Cox	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Knubel, William , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Koch, Walter Ernest	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Koenekamp, Clarence D.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Koeppe, Herman Oliver	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kohl, John J.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Kolajajck, Brosig	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kondo, Edward Koichi	age 19	Civilian	Honolulu
Konnick, Albert Joseph	C.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kosec, John Anthony	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kovar, Robert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kozelek, Leonard Joseph	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Enterprise
Krahn, James Albert	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Kraker, Donald J.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	Midway Island NAS
Kramb, James Henry	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kramb, John David	M.Smth.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kramer, Harry Wellington	F.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Kramer, Robert Rudolph	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Krause, Fred Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Krissman, Max Sam	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kruger, Richard Warren	Q.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kruppa, Adolph Louis	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kubinec, William Paul	F.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Kujawa, Conrad	PFC	United States Army	Schofield Barracks
Kukuk, Howard Helgi	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kula, Stanley	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kusie, Donald Joseph	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Kuzee, Ernest George	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Kvalnes, Hans C.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Kvidera, William Lester	C.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Kyser, D. T.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
La France, William Richard	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
La Mar, Ralph B.	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
La Rue, George Willard	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Utah
La Salle, Willard Dale	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
La Verne, Daniel	age 25	Civilian	Red Hill
Lacrosse, Henry E. , Jr.	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Laderach, Robert Paul	F.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lake, John Ervin , Jr.	W.O	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lakin, Donald Lapier	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lakin, Joseph Jordan	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lamb, George Samuel	C.S.F.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lamons, Kenneth Taft	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Lancaster, John Thomas	H.A.1c	United States Navy	USS California

Landman, Henry	A.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Landry, James Joseph , Jr.	Bkr.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lane, Edward Wallace	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lane, Mancel Curtis	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lange, Richard Charles	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Langenwalter, Orville J.	S.K.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lango, Frank J.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Lanouette, Henry John	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Larsen, Donald C. V.	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Larsen, Elliott Deen	Mus.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Larson, Leonard Carl	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lattin, Bleecker	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Laurie, Johnnie Cornelius	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Lawrence, Charles	A.M.M.2c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Lawrence, Edward Stephen	PFC	United States Marine Corps	EWA MCAS
Lawrence, Elmer Patterson	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Lawson, Willard Irvin	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Leary, Thomas Francis	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Lee, Carroll Volney , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lee, Henry Lloyd	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lee, Isaac William	age 21	Civilian	Kaneohe NAS
Lee, Roy Elmer , Jr.	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS California
Leedy, David Alonzo	F.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Leggett, John Goldie	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Legros, Joseph McNeil	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lehman, Gerald George	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Lehman, Myron Kenneth	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Leigh, Malcolm Hedrick	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Leight, James Webster	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lemire, Joseph Sam L.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Leopold, Robert Lawrence	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Lepper, Edmond Brayton	SGT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Lescault, Lionel W.	B.G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Leslie, George G.	PVT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Lesmeister, Steve Louie	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Levar, Frank	C.W.T.P	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Levine, Sherman	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Lewis, James I.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Lewis, John Earl	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Lewis, Theodore J.	CPL	United States Army	Schofield Barracks
Lewis, Wayne Alman	C.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lewison, Neil Stanley	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Libolt, Lester H.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Lightfoot, Worth Ross	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Linbo, Gordon Ellsworth	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lincoln, John William	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lindsay, James E.	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Lindsay, James Mitchell	S.F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lindsey, Harold William	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Lindsley, John Herbert	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Linton, George Edward	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lipe, Wilbur Thomas	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Lipke, Clarence William	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lipple, John Anthony	S.F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lisenby, Daniel Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Lish, Eugene Victor	Mus.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Little, John Grubbs , III.	Lieutenant (jg)	United States Navy	USS Utah
Livers, Raymond Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Livers, Wayne Nicholas	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Livingston, Alfred Eugene	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Livingston, Richard E.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Lock, Douglas A.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lockwood, Clarence M.	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Loebach, Adolph John	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Lohman, Earl Wynne	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lomax, Frank Stuart	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lomibao, Marciano	O.S.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
London, James Edward	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Long, Benjamin Franklin	C.Y.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Long, Guy Edward	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Vestal
Loo, Tai Chung	age 19	Civilian	Pearl Harbor
Lopes, Peter Souza	age 33	Civilian	Honolulu
Lord, Harry W. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Lounsbury, Thomas William	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Loustanau, Charles Bernard	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Love, Carl Robert	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Loveland, Frank Crook	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lovshin, William Joseph	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Lowe, Robert S.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Lucey, Neil Jermiah	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Luke, Vernon Thomas	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Luker, Royle Bradford	F.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Luna, James Edward	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lunsford, Jack Leon	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Nevada
Luntta, John Kallervo	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Lusk, Howard N.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Lutschan, William Edward , Jr.	SGT	United States Marine Corps (Reserve)	EWA MCAS
Luzier, Ernest Burton	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lynch, Donald William	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Lynch, Emmett Isaac	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lynch, James Robert , Jr.	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lynch, Kenneth Lee	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Lynch, William Joseph , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Lyon, Arnold Eugene	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Lyons, Lawrence P. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Mabine, Octavius	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Macy, Thomas Samuel	age 59	Civilian	Hickam Field
Maddox, Raymond Dudley	C.E.M.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Madrid, Arthur John	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Mafnas, Andres Franquez	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Mafnas, Francisco Reyes	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Magee, Gerald James	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Magers, Howard Scott	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Malatak, Joseph	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Malecki, Frank Edward	C.Y.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Malek, Michael	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Malfante, Algeo Victor	S.F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Malinowski, John Stanley	S.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Malson, Harry Lynn	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Manganelli, George Jay	age 14	Civilian	Honolulu

Manges, Howard Ellis	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Manion, Edward Paul	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Manley, William H.	PFC	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Manlove, Arthur Cleon	W.O	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Mann, Charles Willis	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Mann, John H.	SSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Mann, William Edward	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Manning, Leroy	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Manning, Milburn Alex	A.M.M.3c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Manning, Walter Benjamin	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Manske, Robert Francis	Y.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Marinich, Steve Matt	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Maris, Elwood Henry	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Markley, Robert Harold	2nd.Lt	United States Army	Hickam Field
Marling, Joseph Henry	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Marlow, Urban Herschel	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Marsh, Benjamin Raymond , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Marsh, William Arthur	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Marshall, John Andrew	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Downes
Marshall, Thomas Donald	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Marshall, William Earl , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Martin, Dale Lewis	S.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Martin, George M. , Jr.	SGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Martin, Herbert Benjamin	1st.SGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Martin, Hugh Lee	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Martin, James Albert	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Martin, James Orrwell	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Martin, John Winter	F.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Martin, Luster Lee	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Martin, Wallace R.	1st.SGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Martinez, Rudolph Machado	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Marze, Andrew Michael	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Mason, Byron Dalley	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Mason, Henri Clay	Mus.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Massey, James Edward	AS	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Mastel, Clyde Harold	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Masters, Dayton Monroe	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Masterson, Cleburne E. Carl	Ph.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Mastrototaro, Maurice	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Mata, Jesus Manalisay	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Mathein, Harold Richard	Bmkr.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Mathison, Charles Harris	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Mathison, Donald Joseph	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Matney, Vernon Merferd	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Mattox, Harell K.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Mattox, James Durant	A.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Maule, Joseph Keith	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
May, Louis Eugene	S.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Maybee, George Frederick	R.M.2c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Mayfield, Frazier	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Mayfield, Lester Ellsworth	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Mayo, Marvin William	F.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Mayo, Rex Haywood	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McAbee, William E.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
McAllen, John Scott	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Shaw

McBee, Luther Kirk	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
McCabe, Edwin Bonner	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
McCabe, Joseph , Sr.	age 43	Civilian	Honolulu
McCarrens, James Francis	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
McCary, William Moore	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McClafferty, John Charles	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McClelland, Thomas Alfred	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS West Virginia
McClintock, James Jacob	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
McCloud, Donald Robert	F.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
McClung, Harvey Manford	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
McCollom, Lawrence Jennings	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
McComas, Clarence William	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
McCutcheon, Warren Harrell	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Maryland
McDonald, James Oliver	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
McFaddin, Lawrence James	Y.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McGhee, Lester Fred	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
McGlasson, Joe Otis	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McGrady, Samme Willie Genes	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McGraw, George V.	F.1c	United States Navy	USS California
McGuckin, Edward L.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
McGuire, Francis Raymond	S.K.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McHughes, John Breckenridge	C.W.T.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McIntosh, Dencil Jeoffrey	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
McIntosh, Harry George	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McKee, Quentin Guy	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
McKeenan, Bert Eugene	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
McKinnie, Russell	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McKissack, Hale	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
McKosky, Michael Martin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McLaughlin, Herbert E.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
McLaughlin, Lloyd Elden	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
McLeod, Stanley A.	SGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
McMeans, Clyde Clifton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
McMurtrey, Aaron L.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
McPherson, John Blair	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
McQuade, Robert Cameron	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Meadows, Durward A.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Meagher, Donald F.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Means, Louis	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Meares, John Morgan	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Medlen, Joseph Alford	CPL	United States Army	Ft Kamehameha
Meglis, John Anthony	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Melsen, George	S.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Melton, Earl Rudolph	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Melton, Herbert Franklin	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Melton, John Russell	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Mendiola, Enrique Castro	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Menefee, James Austin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Menges, Herbert Hugo	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Enterprise
Meno, Vicente Gogue	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Menzenski, Stanley Paul	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Merithew, William W.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Merrill, Howard Deal	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Messam, Horace Arthur	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Meyers, Victor L.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field

Michael, Charles O.	Lt.Cmdr	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Utah
Micheletto, Carlo Anthony	SGT	United States Marine Corps	EWA MCAS
Middleswart, John Franklin	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Migita, Torao	PVT	United States Army	Schofield Barracks
Milbourne, Jesse Keith	AS	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Miles, Archie Theodore	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Miles, Oscar Wright	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Miller, Chester John	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Miller, Doyle Allen	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Miller, Forrest Newton	C.E.M.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Miller, George Stanley	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Miller, J. B. Delane	Cox	United States Navy	USS Tennessee
Miller, Jessie Zimmer	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Miller, John David	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Miller, Marvin Eugene	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Miller, William Cicero	R.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Enterprise
Miller, William Oscar	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Milligan, Weldon Harvey	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Milner, James William	F.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Mims, Robert Lang	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Minear, Richard J. , Jr.	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Minix, Orville Ray	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Minter, James Dewey	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Mirello, Bernard Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Mister, Joe Eddie	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Mitchell, Edwin N.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Mitchell, John G.	CPL	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Mitchell, Wallace Gregory	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Mlinar, Joseph	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Molpus, Richard Preston	C.M.Smth.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Monroe, Donald	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Montgomery, Charles Andrew	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Montgomery, Robert E.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Montgomery, Wallace Alford	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Montgomery, William A.	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Moody, Robert Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Moore, Clyde Carson	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Moore, Douglas Carlton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Moore, Fred Kenneth	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Moore, James Carlton	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Moorhead, Lionel Jay	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Moorhouse, William Starks	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Moorman, Russell Lee	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Moran, George A.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Morgan, Wayne	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Morgareidge, James Orries	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Morincelli, Edo	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Morley, Eugene Elvis	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Morrell, Elmer R.	PFC	United States Marine Corps	Midway Island NAS
Morris, Emmett Edloe	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Morris, Owen Newton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Morris, William Francis	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Morrison, Earl Leroy	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Morrissey, Edward Francis	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Nevada
Morse, Edward Charles	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Morse, Francis Jerome	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Morse, George Robert	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Morse, Norman Roi	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Moser, Joseph G.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Moslener, Louis Gustav , Jr.	2nd.Lt	United States Army	Hickam Field
Moss, Tommy Lee	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Mostek, Francis Clayton	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Moulton, Gordon Eddy	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Mrace, Albin John	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Muhofski, Joseph Alexander	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Mulick, John Mark	H.A.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Muncy, Claude	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Murdock, Charles Luther	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Murdock, Melvin Elijah	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Murphy, James Palmer	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Murphy, James Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Murphy, Jessie Huell	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Murphy, Thomas J. , Jr.	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Myers, Clair Clifton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Myers, James Gernie	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Myers, Ray Harrison	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Naasz, Erwin H.	S.F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nadel, Alexander Joseph	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Naegle, George Eugene	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Naff, Hugh Kenneth	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Nagamine, Masayoshi	age 27	Civilian	Honolulu
Nail, Elmer Denton	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Nash, Paul Andrews	F.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Nations, James Garland	F.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nations, Morris Edward	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Pennsylvania
Naylor, J. D.	S.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Neal, Tom Dick	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Necessary, Charles Raymond	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Needham, La Verne J.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Neher, Don Ocle	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Neipp, Paul	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nelles, Joseph F.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Nelson, Harl Coplin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nelson, Henry Clarence	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nelson, Lawrence Adolphus	C.T.C.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nelson, Marlyn Wayne	F.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Nelson, Richard Eugene	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nermoe, Earl Tilman	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Neuendorf, William F. , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Neuenschwander, Arthur C.	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Nevill, Sam Douglas	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Newman, Laxton Gail	A.M.M.3c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Newton, Paul Eugene	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Newton, Wayne Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Newton, Wilbur Francis	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Nichols, Alfred Rose	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nichols, Bethel Allan	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nichols, Carl	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Nichols, Clifford Leroy	T.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nichols, Harry Ernest	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma

Nichols, Louis Duffie	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nicholson, Glen Eldon	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nicholson, Hancel Grant	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nicoles, Frank Edward	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Nides, Thomas James	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nielsen, Arnold Madsen	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Nielsen, Floyd Theadore	C.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nigg, Laverne Alious	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Nightingale, Joe Raymond	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Nix, Charles Edward	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Noce, Emile Salvatore	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Nolatubby, Henry Ellis	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Noonan, Robert Harold	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Norman, Donald Charles	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Norman, Orris Nate	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Northway, William M.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Norvelle, Alwyn Berry	C.S.K.A	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Nowosacki, Theodore Lucian	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Nusser, Raymond Alfred	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Nye, Frank Erskine	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
O'Brien, Joseph Bernard	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
O'Bryan, George David	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
O'Bryan, Joseph Benjamin	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
O'Connor, Maurice Michael	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
O'Grady, Camillus M.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
O'Neall, Rex Eugene	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
O'Neill, William Thomas , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Ochoski, Henry Francis	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Oda, Yaeko Lillian	age 6	Civilian	EWA
Odgaard, Edwin Nelson	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Off, Virgil Simon	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Offutt, William H.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Ogle, Charles Ralph	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ogle, Victor Willard	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Oglesby, Lonnie Harris	Sea.2c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Ohashi, Frank	age 29	Civilian	Honolulu
Ohta, Hayako	age 19	Civilian	Honolulu
Ohta, Janet Yumiko	age 3 months	Civilian	Honolulu
Ohta, Kiyoko	age 21	Civilian	Honolulu
Olds, Clifford Nathan	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Oliver, Raymond Brown	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Olsen, Edward Kern	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Olsen, Eli	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Olson, Glen Martin	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ornellas, Barbara June	age 8	Civilian	Honolulu
Ornellas, Gertrude	age 16	Civilian	Honolulu
Orr, Dwight Jerome	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Orr, Willard C.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Orwick, Dean Baker	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Orzech, Stanislaus Joseph	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Osborne, Mervin Eugene	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ostrander, Leland Grimstead	Ph.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ott, Peter Dean	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Otterstetter, Carl William	Sea.2c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Outland, Jarvis Godwin	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma

Overley, Lawrence Jack	F.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Owen, Fredrick Halden	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Owens, James Patrick	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Pennsylvania
Owens, Richard Allen	S.K.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Owsley, Alphard Stanley	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Owsley, Arnold Jacob	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Owsley, Thomas Lea	S.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pace, Amos Paul	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pace, Joseph Wilson	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Pennsylvania
Pace, Millard Clarence	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Paciga, Walter Joseph	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Palides, James , Jr.	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Palmer, Calvin Harry	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Palmer, Wilferd Dewey	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Pang, Harry Tuck Lee	age 30	Civilian	Hickam Field
Paolucci, James Alfred	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Paradis, George Lawrence	Ph.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Parker, Elmer Anthony	C.S.K.P	United States Navy	USS Utah
Parker, Isaac	M.A.T.T.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Parker, June Winton	Q.M.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Parkes, Harry Edward	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Parks, Chester Lloyd	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Paroli, Peter John	Bkr.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Patterson, Clarence Rankin	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Patterson, Elmer Marvin	C.K.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Patterson, Harold Lemuel	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Patterson, Richard , Jr.	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Paulmand, Hilery	O.S.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pavini, Bruno	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pawlowski, Raymond Paul	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Payne, Kenneth Morris	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Peak, Robert Hopkins	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Pearce, Alonzo , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pearce, Dale Ferrell	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Pearson, Norman Cecil	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pearson, Robert Stanley	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Peavey, William Howard	Q.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Peck, Eugene Edward	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Peckham, Howard William	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pedrotti, Francis James	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Peery, Max Valdyne	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Peleschak, Michael	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Peltier, John Arthur	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pence, John Wallace	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Pendarvis, George E.	F.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Pennington, Raymond	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Penny, Russell M.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Pensyl, John Campbell	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Pentico, Walter Ray	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Penton, Howard Lee	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Penuel, George Ames , Jr.	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Pepe, Stephen	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Perdue, Charles Fred	S.F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Perkins, George Ernest	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Perry, Forrest Hurbert	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Utah

Perry, Hal H. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Peterson, Albert H. , Jr.	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Peterson, Elroy Vernon	F.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Peterson, Hardy Wilbur	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Peterson, Roscoe Earl	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pettit, Charles Ross	C.R.M.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Petway, Wiley James	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Petyak, John Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Petz, Robert Albert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Phelps, George Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Philbin, James Richard	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Philipsky, Thomas F.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Phillips, James William	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Phillips, Milo Elah	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Phipps, James Norman	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Piasecki, Alexander Louis	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Pierce, Sidney	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Enterprise
Pietzsch, Jay E.	2nd.Lt	United States Army	Hickam Field
Pike, Harvey Lee	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pike, Lewis Jackson	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pinkham, Albert Wesley	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pinko, Andrew Anthony	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Pirtle, Gerald Homer	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Piskuran, Rudolph Victor	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Pitcher, Jack Arthur	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Pitcher, Walter Giles	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pitts, Lewis William , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Plant, Donald D.	PVT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Platschorre, Daniel P.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Poindexter, Herbert J. , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ponder, Walter Howard	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Pool, Elmer Leo	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Poole, Ralph Ernest	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Porterfield, Robert Kirk	A.M.M.3c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Portillo, Damian Maraya	S.C.1c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Pennsylvania
Posey, Frank S. E.	TSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Post, Darrell Albert	C.M.M.A	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Povesko, George	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Powell, Jack Speed	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Powell, Raymond E.	TSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Powell, Thomas George	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Powell, William J.	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Power, Abner Franklin	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Powers, Joe O`Neil	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Powers, Roy Wallace	S.F.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Powloski, Daniel J.	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Presson, Wayne Harold	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Prewitt, Brady Oliver	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Pribble, Robert Lamb	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Price, Arland Earl	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Price, George Franklin	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Price, George	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Price, John A.	SSGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Pride, Lewis Bailey , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Pritchett, Robert Leo , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Przybysz, Alexsander J.	Prt.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Puckett, Edwin Lester	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pue, Jasper Langley , Jr.	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Pugh, John , Jr.	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Pullen, Roy Alfred	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Pummill, Nolan Eugene	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Downes
Putnam, Avis Boyd	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Puzio, Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Quarto, Mike Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Quinata, Jose Sanchez	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Quirk, Edward Joseph	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Racisz, Edward Stanley	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Radford, Neal Jason	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rae, Allen G.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Raimond, Paul Smith	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Rainbolt, John Thomas	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Rall, Richard Redner	Lieutenant (jg)	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Rasmussen, Arthur Severin	C.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rasmussen, Warren D.	SGT	United States Army	Camp Malakole
Rasmusson, George Vernon	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ratkovich, William	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rawhouser, Glen Donald	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rawson, Clyde Jackson	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ray, Eldon Casper	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ray, Harry Joseph	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Reagan, Dan Edward	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Reaves, Casbie	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rector, Clay Cooper	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Reece, John Jeffris	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Reed, Frank Edward	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Reed, James Buchanan , Jr.	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Reed, Ray Ellison	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Reeves, Thomas J.	W.O	United States Navy	USS California
Regan, Leo Basil	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Register, Paul James	Lt.Cmdr	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Reid, George Beard	S.F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Reid, William Henry	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Vestal
Reinhold, Rudolph Herbert	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Renner, Albert	F.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Restivo, Jack Martin	Y.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Reuss, Herman C.	TSGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Reynolds, Earl Arthur	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Reynolds, Jack Franklyn	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rhodes, Birb Richard	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rhodes, Mark Alexander	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rhodes, William T.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Rice, Irvin Franklin	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Rice, William Hurst	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Rice, William Albert	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rice, Wilson Albert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Rich, Claude Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rich, Porter Leigh	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Richar, Raymond Lyle	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Richardson, Warren John	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Richey, Joseph L.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS California

Richey, Robert M.	1st.Lt	United States Army	Hickam Field
Richison, Fred Louis	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Richter, Albert Wallace	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Richter, Leonard Claiver	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Rico, Guadalupe Augustine	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Riddell, Eugene Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ridenour, Clyde , Jr.	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Riganti, Fred	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Riggins, Gerald Herald	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Riley, David Joseph	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ripley, Edwin Herbert	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Rivera, Francisco Unpingoo	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Roach, Russell Clyde	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Robbins, Anson E.	PVT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Roberts, Dwight Fisk	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Roberts, Earl Reed	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Roberts, Kenneth Franklin	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Roberts, McClellan Taylor	C.Ph.M.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Roberts, Walter Scott , Jr.	R.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Roberts, Wilburn Carle	Bkr.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Roberts, William Francis	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Robertson, Edgar , Jr.	M.A.T.T.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Robertson, James Milton	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Robertson, Joseph Morris	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Robinson, Harold Thomas	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Robinson, James Henry	Sea.2c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Robinson, James William	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Robinson, John James	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Robinson, Robert Warren	Ph.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Robison, Mark Clifton	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Roby, Raymond Arthur	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rodgers, John Dayton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Roe, Eugene Oscar	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Tennessee
Roehm, Harry Turner	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Roesch, Harold William	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Rogers, Thomas Sprugeon	C.W.T.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rogers, Walter Boone	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Rogness, Halvor E.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Romano, Simon	O.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rombalski, Donald Roger	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Romero, Vladimir M.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ronning, Emil Oliver	Cox	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Root, Melvin Lenord	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rose, Chester Clay	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rose, Ernest Claude	S.C.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Rosenau, Howard Arthur	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Rosenbery, Orval Albert	S.F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rosenthal, Alfred Aaron	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Ross, Deane Lundy	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ross, Joe Boyce	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Ross, William Fraser	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rouse, Joseph Carel	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Rowe, Eugene Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rowell, Frank Malcom	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Royals, William Nicholas	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Royer, Howard Dale	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Royse, Frank Willard	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Rozar, John Frank	W.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rozmus, Joseph Stanley	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ruddock, Cecil Roy	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ruggerio, William	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Runckel, Robert Gleason	Bug.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Runiak, Nicholas	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ruse, Charles Lee	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Rush, Richard Perry	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rusher, Orville Lester	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Rushford, Harvey George	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Ruskey, Joseph John	C.B.M.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Russell, Benjamin Nelson	AS	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Russett, Arthur William	Ph.M.1c	United States Navy	NAVAL HOSP P.H.
Rutkowski, John Peter	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ruttan, Dale Andrew	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ryan, Edmund Thomas	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Sadlowski, Roman Walter	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Saffell, Morris Franklin	F.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Sahl, Glenn Dawain	F.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Sampson, Kenneth Harlan	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Sampson, Sherley Rolland	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Sandall, Merrill Keith	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sanders, Dean Stanley	C.M.M.P	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Sanders, Eugene Thomas	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sanderson, James Harvey	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sanford, Thomas Steger	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Santos, Filomeno	O.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sather, William Ford	Pmkr.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Saulsbury, Theodore Hilliard	C.K.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Saunders, Charles Louis	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Savage, Lyal Jackson	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Savage, Walter Samuel , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Savidge, John Edwin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Savin, Tom	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Savinski, Michael	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Saylor, Paul Edd	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Schdowski, Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Scheuerlein, George Albert	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Schick, William Rhinehart	1st.Lt	United States Army	Hickam (B-17)
Schiller, Ernest	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Schlect, Benjamin	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Schleifer, Louis	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Schleiter, Walter Fay	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Schlund, Elmer Pershing	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Schmersahl, George R.	SGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Schmidt, Herman	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Schmidt, Vernon Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Schmitt, Aloysius Herman	Lieutenant (jg)	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Schmitz, Andrew James	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Schneider, William Jacob	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Schoonover, John Harry	Ph.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Schott, Robert L.	PFC	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Schrank, Harold Arthur	Bkr.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Schroeder, Henry	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Schuman, Herman Lincoln	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Schuon, Richard Martin , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Schurr, John	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Schwarting, Herbert C.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Scilley, Harold Hugh	S.F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Scott, A. J.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Scott, Bernard Oliver	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Scott, Crawford Edward	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Scott, George Harrison	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Scott, George William	S.K.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Scott, Ralph Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Scott, Robert Raymond	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Scruggs, Jack Leo	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Seaman, Russell Otto	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Searle, Erwin Leroy	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Seaton, Chester Ernest	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Sederstrom, Verdi Delmore	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Oklahoma
Seeley, William Eugene	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sellon, William Lawrence	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Severinson, Everett Iven	S.F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Sevier, Charles Clifton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Shafer, William Kenneth	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Shanahan, William James , Jr.	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Shannon, William Alfred	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sharbaugh, Harry Robert	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sharon, Lewis Purdie	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Shattuck, Robert R.	PFC	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Shaum, Donald Robert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Shaw, Clyde Donald	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Shaw, Robert K.	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sheffer, George Robert	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Shelden, Edward Judson	F.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Shelly, Russell K. , Jr.	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Sherman, Robert O.	SGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Sherrill, Warren Joseph	Y.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sherven, Richard Stanton	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Shields, William F.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Shiffman, Harold Ely	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Shiley, Paul Eugene	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Shimer, Melvin Irvin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Shive, Gordon Eshom	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Shive, Malcolm Holman	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Shively, Benjamin Franklin	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Shook, Shelby Charles	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS California
Shores, Irland , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Shouse, Henson Taylor	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Shugart, Marvin John	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sibley, Delmar Dale	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sidders, Russell Lewis	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sidell, John Henry	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Silva, William Garfield	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Silva, William Howard	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Downes
Silvey, Jesse	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Simensen, Carleton Elliott	2nd.Lt	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona

Simmons, Frank Leroy	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Simmons, Tceollyar	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Simon, Walter Hamilton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Simpson, Albert Eugene	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Skaggs, Eugene Mitchell	S.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Skeen, Harvey Leroy	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Skiles, Charley Jackson , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Skiles, Eugene	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Skiles, Garold Leroy	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Slapikas, Edward Frank	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Sletto, Earl Clifton	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Slifer, Martin Rueben	G.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Smalley, Jack G.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smart, George David	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smartt, Joseph Gillespie	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	Kaneohe NAS
Smestad, Halge Hojem	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smith, Albert Joseph	Lieutenant (jg)	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smith, Earl Walter	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smith, Earl , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smith, Edward	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smith, George Randolph	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Smith, George J.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Smith, Gerald Owen	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS Tennessee
Smith, Gordon Ellsworth	S.K.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Smith, Harry E.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Smith, Harry	Sea.2c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Smith, John Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smith, John A.	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smith, Keith Vodden	PVT	United States Marine Corps (Reserve)	USS Nevada
Smith, Leonard Ferdnay	M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Smith, Lloyd George	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Smith, Luther Kent	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smith, Mack Lawrence	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smith, Marvin Ray	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smith, Merle Andrew	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Smith, Orville Stanley	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Smith, Ralph Stanley	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Smith, Robert Daniel	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Smith, Roland Hampton	Mus.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Smith, Walter Tharnel	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sniff, Jack Bertrand	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Soens, Harold Mathias	S.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Solar, Adolfo	B.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Sollie, Walter Henry	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Solomon, James Cleve	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Soma, Richard Masaru	age 22	Civilian	Wahiawa
Sooter, James Fredrick	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sorensen, Holger Earl	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sousley, Joseph B.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Utah
South, Charles Braxton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
South, Elmer W.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Spaeth, Johnnie Herbert	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Spangler, Maurice Verdon	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Sparks, John B.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Spear, Herman Alder	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada

Speicher, Ernest Edward	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Spence, Merle Joe	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Spencer, Delbert James	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Sperling, Joseph	S.F.1c	United States Navy	USS Curtiss
Spotz, Maurice Edwin	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Spreeman, Robert Lawrence	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Springer, Charles Harold	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
St Germain, Maurice J.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Stacey, Morris E.	SGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Stafford, Gordon William	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Stallings, Kermit Braxton	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stapler, Leo	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Staples, Merton Iran	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Stapleton, Kirby Roy	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Starkovich, Charles	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Starkovich, Joseph , Jr.	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Staton, Paul L.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Staudt, Alfred Parker	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Steely, Ulis Claude	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Steffan, Joseph Philip	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Steigleder, Lester Leroy	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stein, Walter Claude	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Steiner, Samuel Cyrus	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Steinhoff, Lloyd Delroy	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stembrosky, George Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Stephens, Woodrow Wilson	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stephenson, Hugh Donald	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sterling, Gordon H. , Jr.	2nd.Lt	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Sterling, Otis Delaney	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Sterns, Charles M. , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Oklahoma
Stevens, Jack Hazelip	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stevens, Theodore R.	A.M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stevenson, Frank Jake	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Stewart, Everett R.	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Stewart, Floyd D.	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Pennsylvania
Stewart, Thomas Lester	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stief, Frank William , Jr.	S.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Stillings, Gerald Fay	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stockdale, Louis S.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Oklahoma
Stockman, Harold William	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stockton, Louis Alton	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stockwell, Carey K.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Stoddard, William Edison	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stopyra, Julian John	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Storm, Laun Lee	Y.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stott, Donald Alfred	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Stout, Robert Thomas	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Stouten, James	C.B.M.A	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Stovall, Richard Patt	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Strange, Charles Orval	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Stratton, John Raymond	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Strickland, Charles E.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Strickland, James E. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Strickland, Perry William	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Downes
Strinz, Gerald Victor	F.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Utah

Suggs, William Alfred	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sullivan, Edward Francis	PVT	United States Army	Ft Kamehameha
Sulser, Frederick Franklin	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Summers, Glen Allen	Y.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Summers, Harold Edgar	S.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sumner, Oren	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Surratt, Milton Reece	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Surrells, Leo H.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Sutton, Clyde Westly	C.C.Std.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sutton, George Woodrow	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Swanson, Charles Harold	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Sweany, Charles E.	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Swiontek, Stanley Stephen	Fld.Ck	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Swisher, Charles Elijah	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Sylvester, William Grover	1st.Lt	United States Army	Hickam (Ft Weaver)
Symonette, Henry	O.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Szabo, Theodore Stephen	PVT	United States Marine Corps (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Szematowicz, Jerome J.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Szurgot, Edward Frank	S.K.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Taber, George Edward	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Tacderan, Francisco	age 34	Civilian	EWA
Tafoya, Antonio S.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Takefuji, James Takao	age 20	Civilian	Honolulu
Talbert, Edward Everette	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tambolleo, Victor Charles	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Tanner, Rangner F. , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tanner, Russell Allen	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Tapie, Edward Casamiro	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Tapp, Lambert Ray	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Targ, John	C.W.T.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Taylor, Aaron Gust	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Taylor, Charles Benton	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Taylor, Charles Robert	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Oklahoma
Taylor, Harry Theodore	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Taylor, Palmer Lee	M.A.T.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Taylor, Robert Denzil	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Teeling, Charles Madison	C.Prt.P	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Teer, Allen Ray	E.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Temple, Monroe	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Temples, Houston	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tennell, Raymond Clifford	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Tennison, Anderson G.	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Terhune, Benjamin C.	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Terrell, John Raymond	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Theiller, Rudolph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Thinnes, Arthur Ray	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Thomas, Houston O'Neal	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Thomas, Randall James	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Thomas, Stanley Horace	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Thomas, Vincent Duron	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Thompson, Charles William	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Thompson, Charles Leroy	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Thompson, Clarence	S.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Thompson, George Allen	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Thompson, Irven Edgar	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Thompson, Irvin A. R.	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Thompson, Ralph William	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Thompson, Robert Gary	S.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Thompson, William Manley	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Oklahoma
Thomson, Richard Joseph	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Thorman, John Christopher	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Thornton, Cecil Howard	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Thornton, George Hayward	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Thrombley, Robert Leroy	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Thuman, John Henry	Ph.M.3c	United States Navy	NAV MBL HOSP #2
Thunhorst, Lee Vernon	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Tibbets, Hermann K. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Tibbs, Ernie Ewart	C.M.M.P	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Tidball, David Franklin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Timm, Lloyd Rudolph	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Timmerman, William Frederick	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Tindall, Lewis Frank	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tiner, Robert Reaves	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Tini, Dante Sylvester	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tipsword, Keith Warren	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Tipton, Henry Glenn	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tisdale, William Esley	C.W.T.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Titterington, Everett Cecil	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tobin, Patrick Phillip	PFC	United States Marine Corps (Reserve)	USS Pennsylvania
Todd, Neal Kenneth	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tokusato, Yoshio	age 19	Civilian	Honolulu
Tomich, Peter	C.W.T.P	United States Navy	USS Utah
Topalian, James N.	CPL	United States Army	Hickam Field
Torti, Natale Ignatius	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tranbarger, Orval Austin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Trapp, Harold Frank	F.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Trapp, William Herman	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Treadway, Shelby	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Treanor, Frank P.	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Triplett, Thomas Edgar	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Trovato, Tom	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Trujillo, Richard Ignacio	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Nevada
Tucker, Raymond Edward	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Tucker, William David	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tuckerman, George William	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Tumlinson, Victor Pat	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tuntland, Earl Eugene	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Turk, Pete	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Turner, Billy	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Turner, William George	PVT	United States Marine Corps	EWA MCAS
Turnipseed, John Morgan	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Tushla, Louis James	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Tussey, Lloyd Harold	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Tuttle, Ralph E.	F.2c	United States Navy	Midway Island NAS
Tyce, Robert H.	age 38	Civilian	Honolulu
Tyson, Robert	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ufford, Russell Orville	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Uhlig, Edward Bruno	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Uhlmann, Robert W.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	Kaneohe NAS
Uhrenholdt, Andrew Curtis	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona

Ulrich, Elmer Herbert	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Ulrich, George Vernon	F.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Urban, John Joseph	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Uyeno, Hisao	age 20	Civilian	Honolulu
Valente, Richard Dominic	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Valley, Lowell Earl	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Van Atta, Garland Wade	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Van Horn, James Randolf	AS	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Van Valkenburgh, Franklin	Captain	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Vander Goore, Albert Peter	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Vanderelli, Martin	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Vanderpool, Payton L. , Jr.	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Varchol, Brinley	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Vassar, Benjamin Frank	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Vaughan, William Frank	Ph.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Veeder, Gordon Elliott	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Velia, Galen Steve	S.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Venable, Hoge Cralle , Jr.	S.K.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Vernick, Edward Frank	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Vidoloff, Russell P.	PVT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Vieira, Alvaro Everett	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Villa, Michael William	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Vincent, Jesse Charles , Jr.	CPL	United States Marine Corps	USS Pennsylvania
Vining, George Eugene	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS California
Vinson, James	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Downes
Vogelgesang, Joseph , Jr.	F.2c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Vogt, John H. L., Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Enterprise
Vojta, Walter Arnold	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Vosti, Anthony August	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wade, Durrell	A.M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Wade, George Hollive , Jr.	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Pennsylvania
Wagner, Mearl James	S.C.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wagner, Thomas George	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Wagoner, Lewis Lowell	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Wainwright, Silas Alonzo	Ph.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wait, Wayland Lemoyne	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Walczynski, Andrew A.	SSGT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Walker, Bill	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Walker, David	M.A.T.T.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Walker, Ernest M. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Walker, Harry Earnest	S.K.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Walker, Lumus E.	PVT	United States Army	Wheeler Field
Walkowiak, Robert N.	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Wallace, Houston Oliver	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wallace, James Frank	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wallace, Ralph Leroy	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wallen, Earl Delbert	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS California
Wallenstien, Richard Henry	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Walpole, Eugene Anderson	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Walters, Bethel Elbert	F.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Walters, Charles Edward	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Walters, Clarence Arthur	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Walters, William Spurgeon , Jr.	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Walther, Edward Alfred	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Walton, Alva Dowding	Y.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Walton, Ivan Irwin	Cox	United States Navy	USS Nevada
Ward, Albert Lewis	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ward, James Richard	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Ward, William E.	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wardigo, Walter H.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Wasielewski, Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Watkins, Lenvil Leo	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Watson, Claude Bridger , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Watson, Raphael August	A.M.M.1c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Watson, Richard Leon	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Watson, William Lafayette	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Watts, Sherman Maurice	H.A.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Watts, Victor Ed	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Weaver, Luther Dayton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	Kaneohe NAS
Weaver, Richard Walter	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Webb, Carl Edward	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Webb, James Cecil	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Webster, Harold Dwayne	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Weeden, Carl Alfred	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wegrzyn, Felix S.	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Weidell, William Peter	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Weier, Bernard Arthur	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Welch, William Edward	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Weller, Ludwig Fredrick	C.S.K.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wells, Alfred Floyd	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Wells, Floyd Arthur	R.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wells, Harvey Anthony	S.F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wells, Raymond Virgil , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wells, William Bennett	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
West, Broadus Franklin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
West, Ernest Ray	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
West, Webster Paul	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Westbrook, James Ross	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Westbrook, Robert H. , Jr.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Westcott, William Percy , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Westerfield, Ivan Ayers	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Westin, Donald Vern	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Westlund, Fred Edwin	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wetrich, Vernard Oren	F.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
Wheeler, John Dennis	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Whisler, Gilbert Henry	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Whitaker, John William , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Whitcomb, Cecil Eugene	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
White, Alice	age 42	Civilian	Honolulu
White, Charles William	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
White, Claude	C.W.T.P	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
White, Glen Albert	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Utah
White, Jack Dewey	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
White, James Clifton	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
White, Vernon Russell	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
White, Volmer Dowin	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Whitehead, Ulmont Irving , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Whiteman, George Allison	2nd.Lt	United States Army	Bellows Field
Whitlock, Paul Morgan	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Whitson, Alton Walter	E.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma

Whitson, Ernest Hubert , Jr.	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Whitt, William Byron	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Whittemore, Andrew Tiny	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wiant, Thomas Solomon	AS	United States Navy	USS California
Wick, Everett Morris	F.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wicker, Eugene Woodrow	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Wicklund, John Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wiegand, Lloyd Paul	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Wilbur, Harold	C.M.3c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Wilcox, Arnold Alfred	Q.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wilcox, George James , Jr.	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Will, Joseph William	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Willette, Laddie James	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Williams, Adrian Delton	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Williams, Albert Luther	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Williams, Clyde Richard	Mus.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Williams, Clyde	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Shaw
Williams, George Washington	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Williams, Jack Herman	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Williams, James Clifford	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Williams, Laurence A.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Williams, Wilbur Slade	O.S.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Williamson, Randolph , Jr.	M.A.T.T.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Williamson, William Dean	R.M.2c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Willis, Robert Kenneth , Jr.	Sea.1c	USN.	USS Arizona
Willis, Walter M.	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Enterprise
Wilson, Bernard Martin	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Wilson, Clyde Richard	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Wilson, Comer A.	C.B.M.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wilson, Eunice	age 7 months	Civilian	Honolulu
Wilson, Hurschel Woodrow	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wilson, John James	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wilson, Milton Sloss	F.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Wilson, Neil Mataweny	C.W.O	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wilson, Ray Milo	R.M.3c	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Wimberly, Paul Edwin	G.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wimmer, Bernard Ramon	F.C.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Windish, Robert James	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Windle, Everett Gordon	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Windle, Robert England	PFC	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Winfield, Starring B.	R.M.3c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Winter, Edward	W.O	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Wise, Clarence Alvin	F.3c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Wise, Rex Elwood	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Wittenberg, Russell Duane	PVT	United States Marine Corps	USS Arizona
Wodarski, Steven Joseph	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS California
Wohl, Oswald Carl	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Wojtkiewicz, Frank Peter	C.M.M.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wolf, George Alexanderson , Jr.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Arizona
Wood, Earl A.	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Wood, Frank	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Wood, Harold Baker	B.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wood, Horace Van	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wood, Roy Eugene	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Woods, Lawrence Eldon	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma

Woods, Vernon Wesley	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Woods, William Anthony	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Woods, Winfred Oral	M.M.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Woodward, Ardenne Allen	M.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Woodworth, Lawton Jay	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Woody, Harlan Fred	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Woolf, Norman Bragg	C.W.T.P	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Workman, Creighton Hale	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Wortham, John Layman	G.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Wright, Edward Henry	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wright, Paul Raymond	C.W.T.P	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Wright, Thomas Monroe	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Wyckoff, Robert Leroy	F.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Wydila, John Charles	S.F.3c	United States Navy	USS California
Wyman, Eldon P.	Ensign	United States Navy (Reserve)	USS Oklahoma
Yates, Elmer Elias	S.C.3c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Yeats, Charles , Jr.	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Yomine, Frank Peter	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Young, Eric Reed	Ensign	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Young, Glendale Rex	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Young, Jay Wesley	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Young, Martin Daymond	F.2c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Young, Robert Verdun	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Young, Virgil Jarrett	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Young, Vivan Louis	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Yugovich, Michael Charles	E.M.2c	United States Navy	USS Helena
Yurko, Joseph John	W.T.1c	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Zacek, Laddie John	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Pennsylvania
Zaczkiewicz, Marion Herbert	PFC	United States Army	Hickam Field
Zappala, Joseph S.	PVT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Zeiler, John Virgel	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ziembicki, Steve Anthony	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Zimmerman, Fred	Cox	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Zimmerman, Lloyd McDonald	Sea.2c	United States Navy	USS Arizona
Ziskind, Samuel J.	PVT	United States Army	Ft Shafter
Zobeck, Lester Frank	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS West Virginia
Zuckoff, Walter D.	PVT	United States Army (Reserve)	Hickam Field
Zuschlag, Walter J.	SGT	United States Army	Hickam Field
Zvansky, Thomas	C.S.M.P	United States Navy	USS Oklahoma
Zwarun, Michael , Jr.	Sea.1c	United States Navy	USS Arizona

Source: There are 2402 names in this database.
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http://www.usswestvirginia.org/ph/phlist.php

Bill Text of S.J.RES.55.IS
105th Congress (1997-1998)

S.J.RES.55 -- Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during... (Introduced in Senate - IS)

SJ 55 IS

105th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. J. RES. 55

Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during World War II, and to advance the late Major General Walter C. Short on the retired list of the Army to the highest grade held as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, during World War II, as was done under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for all other senior officers who served in positions of command during World War II, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

September 1 (legislative day, AUGUST 31), 1998

Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. HELMS, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. FAIRCLOTH, Mr. DURBIN, and Mr. FORD) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

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JOINT RESOLUTION

Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during World War II, and to advance the late Major General Walter C. Short on the retired list of the Army to the highest grade held as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, during World War II, as was done under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for all other senior officers who served in positions of command during World War II, and for other purposes.

Whereas Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, formerly the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, possessed an excellent and unassailable record throughout his career in the United States Navy prior to the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor;

Whereas Major General Walter C. Short, formerly the Commander of the United States Army Hawaiian Department, possessed an excellent and unassailable record throughout his career in the United States Army prior to the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor;

Whereas numerous investigations following the attack on Pearl Harbor have documented that Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were not provided with the necessary and critical intelligence available that foretold of war with Japan, that warned of imminent attack, and that would have alerted them to prepare for the attack, including such essential communiques as the Japanese Pearl Harbor Bomb Plot message of September 24, 1941, and the message sent from the Imperial Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese Ambassador in the United States from December 6-7, 1941, known as the Fourteen-Part Message;

Whereas on December 16, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were relieved of their commands and returned to their permanent ranks of rear admiral and major general;

Whereas Admiral William Harrison Standley, who served as a member of the investigating commission known as the Roberts Commission that accused Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short of `dereliction of duty' only six weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, later disavowed the report maintaining that `these two officers were martyred' and `if they had been brought to trial, both would have been cleared of the charge';

Whereas on October 19, 1944, a Naval Court of Inquiry exonerated Admiral Kimmel on the grounds that his military decisions and the disposition of his forces at the time of the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor were proper `by virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither the probability nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor'; criticized the higher command for not sharing with Admiral Kimmel `during the very critical period of 26 November to 7 December 1941, important information ... regarding the Japanese situation'; and, concluded that the Japanese attack and its outcome was attributable to no serious fault on the part of anyone in the naval service;

Whereas on June 15, 1944, an investigation conducted by Admiral T. C. Hart at the direction of the Secretary of the Navy produced evidence, subsequently confirmed, that essential intelligence concerning Japanese intentions and war plans was available in Washington but was not shared with Admiral Kimmel;

Whereas on October 20, 1944, the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation determined that Lieutenant General Short had not been kept `fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for

better preparation for war'; detailed information and intelligence about Japanese intentions and war plans were available in `abundance' but were not shared with the General Short's Hawaii command; and General Short was not provided `on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this';

Whereas the reports by both the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation were kept secret, and Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short were denied their requests to defend themselves through trial by court-martial;

Whereas the joint committee of Congress that was established to investigate the conduct of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short issued, on May 23, 1946, a 1,075-page report which included the conclusions of the committee that the two officers had not been guilty of dereliction of duty;

Whereas the then Chief of Naval Personnel, Admiral J. L. Holloway, Jr., on April 27, 1954, recommended that Admiral Kimmel be advanced in rank in accordance with the provisions of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947;

Whereas on November 13, 1991, a majority of the members of the Board for the Correction of Military Records of the Department of the Army found that Lieutenant General Short `was unjustly held responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster' and that `it would be equitable and just' to advance him to the rank of lieutenant general on the retired list';

Whereas in October 1994, the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle Trost, withdrew his 1988 recommendation against the advancement of Admiral Kimmel and recommended that the case of Admiral Kimmel be reopened;

Whereas the Dorn Report, a report on the results of a Department of Defense study that was issued on December

15, 1995, did not provide support for an advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel or Major General Short in grade, it did set forth as a conclusion of the study that `responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, it should be broadly shared';

Whereas the Dorn Report found that `Army and Navy officials in Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications ... which provided crucial confirmation of the imminence of war'; that `the evidence of the handling of these messages in Washington reveals some ineptitude, some unwarranted assumptions and misestimations, limited coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of clarification and follow-up at higher levels'; and, that `together, these characteristics resulted in failure ... to appreciate fully and to convey to the commanders in Hawaii the sense of focus and urgency that these intercepts should have engendered';

Whereas, on July 21, 1997, Vice Admiral David C. Richardson (United States Navy, retired) responded to the Dorn Report with his own study which confirmed findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation and established, among other facts, that the war effort in 1941 was undermined by a restrictive intelligence distribution policy, and the degree to which the commanders of the United States forces in Hawaii were not alerted about the impending attack on Hawaii was directly attributable to the withholding of intelligence from Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short;

Whereas the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, in establishing a promotion system for the Navy and the Army, provided a legal basis for the President to honor any officer of the Armed Forces of the United States who served his country as a senior commander during World War II with a placement of that officer, with the advice and consent of the Senate, on a retired list with the highest grade held while on the active duty list;

Whereas Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short are the only two eligible officers from World War II who were excluded from the list of retired officers presented for advancement on the retired lists to their highest wartime ranks under the terms of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947;

Whereas this singular exclusion from advancement on the retired list serves only to perpetuate the myth that the senior commanders in Hawaii were derelict in their duty and responsible for the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor, a distinct and unacceptable expression of dishonor toward two of the finest officers who have served in the Armed Forces of the United States;

Whereas Major General Walter Short died on September 23, 1949, and Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel died on May 14, 1968, without the honor of having been returned to their wartime ranks as were their fellow veterans of World War II; and

Whereas the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, the Admiral Nimitz Foundation, the Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Retired Officers Association, and the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Committee, and other associations and numerous retired military officers have called for the rehabilitation of the reputations and honor of Admiral

Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short through their posthumous advancement on the retired lists to their highest wartime grades: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ADVANCEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND MAJOR GENERAL SHORT ON RETIRED LISTS.

(a) REQUEST- The President is requested--

(1) to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to the grade of admiral on the retired list of the Navy; and

(2) to advance the late Major General Walter C. Short to the grade of lieutenant general on the retired list of the Army.

(b) ADDITIONAL BENEFITS NOT TO ACCRUE- Any advancement in grade on a retired list requested under subsection (a) shall not increase or change the compensation or benefits from the United States to which any person is now or may in the future be entitled based upon the military service of the officer advanced.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE OF ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL SHORT.

It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel performed his duties as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, competently and professionally, and, therefore, the losses incurred by the United States in the attacks on the naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and other targets on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, were not a result of dereliction in the performance of those duties by the then Admiral Kimmel; and

(2) the late Major General Walter C. Short performed his duties as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, competently and professionally, and, therefore, the losses incurred by the United States in the attacks on Hickam Army Air Field and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and other targets on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, were not a result of dereliction in the performance of those duties by the then Lieutenant General Short.

Source: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:S.J.RES.55.IS:

Text of the Roberts Commission Report (Summary):

77TH Congress | SENATE | DOCUMENT
2d Session | No. 159

SENATE

ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR BY JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT THE FACTS RELATING TO THE ATTACK MADE BY JAPANESE ARMED FORCES UPON PEARL HARBOR IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

S. Docs., 77-2, VOL. 8 - 8

[SUBMITTED BY MR. HAYDEN]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
January 28 (Legislative Day, January 23), 1942.

ORDERED, That the report of the Commission appointed by the President to investigate and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, be printed as a Senate Document.

JAPANESE ATTACK UPON PEARL HARBOR

JANUARY 23, 1942

The PRESIDENT,
The White House

SIR: The undersigned were appointed by Executive order of December 18, 1941, which defined our duties as a commission thus:

"to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

"The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned, and, if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor."

The Congress speedily supplemented the Executive order by granting the Commission power to summon witnesses and examine them under oath.

The Commission held three meetings in Washington, December 18, 19, and 20, and, on the latter day, proceeded to Honolulu, T. H., where the Commission arrived December 22 and held meetings December 22, 23, 24, and 26 at the headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, and December 27, 29, 30, and 31, 1941, and January 2 and 3, 1942, at the submarine base, Pearl Harbor; and January 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu. January 10 the commission left Honolulu for Washington, D. C.; held meetings January 12, 13, and 14; arrived at Washington January 15 and held further meetings January 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23.

The Commission examined 127 witnesses and received a large number of documents. All members of the Military and Naval Establishments, and civil officers and citizens who were thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the inquiry, were summoned and examined under oath. All persons in the island of Oahu, who believed they had knowledge of such facts, were publicly requested to appear, and a number responded to the invitation and gave evidence.

Various rumors and hearsay statements have been communicated to the Commission. The Commission has sought to find and examine witnesses who might be expected to have knowledge respecting them. We believe that our findings of fact sufficiently dispose of most of them.

The evidence touches subjects which in the national interest should remain secret. We have, therefore, refrained from quotation of testimony or documentary proof. Our findings, however, have been made with the purpose fully and accurately to reflect the testimony, which as respects matters of fact is substantially without contradiction.

It is true, as we have found, that due to the enormous demand on the Nation's capacity to produce munitions and war supplies, there was a deficiency in the provision of materiel for the Hawaiian area. This was but natural, in the circumstances, and was well known to the Government departments and local commanders. We have made no detailed findings on the subject since, as will appear from our report, we find that this deficiency did not affect the critical fact of failure to take appropriate measures with the means available.

At our hearings reference was made to what has long been a matter of common knowledge that there are, and have been, diverse views of national policy respecting the basing of the entire United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, T. H. We feel that the national policy in this matter is one that has been settled by those responsible for such decisions and that it is not within our province that of finding the facts respecting the attack of December 7, and the responsibility for the resulting damage to the United States to discuss any such topic.

Regrettable loss of life and extensive damage resulted from the air raid. The nature of that damage and the details of the measures taken to repair it have no direct bearing on the execution of the mandate appointing this Commission, and the subject is dealt with in our report only to the extent that it bears on questions of responsibility for the disaster.

The evidence taken covered a wide scope. The Commission intentionally invited such latitude of testimony and inquiry in the belief that thereby incidental light might be thrown upon the main issues involved. As an example, the Commission heard evidence to show what had been done at Pearl Harbor and on the island of Oahu by naval and military commands subsequent to December 7, 1941, in the view that this might throw some light upon the matters submitted for our consideration. Again, the Commission heard much testimony as to the population of Hawaii, its composition, and the attitude and disposition of the persons composing it, in the belief that the facts disclosed might aid in appraising the results of investigative, counterespionage, and anti-sabotage work done antecedent to the attack of December 7, 1941.

The Commission visited the naval base at Pearl Harbor and air fields of the Military and Naval Establishments, as well as the Army posts and forts and certain of the coast fortifications on the island of Oahu.

The minutes of each meeting of the Commission are of record. The statements of witnesses received in the meetings previous to that of December 22 have been recorded in summaries. All testimony received at the meeting of December 22 and the subsequent meetings was stenographically reported and transcribed.

The oral evidence received amounts to 1,887 typewritten pages, and the records and documents examined exceed 3,000 printed pages in number.

Appended hereto is a map of the island of Oahu showing the location of the principal naval and military establishments.

All the testimony and evidence received have been considered and, as the result of its deliberations, the Commission submits the following:

FINDING OF FACT

I

About 7:55 a. m. Honolulu time (1:25 p. m. Eastern standard time) on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Japanese forces attacked Army and Navy installations and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Oahu, T. H.

Although the United States and Japan were at peace on that morning, Japan planned to announce to the Secretary of State of the United States at 1 p. m. of that day, eastern standard time (7:30 a.

m. Honolulu time) the severance of diplomatic relations and simultaneously to attack the island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor. The military preparations for this breach of international faith and honor were put in train and the forces for its consummation had been dispatched weeks prior to any intimation of the planned severance of relations.

II

The Territory of Hawaii comprises the group of islands known as the Hawaiian Islands. This group consists of the larger islands Hawaii, Maui, Molokai, Oahu, and Kauai and a number of smaller islands. They extend from Hawaii in the south some 300 miles in a northwesterly direction, including Kauai in the north. For purposes of certain developments and protection, the islands of Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Christmas, and Canton had been placed under the responsible naval and military heads in the Hawaiian area.

The importance of the Territory of Hawaii from a national defense standpoint is the fact that Pearl Harbor, the main outlying naval base in the Pacific, is located in the island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian group. For this reason all measures for the protection and defense of the Territory have centered in and around Oahu, the other islands being garrisoned by minor forces only. A main outlying naval base such as Pearl Harbor, is intended for the use of the fleet for taking on fuel and supplies, for recreation and rest of the fleet personnel, and for the repair and refitting of ships.

III

It has been well known that the policy of the United States as to affairs in the Pacific was in conflict with the policies of other governments. It was realized by the State, War, and Navy Departments of the United States that unless these policies were reconciled war in the Pacific was inevitable.

IV

Plans and preparations against the contingency of war are the joint responsibility of the military and naval authorities, and, within the limits of funds and authorizations provided by the Congress, were being ceaselessly carried out.

Under these plans the general function of the Army is to conduct military operations in direct defense of United States territory. The general function of the Navy is to conduct naval operations to gain and maintain control of vital sea areas, thereby contributing to the defense of the coastal frontiers.

Specific plans for the protection of the Hawaiian area against every contingency had been prepared. These included joint Army and Navy war plans, and War Department and Navy Department plans subsidiary thereto which establish the Hawaiian coastal frontier, assign tasks and forces to both Army and Navy for its joint defense, and prescribe that the system of coordination between the responsible Army and Navy commanders shall be by mutual cooperation.

V

The responsibility for the Joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier rested upon the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, the latter acting as a subordinate of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. The commander in chief of the fleet, in addition, was assigned the task of protecting the territory within the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions within that frontier, and the further task of covering the operations of the Hawaiian coastal frontier forces. The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, could properly deal, respecting defense measures and dispositions, with either the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet or the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet from February 1 to December 17, 1941, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. The commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, from April 11, 1940, to date is Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch. The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, from February 7 to December 17, 1941, was Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short.

A local joint defense plan entitled "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier," was prepared by General Short and Rear Admiral Bloch, the latter acting under the direction of Admiral Kimmel. Each commander adopted a standing operating procedure, or standing orders, to carry out his obligation under the joint agreement. This joint coastal frontier defense

plan was intended to become operative upon order of the War and Navy Departments or, as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an emergency, a threat of hostile action, or the occurrence of war.

The means available to the Army, for the fulfillment of its mission, consist of coast defense and antiaircraft artillery, mobile ground forces, the Hawaiian air force, and an aircraft warning service. The supporting elements of the Navy consist of local naval defense forces comprising light surface craft and shore-based aircraft not assigned to the fleet. The fleet as such was not charged with the defense of Pearl Harbor, except that certain aircraft attached to the fleet when present, and the antiaircraft weapons of such units of the fleet as were in port, were available.

It was recognized that, prior to furnishing the full war strength garrison, insufficient forces were available to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time. The responsible commanders made numerous recommendations to the War and

Navy Departments for additional forces, equipment, and funds which they deemed necessary to insure the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier under any eventuality. The national situation permitted only a partial filling of these requirements. However, presupposing timely dispositions by the Army and Navy commands in Hawaii, the forces available to them were adequate to frustrate a surprise air attack or greatly to mitigate its effectiveness.

VII

In a letter of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy advised the Secretary of War that the increased gravity of the Japanese situation had prompted a restudy of the problem of the security of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor. The writer stated:

"If war eventuates with Japan, It is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor."

The writer stated that the

"inherent possibilities of a major disaster "

warranted further speedy action to

"increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned * * *"

The letter proceeded:

"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."

It stated the defenses against all but the first two were then satisfactory, described the probable character of an air attack and urgent consideration by the Army of dispositions to discover and meet such attack and provision of additional equipment therefor. It concluded with recommendations for the revision of joint defense plans with special emphasis on the coordination of Army and Navy operations against surprise aircraft raids. It also urged the conduct of joint exercises to train the forces to meet such raids.

The Secretary of War replied February 7, 1941, giving the present and prospective status of the Hawaiian Department in respect of airplanes and antiaircraft artillery, and stating with respect to the other proposals of the Secretary of the Navy that a copy of the letter was being forwarded to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, with direction to him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making the suggested measures effective.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short received copies of these letters at about the time they assumed the commands which they held December 7, 1941. Rear Admiral Bloch also received copies.

The joint coastal frontier defense plan and plans subsidiary thereto envisaged the possibility of an air attack and estimated that, if made it would most likely occur at dawn. An agreement between the Hawaiian air force and the commander, Navy Patrol Wing 21 established the responsibilities for the joint use and operation of the available air forces of the Army and Navy. The standing operating procedure, Hawaiian Department, and standing orders of the United States Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District also pre-

scribed measures for protection against air attack. Frequent joint drills and exercises were conducted during the year 1941 to insure such measures would be effective.

VIII

For months prior to December 7, 1941, the Secretary of State was repeatedly in contact with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, not only in Cabinet meetings, but in meetings of the war council; and on the occasions of those contacts and in conference, with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, discussed negotiations with Japan and the growing tensity of the relations of the United States with Japan. At meetings of the war council the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations were also present. The Secretary of State constantly kept the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy informed of the progress of the negotiations, and all three of these officials were cognizant of the growing threat of hostilities and of the military and naval needs and measures consequent thereupon. The Secretaries of War and Navy were in constant touch with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and imparted to them the information received from the Secretary of State and the results of their conferences with him. The latter officers in turn advised the responsible commanders in the field of the progress of events and of the growing threat of hostilities. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area were aware that previous Japanese actions and demonstrated Axis methods indicated that hostile action might be expected prior to a declaration of war.

IX

October 16, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commander in chief of the fleet were advised by the War and Navy Departments of the changes in the Japanese Cabinet, of the probability of hostilities between Japan and Russia, and of the possibility of an attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States. Both commanders were warned to take precautions and to make preparatory dispositions which would not disclose their strategic intentions or constitute provocation as against Japan. Admiral Kimmel made certain dispositions of units of the fleet, and placed additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor. At that time various task forces of the Navy were engaged in training operations and maneuvers which were deemed highly important to the training of the fleet personnel, and the Army was also conducting intensive training, particularly of its air arm. The responsible commanders testified that to undertake increased defense measures respecting Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian area would necessitate curtailment of training, if not its virtual suspension, and they thought the situation was not such as to require this.

November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to Admiral Kimmel, in which he stated that in the opinion of the Navy Department a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility; that the doubt as to favorable outcome of pending negotiations, the statements of the Japanese Government, and the movements of its army and naval forces, supported this opinion. The

communication enjoined secrecy to prevent complication of the tense existing situation. The message advised that the Chief of Staff of the Army requested that the local senior Army officers be advised that he concurred in the despatch. This message was seen by both the commander in chief of the fleet and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department.

The responsible commanders in Hawaii knew that negotiations had been continued through October and November, and were awaiting further developments. November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army informed the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, that the negotiations with Japan seemed to be ended, with little likelihood of their resumption; that Japanese action was unpredictable; that hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible; that in the event hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that this Nation should not commit the first overt act; that the department commander was not to be restricted to any course which would jeopardize his defense. The message directed him, even prior to hostile action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary, but to carry them out in such a way as not to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. He was directed to restrict the information contained in the message to the minimum of essential officers, and to report to the Chief of Staff the measures taken. The purport of this message was communicated by the department commander to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

On the same day (November 27, 1941), the Chief of Military Intelligence sent a message to the intelligence officer on the staff of the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, directing him to

inform the commanding general and his chief of staff that negotiations with Japan had practically ceased; that hostilities might ensue; and that subversive activity might be expected.

On the same day (November 27, 1941), the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. It directed the execution of a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. It stated that Guam, Samoa, and continental districts had been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage, and that a similar warning was being sent by the War Department. It ordered that the addressee inform naval district and Army authorities. The commander in chief of the fleet communicated the purport of this message to the general commanding the Hawaiian Department of the Army.

At the time of our hearing General Short had no independent recollection of the last-mentioned message, although he felt that it must have been shown to him.

November 27, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, in response to the direction of the Chief of Staff that he report measures taken, informed the Chief of Staff that he had alerted his

command against sabotage and that he was maintaining liaison with the Navy. No reply referring to this message was sent by the War Department; but General Short testified that he considered the Adjutant General's message referred to in the next succeeding paragraph a reply.

November 28, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, received from The Adjutant General of the Army a message stating that the critical situation required every precaution to be taken at once against subversive activities, within the scope of the Army's responsibility; that all necessary measures be taken to protect military establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, against propaganda affecting Army personnel, and against all espionage. The message disclaimed ordering any illegal measures, and warned that protective measures should be confined to those essential to security, so as to avoid unnecessary publicity and alarm. The message stated that identical communications were being sent to all air stations and, on November 28, the Chief of the Army Air Forces sent such an identical message to the commanding general, Hawaiian Air Force.

November 29, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, replied to the last-mentioned message, outlining at length and in detail the measures taken to prevent sabotage of military establishments and property and essential industrial and public-utility installations. No reply was sent by the War Department to this message. General Short testified that he considered this series of messages a tacit agreement that the measures taken were all that were intended by the Department.

November 29, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the commander in chief of the fleet, which was in substance a quotation of the Chief of Staff's despatch of November 27 to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department; and in addition directed the addressee to take no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act, and ordered certain action in case hostilities should occur.

November 30, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and also forwarded the message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for his information, in which it was stated the indications were that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus, directing the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to do certain scouting, but to avoid the appearance of attacking. Admiral Kimmel testified that he had viewed this message as indicating that the Navy Department was not expecting a Japanese attack on Hawaii.

The Navy Department sent three messages to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet; the first of December 3, 1941, stated that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents; the second of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only); and the third of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment.

The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable imminence of air raids. On the contrary they only served to emphasize in their minds the danger from sabotage and surprise submarine attack. The necessity for taking a state-of-war readiness which would have been required to avert or meet an air-raid attack was not considered.

X

December 1, 1941, the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin which, under the caption "Japanese Naval Situation,"' stated:

"Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indochina and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by all individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the commander in chief, Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of: the carriers."

The Naval Intelligence Service in Hawaii, due to lack of information indicating that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea, concluded they were in home ports.

XI

At about noon, eastern standard time (6:30 a.m. Honolulu time), December 7, an additional warning message, indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan, was its dispatched by the Chief of Staff after conference with the Chief Naval Operations, for the information of responsible Army and Navy commanders. Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.

XII

The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, the commander in chief of the fleet, and the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, their senior subordinates, and their principal staff officers, considered the possibility of air raids. Without exception they believed that the chance of such a raid while the Pacific Fleet was based upon Pearl Harbor were practically nil. The attack of Sunday, December 7, 1941, was therefore a complete surprise to each of them.

While General Short and Admiral Kimmel conferred frequently with respect to joint Army-Navy plans and procedures, they did not, subsequent to November 27, 1941, hold any conference specifically directed to the meaning of the messages received from the War and Navy Departments or concerning action required to be taken pursuant to those messages.

For some time prior to November 27, 1941, the War Department and the Navy Department had under consideration the possibility of sending Army airplanes to Wake and Midway and withdrawing Marine planes then on those islands; of relieving marines stationed there by the substitution of units of the Army. General Short, Admiral Kimmel, and Rear Admiral Bloch had been in conference concerning this proposal.

At the time of the receipt of the messages of November 27 by Admiral Kimmel and General Short, respectively, this proposal was a subject of discussion. General Short held discussions with Admiral Kimmel on November 27, December 1, 2, and 3 concerning this matter in an effort to compose certain differences of view. At one of these conferences Admiral Kimmel inquired of his war-plans officer, Captain McMorris, who was present, concerning the probability of a surprise air attack on Oahu. According to General Short, Captain McMorris replied there was no probability of such an attack; and, according to Captain McMorris, his reply was that the Japanese would never so attack. According to the testimony Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not discuss means or measures for Hawaiian defense to be adopted in the light of the messages.

On and after November 27, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, independently took such action as each deemed appropriate to the

existing situation. Neither informed the other specifically of the action he was taking, and neither inquired of the other whether or not any action had been taken, nor did they consult as to the appropriateness of the actions taken by them respectively.

After receipt of the messages of November 27 the following action was taken:

The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, ordered alert No. 1 (see next succeeding paragraph) into effect on November 27, and it was maintained in effect until December 7. At the same time he ordered that the aircraft warning system operate daily from 4 to 7 a. m. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as base-defense officer, called a conference of all the destroyer commanders of the inshore patrol, advised them that something might happen, and that they should be on the alert. The commander in chief of the fleet made certain dispositions of units of the fleet for the purpose of strengthening his outposts to the south and west of the Hawaiian Islands, and also issued an order that any Japanese submarines found in the operating areas around the island of Oahu should be attacked. This order went beyond the authority given him by the Navy Department.

In the Hawaiian Department's standing operating procedure governing the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, three states of readiness were prescribed, known as alert No. 1, alert No. 2, and alert No. 3. Alert No. 1 was thus defined:

"This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without."

Alert No. 2 was thus defined:

"This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings is provided."

Alert No. 3 was thus defined:

"This alert requires occupation of alt field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands."

XIII

The responsibilities of the Army included the installation and operation of an aircraft warning system for the detection of water-borne and air-borne craft at a distance from the coast. Throughout the spring and summer of 1941 the Army was engaged in the installation of permanent facilities for this purpose on the Hawaiian Islands. Permanent installations had not, on December 7, 1941, been completed. By November 27, 1941, certain mobile equipment had been installed at temporary locations, and was being operated intermittently throughout the day for the purpose of training personnel in its operation. On November 27, 1941, in connection with the order for alert No. 1, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, ordered that this system be operated each day during the period from 4 until 7 a. m. It was intended that in the near future the Navy should have officer personnel in the information
center, but up December 7 such officers had not been designated. In accordance with the order in effect, the system closed at 7 a. m. Sunday, December 7. A noncommissioned officer who had been receiving training requested that he be allowed to remain at one of the stations, and as granted leave so to do. At about 7:02 a. m. he discovered what he thought was a large flight of planes slightly east of north of Oahu, at a distance of about 130 miles. He reported this fact at 7:20 a. m. to a lieutenant of the Army who was at the central information center, having been detailed there to familiarize himself with the operation of the system. This inexperienced lieutenant, having information that certain United States planes might be in the vicinity at the time, assumed that the planes in question were friendly planes, and took no action with respect to them. The recording of the observation made indicated that these airplanes were tracked toward the land and then lost.

On November 27, 1941, there was sufficient partially trained personnel available to operate the aircraft warning system throughout 24 hours of the day, as installed in its temporary locations. An arc of nearly 360 around Oahu could have been covered.

Admiral Kimmel, on and prior to December 7,1941, assumed that the aircraft warning system was being fully operated by the Army, but made no inquiry after reading any of the messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments as to what the fact was with respect to its operation.

XIV

The joint coastal frontier defense plan provided that, when it became effective, the Army should conduct an inshore airplane patrol, covering the circumference of the island of Oahu to a distance of about 20 miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no inshore patrol was conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. Pilots were being trained on weekdays, and the training involved flying around the confines of Oahu from about 8 o'clock in the morning throughout

the day. On Sunday morning no inshore airplane patrol conducted.

XV

Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating from Oahu to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no distant reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the island of Oahu and, in connection with such operations, carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, however, constituted but small arcs of the total arc of 360 , and rarely extended to a radius of 700 miles.

Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded a measure of security against a surprise air attack.

General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance, but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnaissance, if any, being conducted by the Navy.

XVI

There were, prior to December 7, 1941, Japanese spies on the island of Oahu. Some were Japanese consular agents and others were persons having no open relations with the Japanese foreign service. These spies collected and, through various channels transmitted, information to the Japanese Empire respecting the military and naval establishments and dispositions on the island.

In Hawaii the local Army Intelligence Service has always devoted itself to matters pertaining to Army personnel and property; and the local Naval Intelligence Service to matters pertaining to Navy personnel and property. In addition, prior to the establishment of an office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii, Naval Intelligence investigated enemy activities amongst the civil population. Then the Bureau's office was established it was agreed by the three governmental agencies that the Bureau should take over and become primarily responsible for investigation of matters connected with the civil population, and that the three services should cooperate with each other. Efforts were made by the Bureau to uncover espionage activities in Hawaii. The United States being at peace with Japan, restrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods of obtaining the content of messages transmitted by telephone or radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Oahu and Japan. The Bureau and the local intelligence staffs were unable prior to December 7, to obtain and make available significant information respecting Japanese plans and fleet movements in the direction of Hawaii.

In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents acting under the Japanese consul, who was stationed in Honolulu, T. H. The naval district intelligence office raised a question with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and with the intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Department of the Army, whether these agents

should not be arrested for failing to register as agents of a foreign principal as required by statutes of the United States. In conferences respecting this question, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department objected to the arrest of any such persons at least until then had been given notice and an opportunity to register, asserting that their arrest would tend to thwart the efforts which the Army had made to create friendly sentiment toward the United States on the part of Japanese aliens resident in Hawaii and American citizens of Japanese descent resident in Hawaii and create unnecessary bad feeling. No action was taken against the agents.

It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii was the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that the Japanese consul sent to and received from Tokyo in his own and other names many messages on commercial radio circuits. This activity greatly increased toward December 7, 1941. The contents of these messages, if it could have been learned, might have

furnished valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations with Japan, and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating agencies, they were unable prior to December 7 to obtain and examine messages transmitted through commercial channels by the Japanese consul, or by persons acting for him.

It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japanese had complete information. They evidently knew that no task force of the United States Navy was anywhere in the sector northeast, north, and northwest of the Hawaiian Islands. They evidently knew that no distant airplane reconnaissance was maintained in any sector. They evidently knew that up to December 6 no inshore airplane patrol was being maintained around the periphery of Oahu. They knew, from maps which they had obtained, the exact location of vital air fields, hangars, and other structures. They also knew accurately where certain important naval vessels would be berthed. Their flyers had the most detailed maps, courses, and bearings, so that each could attack a given vessel or field. Each seems to have been given in a specified mission.

XVII

The passes and liberty granted the personnel of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on Saturday, December 6, were normal for a period when the forces were not upon a war footing, with the following exceptions: The normal Army guard had been increased by approximately 100 percent; two battalions of infantry were held in reserve for anti-sabotage defense; antiaircraft gun crews were maintained on ships in harbor for instant defense; all Navy personnel, with the exception of those authorized to be absent, were required to be in their quarters at midnight; all places of amusement in Honolulu and all entertainments at the Army posts were closed at midnight; all saloons and drinking places in Honolulu were closed at midnight.

On the night of December 6 numerous officers of the Army and Navy attended social functions at various points on the island of Oahu, principally the usual Saturday functions at the various posts and naval establishments. The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet were both guests at dinners away from their posts of command on that evening, but returned to their quarters at an early hour.

The percentages of strength in the Army present for duty on the island of Oahu at 8 a. m. December 7, 1941, reported by all major echelons and posts, were: Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, 90 per cent; Twenty-fifth Infantry Division, 85.6 percent; Coast Artillery Corps, 87.5 percent; Air Force, 88.9 percent; miscellaneous, including department headquarters, ordnance, quartermaster, and medical, 92 percent. Estimated general percentage, 88.8 percent. Reports from large ships and destroyers that were in Pearl Harbor during the attack show 60 percent of officers on board and 96 percent of the men. Of 75 vessels of the fleet, of all kinds, 49 commanding officers were aboard during the attack and 22 were en route to their ships, 1 was on another ship, and 1 was on authorized leave, which leaves 2 for whom we are unable to account.

Intoxicating liquor is sold on the island of Oahu, and men on pass or on liberty have the opportunity to buy and consume it. Following the established procedure, at home and abroad, the Army exercises disciplinary control of men on pass through its military police, and the Navy of men on liberty by the use of shore patrols. These organizations take into custody any person showing evidence of intoxication. On the night of December 7, 1941, from 6 p. m. to 6 a. m., arrests of soldiers by the military police, for intoxication, were 38, and arrests of sailors by the Navy shore patrol, for intoxication, were 4. By comparison the arrests of civilians for drunkenness on that night were 39. Thorough inquiry disclosed there is no evidence of excessive drinking by any officer of either service on that night. The evidence shows that as respects the use of intoxicating liquor and intoxication, the conditions amongst the men of the Army and of the Navy on the night of December 6 compare closely with similar conditions for the several preceding months. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, the usual percentage of enlisted strength entitled to passes or liberty took advantage of such privilege to spend the afternoon or evening in the city of Honolulu. Application of this ratio to total numbers of all the services then on the island of Oahu and in Pearl Harbor, amounting to about 75,000 men indicates that no less than 11,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines visited Honolulu that afternoon and evening.

In normal times more enlisted men of both services are absent from duty by permission on Saturday nights than on other nights; and on Saturday nights more officers are customarily absent than on weekday nights.

On the morning of Sunday, December 7, Army posts and naval vessels and stations were adequately manned, for the readiness and alert then in effect, by men fit for duty.

The attack on the morning of December 7,1941, was a combined air-raid and submarine attack on the island of Oahu, a bombardment of Midway, and a continuous air attack and bombardment on Wake Island.

Available information indicates that the force attacking Oahu consisted of either three or four Japanese carriers, with supporting surface craft and a few small submarines, and that this force had maintained radio silence during its approach, which, except for the submarines, was from the northward of Oahu.

In the attack on Oahu a suspicions object was sighted in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6:30 a. m., by the U. S. S. Antares. Between 6:33 and 6:45 this object, which was a small submarine, was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of a naval patrol plane and the U. S. S. Ward. A report of this action by the Ward reached the naval-base watch officer at 7:12 a. m., who notified his chief of staff. The ready destroyer was despatched to investigate, but no alert warnings were issued based upon this report. Another small submarine was fired upon, depth-charged, rammed, and sunk inside the harbor between 8:35 and 8:43 a. m. A third small submarine grounded in Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There is no evidence of any damage by torpedoes fired by these submarines.

Pearl Harbor was provided with an anti-torpedo net which would have prevented the entrance of torpedoes into the harbor, and would have revealed the entrance of a submarine. The procedure prior to December 7, 1941, was to keep the net closed during the hours of darkness, opening it only when necessary for a vessel to pass through. It was kept open during daylight hours, on the theory that, during daylight the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel, and other vessels in the vicinity, would detect a submerged or partially submerged submarine. December 7 the net was opened at 4:58 a. m. for the entrance of two mine sweepers. It was kept open until 8:40 a. m., when it was closed by orders. The net was not damaged. The submarine was first sighted in the harbor at 7:45 a. m. The time of its entrance is not known, but probably it passed in about 7 a. m.

An estimated force of from 150 to 200 fighting, bombing, and torpedo planes simultaneously attacked Pearl Harbor and all air bases Oahu at about 7:55 a. m. All attacking planes had withdrawn before 11 a. m. As a result of the attack serious loss of life was caused and serious damage was inflicted on ships in the harbor, and planes, hangars, and other facilities at Hickam Field, Ewa Field, Ford Island, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field, and Kaneohe.

The major part of the damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from planes. The torpedoes were of an obsolete type, altered to increase their explosive load, to decrease their radius, and fitted with side vanes to insure functioning in shallow water a weapon peculiarly adapted to an attack such as the one delivered upon ships in Pearl Harbor. Many of the bombs had extra heavy cases, and appeared to be modified armor-piercing shell.

December 7, 1941, at 9:30 p. m. Midway time (11: 30 p. m. Honolulu time), a force believed to consist of two cruisers and two destroyers, approaching from the southward, opened fire and shelled Midway Island for about 30 minutes. About noon December 8, 1941 (2:50 p. m. December 7, Honolulu time), some 27 land planes made strafing and bombing attack on Wake Island. Some loss of life and damage to material resulted on each island. Attacks on Wake continued until its capture on December 22, 1941 (December 21, Honolulu time).

Immediately upon realizing that the Japanese were attacking, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, ordered alert No. 3. The alert was executed with reasonable promptness. At the same time the commander in chief placed the fleet on a full war basis and

issued a series of orders in an effort to intercept and destroy the attacking force.

Officers and enlisted men, in defending against the attack, demonstrated excellent training and high morale. Antiaircraft weapons aboard ship, which were not already manned, and antiaircraft weapons ashore, which were in position, were promptly manned. Junior officers and enlisted men on their own initiative procured from storage every possible automatic weapon. These weapons continued in action during and in spite of low-level strafing and dive bombing which have been known to demoralize even seasoned troops. At least three fighter pilots, in total disregard of their own safety, attempted to take off in the face of greatly superior forces then attacking their airdrome, but lost their lives in the attempt. A few fighter planes parked on an outlying gunnery training field, which was not attacked, took the air. This combined antiaircraft and fighter action resulted

in the destruction of approximately 30 enemy aircraft, and a number of others were lost at sea because they were unable to rejoin their carriers.

XIX

The state of readiness prescribed for Army aircraft prior to the attack required them to be ready for flight only after 4 hours' notice. The type of alert in effect required all Army aircraft to be concentrated in order more effectively to guard against possible sabotage instead of being dispersed in order to afford greater security against air attack, and greater facility in taking the air. This state of readiness, this concentration of airplanes, and the element of surprise, all contributed to the effectiveness of the Japanese attack, and resulted in such permanent or temporary disablement of airplanes that very few fighter airplanes were able to take the air during the course of the action. For the same reasons it was impossible to get airplanes into the air in time to trail the Japanese airplanes back to their carriers.

The aircraft warning system, which was remanned by about 8:30 a. m. December 7, 1941, failed during the balance of that day to furnish any reliable information of enemy aircraft returning to their carriers. Such information as it afforded indicated enemy forces to the southward and southwestward of Oahu. A report of an actual contact with an enemy carrier, which later proved to be erroneous, gave credence to numerous reports from other sources indicating enemy carriers might be to the southward and southwestward thus causing futile searches in those areas.

On December 7 Naval Task Force 8 was about 200 miles west of Oahu, proceeding toward Oahu. Another was about 700 miles west of Oahu. A third, Task Force 11, was in the vicinity of Johnston Island, about 700 miles southwest of Oahu. These task forces were engaged in operations connected with strengthening the defenses of the outlying islands.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, prior to the attack, the following searches of sea areas were being made. Six patrol planes were searching south and southeastwardly from Midway. These patrol planes were in the air engaged in a joint exercise with submarines south of Oahu. Eighteen scouting planes from Task Force 8 had been dispatched to scout in advance of the force which was on its way to

Oahu. These scouted to the southwestward of Oahu. After the attack following searches were made: The 3 planes in the air south of Oahu, according to their standing orders, searched to the northwest of Oahu a distance of about 375 miles. Nine planes were dispatched by Task Force 8 and searched to the south and southwest of Oahu. Carrier planes of Task Force 11 searched in an area about 500 miles southwestward of Oahu. About 11:27 a. m. 2 heavy Army bombers and 4 light bombers took off to attack a carrier reported about 25 miles off Barber's Point. After failure to make contact the 2 heavy bombers searched first to the southwestward and then in areas to the northwest of Oahu. The other 4 searched to the southwestward. At 11:50 a. m. 6 Navy VS planes searched southward of Oahu. Thereafter 9 planes searched the sector southwest to northwest of Oahu. Two utility planes searched northward of Oahu to a distance of 300 miles, and 9 planes which had arrived from carriers and refueled searched some 200 miles to the northward. No contacts were made with enemy aircraft or carriers, except that 1 Navy airplane was attacked by a Japanese airplane some 300 miles north of Oahu. This incident was not reported until the next day.

SUMMARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT FACTS

Pearl Harbor is an important outlying naval base, and its security is vital to both offensive and defensive operations. It is the Army's function to insure the security of Pearl Harbor against hostile attack, and the Navy's function to support the Army indirectly by operations at sea and directly by making available therefor such instrumentalities of the Navy as are on the vessels of the fleet when in harbor and are located or based on shore either temporarily or permanently.

Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to success in war and requires that the operations of the Army and the Navy be coordinated. Under the then existing plans the joint defense of the Hawaiian frontier was to be coordinated by mutual cooperation between the commanders concerned. Plans for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier were prepared by the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, the latter acting as a subordinate of the commander in chief of the Pacific fleet. Adherence to such a plan prepared in advance of hostilities does not suffice to relieve commanders of their responsibility to apply and adapt the plan to the situation as it develops.

Where, as here, the defense of an area is the joint responsibility of two commanders who are to coordinate their activities by mutual cooperation, the first duty of such commanders in the case of

an emergency is conference and consultation with respect to the measures to be taken under the existing plans and the adaptation of those plans in whole or in part to the situation.

At about the time that Admiral Kimmel and General Short assumed their respective commands, the War and Navy Departments were in correspondence with respect to adequate defense against air raids on Oahu and the naval base. The correspondence between the departments exhibits a deep concern respecting the probability of this form of attack. These commanders were acquainted with this

correspondence. Nevertheless there has been amongst the responsible commanders and their subordinates, without exception, a conviction, which persisted up to December 7, 1941, that Japan had no intention of making any such raid. Consequently this form of attack was a complete surprise to all of the superior officers of Army and Navy stationed in the Hawaiian area. This conviction persisted notwithstanding messages containing warnings and orders, brought to the attention of both commanders over a period of weeks prior to the attack. As early as October 16 the commanders were warned of the possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States and were directed to take precautions and make preparatory dispositions in the light of this information. A significant warning message was communicated to both the local commanders on November 24. On November 27 each responsible commander was warned that hostilities were momentarily possible. The warnings indicated war, and war only.

Both of these messages contained orders. The commanding general was ordered to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary. The commander in chief of the fleet was ordered to execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. Other significant messages followed on succeeding days. These emphasized the impending danger and the need for war readiness.

In this situation, during a period of 10 days preceding the Japanese attack, the responsible commanders held no conference directed to a discussion of the meaning of the warnings and orders sent them. And failed to collaborate and to coordinate defensive measures which should be taken pursuant to the orders received. Dispositions as a result of the messages were independently made by each commander. Neither of them informed himself of the measures and dispositions taken by the other.

The dispositions so made were inadequate to meet a surprise air attack.

Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent the initiation of a state of readiness for defense.

The personnel, materiel, and equipment were insufficient to place the forces on a war footing and maintain them on that footing for an extended period. These deficiencies did not preclude measures which would have to a great extent frustrated the attack or mitigated its severity.

A considerable number of the Army and Navy personnel were on pass or liberty December 6, for the reason that the state of alert or of readiness demanded by the emergency had not been put into effect. With immaterial exceptions Army and Navy personnel had returned from leave and liberty hours before the attack ensued, fit for duty.

Both officers and men responded immediately in the emergency and exhibited initiative, efficiency, and bravery in meeting the raid.

Based upon its findings of fact, the Commission reaches the following

CONCLUSIONS

1. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to success in war and requires: First, the coordination of the foreign and military policies of the Nation; and, second, the coordination of the operations of the Army and Navy.

2. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan.

3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and

the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.

4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled their obligations by consulting and cooperating with each other, and with their superiors, respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier; and each knew of, and concurred in, the warnings and orders sent by the other to the responsible commanders with respect to such defense.

5 The Chief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his command responsibility by issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of probable hostilities, in the following words: "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary."

6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsibility by issuing a warning and by giving a direct order to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, in the following words:

This despatch is to be considered a war warning.

And

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned.

7. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area, in fulfillment of their obligation so to do, prepared plans which, if adapted to and used for the existing emergency, would have been adequate.

8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was to confer upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans.

9. These commanders failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing plans to meet the emergency.

10. The order for alert No. 1 of the Army command in Hawaii was not adequate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.

11. The state of readiness of the naval forces on the morning of December 7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.

12. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warning system of the Army should have been operating: the distant reconnaissance of the Navy, and the inshore air patrol of the Army,

should have been maintained; the antiaircraft batteries of the Army and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as additional antiaircraft artillery located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, should have been manned and supplied with ammunition: and a high state of readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon the warnings and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.

13. There were deficiencies in personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time. But these deficiencies should not have affected the decision of the responsible commanders as to the state of readiness to be prescribed.

14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both commanders in the field at about 7 a. m. Hawaiian time, December 7, 1941, was but an added precaution, in view of the warnings and orders previously issued. If the message had reached its destination at the time intended, it would still have been too late to be of substantial use. In view of the fact that the commanders had failed to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its anticipated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to meet it.

15. The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe that General Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief of Staff's message of that date, nor otherwise, had reported the measures taken by him, and the transmission of two messages concerned chiefly with sabotage which warned him not to resort to illegal methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to take measures which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply to his message of November 29 outlining in full all the actions he had taken against sabotage only, and referring to nothing

else, tended to lead General Short to believe that what he had done met the requirements of the warnings and orders received by him.

16. The failure of the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to confer and cooperate with respect to the meaning of the warnings received and the measures necessary to comply with the orders given them under date of November 27, 1941, resulted largely from a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military, and naval circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the Pacific Fleet and our most important outpost.

17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform him-

self of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department.

18. The Japanese attack was a complete surprise to the commanders and they failed to make suitable dispositions to meet such an attack. Each failed properly to evaluate the seriousness of the situation. These errors of judgment were the effective causes for the success of the attack.

19. Causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were:
Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war by the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such laws and customs.

Restrictions which prevented effective counter-espionage.

Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive Japanese action in the Ear East, and on anti-sabotage measures.

Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-sabotage measures instituted by the commanding general, Hawaiian Department.

Non-receipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the warning message of December 7, 1941.

20. When the attack developed on the morning of December 7, 1941, the officers and enlisted men of both services were present in sufficient number and were in fit condition to perform any duty. Except for a negligible number, the use of intoxicating liquor on the preceding evening did not affect their efficiency.

21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors' orders without question. They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed.

Respectfully submitted.

OWEN J. ROBERTS.
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J. M. REEVES.
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[January 23, 1942]

Source: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/roberts/roberts.html

Do Freedom of Information Act Files Prove FDR Had Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor?

March 11, 2002

Robert B. Stinnett, Douglas Cirignano

An Interview with Robert B. Stinnett by Douglas Cirignano

On November 25, 1941 Japan's Admiral Yamamoto sent a radio message to the group of Japanese warships that would attack Pearl Harbor on December 7. Newly released naval records prove that from November 17 to 25 the United States Navy intercepted eighty-three messages that Yamamoto sent to his carriers. Part of the November 25 message read: "...the task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow..."

One might wonder if the theory that President Franklin Roosevelt had a foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack would have been alluded to in this summer's movie, *Pearl Harbor*. Since World War II many people have suspected that Washington knew the attack was coming. When Thomas Dewey was running for president against Roosevelt in 1944 he found out about America's ability to intercept Japan's radio messages, and thought this knowledge would enable him to defeat the popular FDR. In the fall of that year, Dewey planned a series of speeches charging FDR with foreknowledge of the attack. Ultimately, General George Marshall, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, persuaded Dewey not to make the speeches. Japan's naval leaders did not realize America had cracked their codes, and Dewey's speeches could have sacrificed America's code-breaking advantage. So, Dewey said nothing, and in November FDR was elected president for the fourth time.

Now, though, according to Robert Stinnett, author of Simon & Schuster's *Day Of Deceit*, we have the proof. Stinnett's book is dedicated to Congressman John Moss, the author of America's Freedom of Information Act. According to Stinnett, the answers to the mysteries of Pearl Harbor can be found in the extraordinary number of documents he was able to attain through Freedom of Information Act requests. Cable after cable of decryptions, scores of military messages that America was intercepting, clearly showed that Japanese ships were preparing for war and heading straight for Hawaii. Stinnett, an author, journalist, and World War II veteran, spent sixteen years delving into the National Archives. He poured over more than 200,000 documents, and conducted dozens of interviews. This meticulous research led Stinnett to a firmly held conclusion: FDR knew.

"Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars," was Roosevelt's famous campaign statement of 1940. He wasn't being ingenuous. FDR's military and State Department leaders were agreeing that a victorious Nazi Germany would threaten the national security of the United States. In White House meetings the strong feeling was that America needed a call to action. This is not what the public wanted, though. Eighty to ninety percent of the American people wanted nothing to do with Europe's war. So, according to Stinnett, Roosevelt provoked Japan to attack us, let it happen at Pearl Harbor, and thus galvanized the country to war. Many who came into contact with Roosevelt during that time hinted that FDR wasn't being forthright about his intentions in Europe. After the attack, on the Sunday evening of December 7, 1941, Roosevelt had a brief meeting in the White House with Edward R. Murrow, the famed journalist, and William Donovan, the founder of the Office of Strategic Services. Later Donovan told an assistant that he believed FDR welcomed the attack and didn't seem surprised. The only thing Roosevelt seemed to care about, Donovan felt, was if the public would now support a declaration of war. According to *Day Of Deceit*, in October 1940 FDR adopted a specific strategy to incite Japan to commit an overt act of war. Part of the strategy was to move America's Pacific fleet out of California and anchor it in Pearl Harbor. Admiral James Richardson, the commander of the Pacific fleet, strongly opposed keeping the ships in harm's way in Hawaii. He expressed this to Roosevelt, and so the President relieved him of his command. Later Richardson quoted Roosevelt as saying: "Sooner or later the Japanese will commit an overt act against the United States and the nation will be willing to enter the war."

To those who believe that government conspiracies can't possibly happen, *Day Of Deceit* could prove to them otherwise. Stinnett's well-documented book makes a convincing case that the highest officials of the government—including the highest official—fooled and deceived millions of Americans about one of the most important days in the history of the country. It now has to be considered one of the most definitive—if not the definitive—book on the subject. Gore Vidal has said, "...Robert Stinnett has come up with most of the smoking guns. *Day Of Deceit* shows that the famous 'surprise' attack was no surprise to our war-minded rulers..." And John Toland, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of the Pearl Harbor book, *Infamy*, said, "Step by step, Stinnett goes through the prelude to war, using new documents to reveal the terrible secrets that have never been disclosed to the public. It is disturbing that eleven presidents, including those I admired, kept the truth from the public until Stinnett's Freedom of Information Act requests finally persuaded the Navy to release the evidence."

What led you to write a book about Pearl Harbor?

Stinnett: Well, I was in the navy in World War II. I was on an aircraft carrier. With George Bush, believe it or not.

You wrote a book about that.

Stinnett: Yes, that's right. So, we were always told that Japanese targets, the warships, were sighted by United States submarines. We were never told about breaking the Japanese codes. Okay. So, in 1982 I read a book by a Professor Prange called *At Dawn We Slept*. And in that book it said that there was a secret US Navy monitoring station at Pearl Harbor intercepting Japanese naval codes prior to December 7. Well, that was a bombshell to me. That was the first time I had heard about that. I worked at *The Oakland Tribune* at that time....So I went over to Hawaii to see the station to confirm it. And, then, to make a long story short, I met the cryptographers involved, and they steered me to other sources, documents that would support all of their information. And so that started me going. My primary purpose was to learn about the intercept procedures. And so I filed Freedom of Information Act requests with the Navy because communications intelligence is very difficult. It's a no-no. They don't want to discuss it. But the Navy did let me, gave me permission to go to Hawaii and they showed me the station....So that started me on it. And then I would ask for certain information, this is now, we're talking about in the 1980's, the late 1980's. And they're very reluctant to give me more information. I'm getting a little bit.

Historians and government officials who claim that Washington didn't have a foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack have always contended that America wasn't intercepting and hadn't cracked Japan's important military codes in the months and days preceding the attack. The crux of your book is that your research proves that is absolutely untrue. We were reading most all of Japan's radio messages. Correct?

Stinnett: That is correct. And I believed that, too. You know, because, *Life* magazine in September 1945, right after Japan surrendered, suggested that this was the case, that Roosevelt engineered Pearl Harbor. But that was discarded as an anti-Roosevelt tract, and I believed it, also.

Another claim at the heart of the Pearl Harbor surprise-attack lore is that Japan's ships kept radio silence as they approached Hawaii. That's absolutely untrue, also?

Stinnett: That is correct. And this was all withheld from Congress, so nobody knew about all this.

Until the Freedom of Information Act.

Stinnett: Yes.

Is this statement true?—If America was intercepting and decoding Japan's military messages then Washington and FDR knew that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor.

Stinnett: Oh, absolutely.

You feel it's as simple as that?

Stinnett: That is right. And that was their plan. It was their "overt act of war" plan that I talk about in my book that President Roosevelt adopted on October 7, 1940.

You write that in late November 1941 an order was sent out to all US military commanders that stated: "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." According to Secretary of War Stimson, the order came directly from President Roosevelt. Was FDR's cabinet on record for supporting this policy of provoking Japan to commit the first overt act of war?

Stinnett: I don't know that he revealed it to the cabinet. He may have revealed it to Harry Hopkins, his close confidant, but there's no evidence that anybody in the cabinet knew about this.

I thought you wrote in your book that they did...That some of them were on record for...

Stinnett: Well, some did. Secretary of War Stimson knew, based on his diary, and also probably Frank Knox, the Secretary of Navy knew. But Frank Knox died before the investigation started. So all we have really is Stimson, his diary. And he reveals a lot in there, and I do cite it in my book...You must mean his war cabinet. Yes. Stimson's diary reveals that nine people in the war cabinet—the military people—knew about the provocation policy.

Even though Roosevelt made contrary statements to the public, didn't he and his advisors feel that America was eventually going to have to get into the war?

Stinnett: That is right. Well, his statement was, "I won't send your boys to war unless we are attacked." So then he engineered this attack—to get us into war really against Germany. But I think that was his only option. I express that in the book.

Who was Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum and what was his connection to the Pearl Harbor attack?

Stinnett: He worked for Naval intelligence in Washington. He also was the communications routing officer for President Roosevelt. So all these intercepts would go to Commander McCollum and then he would route them to the President. There's no question about that. He also was the author of this plan to provoke Japan into attacking us at Pearl Harbor. And he was born and raised in Japan.

McCollum wrote this plan, this memorandum, in October 1940. It was addressed to two of Roosevelt's closest advisors. In the memo McCollum is expressing that it's inevitable that Japan and America are going to go to war, and that Nazi Germany's going to become a threat to America's security. McCollum is saying that America's going to have to get into the war. But he also says that public opinion is against that. So, McCollum then suggests eight specific things that America should do to provoke Japan to become more hostile, to attack us, so that the public would be behind a war effort. And because he was born and raised in Japan, he understood the Japanese mentality and how the Japanese would react.

Stinnett: Yes. Exactly.

Has the existence of this memo from Commander McCollum ever been revealed to the public before your book came out?

Stinnett: No, no. I received that as pursuant to my FOIA request on January 1995 from the National Archives. I had no idea it existed.

FDR and his military advisors knew that if McCollum's eight actions were implemented—things like keeping the Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbor, and crippling Japan's economy with an embargo—there was no question in their minds that this would cause Japan—whose government was very militant—to attack the United States. Correct?

Stinnett: That is correct, and that is what Commander McCollum said. He said, "If you adopt these policies then Japan will commit an overt act of war."

Is there any proof that FDR saw McCollum's memorandum?

Stinnett: There's no proof that he actually saw the memorandum, but he adopted all eight of the provocations—including where he signed executive orders...And other information in Navy files offers conclusive evidence that he did see it.

The memo is addressed to two of Roosevelt's top advisors, and you include the document where one of them is agreeing with McCollum's suggested course of action.

Stinnett: Yes, Dudley Knox, who was his very close associate.

The "splendid arrangement" was a phrase that FDR's military leaders used to describe America's situation in the Pacific. Can you explain what the "splendid arrangement" was?

Stinnett: The "splendid arrangement" was the system of twenty-two monitoring stations in the Pacific that were operated by the United States, Britain, and the Dutch. These extended along the west coast of the United States, up to Alaska, then down to Southeast Asia, and into the Central Pacific.

These radio monitoring stations allowed us to intercept and read all of Japan's messages, right?

Stinnett: Absolutely. We had Japan wired for sound.

You claim that the "splendid arrangement" was so adept that ever since the 1920's Washington always knew what Japan's government was doing. So to assert that we didn't know the Japanese were going to bomb Pearl Harbor would be illogical?

Stinnett: That is correct.

Your book claims that in 1941 Japan had a spy residing in the Japanese consulate in Honolulu.

Stinnett: Japan secreted this spy—he was a Japanese naval officer—in Honolulu. He arrived there in March 1941 under an assumed name, and he was attached to the Japanese consulate there. But when the FBI checked on him they found out he was not listed in the Japanese foreign registry, so they were suspicious immediately. They put a tail on him. And then the spy started filing messages to Japan that we were intercepting. This was in a diplomatic code now. And so the FBI continued to tail him, and so did Naval intelligence.

Naval intelligence, the FBI, and Roosevelt knew this man was spying on the fleet in Pearl Harbor, and they let the espionage go on. The policy of FDR's government then was to look the other way and let Japan prepare itself for attacking us?

Stinnett: That's right. That is correct. He was providing a timetable for the attack.

The spy was even sending bomb plots of Pearl Harbor?

Stinnett: Yes. From March to August he was giving a census of the US Pacific fleet. Then starting in August he started preparing bomb plots of Pearl Harbor, where our ships were anchored and so forth.

And Roosevelt even saw those bomb plots, right?

Stinnett: Yes, that is correct.

You claim that twice during the week of December 1 to 6 the spy indicated that Pearl Harbor would be attacked. According to a Japanese commander, the message on December 2 was: "No changes observed by afternoon of 2 December. So far they do not seem to have been alerted." And on the morning of December 6 the message was: "There are no barrage balloons up and there is an opportunity left for a surprise attack against these places." These messages were intercepted by the Navy, right? Did Roosevelt know about these messages?

Stinnett: They were intercepted. That is correct. They were sent by RCA communications. And Roosevelt had sent David Sarnoff, who was head of RCA, to Honolulu so that this would facilitate getting these messages even faster. Though we were also intercepting them off the airways, anyway. And on December 2 and on December 6 the spy indicated that Pearl was going to be the target. And the December 2 message was intercepted, decoded, and translated prior to December 5. The December 6 message...there's really no proof that it was...it was intercepted, but there's all sorts of cover stories on whether or not that reached the President. But he received other information that it was going to happen the next day, anyway.

You saw the records of those intercepts yourself?

Stinnett: Yes. I have those.

And all these other messages that the Navy was constantly intercepting showed exactly where the Japanese ships were, that they were preparing for war, and that they were heading straight for Hawaii. Right?

Stinnett: That's right. Our radio direction finders located the Japanese warships.

You say Roosevelt regularly received copies of these intercepts. How were they delivered to him?

Stinnett: By Commander McCollum routing the information to him. They were prepared in monograph form. They called it monograph....it was sent to the President through Commander McCollum who dispatched it through the naval aide to the President.

On page 203 of the hardcover edition of your book it reads, "Seven Japanese naval broadcasts intercepted between November 28 and December 6 confirmed that Japan intended to start the war and that it would begin in Pearl Harbor." Did you see the records of those intercepts yourself?

Stinnett: Yes. And also we have new information about other intercepts in the current edition that's coming out in May 2001....There's no question about it.

According to Day Of Deceit, on November 25 Admiral Yamamoto sent a radio message to the Japanese fleet. Part of the message read: "The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow..." What's the proof that the record of that intercept exists? Did you see it yourself? Again, did Roosevelt know about it?

Stinnett: The English version of that message has been released by the United States, a government book. The Japanese version—the raw message—has not been released by the U.S. I have copies of the Station H radio logs—a monitoring station in Hawaii. They prove that the Navy intercepted eight-three messages that Yamamoto sent between November seventeenth and twenty-fifth. I have those records, but not the raw intercepts, eighty-six percent of which have not been released by the government...As far as Roosevelt, early in November 1941 Roosevelt ordered that Japanese raw intercepts be delivered directly to him by his naval aide, Captain Beardall. Sometimes if McCollum felt a message was particularly hot he would deliver it himself to FDR.

Late on December 6 and in the very early morning hours of December 7 the United States intercepted messages sent to the Japanese ambassador in Washington. These messages were basically a declaration of war—Japan was saying it was breaking off negotiations with America. At those times, General Marshall and President Roosevelt were shown the intercepts. When FDR read them he said, "This means war." When the last intercept was shown to Roosevelt it was still hours before the Pearl Harbor attack. In that last intercept Japan gave the deadline for when it was breaking off relations with the U.S.—the deadline was the exact hour when Pearl Harbor was attacked. FDR and Marshall should have then sent an emergency warning to Admiral Kimmel in Pearl Harbor. But they acted nonchalantly and didn't get a warning to Kimmel.

Stinnett: Yes. This is a message sent from the Japanese foreign office to the Japanese ambassador in Washington DC. And in it he directed....it broke off relations with the United States and set a timetable of 1:00 PM on Sunday, December 7, eastern time.

Which was the exact time that Pearl Harbor was bombed.

Stinnett: That's right. So they realized, with all their information, this is it. And then General Marshall, though, sat on the message for about fifteen hours because he didn't want to send...he didn't want to warn the Hawaiian commanders in

time....he didn't want them to interfere with the overt act. Eventually they did send it but it didn't arrive until way after the attack.

Roosevelt saw it too. They should have sent an emergency warning to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii, right?

Stinnett: That's right. But you see they wanted the successful overt act by Japan. It unified the American people.

This seems like a classic case of higher-ups doing something questionable, and then getting the people below them to take the blame for it. Admiral Husband Kimmel was in charge of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, and he was demoted and took the blame for the attack. Was that justified?

Stinnett: No, it was not. And Congress, you know, last October of 2000 voted to exonerate him because the information was withheld from them. That's very important. But it was subject to implementation by President Clinton who did not sign it. But at least Congress filed it, made the finding.

You claim that Admiral Kimmel and General Short—who headed up the army in Hawaii—were denied by Washington of the information that would have let them know the attack was coming. In what ways were Kimmel and Short denied intelligence?

Stinnett: Well, they were just cut off...They were not told that the spy was there, and they were not given these crucial documents, the radio direction finder information. All this information was going to everybody but Kimmel and Short. That's very clear.... At one point Kimmel specifically requested that Washington let him know immediately about any important developments, but they did not do that.

Kimmel was given some information, because two weeks before the attack he sent the Pacific fleet north of Hawaii on a reconnaissance exercise to look for Japanese carriers. When White House military officials learned of this what was their reaction?

Stinnett: Admiral Kimmel tried a number of occasions to do something to defend Pearl Harbor. And, right, two weeks before the attack, on November 23, Kimmel sent nearly one hundred warships of the Pacific fleet to the exact site where Japan planned to launch the attack. Kimmel meant business. He was looking for the Japanese. His actions indicated that he wanted to be thoroughly prepared for action if he encountered a Japanese carrier force. When White House officials learned this, they directed to Kimmel that he was "complicating the situation"....You see, the White House wanted a clean cut overt act of war by Japan. Isolationists would have charged FDR was precipitating Japanese action by allowing the Pacific fleet in the North Pacific...So, minutes after Kimmel got the White House directive he canceled the exercise and returned the fleet to its anchorage in Pearl Harbor...That's where the Japanese found it on December 7, 1941.

The White House was handcuffing Kimmel? They wanted him to be completely passive?

Stinnett: That is right.

FDR did send a war warning to Kimmel on November 28. Was that enough of a warning?

Stinnett: Well, that was a warning, but also in there they directed Admiral Kimmel and all the Pacific commanders to stand aside, don't go on the offensive, and remain in a defensive position, and let Japan commit the first overt act. That's right in the message, and it's in my book. And Admiral Kimmel, the message he received, it was repeated twice....stand aside and let Japan commit the first overt act, the exact wording is in my book.

Your book makes it abundantly clear that FDR and his advisors knew Japan was preparing for war, and knew that Japan was eventually going to attack. But can it be said that FDR knew that the attack was going to take place specifically on the morning of December 7 at Pearl Harbor?

Stinnett: Yes.....Absolutely.

Through the radio intercepts.

Stinnett: Through the radio intercepts. Right. Both military and diplomatic.

Did America's ambassador in Japan, Ambassador Joseph Grew, have any indications that Japan was planning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

Stinnett: The information is that he did. I do quote him in the book, and he warned Washington to be on the alert because he couldn't give them the last minute information.

Well, according to your book Ambassador Grew had a reliable source in the Japanese embassy tell him that Japan was planning the attack, and then Grew sent dire warnings to the White House that an attack on Hawaii was a very real possibility.

Stinnett: Yes, well, he was the first one to—after President Roosevelt adopted this eight action memo—Ambassador Grew learned about the Pearl Harbor attack in January1941. And then Commander McCollum was asked to evaluate this, and he said, "Oh, there's nothing to it."—even though it was his plan!

He was being disingenuous, McCollum.

Stinnett: Yea. Exactly.

On December 5 the Navy intercepted a message telling Japanese embassies around the world to burn their code books. What does it mean when a government is telling its embassies to burn their code books?

Stinnett: That means war is coming within a day or two.

That's common knowledge in the military. And the military officials in Washington saw this intercept and the meaning of it wasn't lost on them.

Stinnett: Yes. That's right.

FDR and Washington also knew that Japan had recalled from sea all its merchant ships. What does that mean?

Stinnett: It's known in government and the military that if a nation recalls its merchant ships then those ships are needed to transport soldiers and supplies for war.

So, in your opinion, if there had been no Pearl Harbor, then would America ever have ended up dropping nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Stinnett: Well, that's what the survivors, the families of those who were killed at Pearl, and other people say. They claim that if there hadn't been Pearl Harbor there would have been no Hiroshima. But, of course, that's a "what if" question. And I don't know how to answer it.

One could only speculate on that. But it seems in a way Hiroshima and Nagasaki were maybe retribution for Pearl Harbor.

Stinnett: I think it was more really to bring a close to the war. You know, I was out there at the time, and, frankly, I...we were subject to kamikaze attacks, they were attacking our carriers, and about half of our carriers were knocked out as of July 1945, so, personally, I was very pleased with the atom bombing because that ended the war. It probably saved my life.

If what you're saying is true, then Pearl Harbor is a prime example of government treating human beings like guinea pigs. Yet, you, yourself, don't disparage and don't have a negative view of FDR.

Stinnett: No, I don't have a negative view. I think it was his only option to do this. And I quote the chief cryptographer for the Pacific fleet, who said, "It was a pretty cheap price to pay for unifying the country."

That cryptographer, Commander Joseph Rochefort, was a confidant of McCollum's. He worked closely with Kimmel in Pearl Harbor. It could be argued that Rochefort was the closest one to Kimmel who was most responsible for denying Kimmel of the vital intelligence. And he did make that statement. But do you agree with that? A lot of people would be offended and angered by that statement. A lot of people wouldn't agree with it.

Stinnett: A lot of people would not, but I think under the circumstances this was FDR's only option. And, of course, this was sort of used in the Viet Nam War, you know. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was based on a provocation aimed at the North Vietnamese gunboats—something like that. That's how President Johnson got The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed through the Congress. There was a provocation.

Apparently, it's a military strategy, but the families—obviously—of the people who get killed when a military uses this strategy wouldn't agree with it.

Stinnett: Oh, right. I know. Oh, when I speak about this with the families they just start crying about it, you know. They're terribly upset....But, you know, it was used by President Polk in the Mexican War in 1846. And also by President Lincoln at Fort Sumter And then also, as I say, another example is Viet Nam, this Gulf of Tonkin business.

It could be a traditional military philosophy, the idea that a military has to sometimes provoke the enemy to attack, sacrifice its own soldiers, so as to unify a country for war.

Stinnett: I think so. I think you could probably trace it back to Caesar's time.

How much in your book has never been revealed to the public before?

Stinnett: The breaking of radio silence. The fact that the Japanese ships did not keep silent as they approached Hawaii....The breaking of Japanese codes—I mean the full proof of it. Military codes, I want to emphasize that....And also

McCollum's eight action memo—that's the whole heart of my book. If I didn't have that it wouldn't be as important. That is the smoking gun of Pearl Harbor. It really is.

Your research seems to prove that government conspiracies can exist. In your view, how many people would you say ultimately knew that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor, but kept quiet about it and covered it up before and after the event?

Stinnett: I cite about thirty-five people there in the book that most certainly knew about it. And it's probably more than that.

It also seems like a classic Washington cover-up. In your book you use the phrase "Pearl Harbor deceits". Ever since the attack there have been missing documents, altered documents, people being disingenuous, and people outright perjuring themselves before the Pearl Harbor investigation committees. Correct?

Stinnett: That is right. Absolutely. And you know the Department of Defense has labeled some of my Pearl Harbor requests as B1 National Defense Secrets, and they will not release them. I say that in the book. Janet Reno would not release them to me.

And all the official Congressional Pearl Harbor committees were denied and weren't privy to all this revealing information?

Stinnett: That's right. They were cut out, also.

A lot of people probably don't want to believe that a president would let something like Pearl Harbor happen. Have you gotten any criticism for contending that FDR had a foreknowledge of the attack?

Stinnett: Yes. I get about a seventy percent approval rating. From, you know, comments, news media, radio, and all that. And there's about thirty percent just don't accept this....But the nitty-gritty questions are fine to me. You know, the people who are attacking me, what they are really quoting from is 1950 information. They don't have the 1999 or 2000 information....

The information you put out in your book. You're talking about new things here.

Stinnett: That's right. And this thirty percent, I feel they just don't want to accept it, or they regard FDR as an icon who brought Social Security, and all that. But he also unified this country, and we were able to stop Hitler, you know, and the holocaust, and everything else that was going on. So, you could also say that this was a victory for President Roosevelt.

But it seems under our system of government if President Roosevelt felt it was an emergency to go to war with Germany then he should have come before the American people and the Congress and explained it and convinced us that we had to go defeat Hitler.

Stinnett: Well, you see that was the problem. The strong isolation movement. Eighty percent of the people wanted nothing to do with Europe's war. And, you know, German submarines were sinking our ships in the North Atlantic. That did not rouse the American public. Nobody gave a damn. The USS Ruben James was a destroyer that was sunk, and lost a hundred lives about a month before Pearl Harbor. And there were other ships, merchant ships, and other ships in the North Atlantic that were sunk or damaged. But no one cared about it. I think the American people thought that Roosevelt was trying to provoke us into the German war, or Europe's war. They didn't want anything to do with that. But, you see, Commander McCollum was brilliant. He fashioned this—it was a real PR job—he got Japan to attack us in a most outrageous manner that really did unite the country.

A lot of people would probably be of the opinion that it wasn't so brilliant. The families of the three thousand people who were killed and injured at Pearl Harbor probably wouldn't think it was brilliant.

Stinnett: I know, I know. You see, that's the argument today.

But if this is true, then you agree with what FDR did?

Stinnett: I do. I don't see what other option he had.

Because a lot of the tone in your book seems to be questioning and disagreeing with Roosevelt's actions.

Stinnett: Well, I disagree with the way he treated Admiral Kimmel and General Short, letting them hang out to dry.

Kimmel and Short were cut off from the intelligence loop.

Stinnett: They were cut off. And Congress, you know, last October, the Senate and the House, found that they were cut off. They made the finding. That would have never happened five years ago. Or ten, twenty years ago

It happened because of the Freedom of Information Act?

Stinnett: I think so. And the Short and Kimmel families have credited my book with getting that through Congress.

Did you ever read Clausen's book? Colonel Henry Clausen was part of a Pearl Harbor investigation of November 1944. He wrote a book that was published in 1992 that claimed FDR didn't have a foreknowledge of the attack.

Stinnett: Well, you know, I read that. But I fault Colonel Clausen because he had access to all of these military intercepts and he did not bring them out. And I think that was a crime for him to have done that. He should have been court-martialed for that.

You infer in your book that at one point Clausen was probably trying to cover up for General Marshall's actions of December 6 and 7.

Stinnett: I think so. You know, he was acting on the behalf of the Secretary of War. He had carte blanche with these intercepts.

When was he acting on behalf of the Secretary of War?

Stinnett: Well, Clausen was authorized by Secretary of War Stimson to conduct the Pearl Harbor investigation in November 1944. He traveled to the Hawaiian monitoring stations and interviewed cryptographers but failed to obtain any evidence or testimony concerning the intercepts the Navy was making prior to December 7. So when Congress opened its Pearl Harbor investigation in November 1945 there were no pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese naval intercepts available. Clausen was told by Stimson to get the intercepts, but he didn't do it.

Did you ever talk with Clausen? Did he criticize you?

Stinnett: He died. I tried to contact him. He was an attorney in San Francisco, and I did write him but he would never answer me. I wanted to ask him why he didn't obtain the intercepts. His book doesn't address that major issue. He didn't return my calls, and he never answered my letters. I guess he just didn't want to be exposed to this. Clausen was obviously a part of the conspiracy that kept the pre-Pearl Harbor intercepts from Congress and the American public.

What kind of attention did your book get from the mainstream media? Did it get as much attention as you thought it would?

Stinnett: Most of the mainstream print media has given *Day Of Deceit* very fine reviews. That includes *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, et al. Mainstream TV has not been forthcoming. The exceptions have been C-Span, PAX TV, and local television stations. Neither ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, or Fox News have carried a word. C-SPAN carried ninety minutes of me discussing the book with a crowd of one hundred-fifty people. That was arranged by independent.org—The Independent Institute, a major, progressive think tank in Oakland, California.

Why do you think the information in your book is important?

Stinnett: It's important because it reveals the lengths that some people in the American government will go to deceive the American public, and to keep this vital information—in our land of the First Amendment—from the people. And that's against everything I believe in.

Robert B. Stinnett is a Research Fellow at The Independent Institute in Oakland, Calif., and the author of the book, *Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor* (Free Press). For further information, see the Pearl Harbor Archive.
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Dr. Gordon W. Prange

1945 プランゲ文庫 1949
The Gordon W. Prange Collection

Introduction

- The Civil Censorship Detachment
- Gordon W. Prange
- Preservation
- Access

The Gordon W. Prange Collection is the most comprehensive collection in the world of print publications issued in Japan during the immediate post-World War II years, 1945-1949. The Collection comprises virtually everything published on all subjects during this period - books, pamphlets, newspapers, periodicals, news agency photographs, posters, maps and related archival materials. The Collection includes:

- 18,047 newspaper titles
- 71,000 book and pamphlet titles
- 13,799 magazine titles
- 10,000 news agency photographs
- 90 posters
- 640 maps

The contents of the Prange Collection once constituted the files of the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD), an operating unit of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. (SCAP) Press, Pictorial and Broadcast Division. Between 1945 and 1949, the CCD was responsible for reviewing all Japanese publications to identify violations of the Code for the Japanese Press. When violations were identified by CCD examiners, censorship action was taken. The Collection contains approximately 600,000 pages of censorship documents.

The Civil Censorship Detachment

On August 15, 1945 Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces. General MacArthur arrived in Japan on August 30, 1945. Within three weeks, General MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) issued a ten-point Press Code for the Japanese news media. The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD), an operating unit overseen by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2), was transferred from the Philippines to Japan at the beginning of the Occupation. The CCD was to establish censorship of civilian communications (mail, telephone, telegraph, film, radio and

publications). Japanese agencies and private individuals were required to submit their publications to the CCD, which then determined whether they contained violations of the Press Code. Censorship action, when it occurred, involved additions to or deletions from texts, suppressions of materials, disapprovals, publishing delays, and changes.

Gordon W. Prange

Gordon W. Prange was born in Pomeroy, Iowa on July 16, 1910. He studied at the University of Iowa, receiving his Ph.D. in 1937. That same year, he began his teaching career as a professor of history at the University of Maryland. In 1942, he was granted a leave of absence from the University to embark on a wartime career as an officer in the United States Navy. He was sent to Japan in 1945 as a member of the American Occupation Forces. He completed his Navy service soon thereafter, but continued in Japan as a civilian from 1946 to 1951 as chief of General Douglas MacArthur's 100-person historical staff. When censorship of the Japanese media by Allied Forces was lifted in 1949 and the Civil Censorship Detachment disestablished, Professor Prange, recognizing the historical significance of the CCD material, arranged for its shipment to the University of Maryland. The materials arrived at the University in 1950. On September 15, 1978, the Board of Regents of the University of Maryland passed a motion to name the collection the "Gordon W. Prange Collection: The Allied Presence in Japan, 1945-1952." Professor Prange continued to teach at the University of Maryland until several months before his death on May 15, 1980. He is still remembered by alumni as one of the University's truly great teachers, and is well known today for major works on the war in the Pacific, particularly Tora! Tora! Tora!

Preservation of the Collection

The UM Libraries have invested heavily in organizing, processing, and preserving the Collection, and considerable progress has been made. As a result of severe shortages in the post-war years, Japanese publishers were forced to use poor quality, high-acid content paper, and the publications from these years are deteriorating rapidly. In 1992, the UM Libraries and the National Diet Library of Japan (NDL) began a joint project to preserve the 13,799 magazine titles in the Prange Collection. The project was completed in March 1997. The 63,000 microfiche and the accompanying finding guide are now available to users at the UM Libraries and NDL. In 1993, the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP) awarded the UM Libraries a $1,000,000 grant to begin preparations for the preservation microfilming of the Prange newspaper and newsletter holdings and related censorship documents. In 1995, the National Endowment for the Humanities furthered this effort with an award to the Prange Newspaper Project of $531,095. In 1999, the Nippon Foundation and NEH awarded the Prange Collection $477,000 and $300,000 respectively to complete the Newspaper Project. With the completion of the magazine and newspaper microfilming projects, major progress has been made toward achieving the UM Libraries' goal of preserving the entire Collection so that it will be fully accessible to scholars.

Providing Access to the Collection

In addition to the microform versions of the Prange magazine and newspaper collections that are freely available at the UM Libraries and the National Diet Library in Japan, Prange Collection staff is systematically cataloging the 71,000 books in the Prange Collection by subject. Without the bibliographic control that cataloging provides, it is nearly impossible to provide access to these books. In 2001-2002, the Prange education book collection was cataloged with support from the Nippon Foundation. The economics, political science and sociology books are currently being organized and cataloged.

Source: http://www.lib.umd.edu/prange/html/introduction.jsp

English-Japanese Translations

English	Japanese	Pronunciation
Japanese Empire	大日本帝國	*Dai-Nippon-Teikoku*
Japan	日本	*Nippon*
Okinawa	沖縄	*Okinawa*
Taiwan	台湾	*Taiwan*
Korea	韓国(朝鮮)	*Kankoku (Chōsen)*
Manchuria [Manchukuo]	滿州国	*Manshūkoku*
Kwantung Leased Territory	関東州	*Kantōshū*
Republic of China	中華民國	*Chūkaminkoku*
Kingdom of Thailand	タイ王国	*Tai Ōkoku*
Dutch East Indies	オランダ領東インド	*Oranda Ryōhigashi Indo*
Philippines	フィリピン	*Fuiripin*
United States of America	アメリカ合衆国	*Amerika Gasshūkoku*
Federal Reserve System	連邦準備制度	*Renpō Junbi Seido*
Federal Reserve Bank of New York	ニューヨーク連邦準備銀行	*Nyūyōku Renpō Junbi Ginkō*
Bank of Japan	日本銀行	*Nippon Ginkō*
Bank for International Settlements	国際決済銀行	*Kokusai Kessai Ginkō*
League of Nations	国際連盟	*Kokusai Renmei*
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	カーネギー国際平和基金	*Kānegii Kokusai Heiwa Kikin*
Rockefeller Foundation	ロックフェラー財団	*Rokkufuerā Zaidan*
Council on Foreign Relations	外交問題評議会	*Gaikō Mondai Hyōgikai*
New York Stock Exchange	ニューヨーク証券取引所	*Nyūyoku Shōken Torihikijo*
Yale University	イェール大学	*Iēru Daigaku*
Harvard University	ハーバード大学	*Hābādo Daigaku*
Arlington National Cemetery	アーリントン国立墓地	*Arinton Kokuritsu Bochi*
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier	無名戦士の墓	*Mumei-senshi-no-haka*
Meiji Shrine	明治神宮	*Meiji Jingu*
Yasukuni Shrine	靖国神社	*Yasukuni Jinja*
Imperial Japanese Naval Academy	海軍兵学校	*Kaigun Heigakkō*
Imperial Japanese Army Academy	陸軍士官学校	*Rikugun Shikan Gakkō*
Kure Naval Arsenal	呉海軍工廠	*Kure Kaigun Kōshō*
Kure Naval Station	呉鎮守府	*Kure Chinjufu*
Yokosuka Naval Station	横須賀鎮守府	*Yokosuka Chinjufu*
Sasebo Naval Station	佐世保鎮守府	*Sasebo Chinjufu*
Maizuru Naval Station	舞鶴鎮守府	*Maizuru Chinjufu*
Naval Air Facility Atsugi	厚木海軍飛行場	*Atsugi Kaigun-hikōjō*
Pearl Harbor	真珠湾, パールハーバー	*Shinjuwan, Pāruhābā*
Eta Jima	江田島	*Etajima*
Etorofu Island	択捉島	*Etorofu-jima*
Hitokappu Bay	単冠湾	*Hitokappu-wan*
Pacific Ocean	太平洋	*Taiheiyō*
World War II	第二次世界大戦	*Dai-niji Sekai Taisen*
Sino-Japanese War	日中戦争	*Nicchusensō*
Russo-Japanese War	日露戦争	*Nichi-Ro Sensō*
Attack on Pearl Harbor	真珠湾攻撃	*Shinjuwan Kogeki*
Roberts Commission	ロバーツ委員会	*Robātsu Iinkai*
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere	大東亜共栄圏	*Dai-tō-a Kyōeiken*
Tripartite Pact	日独伊三国軍事同盟	*Nichi-doku-i Sangoku Gunji Domei*
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact	日ソ中立条約	*Nisso Chūritsu Jōyaku*
Diplomatic relations	外交関係	*Gaikō-kankei*
Executive Order	大統領令	*Daitōryōrei*
Kenpeitai (Imperial Japanese secret police)	憲兵隊	*Kenpeitai*

English-Japanese Translations of American Government and Military Positions

President of the United States	アメリカ合衆国大統領	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Daitōryō*
U.S. Secretary of War	アメリカ合衆国陸軍長官	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Rikugun Chōkan*
U.S. Secretary of the Navy	アメリカ合衆国海軍長官	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Kaigun Chōkan*
U.S. Secretary of State	アメリカ合衆国国務長官	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Kokumuchōkan*
U.S. Attorney General	アメリカ合衆国司法長官	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Shihōchōkan*
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury	アメリカ合衆国財務長官	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Zaimuchōkan*
U.S. Department of War	アメリカ合衆国陸軍省	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Rikugunshō*
U.S. Department of the Navy	アメリカ合衆国海軍省	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Kaigunshō*
U.S. Department of State	アメリカ合衆国国務省	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Kokumushō*
U.S. Department of Justice	アメリカ合衆国司法省	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Shihōshō*
U.S. Department of the Treasury	アメリカ合衆国財務省	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Zaimushō*
U.S. Ambassador to Japan	在日本アメリカ合衆国大使	*Zai-Nihon-Amerika-Gasshūkoku-Taishi*
U.S. Embassy in Japan	在日本アメリカ合衆国大使館	*Zai-Nihon-Amerika-Gasshūkoku-Taishikan*
U.S. Senate	アメリカ合衆国上院	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Jōin*
U.S. House of Representatives	アメリカ合衆国下院	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Kain*
U.S. Supreme Court	アメリカ合衆国最高裁判所	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Saikō Saibansho*
Federal Bureau of Investigation	アメリカ連邦捜査局	*Amerika Renpō Sōsakyoku*
Internal Revenue Service	アメリカ合衆国内国歳入庁	*Amerika Gasshūkoku Naikoku Sai'nyū-chō*
United States Army	アメリカ陸軍	*Amerika Rikugun*
United States Navy	アメリカ海軍	*Amerika Kaigun*
United States Marine Corps	アメリカ海兵隊	*Amerika Kaiheitai*
United States Army Air Forces	アメリカ陸軍航空軍	*Amerika Rikugun kōkūgun*
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army	アメリカ陸軍参謀総長	*Amerika Rikugun Sanbōsōchō*
Chief of Naval Operations	アメリカ海軍作戦部長	*Amerika Kaigun Sakusenbuchō*
Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps	アメリカ海兵隊総司令官	*Amerika Kaiheitai Sōshireikan*
United States Pacific Fleet	アメリカ太平洋艦隊	*Amerika Taiheiyō Kantai*
United States Fleet	合衆国艦隊	*Gasshūkkoku Kantai*
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)	アメリカ海軍情報部	*Amerika Kaigun Jōhōbu*

English-Japanese Translations of Japanese Government and Military Positions

Emperor of Japan [His Imperial Majesty]	天皇陛下	*Tenno Heika*
Prime Minister of Japan	内閣総理大臣	*Naikaku sōri daijin*
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs	外務大臣	*Gaimu Daijin*
Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs	外務省	*Gaimushō*
Japanese Ambassador to America	在米国日本国大使	*Zai-Beikoku-Nihon-koku-taishi*
Japanese Embassy in America	在米国日本国大使館	*Zai-Beikoku-Nihon-koku-taishikan*
Consulate General of Japan at Honolulu	在ホノルル日本国総領事館	*Zai-Honoruru-Nihon-koku-Sō-Ryōjikan*
Consul General of Japan at Honolulu	在ホノルル日本国総領事	*Zai-Honoruru-Nihon-koku-Sō-Ryōji*
Imperial Japanese Navy	大日本帝國海軍	*Dai-Nippon-Teikoku-Kaigun*
Imperial Japanese Army	大日本帝國陸軍	*Dai-Nippon-Teikoku-Rikugun*
Imperial General Headquarters	大本営	*Daihon'ei*
Navy Ministry of Japan	海軍省	*Kaigunshō*
Army Ministry of Japan	陸軍省	*Rikugunshō*
Minister of the Navy	海軍大臣	*Kaigun-daijin*
Minister of War [Army]	陸軍大臣	*Rikugun-daijin*
Chief of Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff	軍令部総長	*Gunreibu-sōchō*
Chief of Imperial Japanese Army General Staff	参謀総長	*Sanbo-sōchō*
Governor-General of Korea	朝鮮総督	*Chōsen Sōtoku*
Governor-General of Taiwan	台湾総督	*Taiwan Sōtoku*
Kwantung Army	関東軍	*Kantōgun*
Commander-in-Chief of Combined Fleet	連合艦隊司令長官	*Rengō Kantai Shireichokan*
Combined Fleet (Japan)	連合艦隊	*Rengō Kantai*

English-Japanese Translations of Military Terms

Fleet Admiral	海軍元帥	*Kaigun Gensui*
General of the Army	陸軍元帥	*Rikugun Gensui*
Admiral	海軍大将	*Kaigun Taishō*
Army General	陸軍大将	*Rikugun Taishō*

Commander	司令官	*Shireikan*
Commander-in-Chief (Military)	司令長官	*Shireichōkan*
Noncommissioned Officer (NCO)	下士官	*Kashikan*
Military Attaché	駐在武官	*Chūzaibukan*
Aircraft carrier	航空母艦	*Kōkūbokan*
Cruiser	巡洋艦	*Jun'yōkan*
Destroyer	駆逐艦	*Kuchikukan*
Submarine	潜水艦	*Sensuikan*
Fighter aircraft	戦闘機	*Sentōki*
Bomber (airplane)	爆撃機	*Bakugekiki*
Machine gun	機関銃	*Kikanjū*
Hand grenade	手榴弾	*Teryūdan*
Torpedo	魚雷	*Gyorai*

English-Japanese Translations of Major Cities

Tokyo	東京	*Tōkyō*
Yokohama	横浜	*Yokohama*
Osaka	大阪	*Ōsaka*
Nagoya	名古屋	*Nagoya*
Kobe	神戸	*Kōbe*
Kagoshima	鹿児島	*Kagoshima*
Hiroshima	広島	*Hiroshima*
Nagasaki	長崎	*Nagasaki*
Kyoto	京都	*Kyōtō*
Sapporo	札幌	*Sapporo*
Niigata	新潟	*Niigata*
Seoul	ソウル(京城)	*Souru (Keijō)*
Taipei	台北	*Taipei, Taihoku*
Harbin (Manchuria)	哈尔浜	*Harubin*
Beijing [Peking]	北京	*Pekin*
Nanjing [Nanking]	南京	*Nankin*
Shanghai	上海	*Shanhai*
Hong Kong	香港	*Hon Kon*
Singapore	シンガポール (新加坡)	*Shingapōru*
Batavia (Jakarta)	バタヴィア (ジャカルタ)	*Batabia (Jakaruta)*
Saigon	サイゴン	*Saigon*
Bangkok	バンコク	*Bankoku*
Manila	マニラ	*Manira*
Berlin	ベルリン	*Berurin*
Rome	ローマ	*Rōma*
Moscow	モスクワ	*Mosukuwa*
London	ロンドン	*Rondon*
Hawaii	ハワイ	*Hawai*
Honolulu	ホノルル	*Honoruru*
Washington, D.C.	ワシントン	*Washinton*
New York City	ニューヨーク市	*Nyūyoku-shi*
San Francisco	サンフランシスコ	*Sanfuranshisuko*
Los Angeles	ロサンゼルス	*Rosanzerusu*

English-Japanese Translations of Time, Date, and Miscellaneous

January	一月	*Ichi-gatsu*
February	二月	*Ni-gatsu*
March	三月	*San-gatsu*
April	四月	*Shi-gatsu*
May	五月	*Go-gatsu*
June	六月	*Roku-gatsu*
July	七月	*Shichi-gatsu*
August	八月	*Hachi-gatsu*
September	九月	*Ku-gatsu*
October	十月	*Jū-gatsu*
November	十一月	*Jūichi-gatsu*
December	十二月	*Jū'ni-gatsu*
1941 (Year)	昭和十六年	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen*
November 26, 1941	昭和十六年十一月二十六日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūichi-gatsu Nijū-roku-nichi*
December 1, 1941	昭和十六年十二月一日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Tsuitachi*
December 2, 1941	昭和十六年十二月二日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Futsuka*
December 3, 1941	昭和十六年十二月三日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Mikka*
December 4, 1941	昭和十六年十二月四日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Yokka*
December 5, 1941	昭和十六年十二月五日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Itsuka*
December 6, 1941	昭和十六年十二月六日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Muika*
December 7, 1941	昭和十六年十二月七日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Nanoka*
December 8, 1941	昭和十六年十二月八日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Yōka*
December 9, 1941	昭和十六年十二月九日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Kokonoka*
December 10, 1941	昭和十六年十二月十日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu To-oka*
December 11, 1941	昭和十六年十二月十一日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Jūichi-nichi*
December 20, 1941	昭和十六年十二月二十日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Hatsuka*
December 25, 1941	昭和十六年十二月二十五日	*Shōwa Jūroku-nen Jūni-gatsu Nijū-go-nichi*
Sunday	日曜日	*Nichiyōbi*
Monday	月曜日	*Getsuyōbi*
Tuesday	火曜日	*Kayōbi*
Wednesday	水曜日	*Suiyōbi*
Thursday	木曜日	*Mokuyōbi*
Friday	金曜日	*Kin'yōbi*
Saturday	土曜日	*Doyōbi*
Time	時間	*Jikan*
8 A.M.	午前八時	*Gozen Hachi-ji*
1 P.M.	午後一時	*Gogo Ichi-ji*
7:30 A.M.	午前七時半	*Gozen Shichi-ji-han*
7:55 A.M.	午前七時五十五分	*Gozen Shichi-ji Gojū-gofun*
Mitsubishi (manufacturing company)	三菱	*Mitsubishi*
Kawasaki (manufacturing company)	川崎	*Kawasaki*
Sumimoto (manufacturing company)	住友	*Sumimoto*
Asahi Shinbun (daily newspaper)	朝日新聞	*Asahi Shinbun*
Mainichi Shinbun (daily newspaper)	毎日新聞	*Mainichi Shinbun*
Corporation (joint-stock company)	株式会社	*Kabushiki-kaisha*
Zaibatsu (cartel)	財閥	*Zaibatsu*
Skull and Bones (secret society)	スカル・アンド・ボーンズ	*Sukaru Ando Bōnzu*
Black Dragon Society (secret society)	黒龍会	*Kokuryūkai*

English-Japanese Translations of Prominent Individuals

English	Japanese	Pronunciation
President Franklin D. Roosevelt	フランクリン・ルーズベルト大統領	*Furankurin Rūzuberuto Daitōryō*
Henry Lewis Stimson	ヘンリー・ルイス・スティムソン	*Henri Ruisu Suteimuson*
Frank Knox	フランク・ノックス	*Furanku Nokkusu*
Cordell Hull	コーデル・ハル	*Kōderu Haru*
Henry Morgenthau Jr.	ヘンリー・モーゲンソウ	*Henrii Mōgensou*
Ambassador Joseph Clark Grew	ジョセフ・クラーク・グルー 大使	*Josefu Kuraku Gurū Taishi*
General George C. Marshall	ジョージ・マーシャル陸軍元帥	*Jōji Māsharu Rikugun Gensui*
Admiral Harold R. Stark	ハロルド・スターク海軍大将	*Harorudo Sutāku Kaigun Taishō*
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel	ハズバンド・キンメル海軍大将	*Hazubando Kinmeru Kaigun Taishō*
Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short	ウォルター・ショート海軍中将	*Uorutā Shōto Rikugun Chūshō*
Averell Harriman	アヴェレル・ハリマン	*Abuereru Hariman*
Prescott S. Bush	プレスコット・ブッシュ	*Puresukotto Busshu*
Prime Minister Winston Churchill	ウィンストン・チャーチル首相	*Uinsuton Chāchiru Shushō*
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek	蔣介石 大元帥	*Shō Kai-Seki (Shan Hai-seki) Daigensui*
Josef Stalin	ヨシフ・スターリン	*Yoshifu Sutārin*
Adolf Hitler	アドルフ・ヒトラー	*Adorufu Hitorā*
Hirohito	裕仁; 昭和天皇	*Hirohito; Shōwa Tennō*
Prince Fumimaro Konoe	近衛 文麿	*Konoe Fumimaro*
General Hideki Tojo	東条 英機 大将	*Tōjō Hideki Taishō*
Yosuke Matsuoka	松岡 洋右	*Matsuoka Yōsuke*
Shigenori Togo	東郷 茂徳	*Shigenori Tōgō*
Admiral Teijiro Toyoda	豊田 貞次郎 大将	*Toyoda Teijirō Taishō*
Koki Hirota	広田 弘毅	*Hirota Kōki*
Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama	杉山 元 元帥	*Sugiyama Hajime Gensui*
General Jiro Minami	南 次郎 大将	*Minami Jirō Taishō*
General Kuniaki Koiso	斎藤 実 大将	*Koiso Kuniaki Taishō*
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto	山本 五十六 元帥	*Yamamoto Isoroku Gensui*
Admiral Osami Nagano	永野 修身 大将	*Nagano Ōsami Taishō*
Admiral Chuichi Nagumo	南雲 忠一 大将	*Nagumo Chūichi Taishō*
Admiral Shigetarō Shimada	嶋田 繁太郎 大将	*Shimada Shigetarō Taishō*
Admiral Zengo Yoshida	吉田 善吾 大将	*Yoshida Zengo Taishō*
Admiral Mineo Osumi	大角 岑生 大将	*Ōsumi Mineo Taishō*
Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura	野村 吉三郎 大将	*Nomura Kichisaburō Taishō*
Ambassador Saburo Kurusu	来栖 三郎 大使	*Kurusu Saburō Taishi*
Toyotaro Yuki (banker)	結城 豊太郎	*Yuki Toyotarō*
Shigekazu Shimazaki (pilot)	嶋崎 重和	*Shimazaki Shigekazu*
Captain Mitsuo Fuchida (pilot)	淵田 美津雄	*Fuchida Mitsuo*
Takeo Yoshikawa (spy)	吉川　猛夫	*Yoshikawa Takeo*
Kazuo Sakamaki (prisoner)	酒巻 和男	*Sakamaki Kazuo*

William P. Litynski

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
I served in the U.S. Army from 2001 to 2004 as a soldier in the First Armored Division in Germany (1-1 CAV, Budingen); I was deployed to Iraq (near Baghdad) from April 2003 to July 2004. I have traveled to many cities and places, including Tokyo, London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Vienna, Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt, Milan, Venice, Luxembourg City, Boston, Philadelphia, New York City, Washington D.C., Baltimore, Chicago, San Francisco, San Diego, Seattle, Denver, Dallas, New Haven (Connecticut), Yale University, Harvard University, Princeton University, Columbia University, Buckingham Palace, British Parliament, Reichstag, Grand Canyon, Swiss Alps, and the Rhine River valley. I reside in Pensacola, Florida and lived in Crestview, Florida for several years. (My mother is from Japan, and my grandfather was drafted twice by the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II.)
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Photo # 80-G-23588 Doris Miller receives the Navy Cross

Doris Miller (center), Mess Attendant Second Class, USN, receives the Navy Cross from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, at an awards ceremony held on the flight deck of USS *Enterprise* (CV-6) at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on May 27, 1942. The medal was awarded for heroism on board USS *West Virginia* (BB-48) during the Pearl Harbor Attack on December 7, 1941. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives collection)
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-m/d-miller.htm

Cook Third Class Doris Miller, USN, (1919-1943)

Doris ("Dorie") Miller was born in Waco, Texas, on 12 October 1919. He enlisted in the Navy in September 1939 as a Mess Attendant Third Class. On 7 December 1941, while serving aboard USS *West Virginia* (BB-48), he distinguished himself by courageous conduct and devotion to duty during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He was awarded the Navy Cross for his actions on this occasion.

Doris Miller served aboard USS Indianapolis (CA-35) from December 1941 to May 1943. He was then assigned to the escort carrier *Liscome Bay* (CVE-56). Cook Third Class Miller was lost with that ship when she was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine on 24 November 1943, during the invasion of the Gilbert Islands.

Source: http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-m/d-miller.htm



Mitsuo Fuchida (left), the Japanese pilot who led the initial Imperial Japanese Navy air attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, chats with General James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle, the famous American aviator who bombed Tokyo, Japan on April 18, 1942 during the Doolittle Raid, during a goodwill visit in New York City on March 2, 1953. Mitsuo Fuchida converted to Christianity after World War II.
(Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS) http://www.corbisimages.com/Enlargement/U1021277AACME.html



Former Imperial Japanese Navy pilot Mitsuo Fuchida makes a public profession of his faith in Christ and love for all humanity as he reads the Bible during a meeting at an auditorium in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on March 14, 1959. (Photo: © Bettmann/CORBIS)

Photo # NH 97326-KN USS Arizona Memorial, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, June 1987



The USS *Arizona* Memorial in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii was completed in 1962 to honor the sailors and marines who perished aboard USS Arizona on December 7, 1941. May they rest in peace.
(Photographed by Lieutenant Commander Tracy D. Connors, USN (Retired); *Official U.S. Navy Photograph, NHHC Collection)*
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-a/bb39-v.htm

The shrine room of the USS *Arizona* memorial in Pearl Harbor